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Abstract 
Drawing from an extensive and unique data set acquired by combining a cross-national 
comparative approach and a mixed methods methodology, this thesis examines the contributions 
of Facebook to citizens’ political participation in Italy and the UK. In the last decade there has 
been a proliferation of academic studies investigating the links between digital technologies and 
citizens’ political participation, with an increasing number of publications focusing on social 
networking websites (SNSs). Within this specific sub-field, research has produced contrasting 
evidence. Some scholars stress the positive impact of the Internet and SNSs on political 
participation (i.e., optimists), while others minimise their mobilising power, emphasising their 
tendency to reinforce existing participatory trends (i.e., normalisers) or highlighting their limited 
or even negative influence on political participation (i.e., pessimists). 
The present research differs from the majority of investigations in this area in three ways. 
Firstly, the data for this study were gathered mostly in a non-electoral period and thus the 
contributions of Facebook to citizens’ political participation were assessed independently of the 
electoral process, which usually occasions a rise in political participation. In addition, this 
research tackled two conceptual weaknesses characterising many Internet and political 
participation studies: the failure to consider political participation as a multidimensional 
phenomenon and the over-generalised approach to Internet and SNS usages. It did so by 
differentiating between political communication and political mobilisation activities, and three 
Facebook non-political usages, i.e., information, interpersonal communication, and social 
recreation. Thirdly, in response to the lack of cross-national comparative studies in this subject 
area, the contributions of Facebook to citizens’ political participation were examined in the 
different contexts of Italy and the United Kingdom.  
This thesis makes four main contributions to the field of political communication, and more 
specifically to the strand of research examining the impact of digital technologies on political 
participation. The first contribution is the Particularised Model of Facebook Political 
Participation. The model identifies a number of factors mediating the links between Facebook 
and political participation, demonstrating the relevance of both external, context-related factors 
related to the British and Italian media and political landscapes, and more personal, subjective 
ones such as self-presentation, pre-existing levels of political engagement, and the nature and 
size of the Facebook network. Secondly, this study sheds light on the ways that Facebook 
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functions as a political platform, establishing that dynamics typical of both new and traditional 
media are in action on this SNS, and that Facebook holds the capacity to activate a virtuous 
circle, thereby generating an information-led mobilisation. The third contribution is the Dual 
Routes of Exposure Model which offers clarification on the alleged tendency of digital 
technologies to promote selective exposure and, consequently, political fragmentation and 
polarisation, and shows that Facebook can operate as a potential antidote to such trends. The 
fourth contribution is to the polarised debate between optimists, normalisers, and pessimist, with 
the present research further highlighting the sterility of such a debate and indicating potentially 
fruitful approaches for the development of the field. 
Keywords: political participation; Facebook; the Internet; political communication; 
mobilisation; mixed methods; comparative; cross-national; Italy; United Kingdom. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 A Political Communication Study 
The idea of examining how Facebook can contribute to citizens’ political participation came 
to the author after reflections on the political decline characterising Italy’s recent history. 
This decline started with the Democrazia Cristiania’s 50-year “reign” and, arguably, reached 
its peak with the entry of Silvio Berlusconi into the political arena. Since 1994 – although 
less in the last couple of years – the Italian political scenario has been dominated by the 
figure of Berlusconi, who polarised the political landscape, splitting the Italian electorate 
practically in half: Berlusconi’s supporters vs Berlusconi’s opponents. This state of affairs 
has recently changed due to the ascent of a third political force, aside from the Left and the 
Right, the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S). Being politically left-leaning, the author has always 
had an aversion to Berlusconi and to what he represents. Due to the former Prime Minister’s 
control over the Italian media (see Section 6.1 for a detailed explanation), to obtain political 
information the author looked at TV programs traditionally affiliated to the Left, such as 
Annozero and Ballarò, and resorted to the Internet to avoid news bulletins that he perceived 
to be highly biased. Living in the UK, the author employed Facebook as the main way to 
keep in touch with his Italian friends and noticed how stories, news, and links containing 
anti-Berlusconi views, and criticism of the Italian political class in general, were being 
circulated more and more on this platform. This outburst of anti-party sentiment reached its 
height during the recent financial crisis, which exacerbated Italians’ disenchantment towards 
the political elite who seemed more interested in Berlusconi’s judicial problems than in the 
issues affecting average citizens.  
Considering that some people used Facebook to voice their disapproval of the political class, 
the author wondered if this was specific to Italy, linked to the Italian political and media 
landscapes, or if it was also happening in the UK. Even if the level of public disaffection 
with political institutions was somewhat less in the UK than in Italy, a general degree of 
disaffection was nonetheless discerned by the author through casual conversations with 
friends and colleagues. After some research into the links between the Internet and politics, 
and further developments with social networking websites (SNSs) themselves – for instance, 
Facebook was starting to be used more extensively around the world for organising and 
coordinating political initiatives – the author decided to consider not only how Italian and 
British citizens employ Facebook to obtain political information and express political 
opinions, but also if this SNS could itself foster their participation in protests or other 
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political initiatives. The author thus decided that this thesis would focus on citizens’ political 
participation which, as Section 2.1.1 explains, is a complex phenomenon encompassing a 
wide range of participatory activities.  
Political participation can be approached through various interlinked theoretical lenses. 
Some studies are concerned with the role and relevance of political participation in 
democratic systems (Barber 1984; Habermas 1989; Evans 2001; Fischer 2003). Others 
attempt to classify the different levels of political participation and types of participants 
(Arnstein 1969; Bang 2005; Milbrath 1965; Verba and Nie 1972) or, like the present 
research, try to identify the factors which contribute to political activity (Brundidge 2007; 
Delli Carpini 2004; Kenski and Stroud 2006; Verba et al. 1995; Wang 2007).  
This thesis explores how Facebook can contribute to British and Italian citizens’ political 
participation and falls within the field of political communication. Political communication 
studies the role of communication in the political process (Chaffee 1975). This discipline 
traces its roots right back to Aristotle’s and Plato’s studies of rhetoric and history. In its 
modern form, political communication is highly interdisciplinary, drawing on concepts from 
several fields such as mass communication, political science, sociology and psychology 
(Bennett and Iyengar 2008; Kaid 2004; Ryfe 2001). The present research can be considered 
a text-book political communication study in that it inherits the interest in attitudes, opinions, 
and beliefs from social psychology (Ryfe 2001), while borrowing its focus on behaviours 
from the behaviourist school of political science (see Dahl – 1961–, Kirkpatrick – 1962 –  
and Adcock – 2007 –  for a discussion of the behaviourist turn in political science). Finally, 
by investigating the effects of Facebook usage on citizens’ political behaviours, this study 
assumes an effects-style approach in the fashion of mass communication research (Lievrouw 
2009).  
Over the last decade in the field of political communication, there has been a proliferation of 
academic studies addressing the relationship between the Internet and politics (Chadwick 
and Horward 2009; Holtz-Bacha 2004; Wang 2007). These developments in scholarship are 
linked to several current trends in societies: the progressive integration of the Internet into 
the lives of many individuals, social and political organisations (Baym 2010; Chadwick 
2006; Chadwick and Horward 2009; Papacharissi 2011; van Dijck 2013);  the growing 
detachment of citizens from the political process (Dalton 2004; Hay 2007; Norris 2011; 
Pharr and Putnam 2000); and the changing social, psychological, technological and 
economic conditions (Bennett and Iyengar 2008). 
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Studies assessing the impact of the Internet on the realm of politics cover a diverse array of 
issues: the credibility of online political information; media ownership; commercialisation of 
cyberspace; online political campaigning; and citizens’ political activism and participation 
(Tedesco 2004), with an increasing number of publications focusing on this last topic 
(Anduiza et al. 2009). In the last few years, within this strand of research, many 
investigations have concentrated on SNSs and have examined how such platforms can 
contribute to political campaigning, engagement and participation (Ancu and Cozma 2009; 
Gustafsson 2012; Holt et al. 2013; Kim and Geidner 2008; Marichal 2013; Mascheroni 2012; 
Vitak et al. 2011; Warren et al. 2014; Xenos et al. 2014). This type of enquiry has further 
flourished with the explosion of the Arab Spring, the pro-democracy wave of rebellions 
which occurred in the Arab world between the end of 2010 and 2011, and SNSs have 
become a hot topic for academics all over the world (Khamis and Vaughn 2012; Lim 2012; 
Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira 2011; Tufekci and Wilson 2012).  
This thesis adds to the latter stream of research. Although the links between Facebook and 
political participation are assessed in different national settings, the unit of analysis of the 
present research, as is often the case in political communication studies (Moy et al. 2012; 
Ryfe 2001), is the individual. Hence a bottom-up approach is employed. Rather than 
addressing the ways in which political parties can take advantage of Facebook, the thesis 
focuses on how citizens can employ this online platform for political purposes outside 
electoral periods.  
In particular, as outlined in detail in Section 4.3, this research aims:  
- To explore the advantages and limitations of Facebook as a political platform and to 
clarify the links between Facebook, Internet and offline political participation – is 
Facebook an additional venue for the participation of citizens who are already 
politically active offline and on other online platforms, or can political participation 
start on this SNS and move then to other channels? – adding to the debate among 
Internet optimists, pessimists and normalisers (see Section 3.1). 
- To assess whether the contributions of Facebook to political participation vary in 
relation to different types of political activities  (i.e., political communication vs 
mobilisation) and Facebook usage practices (i.e., information, communication, and 
entertainment) advocating for the adoption of a particularised approach in Internet 
and political participation research (see Section 4.1).  
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- To identify possible factors (e.g., demographic variables, pre-existing levels of 
political engagement, Facebook usage time, etc.) mediating the contributions of 
Facebook to political participation reviewing and enhancing the explanatory models 
of political participation developed so far (see Section 2.1.2).  
 
In relation to this last point, the comparative component of the present research proved 
particularly useful as it enabled the identification of contextual conditions prompting 
variations in Facebook political participation, and shed light on more general determinants of 
this complex phenomenon (see Sections 6.1 and 6.6).  
This study, therefore, examines the conditions under which citizens participate politically on 
Facebook, and how Facebook use enhances or detracts from such behaviour. It does so with 
a unique data set which was acquired by examining a diverse range of activities falling under 
the umbrella of political participation, through a cross-national comparative approach and a 
mixed methods (MM) methodology – two extra analytical layers that made this research 
particularly complex, but also provided a richness not achievable otherwise. 
This thesis is approximately 100,000 words long, including references, tables, and 
appendices, and its overall structure takes the form of seven chapters, including this 
introductory one. The first introductory chapter offers an overview of recent developments in 
the political communication field, into which the present research fits, and of the political 
participatory trends characterising Western democracies, and more specifically Italy and the 
UK. Chapter Two lays out the theoretical dimensions of the research, identifying and 
defining relevant terminology and concepts. It begins by providing a definition of political 
participation and presenting various explanatory models of this phenomenon, moving on to 
describe the main features of the Internet, SNSs and Facebook. In the third chapter, the 
academic literature investigating the links between these technologies and political 
participation is reviewed, firstly considering political participation in general, then taking 
into account specific forms of political participation such as the consumption of political 
information, political discussion, and political mobilisation. The fourth chapter deals with 
the approaches and methodology used in this study. It explains the value of adopting a cross-
national approach and a MM methodology, and describes the various procedures and 
methods used in this investigation. Chapter Five presents the findings of the research, 
focusing on the three research questions and various sub-questions developed in Section 4.3. 
The sixth chapter draws upon the results, tying up the various theoretical and empirical 
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strands presented in the thesis in order to shed light on how Facebook can contribute to 
Italian and British citizens’ political participation. This chapter includes a discussion of the 
implications of the findings, the limitations of the study, and avenues for future research. 
Finally, in the seventh and last chapter, a summary of the main findings, principal issues and 
suggestions which have arisen in this thesis is provided. 
 
1.2 Democratic Deficit and the Rise of New Forms of Political Participation 
In the last decade, as explained in the previous section, an increasing number of 
investigations have examined how digital technologies can contribute to citizens’ political 
participation. Dahlgren (2009) indicates that this course in scholarship could be, in part, 
attributed to the fact that the rise of the Internet coincided with what has been described in 
the literature as democratic deficit, namely citizens’ growing dissatisfaction with democratic 
political institutions and their detachment from the political process. These circumstances 
pushed governments and academics to look for possible solutions which could reverse such a 
negative trend, with some scholars identifying the Internet as a kind of “magic elixir” able to 
increase citizens’ participation and, consequently, to legitimise governments (Stromer-
Galley 2003). 
According to numerous academics, the democratic deficit characterises many Western 
democracies (Dalton 2004; Hay 2007; Norris 2011; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Torcal and 
Montero 2006; van Deth et al. 2007) and, as the next section illustrates, is particularly 
relevant to Italy and the United Kingdom. Conceptually, democracy refers to a political 
praxis that, as indicated in its Greek roots demos (i.e., people) and kratos (i.e., power), can 
be termed as rule of the people. Over the centuries, different theorisations of democracy have 
been developed, theorisations which spell out how democracy should be organised and how 
it should work (representative democracy, direct democracy, etc.). The various 
conceptualisations of democracy may disagree on the extent to which citizens should take 
part in the decision making process, on the spheres of society in need of regulations, or on 
the agents who should act. However, all these theorisations agree that citizens should have 
some form of control over society; all agree that citizens should participate politically. 
Although Aristotle (cf. 1999) was not an advocate of democracy – to the contrary he argued 
that democracy was one of the least favourable systems, since government of the majority 
would easily lead to the rule of the non-virtuous – he described man as a political animal, 
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and contended that his ability to participate in politics was the virtue that distinguished man 
from animals. 
Investigations examining the impact of the Internet on political participation all seem to 
attribute a positive connotation to political participation and be grounded, as Moy et al. 
(2012) observe, in the assumption and normative position that political participation is 
beneficial to both citizens and democratic institutions. This stance is supported by several 
influential political scientists such as Barber (1984), Evans (2001) and Fischer (2003). In 
line with Barber’s (1984) notion of strong democracy, Evans (2001) argues that political 
institutions can be considered democratic only when citizens participate in the resolution of 
the issues affecting their lives. Along the same lines, Fischer (2003) regards citizens’ 
participation as “the cornerstone of the democratic political process” (p. 205), stressing that 
citizens have both the right and the obligation to participate in the public decision-making 
process. This belief, however, is not universally recognised. For instance, as noted by Norris 
(2007, p. 629), the realist school (Schumpeter – 1952 – is arguably the most influential 
advocate of this stance) contends that as long as there are fair and free elections held at 
regular intervals, even limited public involvement is sufficient to guarantee stable and 
accountable government.  
The purpose of this thesis is not to embark on an exploration of the value of political 
participation in democratic systems, but rather to shed light on the capability of a specific 
Internet tool, Facebook, to contribute to a fundamental component of any democratic system: 
citizens’ political participation. In order to do so, participatory trends in Western 
democracies have to be considered. Despite the importance of citizens’ participation for 
democratic societies, and the presence of countless ways through which the represented can 
connect with their representatives (e.g., public meetings, petitions, demonstrations, and 
elections), citizens’ involvement in the political process has proved to be a problematic 
issue. Ward and Gibson (2009) argue that political systems are failing to catch up with the 
on-going trends in today’s society. They observe that due to an increasing freedom of choice, 
individualism and consumerism, citizens have become more and more accustomed to being 
offered products and services matching their specific preferences. Because of these societal 
and technological developments, citizens require more direct and personalised forms of 
engagement, as the broadcast model does not offer the required depth and richness (Coleman 
2009).  
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Consequently, several studies demonstrate the public discontent and disaffection with 
mechanisms and institutions of representative democracy (Dalton 2004; Hay 2007; Norris 
2011; Pharr and Putnam 2000). Norris (2011) identifies three possible explanations for such 
a phenomenon: negative news, growing public expectations, and the failure of governments 
to live up to such expectations. The disenchantment with and distrust of traditional 
institutions, which has been furthered by the economic crisis of 2008 (Uslaner 2010), is 
confirmed by a consistent decline in mainstream party and trade union memberships across 
Western Europe over the past thirty years, a growth in anti-party sentiment, and an 
increasing lack of knowledge or interest in such organisations (Ward and Gibson 2009; 
Norris 2007; van Biezen and Poguntke 2014; van Biezen et al. 2012).  
However, political disenchantment does not have to be confused with political apathy. In this 
sense, Dalton (2004) and Norris (2011) observe that in advanced industrial societies, citizens 
are still committed to democratic principles despite their dissatisfaction with the 
performance of democratic institutions. Citizens’ detachment from political institutions has 
triggered some changes in the way people participate in the political process (Hay 2007; 
McHugh and Parvin 2005; Norris 2002). Norris (2002) speaks of a democratic phoenix and 
argues that the disengagement from traditional forms of political participation has led to the 
emergence of new and unconventional participatory practices. As the popularity of bottom-
up single-issue initiatives (Pattie et al. 2003), as well as the surge of new social movements 
and Internet activism exemplifies, Norris (2002) argues that over the years political 
participation has evolved and diversified, in terms of “the agencies (collective organizations 
structuring political activity), repertoires (the actions commonly used for political 
expression), and targets (the political actors that participants seek to influence)” (p. 215).  
Thus in the last couple of decades, citizens’ participatory repertoires have transformed and 
expanded due to the decay of traditional forms of political participation, changes in the ways 
citizens perceive politics and relate to political institutions, and due also to the rise and 
diffusion of new channels of participation like the Internet. In this sense, Bennett (1998) 
observes a shift from traditional institutionalised politics to what he describes as lifestyle 
politics, namely the tendency of citizens “to organise social and political meaning around 
their lifestyle values and the personal narratives that express them” (Bennett 2004, p. 104). 
In her book, A Private Sphere, Papacharissi (2010) claims that nowadays civic engagement 
is shaped by citizens’ personal agendas, and she calls for a reconsideration of the praxis of 
citizenship. Bennett (1998) and Papacharissi’s (2010) considerations spring from the notion 
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of life politics originally developed by Giddens (1991), who notes the rise of personal choice 
matters in the political sphere.  
Aligning with such notions in his recent book, Networks of Outrage and Hope, Castells 
(2012) analyses the role of the Internet in the Arab Spring, the Spanish Indignados and the 
Occupy Wall Street movement, noting the rise of a culture of autonomy in which individuals 
define their actions according to their values and interests. Independently from the 
institutions of society, through networking, they find likeminded individuals to pursue 
common goals (Castells 2012). Considering such a tendency towards individualisation, 
Bennett (2012) proposes a new framework for understanding large-scale individualised 
collective actions. He maintains that social fragmentation and the decline of group loyalties 
have promoted the development of personalised politics, in which individually expressive 
personal action frames replace collective action frames (Bennett 2012). In the last few years, 
several mobilisations concerning causes such as economic justice and environmental 
protection have developed around personal lifestyle values, and have often been coordinated 
through digital media. The rise of personalised politics, where political participation 
becomes an expression of personal lifestyles, hopes and grievances, has led – according to 
Bennett and Segerberg (2012) – to the emergence of an alternative model of action: the logic 
of connective action. In the more conventional logic of collective action, emphasis is put on 
the formation of collective identity. In contrast, connective action networks are far more 
individualised and technologically enabled than the ones in which action is organised on the 
basis of group identity, membership, or ideology. Among the various online technologies, 
Vromen et al. (2015) stress that SNSs are particularly suited to supporting personalised self-
actualising and communicative forms of political participation akin to Bennett and 
Segerberg’s (2012) logic of connective action. As an example, one such form of 
participation is political consumerism, a lifestyle choice subject to sharing and social 
influence (Gil de Zúñiga, Copeland, and Bimber 2014). In light of these considerations, 
Loader et al. (2014) draw the profile of the networked young citizen, who is less likely to 
become a member of a political party or trade union, more inclined to participate in 
horizontal or non-hierarchical networks and engage in lifestyle politics; who is not dutiful 
but self-actualising, and whose social relations are increasingly enacted in the networked 
environment of social media.  
The rise of new and more individualised forms of political participation suggests that 
citizens are not politically apathetic today, an argument which is further reinforced by the 
voter turnout of the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum – which reached a staggering 
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84% of the voting population (McInnes et al. 2014). However, there is still a degree of 
detachment between citizens and the political process in many Western democracies. In a 
healthy democracy, citizens must be able to engage with the formal democratic process. In 
order to guarantee the quality of the democratic experience, the links between political 
institutions and their publics must therefore be restored (Marsh and McLean 2012; McHugh 
and Parvin 2005).  
 
1.3 Political Culture and Participation in Italy and the United Kingdom 
The previous section has highlighted the sense of political disenchantment present in many 
Western democracies, a diagnosis which applies to both Italy and the UK (Donovan and 
Onofri 2008; Hansard Society 2013, 2014; Mannheimer and Sani 2001; Lodge and Gough 
2009; Miller and Williamson 2008; Whiteley 2012), the two countries on which this thesis 
focuses.  
Before considering citizens’ political participation in Italy and the UK, an analysis of the 
main similarities and differences of Italian and British political cultures will help to elucidate 
the participatory trends occurring in these two countries. Political culture, a term coined by 
Almond in 1956, refers to “the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward politics 
among the members of a political system” (Almond and Bingham Powell 1966, p. 50). In 
Almond and Verba’s (1963) influential classic, Civic Culture, the political cultures of five 
different countries – including Italy and Britain – were examined. According to Almond and 
Verba’s (1963) analysis, the Italian political culture was characterised by political alienation, 
social isolation and distrust, and low national pride. In contrast, British citizens had a greater 
allegiance to and support for their political system and institutions, and had greater faith in 
their own ability to influence national decisions. Despite having different political cultures at 
the time, both populations displayed low levels of political participation. In Italy, this was 
ascribed to Italians’ strong distrust of government and politics in general, whereas in the case 
of the UK, the lack of participation was attributed to the fact that British citizens had little 
motivation to participate as they were content with their political system and, consequently, 
left political matters to political leaders. 
Approximately two decades later, Bertsch et al. (1986) observed a decrease in the allegiance 
between citizens and government in Britain. This negative trend was also noted by Kavanagh 
(1989). Kavanagh (1989) recognised changes in citizens’ sense of political efficacy, which 
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refers to one’s perception of her/his ability to affect the political process, and a growing 
dissatisfaction with the way the political system worked and the policies it produced. 
Kavanagh (1989) argued that this was due to a decline in deferential and supportive elements 
(e.g., support for the monarchy and the unelected House of Lords). This interpretation is 
supported by Eatwell (1997), who suggests that Britain’s civic culture relied a lot on 
leadership, and failures in this area furthered its deterioration, and also by Kakabadse et al. 
(2003) and Williamson (2007), who claim that today’s public distrust is further aggravated 
by a general belief that the concerns of well-resourced lobbies are heard above those of 
citizens.  
With respect to Italy, Bertsch et al. (1986) contended that not much had changed since 
Almond and Verba’s (1963) study, with the Italian political culture remaining an alienated 
one. Sani (1989) questions in part Bertsch et al.’s (1986) analysis and argues that Almond 
and Verba (1963) present an excessively negative picture. Sani (1989) observes that Italian 
citizens’ exposure to political information and political involvement had increased over the 
years, due to a rise in the levels of education in the population, a greater diffusion of media, 
and the higher saliency of political phenomena for citizens. On the other hand, he stresses 
that Italians’ evaluation of the political system, which in Almond and Verba’s (1963) 
account was characterised by very low confidence, became even more negative, confirming 
the widespread unhappiness with Italy’s political condition (Sani 1989). The main trait of 
Italian political culture remains, today, a chronic and long-term dissatisfaction with the 
political system, as evidenced by Donovan and Onofri (2008) and Bull and Newell (2005). 
In this sense, the situation today is not so different from the 1960s and 70s – the ideological 
dissatisfaction with the system which existed then still exists today, although now this 
dissatisfaction is linked to the debasement of Italian politics in recent years (Donovan and 
Onofri 2008).  
In brief, Britain’s political culture, which, according to Almond and Verba’ s (1963) 
analysis, was characterised by high levels of political efficacy, support and deference 
towards the political system in the 1960 and 70s, has been affected by a decline in 
deferential and supportive elements in the last twenty years. On the other hand, Italian 
political culture has always been defined by mistrust and dissatisfaction with the state and 
other political institutions. Blondel and Inoguchi’s (2006) comparative study, and  the 
Eurobarometer data from 2006 as reported upon by Donovan and Onofri (2008), confirm this 
picture and show that the public’s general attitude towards politics and government is similar 
today in Italy and the United Kingdom. 
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British and Italian citizens’ political disenchantment affects, without doubt, the ways they 
participate in politics. In Italy, forms of political participation associated with political 
institutions have undergone a substantial decrease in the last fifty years (Segatti 2006). On 
the other hand, Sani (1989) reported a rise in the frequency of sit-ins, demonstrations, 
occupations of public buildings, plants and offices, blocking of railroads and highways, a 
trend confirmed also in more recent studies which establish that many Italians participate in 
demonstrations, boycotts, and petitions (Della Porta et al. 2006; Quaranta 2012). These 
participatory forms, as explained by Sani (1989), differ from the traditional ones as they are 
more socially visible, more spontaneous and less directed by political organisations and 
institutions. In addition, another recent investigation by ISTAT (2010) reveals that, in the 
last decade, there has been a rise in Italy in forms of political participation which can be 
described as invisible, such as consumption of political information and political discussion. 
In the last few years, under the pressure of the worldwide economic crisis and in the wake of 
the Arab Spring and Spanish Indignados, Italy has experienced a period of social and 
political turbulence, with many citizens engaging politically more and more through the 
Internet and social media (De Cindio and Stortone 2013). The relevance of digital 
technologies for Italians’ political participation has been demonstrated by the achievements 
of the Movimento Viola – using the Internet as their main organisational and promotional 
tool, they organised a successful national protest against Berlusconi, the No B Day (Mascia 
2010) – and most of all by the success of a new player in Italian politics, the M5S. The M5S, 
which refuses to be considered a political party, priding itself on its anti-establishment, 
bottom-up nature, was founded by the Italian comedian Beppe Grillo and the entrepreneur 
Roberto Casaleggio in 2009. By taking advantage of Italians’ anti-party sentiment and using 
extensively online communication platforms in combination with offline meet-ups, Grillo 
and Casaleggio created a movement which, within a few years, became one of the top 
political forces of the country, receiving 25% of total preferences in the 2013 Italian general 
election, falling only 4% short from the Centre-Left and the Centre-Right coalitions (Bartlett 
et al. 2013).  
An overview of Italians’ political participation has revealed limited levels of participation in 
more traditional political activities, but has shown a growth in many other forms of 
participation, such as the consumption of political information, political discussion, 
participation in contentious political actions and online political activities. A similar picture 
emerges in the UK. British citizens in the last decade have not demonstrated increased 
engagement in some of the above political activities, such as taking part in demonstrations or 
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contacting elected officials. Rather, levels of engagement in this respect have remained fairly 
stable (Wilks-Heeg et al. 2012). However, possibly due to the presence of a relatively high 
profile government/parliamentary e-petitions system (Hansard Society 2013), petitions 
appear to be more widespread in the UK than in Italy, and, among British online users, 
signing a petition is the most popular political activity after voting (Williamson 2010). 
Although there has been an increase in petition signing – as shown in the 2013 report of the 
Hansard Society on political engagement – the British public remains disengaged and 
disillusioned, and the sense of indifference towards politics is seemingly on the rise. The 
2014 report indicates small improvements in this sense, but still confirms the limited 
political activity of the British public, particularly in relation to more time-consuming forms 
of action, such as contributing to an online discussion or attending a political meeting 
(Hansard Society 2014). The Scottish Independence Referendum with its 84% voter turnout, 
the highest turnout in Scotland since the vote was extended to women in 1918 (McInnes et 
al. 2014), contradicts in part such trends. However, these figures apply only to the Scottish 
context, and are possibly linked to the “personal” nature of this vote and the role played by 
national identity in it. The staggering voter turnout prompted by the Scottish referendum has 
not been replicated in the wider UK population for the 2015 general election, which brought 
only 66.2% of voters to the polls – only a slight increase on the 65.1% turnout in 2010 
(Hawkins et al. 2015). Similarly to Italians, British citizens are increasingly less likely to 
engage with mainstream political parties, as shown in a recent report by Keen (2015) who 
highlights that the membership of the three main political parties is at a historic low, with 
less than 1% of the British electorate being members of the Conservative, Labour or Liberal 
Democrat Party (on the other hand the membership of smaller, often nationalist, parties like 
the SNP, Greens, and UKIP is on the rise). Possible factors behind such a trend are the 
general public's lack of identification with formal party politics, and the fact that people are 
now drawn towards single-issue campaigns and organisations which cut across parties and 
allow a less structured and less formal political engagement (Power Enquiry 2006).  
To summarise, in both Italy and the UK many citizens are strongly dissatisfied with 
mainstream political parties and institutions (Curran et al. 2014; Donovan and Onofri 2008; 
Lodge and Gough 2009; Mannheimer and Sani 2001; Miller and Williamson 2008), and 
participation in formal party politics has decreased sharply in the last two decades (Segatti 
2006; Whiteley 2012; Wilks-Heeg et al. 2012). Some British citizens have moved towards a 
form of activism associated with less traditional organisations and more single-issue in 
nature (Power Enquiry 2006). A similar phenomenon has occurred in Italy, the difference 
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being that Italians have also increased their consumption of political information, political 
discussion, and participation in contentious actions and online political activities (De Cindio 
and Stortone 2013; Quaranta 2012). In the light of these findings, a comparison between 
Italy and the UK in terms of political participation seems reasonable. This thesis develops 
the comparison and, focusing specifically on Facebook, examines how this online platform 
can contribute to citizens’ political participation, and how political activity on this SNS fits 
within the highlighted participatory trends.  
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2 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, THE INTERNET, AND 
SOCIALNETWORKING WEBSITES: KEY CONCEPTS  
This chapter aims to provide a theoretical framework through which political participation 
can be approached and the links between this phenomenon and digital technologies 
considered. To this end, it identifies and defines relevant terminology and concepts. The 
chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, political participation is defined, its 
determinants – as indicated by research – discussed, and various models seeking to explain 
this phenomenon presented. The second, third and fourth sections focus respectively on the 
Internet, SNSs and Facebook, lay out the features and affordances of these technologies, and 
examine their impact on society and individuals. The figure below provides a conceptual 
map of the chapter and highlights the main themes which emerge from the review of the 
relevant academic literature.  
Figure 1 - Political Participation, the Internet and Social Networking Websites: Conceptual 
Map                 
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2.1 Political Participation:  A Complex and Multifaceted Phenomenon  
2.1.1 Defining political participation  
Political participation is a popular and widely investigated subject in academic studies. Many 
scholars offer theorisations and definitions of this phenomenon, or rather array of 
phenomena, leading to studies that examine a diverse variety of political activities ranging 
from voting and campaigning to political discussion and consumption of political 
information (e.g., Borge and Cardenal 2010; Dalton, 2008; Fowler et al. 2008; Kavanaugh et 
al. 2008; Kenski and Stroud 2006; Wang 2007). As the findings of a political participation 
study are highly contingent upon the considered political activities (Verba et al. 1995), it is 
essential to provide a definition of political participation and clarify the theoretical 
framework through which this topic has been approached in this thesis. 
One of the most influential and utilised theorisations of political participation is developed 
by Verba et al. (1995) who, in their seminal work Voice and Equality, speak of voluntary 
political participation, referring to the “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing 
government actions – either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public 
policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies” (p. 38). 
According to Verba et al. (1995), the ultimate purpose of political participation is 
mobilisation, namely influencing governments’ actions, either directly (e.g., by contacting 
public officials) or indirectly by influencing citizens (e.g., persuading a person to support a 
political party or candidate). This explains why Verba et al. (1995) exclude from their study 
activities such as following political news or discussing  politics with friends, but include the 
following actions: voting; attending protests, marches, or demonstrations; contributing to 
electoral campaigns and political organisations; particpating in voluntary associations; 
donating money to political causes; and contacting government officials. 
Verba et al.’s (1995) definition is often adopted in studies addressing the impact of the 
Internet on political participation (e.g., Calenda and Meijer 2009; Dimitrova et al. 2014; 
Dutta-Bergman and Chung 2005). For instance, Calenda and Meijer (2009), focusing on how 
young people employ the Internet for political participation, distinguish between traditional 
forms of participation (e.g., voting in elections, campaigning for elections, membership of 
political parties, fundraising for political candidates) and new politics (e.g., involvement in 
non-partisan networks, membership of single-issue movements), both of which include 
activities which fall under Verba et al.’s (1995) conceptualisation.  
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Given the rise of new, more individualised and personalised forms of participation, as 
discussed in Section 1.2, and the diffusion of digital technologies, a more modern and up-to-
date definition of political participation seems to be needed. In a review of Whiteley's (2012) 
Political Participation in Britain, Fox (2014) remarks that in the light of societal changes 
and technological advancements, definitions of political participation which focus 
exclusively on behaviours aiming to influence governments’ action are too narrow. 
Likewise, in his paper on Facebook groups and activism, Marichal (2013) suggests that 
political participation on SNSs should be understood “less as intentional efforts to promote 
social and political change and more as a discursive performance designed to express a 
political identity”, a conception embraced also in other Internet and political participation 
studies (Sanford and Rose 2007; Ward and de Vreese 2011).  
In line with such premises, this thesis develops a more wide-ranging definition of political 
participation. This definition includes, under the conceptual umbrella of political 
participation, those political behaviours described by Christy (1987) as communication 
activities. Christy (1987) distinguishes three commonly examined types of political 
participation: electoral activity (e.g., voting, attending campaign meetings, working for a 
candidate or party), contacting activity (e.g., contacting government officials), and 
communication activity. Communication activity is a form of political participation not 
channelled through political institutions and reflects a more exclusive and individual interest 
and a psychological involvement in politics (e.g., certain forms of political discussion, 
following politics in the mass media). The necessity of taking communication activities into 
account is also confirmed by a recent study examining citizens’ motivations to engage in 
politics online: Hoffman et al. (2013) establish that people’s political activity is driven by 
both a desire to influence government as well as to communicate political ideas, with 
citizens recognising that the majority of political acts serve the second rather than the first 
purpose. In the light of these considerations, political participation is defined in this thesis as:  
the set of activities influencing or aiming to influence governments’ actions and 
other individuals’ political behaviours, and/or reflecting individuals’ interest and 
psychological involvement in politics. 
This definition is essentially a hybrid one, arising from the combination of Verba et al. 
(1995) and Christy’s (1987) conceptualisations. At the same time, it embraces what could be 
labelled as the mobilisation dimension – influencing or aiming to influence governments’ 
actions and other individuals’ political behaviours – and the communication dimension – 
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reflecting individuals’ interest and psychological involvement in politics. It thus covers a 
wealth of participatory activities ranging from more traditional forms of participation, such 
as contacting a politician, to recently emerged forms, such as e-petitions or expressing 
political opinions online. 
 
2.1.2 Explaining political participation  
As the previous sections have shown, political participation is a complex phenomenon 
encompassing a wide range of participatory activities. Numerous explanatory models and 
theories of political participation have been developed in academia. In their study on party 
activism in Britain, Whiteley and Seyd (2002) identify five main models of political 
participation: the Social Psychological Model; the Rational Choice Model; the General 
Incentives Model; the Mobilisation Model; and the Civic Voluntarism Model. 
A key contributor to the social psychological approach to political participation is Fishbein 
(1967). As Whiteley and Seyd (2002) explain, Fishbein (1967) argues that three kinds of 
variables function as the basic determinants of behaviour: “(1) attitudes toward the 
behaviour; (2) normative beliefs (both personal and social); and (3) motivation to comply 
with the norms” (p. 490). According to this notion, behaviour can be explained in terms of 
expected benefits and social norms. Individuals are in fact utilitarian, capable of calculating 
the benefits of different courses of actions, but they are also embedded in networks of social 
norms and beliefs, their political actions therefore determined by the interaction between 
these two sets of variables (Muller 1979).  
Another model of participation is the Rational Choice Model, which finds its roots in 
Downs’s (1957) ground-breaking work, Economic Theory of Democracy. Downs (1957) 
maintains that self-interest and, consequently, cost-effectiveness are the cornerstones of 
political behaviour. According to this theoretical approach, an individual acts out of self-
interest in a rational way. Rational action involves utility maximisation: a person, when 
confronted with various options, will pick up the one that, in her/his account, best serves 
her/his objectives (Green and Shapiro 1994). However, as Olson (1965) highlights, when 
trying to explain political participation, rational choice theories have to face the so-called 
paradox of participation. Taking into consideration the participation in collective actions, 
Olson (1965) observes that the products of political parties – such as policies – are public 
goods. Public goods benefit every citizen independently of who took part in the development 
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and implementation of the policies. Therefore, for rational, self-interested actors, the most 
cost-effective way to achieve this goal would be free-riding, rather than actively taking part 
in the process. To overcome the paradox of participation, Olson (1965) introduces the 
notion of selective incentives. Accordingly, citizens could, for instance, decide to join trade 
unions because of selective incentives, such as free legal advice or discounts on certain 
products. Olson’s (1965) explanation is certainly valid for forms of participation such as 
joining a political party or a union, but it falls short in explaining behaviours such as voting, 
from which selective incentives are largely absent (Whiteley and Seyd 2002).  
The General Incentives Model integrates Olson (1965) and Fishbein’s (1967) theorisations, 
and rests on the premise that citizens need three types of incentives in order to participate in 
politics: outcome, process and ideological incentives. Outcome incentives are introduced by 
Olson (1965), and refer to the achievement of specific goals (e.g., becoming member of a 
political party in order to pursue a career in politics); process incentives derive from the 
process of participation itself (e.g., feeling entertained when participating in a political 
protest); ideological incentives enable individuals to give expressions to deeply held beliefs 
and interact with like-minded individuals (Whiteley and Seyd 2002). 
The Mobilisation Model approaches political participation from a completely different 
perspective, asserting that political opportunities in the environment and stimuli coming 
from other individuals trigger political participation (Whiteley and Seyd 2002). This model 
is particularly relevant to the present study as it links participation to citizens’ settings and 
social networks. Social networks can be described as “a set of nodes (where connections are 
made either through individuals or organisational units) and the linkages between them” 
(Gilchrist 2004, p. 29), and, according to Castells (1996), they are the new social 
morphology of the contemporary era.  Bimber (2001) holds the view that social networks 
have the potential to foster political participation and lead to the engagement of passive 
members of the public. Similarly, Putman (2000), concentrating on social capital which 
refers to “connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them” (p. 19), stresses how  political conversations typical of 
social gatherings may generate collective action, a process which could explain the positive 
links between political participation and participation in civic associations consistently found 
in the literature (Delli Carpini 2004; Putman 2000; Verba et al. 1995). 
Lim (2008, p. 964) points out how numerous studies found that personal networks can lead 
to participation in social and political movements (Nepstad and Smith 1999; Passy and 
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Giugni 2001; Viterna 2006). Research by Brady et al. (1999) shows that recruitment 
attempts tend to be more successful if coming from personal contacts (i.e., strong ties), rather 
than from strangers, or secondary connections (i.e., weak ties) – see Section 2.3 for a further 
discussion of strong and weak ties. Using the same data set, Lim (2008) paints a slightly 
different picture and highlights that the closeness of the relationship does not impact 
decisively on the response to recruiting attempts. In line with the findings of Huckfeldt and 
Sprague (1995), who examine the relationship between interpersonal influences and voting 
decisions, Lim (2008) establishes that a common interest in politics and shared political 
identity influence political mobilisation more than the strength of ties. He identifies two 
possible explanations for these results. One reason could be that civic associations, and the 
relationships which form within them, are founded on social activism developed around 
specific political issues. Therefore, ignoring a request from a co-member could suggest a 
questioning of the association itself, and might strain relationships with co-members in 
general. Another possibility concerns the relationship between associational ties and 
members’ identity. In this sense, requests coming from co-members recognise and reinforce 
the activist’s identity, encouraging her/him to participate (Lim 2008).  
The relevance of recruitment for the political participation process has also been recognised 
by Verba et al. (1995) in their Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM), which is arguably the 
dominant model of political participation in political science. Verba et al. (1995) focus on 
three factors which can account for political activity or inactivity. They argue that people 
may be politically inactive due to a lack of resources, a lack of psychological engagement 
with politics, or because they are outside the necessary recruitment networks. As such, the 
three components of the CVM are: resources – which are considered by Verba et al. (1995) 
the most critical element in their model – political engagement, and recruitment. The links 
between recruitment networks and political participation have already been exposed in the 
discussion of the Mobilisation Model. With respect to resources, Verba et al. (1995) stress 
the relevance for political participation of time, money, and civic skills (i.e., organisational 
and communication capacities). Verba et al.’s (1995) theorisation has been developed, in 
part, from the Socio-Economic Status Model (SES). According to the SES, people of higher 
socio-economic status (e.g., higher education, higher income, higher-status jobs, etc.) are 
more politically active. By taking into account resources, and by showing how their 
availability varies on the basis of socio-economic status, Verba et al. (1995) explain the SES 
and shed light on why some individuals are more active than others, and why certain people 
engage in specific political activities. For instance, education enhances political interest and 
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civic skills, and can facilitate forms of participation such as organising political initiatives. 
Income, on the other hand, provides the monetary resources needed for political activities 
such as donating money to a political candidate or party (Brady et al. 1995). In view of these 
considerations, Verba et al. (1995) conclude that disparities in citizens’ political participation 
will remain as long inequalities in education and income persist. 
The third component of the CVM is political engagement. Like political participation, 
political engagement has been theorised and defined in numerous ways. For instance, 
according to Boulianne (2009), political engagement includes behaviours which fall under 
the definition of political participation employed in this thesis (e.g., donations to a campaign 
or political group, working as part of a political campaign or political group). In the present 
research, political engagement is intended, as per Verba et al.’s (1995) conceptualisation, as 
citizens’ psychological predisposition towards politics. Verba et al. (1995) identify four main 
measures of political engagement: political interest, political efficacy, political information 
or knowledge, and partisanship. 
The academic literature recognises these measures as relevant drivers of political 
participation (Brundidge 2007; Brundidge and Rice 2009; Delli Carpini 2004; Kavanaugh et 
al. 2008). Partisanship refers to the identification with a political party and is an excellent 
predictor of many political orientations (Sani 1989; Verba et al. 1995). Abramovitz and 
Saunders (2006) explain how partisan choices are rooted in citizens’ social identities and 
ideology. Bearing this in mind, the relationship between partisanship and political 
participation could be explained through the General Incentives Model: by participating in 
party-related activities, citizens give expressions to their beliefs and confirm their belonging 
to a specific group.  Another component of Verba et al.’s (1995) political engagement index 
is political knowledge, which can be described as “the range of factual information about 
politics that is stored in long-term memory” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993, p. 10). This 
knowledge can be obtained through formal education, discussion and news consumption 
(Kenski and Stroud 2006). Political knowledge is a consistent and established driver of 
political participation (Brundidge 2007; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993; Jung et al. 2011; 
McLeod et al. 1999; Verba et al. 1995), a relationship which is potentially explained by the 
fact that knowledge enables individuals to make reasoned civic decisions and thus increases 
their ability to participate (Galston 2001). Political efficacy encompasses two dimensions: 
internal efficacy, which refers to an individual’s confidence in her/his ability to understand 
politics and to participate politically; and external efficacy, which indicates a person’s belief 
in the responsiveness of the political system to her/his participation (Balch 1974; Delli 
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Carpini 2004). Kenski and Stroud (2006) provide an incentives-based explanation of how 
political efficacy impacts on political participation and argue that an individual is little 
encouraged to invest time and efforts in politics if he or she feels that it cannot make a 
difference.  
Finally, the last measure of political engagement identified by Verba et al. (1995) is political 
interest. Among the four components of political engagement, interest in politics is, 
according to Verba et al. (1995), the strongest predictor of political activity. Research 
establishes that citizens who follow politics and care about what happens in the political 
arena are more politically active both offline (Brady et al., 1999; Finkel, 2002; Prior, 2005) 
and online (Barisione et al. 2014; Cremonesi et al. 2014; Kim and Khang 2014; Knobloch-
Westerwick and Johnson 2014; Vraga et al. 2015). Unlike with other measures of political 
engagement, academics have thus far been unable to understand the origins of an 
individual’s political interest,  whether it is a stable personal trait or a more volatile and 
reactionary phenomenon, provoked by contingent political situations (Prior 2010). 
There are a number of other factors associated with political participation which are 
highlighted in the academic literature. In terms of demographics, research finds that age, 
gender, education and occupation can impact on levels of political participation (see Lutz et 
al. – 2014 – for a recent discussion of the links between these variables and offline/online 
political participation). The ways in which education and occupation can influence political 
participation have been considered previously in the analysis of the SES. With respect to 
gender, several authors indicate the presence of a remarkably persistent gender gap in 
political participation, with males being generally more politically active than females 
(Atkeson and Rapoport 2003; Burns et al. 1997; Calenda and Meijer 2009; Coonway 2001). 
Hooghe and Stolle (2004) list a series of possible causes for such a gap, including the male-
dominated culture of political associations which might inhibit women’s participation, or the 
fact that women have less discretionary time or resources available to spend on political 
participation. 
A resource approach can also help in explaining the links between political participation and 
age. The general pattern established by research is that political interest and participation 
increase with age (Holt et al. 2013; Mascherini et al. 2009; Putnam 2000). This generational 
gap has often been explained with considerations of life-cycle: young people participate less 
because they lack the resources that older people have accumulated during their lives (Nie et 
al. 1974; Zukin et al. 2006). Quintelier (2007) confirms the impact of the life-cycle, 
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identifying educational attainment as a determinant able to explain the larger differences in 
political participation between young and old. However, there could be another reason 
behind the young/old participatory gap. This has to do with the ways researchers tend to 
operationalise political participation, and their tendency to focus mainly on formal political 
activities such as voting, as done by Verba et al. 1995. In fact, as noted by numerous 
academics, young people tend to engage in more single-issue and informal types of political 
participation like wearing badges, signing petitions and taking part in demonstrations, while 
older people prefer to channel their participation through more formal routes, such as the 
ballot box and political parties (Melo and Stockemer 2014; Norris 2007; Quintellier 2007).  
Finally, another factor relevant to this thesis which can influence political participation is 
media usage. With regards to traditional media (the links between political participation and 
the Internet are covered extensively in Section 3.1), research illustrates that the motivations 
behind media usage (e.g., entertainment, information, etc.) impact on political participation 
more than the choice of medium itself (Boulianne 2009; Dimitrova et al. 2014; Norris 2000). 
Researchers tend to agree that using media for information can prompt participation, 
whereas employing media for entertainment can limit it (Putman 2000; Shah et al. 2001; 
Sotirovic and McLeod 2004; Zhang and Chia 2006). This information/entertainment 
dichotomy is evident particularly in relation to TV usage. Research has shown that viewing 
TV for entertainment can inhibit political participation (Norris 1996; Prior 2005, 2007; 
Putnam 2000; Quintelier and Hooghe 2011), while watching television for informational 
purposes tends to encourage participation (Ho et al. 2011; Norris 1996; Putnam 2000; 
Wilkins 2000; Zhang and Chia 2006). The positive influence of informational media use on 
political participation is confirmed with regard to the press (Hoffman and Appiah 2008; Moy 
et al. 2005; Shah et al. 2001; Wilkins 2000; Zhang and Chia 2006) and radio (Johnson and 
Kaye 2013a). 
This section has revealed how complex the phenomenon of political participation is. 
Incentives (i.e., outcome, process and ideological), resources (e.g., time and money), 
demographic variables (i.e., age and gender, education and occupation), political 
engagement, stimuli from one’s environment and social network, and media usage are all 
identified in the literature as relevant determinants of political participation. All these factors 
must therefore be considered when examining the contributions of Facebook to this 
phenomenon.  
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2.2 The Internet: The Master Medium 
Before moving on to assess how the Internet and SNSs can contribute to citizens’ political 
participation, the features of these technologies and their influence on individuals and 
society are explored in this and the two following sections.  
Chadwick (2006) defines the Internet as “a network of networks of one-to-one, one-to-many, 
many-to-many and many-to-one local, national and global information and communication 
technologies with relatively open standards and comparatively low barriers to entry” (p. 7). 
Because of this multifaceted nature, Selnow (1998) dubs the Internet the master medium. 
The Internet “incorporates text, sound, image, movement, and the potential for real-time 
interaction all in one package” (Kent and Taylor 2002, p. 31). Precisely “because it is a 
hybrid of the largely one-directional print, audio, and video media” which offers at the same 
time “the opportunity for a two-way communication feedback loop” (p. 510), Tedesco 
(2004) deems the Internet as revolutionary. Similarly, with reference to the integration of 
various modes of communication into one interactive network, Castells (1996) compares the 
technological transformation brought on by the Internet to the one fostered by the invention 
of the alphabet.  
In his influential work, The Rise of the Network Society, Castells (1996) traces the history of 
this medium. The Internet originated in 1960 when, to prevent a breakdown of American 
communications in case of a nuclear war, the US Defence Department Advanced Research 
Project Agency created a network architecture that was not controlled by a central machine, 
but was formed by autonomous computers with numerous ways to link up. This structure 
was called ARPANET and became the foundation of the global and horizontal 
communication network which is today the Internet. The Internet went through various 
transformations and, as it grew, the need to be able to find and organise files and information 
within it became evident. A decisive breakthrough happened between 1990 and 1992, with 
the emergence of the World Wide Web (WWW) which has made the Internet what is today. 
The web can be described as a flexible network of networks within the Internet that allows 
the grouping of interests and projects. This enabled users to interact meaningfully and to 
overcome the time-costly browsing of pre-WWW Internet (Castells 1996).  
Things have moved on since then, and people have witnessed the rise of Web 2.0. Web 2.0 is 
an expression which was coined by the O’Reilly Media Group in 2003 during the planning 
for an Internet conference (Allen 2009). Web 2.0 started being adopted into popular 
commentary in 2005, yet businesses and web services considered to be exemplary of Web 
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2.0 – blogs, search engines, wikis, and SNSs – date from earlier times (Allen 2013). The 
main features of Web 2.0 can be easily understood if compared to the features of Web 1.0. 
Web 1.0 refers to the web between 1993 and 2003 while Web 2.0 is regarded as the web 
since 2003 (Berners-Lee et al. – 2001 – predict a further evolution of Web 2.0 to Web 3.0 or 
Semantic Web). According to Zhai and Liu (2007), Web 2.0 is not a simple update of Web 
1.0, but is the symbol of the second revolution of Internet technologies, which brought about 
great technological innovation and introduced totally new notions such as personalisation 
and users’ participation. “Web 1.0 are mostly HTML pages viewed through a Web browser, 
while Web 2.0 are web pages, plus a lot of other ‘content’ shared over the web, with more 
interactivity” (Zhai and Liu 2007, p. 27).  
Among the various features of Web 2.0, there are four which are particularly relevant to the 
present research. The first is the aggregation and availability of a vast amount of 
information, considered by Chadwick and Howard (2009) to be one of the most typical and 
revolutionary components of Web 2.0. The second feature is the notion of collective 
intelligence which refers to distributed networks of creators and contributors producing 
information commodities (Chadwick and Howard 2009). Examples of collective intelligence 
are free and open source software projects such as Firefox, and user-generated content sites 
such as Wikipedia. The third typical feature of Web 2.0 is the empowerment of Internet 
users who, encouraged by such a collaborative environment, play an active role in content 
creation and distribution (Pietrik 2010). The fourth feature is personalisation, which, 
according to Papacharissi (2009), is “the ability to organize information based on a 
subjective order of importance determined by the self” (pp. 236-237), and is the main 
component on which blogs and SNSs thrive.   
A useful way to grasp the main features of the Internet is to look at this medium in 
opposition to traditional media such as TV, radio and the press. To describe the differences 
between traditional media and new media such as the Internet, Negroponte (1995) 
introduced the push-versus-pull media dichotomy. Traditional media, characterised by 
unidirectional communication, can be defined as push media, whereas the Internet is 
considered a pull medium due to the presence of a proactive and self-selecting audience 
(Chaffey 2007). Within the push media environment, media elites decide which content to 
publish and when and where such content will reach the audience (Holbert et al. 2010). 
Chaffee and Metzger (2001) illustrate the main principles on which pull media are built. 
They argue that pull media differ from traditional media as the user/receiver, rather than the 
sender, is in control of the communication process, and also because they are characterised 
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by interactivity rather than one-way communication. Spurgeon (2008) agrees with Chaffee 
and Metzger (2001) in identifying interactivity as one of the main characteristics of new 
media, as well as a key category of comparison between old mass media and new digital 
media. She observes how broadcast mass media involves a type of interactivity defined as 
consultation: they offer a modicum of control in that users select information from a 
predetermined menu of content. In contrast, new media are programmed to support different 
types of interactivity, extending the possibilities of conversational interaction and 
participation, and facilitating consumer productivity (Spurgeon 2008). Chadwick and 
Howard (2009) believe that interactivity is what makes the Internet a political tool unlike any 
other media. This stance is in part shared by Bimber et al. (2009) who recognise that, unlike 
earlier technologies such as television, telephony and newspapers which provide limited 
opportunities for citizens’ interaction, collective agenda-building and decision-making, the 
Internet can have a different participative impact on politics.  
The other major, politically relevant feature of pull media is the control the audience can 
exercise over transmission and consumption of content. The political consequences of users’ 
empowerment and control are manifold, ranging from the rise of new forms and platforms 
for citizens’ political participation to the publication and circulation of alternative non-elitist 
political stories (for a detailed account on the impact of the Internet on political information, 
see Section 3.2). Taking into account the active role of Internet users, Holbert et al. (2010) 
develop a fascinating comparison between pull and push media through the application of 
the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM). The ELM is a persuasion model developed by 
Petty and Ciacioppo (1986), indicating that persuasion can happen through two different 
routes, depending on audience’s motivation and ability. When recipients have both the 
ability and motivation to attend and consume persuasive messages, persuasion takes place 
through the central route. Otherwise it occurs through the peripheral route. When the 
persuasive process happens through the central route, it generates long-lasting effects, 
stronger attitude-behaviour associations, and greater resistance to counter-attitudinal 
messages (Petty and Ciacioppo 1986). Holbert et al. (2010) argue that the elite-based 
decisions relating to message construction and distribution which characterise push media 
often do not take into account audience’s ability and motivation to consume political 
messages. In other words, the push media’s top-down process tends mostly to activate the 
peripheral route of persuasion. In contrast, pull media are more prone to generating 
persuasion through the central route, as their users are in control – an element which 
guarantees a certain degree of motivation. Furthermore, the fact that the audience can chose 
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when, where and how to consume political messages facilitates individuals’ ability to 
process and consume messages.  
Another significant aspect that has to be taken into account to better grasp the contributions 
of the Internet to citizens’ political participation is its spatial impact on communication. The 
Internet is a participatory medium facilitating collaboration and interaction among 
individuals, regardless of geographical boundaries (Milakovich 2010). Benkler (2006) 
believes that the Internet has strengthened connections between individuals on two spatial 
levels: Internet users connect more with individuals who are geographically distant without 
reducing their own local connections. Welman et al. (2003) share this idea, arguing that 
people use the Internet to strengthen locally-based social connectedness but also to develop 
and maintain global connectedness. Consequently, individuals can employ this medium to 
create a social network built around shared interests and identity across local and global 
boundaries. If early predictions suggested that the Internet would enable individuals to build 
space-free relationships in the cyberspace, current research on the contrary has shown that 
individuals use the Internet to connect with, rather than escape from, their immediate 
environment (Kim and Ball-Rokeach 2009). These findings are confirmed by Uslaner 
(2004), who establishes that online communications occur mainly between people who 
already know each other offline.  
The synthesis of the research thus far mentioned seems to paint an overwhelmingly positive 
picture of the Internet. However, not all scholars share such a techno-optimistic stance. For 
instance, Curran e al. (2012) adopt a critical approach to the study of the Internet. Bearing in 
mind the economic and societal contexts in which the Internet operates, Curran e al. (2012) 
play down its impact on the communication environment which, as they observe, is still 
dominated by big corporations and is used to further their profit-oriented interests. In line 
with Chadwick’s (2006) remarks on the role of corporations and governments in the 
development of such a medium,  Curran (2012a, 2012b) stresses that the Internet was not 
created as a public communication tool, highlighting the influence first of the military, and 
subsequently of corporations, in its development. He emphasises the commercialisation of 
the online environment and, considering that online users’ personal data are being sold to 
certain providers, argues that the Internet has been transformed into a mass surveillance tool 
(Curran 2012a, 2012b). Similarly, Stanyer (2009) and van Dijck (2013) note how the 
Internet is dominated by corporate media chains.  Accordingly, Fuchs (2014, p. 77) observes 
that “there is an asymmetry between the power of corporations and other powerful groups 
and the actual counter-power of citizens … due to the fact that the ruling powers control 
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more resources, such as money, decision-making power, capacity for attention generation, 
etc.” 
As the Internet has become more and more pervasive in everyday life, the aforementioned 
techno-enthusiasm has also been tempered by concerns over the potentially divisive aspect 
of digital technologies. Many authors address the issue of the digital divide and the exclusion 
of certain groups of the population (e.g., older people, women in certain societies, ethnic 
minorities, people with low levels of education and income, etc.) from fields of society like 
politics, education, community life and social relationships (Abbey and Hyde 2009; 
Barrantes and Galperin 2008; Bonfadelli 2002; Norris 2001; Rice and Kats 2003; van Dijk 
2005, 2009). The digital divide refers to a gap in access to and usage of new forms of 
information technology (van Dijk 2009). Focusing on the case of Europe, van Dijk (2009) 
stresses that the access gap – with particular attention to computer access and Internet 
connection – is still a relevant issue today. In fact, even if such a gap is slowly closing, 
Northern European countries provide greater access to the Internet than Southern European 
ones (van Dijk 2009). This trend is confirmed in the two countries on which this thesis 
focuses. Recent reports reveal that 54% of the Italian population is online (Audiweb 2013) 
while, according to the Oxford Internet Institute, 78% of the UK population has access to the 
Internet (Dutton and Blank 2013). Likewise, a study by the European Commission (2013) 
shows that 87% of the British population use the Internet weekly, a figure above the EU 
average of 72%, with only 8% of the population having never used this medium (much lower 
than the EU average of 20%). The picture is different in Italy, where the usage of the Internet 
is much lower than the EU average, with only 56% of Italians reporting of using the Internet 
weekly, and 34% of the population having never used it.  
The digital divide applies not only to access, but also to the ways digital technologies are 
used. In this sense, researchers talk of a usage gap (Bonfadelli 2002; van Dijk 2005, 2009). 
According to van Dijk (2009), the divisions created by uneven access to skills are greater 
than those caused by physical factors, and while physical access gaps are closing in the 
developed countries, the skills gaps continue growing. Taking this into consideration, he 
concludes that social and cultural differences in society are not only reflected but actually 
reinforced in computer and Internet use, and that those users who already hold a strong 
position within the society tend to benefit from the usage of digital technologies more than 
other individuals (van Dijk 2009).  
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Originally developed as part of a military project, the Internet has changed the lives of many 
people by making available a vast amount of information and facilitating and fostering 
communication.  Because of its hybrid nature incorporating text, sound, image and the 
potential for real-time interaction, the Internet has been dubbed the master medium. It differs 
from traditional media in that users, rather than broadcasters, are in control of the 
communication process, and in that it is characterised by two-way rather than one-way 
communication. Many scholars have celebrated the contributions of the Internet to society. 
On the other hand, others have depicted it as a tool of surveillance dominated by big 
corporations, suited to their profit-oriented interests, or highlighted its tendency to favour 
those individuals who are already rich in terms of resources, consequently widening existing 
societal gaps. While scholars may disagree on the appropriate ways of perceiving such a 
medium or on the value of its contributions to society (Internet optimists vs Internet 
pessimists), what appears certain is that the Internet is a revolutionary medium which 
impacts on countless spheres of people’s lives, including the sphere of politics. 
 
2.3 Social Networking Websites: Self-Presentation, Network Composition 
and Privacy  
Due to the widespread and rapid penetration of SNSs into diverse segments of the worldwide 
population, there has been a proliferation in the last few years of news stories and academic 
and non-academic studies dealing with these platforms. This trend seems destined to carry 
on, given how embedded SNSs have become in many individuals’ daily routines, plus the 
consequences that the adoption of SNSs can have on disparate aspects of people’s lives – 
ranging from less serious matters such as shopping and organisation of recreational 
activities, to more weighty affairs like the coordination of protest movements (boyd 2014; 
Marichal 2013; van Dijck 2013). SNSs can be defined as “web-based services that allow 
individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) 
articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse 
their list of connections and those made by others within the system” (boyd and Ellison 
2007). The basic unit of SNSs is the user profile. Ancu and Cozma (2009) identify three 
main elements characterising SNS profiles: a description of the profile owner; the 
communication exchange between the profile owner and friends (i.e., “Comments” on 
MySpace, or “Wall” on Facebook); and the list of friends. According to Ancu and Cozma 
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(2009), this last element is the fundamental component of SNSs as it can facilitate the 
expansion of the network by displaying users’ social connections.  
SNSs normally have a central theme or cohering factor: common interests or contexts such 
as college (e.g., the first version of Facebook) or work (e.g., Linkedin), or specific modes of 
sharing information, like photos (e.g., Flicker and Instagram), and can vary greatly in terms 
of design, openness, and customisability (Kim and Geidner 2008). In two reports of the Pew 
Research Center, Hampton et al. (2011) and Mitchell et al. (2013) indicate that there is a 
great deal of variation in how people use SNSs, with usage practices varying according to 
the types of person and SNSs in question. So far research has indicated that SNSs are used 
mainly for relational maintenance – to keep in touch with friends, but also to make new 
friends (Langstedt 2013; Lampe et al. 2006; Raacke and Bonds-Raacke 2008) – to establish, 
present, and negotiate identity (Liu 2007), for social surveillance (Joinson 2008), to share 
information and be entertained (Waters and Ackerman 2011). 
As for the Internet (see previous section), several authors adopt a critical approach to the 
study of SNSs. In her thought-provoking book, The Culture of Connectivity, van Dijck 
(2013) considers SNSs as platforms falling under the category of social media – social media 
are “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological 
foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated 
information” (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010, p. 60). Influenced by Actor-Network theory 
(Latour 2005) and Castells’ (2009) political economy approach, van Dijck (2013) regards 
social media platforms as both techno-cultural constructs and socio-economic structures. She 
proposes to look at distinct platforms as if they were microsystems strictly connected to each 
other, these interconnections manufacturing the ecosystem of connective media. Van Dijck 
(2013) explains that most social media platforms started as amateur-driven community 
services which facilitated user connectivity. They were networked media which did not 
connect people automatically.  Half a decade later, these platforms have turned into global 
information and data mining corporations which engineer and exploit user connectivity. 
Such platforms are social in that they operate as online facilitators or enhancers of human 
networks, but they are also automated systems that fabricate and manipulate connections. 
This shift from networked communication to platformed sociality and from participatory 
culture to a culture of connectivity produced the ecosystem of connective media which 
became gradually dominated by few major platforms, i.e., Google, Facebook, Apple, and 
Amazon. Van Dijck’s (2013) critical account is useful in understanding the environment in 
which services like Facebook and Twitter operate, how they have developed and how, in a 
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short period of time, they have deeply penetrated people’s daily habits of communication 
and creative production.  
In terms of research trends, reviews of academic articles focusing on SNSs indicate that 
there are four dominant themes in SNS research: impression management and friendship 
performance; network and network structure; bridging online and offline networks; and 
privacy (boyd and Ellison 2007; Zhang and Leung 2014). With regards to this last theme, 
due to technological advancements in electronic information collection and storage, the most 
frequently discussed aspect of privacy is the informational one (Goldie 2006). This aspect 
refers to “the claim of an individual to determine what information about himself or herself 
should be known to others … this also involves when such information will be obtained and 
what uses will be made of it by others” (Westin 2003, p. 431). In relation to the 
informational dimension of privacy, Raynes-Goldie (2010) distinguishes between social and 
institutional privacy. The first concerns individuals’ control over their personal information, 
while the second focuses on the exploitation of users’ data by corporations such as Facebook 
(Raynes-Goldie 2010). SNSs disrupt the social dynamics of privacy (Grimmelmann 2009), 
challenging people’s sense of control (boyd 2011). Barnes (2006) speaks of a privacy 
paradox, as research illustrates that users are concerned about their privacy but do not apply 
these concerns to their SNS usage (boyd and Hargittai 2010; Lewis et al. 2008). By 
disclosing personal information, SNS users can risk losing opportunities (e.g., jobs or 
scholarships) if they happen to discredit themselves in some way, or open themselves up to 
other dangers such as cyber and physical stalking, identity theft, and surveillance (Bohnert 
and Ross 2010; Gross and Acquisti 2005). Despite these potential consequences, users still 
disclose personal information online. The reasons behind such a paradox are not yet clear 
and it has been suggested that there are benefits to such SNS disclosures, such as peer 
acceptance and perceived popularity. It seems that increased social interaction may be more 
important to many than the potential privacy risks of disclosing personal information 
(Debatin et al. 2009; Donath and boyd 2004; Gross and Acquisti 2005; Lampe et al. 2007). 
With respect to the network and network structure theme, it emerges that SNSs can expand 
the communicative channels through which people cultivate social relationships. Granovetter 
(1973) distinguishes between strong and weak ties in terms of the time and emotions 
invested in the relationship, and the reciprocity of communication between the considered 
participants. Examples of strong ties include friendships and familial relationships, whereas 
weak ties are typical of acquaintances. Considering such a distinction, Papacharissi (2011) 
explains that SNSs allow a user to connect with individuals both within the same network as 
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her/himself as well as in other networks, with varying levels of frequency and ties of various 
strengths (strong and weak), at both local and global levels. Donath and boyd (2004) suggest 
that SNSs enable people to maintain relationship with more individuals, an argument 
supported by Hampton et al. (2011), who establish that SNS users have larger networks than 
the average American. Because SNSs increase the number of weak ties an individual can 
maintain, they can be described as social supernets (Donath and boyd 2004).  Ellison et al. 
(2011) also stress the impact of these platforms on network size and highlight how, in their 
lives, people frequently encounter others with whom they might want to reconnect – but due 
to social or logistical barriers they are unable to do so. In these cases, the potential benefits 
of social connection are outweighed by the costs of coordination. By facilitating interaction 
and enabling active (e.g., messaging) and passive (e.g., status updates) communication with 
very little effort, SNSs can lower the coordination costs and promote the maintenance (or re-
engagement) of weak ties (Ellison et al. 2011).  
Concerning the relationship between online and offline networks and the social and spatial 
connections between SNSs and the offline world, boyd and Ellison (2007) stress that the 
majority of SNSs principally support pre-existing social relations. Ellison et al. (2007) 
indicate that Facebook is employed to sustain existing offline relationships or to strengthen 
offline connections rather than to meet new people. Similarly, Lampe et al. (2006) determine 
that Facebook users search more for people with whom they have an offline connection than 
for complete strangers, and, in a subsequent study, they differentiate SNSs from online 
dating websites as they are most often used to connect with individuals people know from 
offline settings, rather than for meeting new people online (Lampe et al. 2007). However, 
these findings do not mean that SNSs are simply platforms supporting activities and 
interactions likely to happen offline anyway, or that SNSs do not increase the reach of 
communication messages.  In fact, studies by Lampe et al. (2007) and boyd and Ellison 
(2007), while demonstrating an awareness that SNSs are generally employed to support 
existing relationships, do not deny the possibility of using these platforms to engage and 
interact in new ways with individuals already part of users’ networks, or even to connect 
with new people. Likewise, Mendelson and Papacharissi (2011) highlight how SNSs link 
networks of individuals that may or may not share a place-based connection and, taking the 
case of Facebook groups as an example, Bittle et al. (2009) emphasise how SNSs can 
connect individuals with similar interests, independently of their location. Accordingly, it 
could be argued that, despite being originally created to support and strengthen already 
existing relationships, the customisability of SNSs has empowered their users to make the 
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technology their own and venture to use it in new ways. In other words, due to users’ 
control, the current usages of SNSs are much more manifold and diverse than the ones 
originally intended.  
As boyd and Ellison (2007) outline in their influential review, the final dominant theme in 
SNS research is that of identity management, as “SNSs constitute an important research 
context for scholars investigating processes of impression management, self-presentation, 
and friendship performance” (p. 10). Goffman (1959) could be considered the pioneer of the 
concept of selective self-presentation. Goffman (1959) adopts a dramaturgical approach to 
the study of self-presentation, describing the interactions between individuals and their 
audiences as performance, which he intends to mean: “all the activity of a given participant 
on a given occasion which serves to influence in any way any of the other participants” (p. 
15).  According to Goffman (1959), people consciously and unconsciously work to condition 
the way they are perceived, and in order to convey a positive impression of themselves they 
emphasise certain characteristics while concealing others.  
The development and diffusion of digital technologies have had an important impact on the 
dynamics of self-presentation. New media allow people to present to highly selective 
versions of themselves, and SNSs are the latest networked platform enabling self-
presentation to a variety of interconnected audiences (Mendelson and Papacharissi 2011). 
Papacharissi (2011) asserts that the appeal of SNSs derives from their provision of a stage 
for self-presentation and social connection. She argues that these platforms are tools to 
simultaneously present and promote individual and collective identities. SNSs provide props 
such as text, photographs, and other multimedia capabilities that facilitate self-presentation 
in a context where the performance is based on public displays of social connections or 
friends, which are used to authenticate identity and the self through association with social 
circles (Papacharissi 2011). Similarly, Liu (2007) explains how, through SNSs, individuals 
can express their individuality at the same time as connecting to others.  
Papacharissi (2011) observes that the process of self-presentation is complicated in the 
context of SNSs, where private and public boundaries blur, and a variety of audiences which 
may have been separate offline are combined into a single one. This compels users to engage 
in a series of mini performances, resulting in a more malleable presentation of the self that 
can make sense to these multiple audiences (Papacharissi 2011).  In this regard, boyd (2011) 
speaks of networked publics, which are publics restructured by networked technologies, and 
identifies three dynamics playing a central role in shaping them. The first is the presence of 
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invisible audiences as – unlike in offline interactions – the audience is not always known and 
visible. The second is the collapsed context in which the lack of social and spatial boundaries 
complicates the maintenance of separated social contexts and leads to a flattened, collapsed 
audience. The third is the blurring of the public and the private (the private refers to the 
realm of personal intimacy, while the public constitutes what is open, revealed, or accessible 
– Slater 1998; Weintraub 1997), which, combined with the lack of control over the different 
contexts, complicates the determination of the audience for one’s disclosures 
In order to cope with the emergence of this networked, collapsed and invisible audience and 
the blurring of the public and the private, individuals have developed a series of disclosure 
strategies (Vitak 2012). When generating a SNS profile, users have to make a series of 
choices and considerations in relation to how they want to present themselves, the audience 
they wish to view their self-representations and those who actually see them (boyd 2011). 
For these reasons users can opt to limit the visibility of their profile, ranging from truly 
public profiles to semi-public ones (boyd 2011), or apply a lowest common denominator 
strategy, not circulating messages that some audiences may perceive as problematic (Hogan 
2010). Alternatively, users can decide to treat public channels as if they were more private, 
distributing messages to their entire network despite the wish to reach only specific people 
(Marwick and boyd 2011). Furthermore, focusing on Facebook, Brake (2014) shows that 
users may also choose to segregate their audiences by modifying their privacy settings, 
making their posts visible only to certain friends, or by using closed Facebook groups or 
private chats to communicate.  Gross and Acquisti (2005) provide an example of these 
disclosure strategies, finding that students manage their Facebook identity and address their 
privacy concerns about unwanted audiences by: withholding personal information; altering 
the visibility of their information from within the site; creating alternative profiles; and using 
private messaging.  
This section has illustrated the main features of SNSs, the great deal of variation in how 
people use these platforms, and the capability of SNSs to engineer and facilitate users’ 
connectivity. It has identified four dominant themes which have emerged in SNS research: 
networks and networks’ structure, the links between online and offline networks, self-
presentation, and privacy. Furthermore it has indicated the following: the presence of a 
privacy paradox, describing the way in which users might worry about their privacy but still 
disclose a great deal of personal information; how these platform can operate as social 
supernets facilitating the management of larger networks of contacts; that SNSs mainly 
support offline-based connections, but can also connect people on the basis of interests, 
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independently of their locations; and how SNSs complicate the process of self-presentation 
due to the presence of networked publics. 
 
2.4 Facebook: A Connective Platform  
Among the various SNSs operating worldwide (e.g., Twitter, MySpace, Orkut, Instagram, 
Tumblr, etc.) this thesis focuses exclusively on Facebook. There are two main reasons 
behind this choice. The first relates to the popularity of Facebook which has become central 
in organising many people’s social lives (Kirkpatrick 2010; Marichal 2013; van Dijck 2013). 
Launched in 2004 as a website for Harvard University students, Facebook has grown 
exponentially within a few years’ time, reaching one billion active users in 2012 and 
enabling over 140 billion connections between friends (Facebook 2012). With over 30 
million users in the UK and 20 million in Italy, Facebook is the most popular SNS in these 
two countries. In addition, considering the almost identical age composition of the British 
and Italian Facebook populations, this SNS appears the most suitable for a cross-national 
comparison (see Appendix A for Italy and UK Facebook statistics).  
The choice of Facebook has also been influenced by considerations of the tools this SNS 
provides to its users. By taking advantage of a large range of communicative tools (e.g., 
instant and private messages, posts, events, groups, etc.), Facebook users can engage in a 
varied array of political activities – other SNSs have built-in limitations which prevent users 
from engaging in extensive political discussion, for instance Twitter posts are limited to 140 
characters. As described by Caers et al. (2013), Facebook activity develops through two 
main pages: the homepage and the profile. On the profile page, called The Wall, users 
present themselves by providing basic information about themselves (e.g., where they live, 
place of birth, education, job, etc.), and can post pictures and status updates. Facebook 
allows users to interact with each other in a number of different ways: directly through wall 
posting and instant and private messages, or indirectly through status updates and posting 
notes and content (Vitak et al. 2011). Among the various forms of communication, wall 
posts are the most particular ones in that, as explained by Walther et al. (2011), they qualify 
as mass-personal communication (O’Sullivan 2005), which is – as the name suggests – a 
hybrid between mass and personal communication. Wall posts are addressed to the wall’s 
“owner” but they can also be read by other people connected to her/him, so they are personal 
messages which are broadcasted for other to see (Walther et al. 2011). 
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The second page around which Facebook activity develops is the home, called the News 
Feed, where users are informed on the activities of their network (e.g., likes, groups joined, 
status updates, etc.). The News Feed is arguably one of the most innovative features of 
Facebook. It performs an information-based function, simplifying and accelerating the 
sharing of information by showing a constantly updated list of friends’ activities, ranging 
from status updates to recently uploaded content, from posts to joined groups (Vitak et al. 
2011). According to Ruchi Sangivi, News Feed product manager, “the News Feed highlights 
what’s happening in your social circle on Facebook. It updates a personalized list of news 
stories throughout the day” (cited in Kirkpatrick 2010, p. 189). The News Feed drastically 
enhances the informative power of Facebook, which resultantly operates as a media platform 
generating and disseminating customised news stories.  
The News Feed does not display all the activities of someone’s network, but only those 
activities relevant to the user. The relevance of an activity is established through an 
algorithm, the EdgeRank, based on various parameters among which the most important one 
is users’ previous behaviour (Kirkpatrick 2010). This means that if a user does not interact 
with a friend over a certain period of time, this friend’s activities will stop appearing in the 
News Feed. Van Dijck (2013) illustrates that, through the EdgeRank, Facebook ranks the 
importance of friends and controls their visibility and, consequently, the visibility of the 
news, items, and ideas that they post. In this sense, Facebook is a typical example of the new 
ilk of social media platforms which, as explained in the previous section, do not only 
facilitate users’ connectivity but also engineer and manipulate connections. Likewise, 
Marichal (2012) speaks of an architecture of disclosure and observes how the architecture of 
the site imposes choices on users that foster the dissemination and sharing of personal data, 
thus benefitting Facebook in terms of advertising revenues. In this sense, John (2013) 
contends that the notion of sharing is used by Facebook and other corporations in order to 
mystify the logic of profit and advertising on which their operations are based. 
Concerns over the manipulation of the News Feed have grown among researchers and the 
general public since the publication of Kramer et al.’s (2014) experimental study, 
commissioned by Facebook itself. The experiment was conducted on 689,000 Facebook 
users over a period of one week, and manipulated the extent to which people were exposed 
to emotional expressions in their News Feed (a discussion on the ethical issues of such an 
approach can be found in Section 4.7). Kramer et al. (2014) establish that users who were 
exposed to more negative stories through their News Feed were more likely to write negative 
posts, and vice versa, demonstrating how Facebook can manipulate information circulating 
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within its environment. Considering that Facebook is essentially a business based on making 
profit through the free accumulation of participants’ data (Langlois 2011), van Dijck (2013) 
questions the purpose of the EdgeRank – which could be that of personalising and 
optimising users’ online experience but could also be that of promoting users’ interlinking 
for profit generation. She raises the same questions in relation to the Share and Like buttons 
which have been effectively exported to other platforms, enabling users to distribute 
personal information to each other but also enabling the spreading of such information to 
third parties (van Dijck 2013). 
In a review of academic articles dealing with Facebook, Caers et al. (2013) explain that 
because of the limited scope of many of these studies in terms of sample size and settings 
(most articles are based on US samples), and due also to numerous changes in the design and 
features of Facebook, more research is needed. With regards to the various usages of this 
specific SNS, research establishes that this platform is employed mainly to keep in touch 
with friends (Ellison et al. 2006; Joinson 2008; Lampe et al. 2008), to find information or 
seek advice (Vitak and Ellison 2012), to relieve boredom (Lampe et al. 2008), to maintain 
long-distance relationships, for game-playing/entertainment, photo-related activities, 
organising social activities, passive observations, and establishing new friendships (Tosun 
2012). Lampe et al. (2006, 2008) illustrate that the ways people use Facebook remain stable 
over time, unless there are changes in the users’ social contexts (e.g., going abroad to study) 
or in features of the service (e.g., the introduction of the News Feed), and indicate that 
Facebook has become more and more embedded in many people’s lives. Focusing on 
students, Debatin et al. (2009) highlight that Facebook has become ingrained in students’ 
daily routines. In this sense, they speak of a routinisation and ritualisation of Facebook 
which, they argue, is used not only for informational and entertainment purposes, but also 
out of habit because it has become part of people’s everyday lives and routines (Debatin et al. 
2009). 
In an interesting study on Facebook abstention, Portwood-Stacer (2012) suggests that 
resistance to this SNS is driven by concerns about the power that the platform can hold over 
people’s lives, with many non-users positioning “themselves as being above the ‘time-
wasting’, ‘artificiality’, and ‘narcissism’ that they see as characterizing Facebook use” (p. 
1051). The relevance that Facebook has for certain people is arguably rooted in its links to 
the offline sphere. Research finds that users employ the site mainly to articulate what Zhao 
(2006) labels as anchored relationships, namely offline-based online relationships (Lampe et 
al. 2006, 2008; Pempek et al. 2009; Reich et al. 2012; Subrahmanyam et al. 2008). In this 
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sense, Facebook exhibits what Gordon and Koo (2008) label as net-locality in that it often 
utilises lived geography as an organising principle for its network. As Gordon and Koo 
(2008) explain, “Facebook and its ilk ... reify traditional relationships built in physical 
spaces, while at the same time projecting the concept of physical connectivity into the space 
of flows” (p. 209). The net-locality is the original – but not the sole – principle for the 
development of Facebook social networks, as the proliferation of groups built on specific 
interests or issues demonstrates. It could be argued that Facebook started by connecting 
people who are geographically proximate, but then developed into a platform also allowing 
people to connect with one another over mutual interests. This SNS has progressively grown 
into a connective platform which allows individuals to manage a larger set of weak ties – the 
average size of a Facebook network is 320 friends – and to make ephemeral connections into 
something more long-lasting, supporting mainly relationships which originated offline, but 
also aiding the formation of online-based connections (Ellison et al. 2011). The connection 
between Facebook and the offline world is also reflected in users’ profiles. As opposed to 
anonymous settings such as online forums or chat rooms, Facebook is a nonymous 
environment (Zhao 2006) in which users are inclined to keep open and recognisable profiles 
which tend to represent an individual honestly (Ellison et al. 2011; Lampe et al. 2007). In 
theory, Facebook users can also create fake profiles, but because of the nonymous nature of 
anchored relationships (Zhao 2006), and given the presence on users’ profiles of information 
provided by their contacts (e.g., posted photos) and the system (e.g., number of friends), 
Facebook offers a context through which users’ real identity and personality can be inferred 
(Utz 2010).  
In the complex array of factors determining Facebook activity, there is another significant 
intervening item: privacy. A study by Gross and Acquisti (2005) shows that, in the early 
years of Facebook, users were unconcerned about the privacy implications of their Facebook 
use. However, with the growth in popularity of this SNS, privacy threats have also increased, 
with users risking being stalked and harassed (Ybarra and Mitchell 2008), hacked (Greiner 
2009), and falling victim to online identity theft (Laursen 2009). Research attests to an 
increase in the use of protective measures among Facebook users, including greater use of 
privacy settings (Debatin et al. 2009). Due to privacy concerns, users can end up limiting the 
amount of people they connect to through the website, or limiting their Facebook activity in 
general, and the presence of certain individuals or groups within their network can lead them 
to censor updates or use alternative channels (Vitak 2012; Vitak and Ellison 2012). Keeping 
in mind Raynes-Goldie’s (2010) distinction between social and institutional privacy 
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introduced in the previous section, Netchitailova (2012) indicates that Facebook users care 
about both aspects of privacy. While users can take measures to protect their social privacy 
such as the creation of alternative profiles or resorting to self-censorship, with regards to 
institutional privacy, the only solution is switching to platforms with better privacy policies. 
However, many users tend to be unaware of alternative platforms, or are reluctant to switch, 
for fear of remaining isolated (Netchitailova 2012). In this sense, Fuchs (2011) emphasises a 
tension between the social and the business sides of online platforms. He indicates Facebook 
as a typical case because, while on the one hand, this SNS claims to value its users’ privacy 
and provides them with privacy settings to protect it, on the other hand, as a corporation, it 
collects its users’ data and sells them to advertisers (Fuchs 2011).  
In summary, among the various SNSs worldwide, Facebook is the one with the largest user 
base. This statistic applies to both Italy and the UK, the two countries on which this thesis 
focuses. Facebook provides its users with a wealth of communicative tools, and the most 
revolutionary component of this SNS is arguably the News Feed, which accelerates the 
sharing and circulation of information in this online environment. Facebook can be described 
as a connective platform facilitating – but also engineering – connections, and exploiting 
users’ data, in order to generate profit. This SNS has gradually become more integrated in 
many people’s everyday lives, providing a novel arena for self-presentation, relationship-
maintenance and creation, and informational and entertainment activities. Facebook tends to 
support mainly anchored relationships, and due to its popularity and nonymous nature, it 
exposes users to privacy risks which can lead them to adopt protective measures and limit 
their Facebook activity. 
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3 INTERNET, SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES AND 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION RESEARCH   
This chapter reviews the academic literature investigating the links between the Internet, 
SNSs and political participation. It focuses first on political participation in general, then 
moves on to examine how digital technologies can contribute to specific forms of political 
participation such as the consumption of political information, political discussion, and 
political mobilisation. 
Figure 2 –  Internet and Political Participation Research: Conceptual Map 
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3.1 Political Participation: Optimists, Normalisers and Pessimists 
As anticipated in Section 1.1, over the last decade there has been a proliferation of academic 
studies addressing the relationship between the Internet and politics (Chadwick and Horward 
2009; Holtz-Bacha 2004; Wang 2007), with an increasing number of publications focusing 
on how this medium can affect citizens’ political engagement and participation (Anduiza et 
al. 2009). Within this research strand it is possible to identify three main schools of thought 
that have generated a lively academic debate, still very much alive today. At one end of the 
continuum there are the optimists who speak of mobilisation and argue that the Internet 
promotes political participation by the following means: offering additional and convenient 
pathways to participation; generating new forms of political engagement and participation; 
and engaging audiences traditionally characterised by lower levels of political engagement 
and activity such as young people, individuals with lower socio-economic status or isolated 
citizens (Bachmann et al. 2010; Bachmann and Gil de Zúñiga 2013; Bengtsson and 
Christensen 2012; Borge and Cardenal 2010; Boullianne 2009; Copeland and Bimber 2015; 
Delli Carpini 2000; Gibson et al. 2005; Hamilton and Tolbert 2012; Jensen 2013; Johnson 
and Kaye 2003; Kavanaugh et al. 2008; Kim and Kim 2007; Krueger 2002; Morris and 
Morris 2013; Rojas and Puig-i-Abril 2009; Tolbert and McNeal 2003; Ward et al. 2003).  
An example of a study endorsing the optimists’ stance is that of Bengtsson and Christensen 
(2012), who, focusing on the case of Finland, propose that the Internet helps to mobilise a 
considerable segment of the population not engaged in politics. Hamilton and Tolbert (2012) 
confirm the mobilising potential of the Internet, suggesting that online information gathering 
and participation may encourage offline political participation and political interest also in 
those citizens who are uninterested in politics, with the Internet leading in certain cases to 
accidental political mobilisation. The role of information as a mobilisation agent for 
audiences characterised by limited levels of political activity is also highlighted by Rojas and 
Puig-i-Abril (2009), who establish that digital technologies offer additional pathways to 
information, stimulating political behaviours in the offline domain. Similarly, Morris and 
Morris (2013) show that in the early stages of the 2012 American presidential campaign, 
greater levels of access to the Internet were associated with greater political knowledge and 
engagement in individuals with low socio-economic status (see Section 2.1.2 for a discussion 
of the impact of SES on political participation).They attribute this link to the incidental 
learning which occurs during high-profile political events. 
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At the other end of the continuum, there are the pessimists who describe the Internet as a 
distracting medium which can contribute to civic decline by inducing citizens to engage in 
web activities, and taking them away from more meaningful forms of participation (Nisbet 
and Scheufele 2004; Scheufele and Nisbet 2002; Zhang and Chia 2006). This perspective has 
been inspired by Putnam’s (1995, 2000) work on social capital. Putnam (2000) documents 
the erosion of social capital (see p. 19, for a definition of social capital) in the American 
society over the last few decades. Putnam (2000) argues that this decline is associated with 
an increase in the viewing of entertainment TV, an activity which displaces time that could 
be invested in civic or political activities. Several authors apply the time displacement 
hypothesis to the online environment, suggesting that the Internet generates passivity by 
absorbing energies that citizens would otherwise invest in political or civic activities (Diani 
2001; Kraut et al. 1998; Lusoli and Ward 2004; Nie and Erbring 2002; Rash 1997; Turkle 
1996). This notion has informed the pessimists’ stance. 
Finally, there is a third school of thought, the advocates of which are referred to in the 
academic literature as normalisers. The normalisers paint a picture in which the Internet has 
supplementary effects on political participation and engagement, reinforcing current 
participatory trends by aiding those citizens already interested in politics (Calenda and 
Meijer 2009; Calenda and Mosca 2007; Cremonesi et al. 2014; Dutta-Bergman and Chung 
2005; Kenski and Stroud 2006; Kim 2006; Krueger 2006; Moy et al. 2005; Norris 2001, 
2002; Polat 2005; Wang 2007). Online political activities are perceived in this sense as an 
extension of offline ones (Calenda and Mosca 2007), with the Internet, rather than operating 
as a game-changing technology, simply providing politically interested citizens with further 
ways to engage and participate (Tedesco 2004). In the normalisers’ conception, even if the 
Internet has in part transformed the ways of doing politics, it has not changed who 
participates in politics (Bimber 2003). Among this group of scholars, there are some who 
perceive the reinforcement role of the Internet in a negative light. They believe that, by 
strengthening existing patterns of political engagement and participation, the Internet 
fortifies established power structures and widens the knowledge gap between politically 
active and less active citizens, making the rich richer and the poor poorer (Bimber 2001, 
2003; Bonfadelli 2002; Brundige and Rice 2009; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993; Lindner and 
Riehm 2011; Schlozman et al. 2010; Tedesco 2004; Weber et al. 2003). 
A distinction between the various digital tools could help to shed light on the debate between 
Internet optimists, pessimists and normalisers. In this sense, Dimitrova et al. (2014) argue 
that it is a mistake to think in terms of general influence, as the effects vary across different 
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digital tools. For instance, their study illustrates that consuming online news has no effect on 
offline political participation, whereas visiting party web sites and using social media for 
political purposes increase participation (Dimitrova et al. 2014). Likewise, focusing on news 
consumption, Yoo and Gil de Zúñiga (2014) stress the differential impact of Facebook and 
blogs, with the first amplifying inequalities between people of different socio-economic 
status, and blog-use associated with an increase in less-educated participants’ political 
knowledge. However, even when such a distinction is made and research focuses specifically 
on SNSs, a mixed picture emerges, similarly to the work which has been produced relating 
to the Internet in general. Some scholars stress the positive impact of SNSs on political 
activity, whereas others minimise their mobilising capability, emphasising their tendency to 
reinforce existing participatory patterns or highlighting their limited or even negative 
influence on political participation.   
A pioneering study within this subject area is that of Williams and Gulati (2007) who 
investigate the relation between candidates’ number of Facebook friends and their vote share 
in 2006 US Midterm elections. They establish that Facebook support has a significant effect 
on candidates’ final vote share and suggest that SNSs are capable of affecting the electoral 
process. However, Williams and Gulati’s (2007) study is somewhat limited in that it focuses 
exclusively on the aggregate level, without examining and explaining the processes behind 
users’ voting behaviour. This approach has been criticised by Kim and Geidner (2008) who 
attempt to fill this gap. Kim and Geidner (2008) indicate that SNS usage enhances voting 
probability by increasing individual and collective voting rewards such as social capital, 
civic duty and political efficacy, and that these platforms are particularly relevant for young 
voters who are, in general, relatively alienated from politics. These two studies identify a 
positive relationship between SNS usage and voting but, by concentrating solely on voting, 
they leave the rest of the political participation spectrum untouched. Other more 
comprehensive investigations confirm that SNSs can aid and promote citizens’ political 
participation (Baek 2015; Bond et al. 2012; Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012; Halpern and Lee 2011; 
Holt et al. 2013; Towner 2013; Xenos et al. 2014). Replicating what Bachman et al. (2010) 
find with respect to online media in general, Holt et al. (2013), Towner (2013) and Xenos et 
al. (2014) all provide evidence in support of the mobilisation hypothesis and argue that SNSs 
could serve as a leveller of political participation between younger and older citizens, as 
youths’ high usage of SNSs can compensate for their limited usage of traditional media to 
obtain political information.  
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In contrast to these findings, there are other studies which paint a picture of limited 
(Baumgartner and Morris 2010; Valenzuela et al. 2009) or even negative effects (Ancu and 
Cozma 2009; Fenton and Barassi 2011) of SNSs on political participation. In their study 
exploring the reasons why members of the public visited MySpace profiles of 2008 US 
primary candidates, Ancu and Cozma (2009) determine that users are attracted to MySpace 
mainly because they desire social interaction with other like-minded individuals, a type of 
usage negatively related to campaign involvement in the study. Fenton and Barassi (2011) 
provide an interesting explanation of the negative influence that SNSs can have on political 
participation. They contend that in assessing the political potential of SNSs, differences 
between individual and collective forms of participation have to be considered. Fenton and 
Barassi (2011) argue, in fact, that SNSs tend to foster individualism and personal affairs, 
disconnecting individuals from the public terrain of political participation and guiding them 
away from the communality of collective political endeavour in favour of “narratives of the 
self and forms of self-representation” (p. 190). Other authors such as Baumgartner and 
Morris (2010) and Valenzuela et al. (2009) reject the idea that SNSs negatively affect 
political participation, suggesting instead that these platforms have limited or no effects on 
political participation. Baumgartner and Morris (2010) find that SNSs did not increase 
political interest and participation in young people who employ these platforms mainly to 
seek out supporting views. Similarly, focusing on the case of Facebook, Valenzuela et al. 
(2009) stress the limited contributions of SNSs to youths’ political participation, arguing that 
these platforms are not the most effective tools to counteract youths’ political 
disengagement. 
Finally, there are a number of other investigations which back up the normalisers’ stance and 
establish that politically engaged individuals get the most from SNSs (Carlisle and Patton 
2013; Gustafsson 2012; Mascheroni 2012; Rainie and Smith 2012; Vesnic-Alujevic 2012; 
Vitak et al. 2011; Yoo and Gil de Zúñiga 2014). Focusing on Facebook, Carlisle and Patton 
(2013) find that during the 2008 US primary and general elections, people showed a limited 
engagement in political activity via Facebook, and that political interest strongly influenced 
Facebook political participation. These findings are supported by Vesnic-Alujevic (2012) 
and Gustafsson (2012). The first indicates that the more people were involved in politics 
offline, the more they participated politically through their Facebook profile pages. 
Similarly, distinguishing between members and non-members of interest organisations, 
Gustafsson (2012) establishes that members consider SNSs valuable tools for participation. 
In contrast, non-members generally refrain from sharing political views with their SNS 
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friends and, despite being exposed to political content and requests for participation, prefer 
to remain passive (Gustafsson 2012). Finally, there is Vitak et al.’s (2011) study which is 
arguably one of the most comprehensive efforts in SNS and political participation research. 
Vitak et al. (2011) establish that Facebook can provide young people with a space to express 
their political opinions, to search for political information, and to engage in political 
discussions. Vitak et al. (2011) also recognise the potential of this specific SNS as a political 
tool, stressing the strong link between Facebook political activity, political interest and 
offline political participation. In this sense, their research can be placed in the normalisers’ 
group, suggesting that those who are already politically engaged seek multiple outlets for 
their political behaviours and that SNSs alone do not drive previously inactive individuals to 
political participation.   
As illustrated in this section, contrasting evidence characterises research examining the 
contributions of the Internet and SNSs to political participation, with three schools of 
thought, i.e., optimists, normalisers, and pessimists, generating an intense academic debate. 
Among them, the normalisers’ stance has found the most support in terms of academic 
research, but the presence of many pessimist and optimist studies demonstrates that there is 
no conclusive evidence in this regard. Such a state of affairs calls for further research in this 
area and highlights the need of new approaches (a potentially fruitful one is presented in 
Section 4.1) examining the links between digital technologies and citizens’ political 
participation.  
 
3.2 Political Information: Multiplication of Sources, Fragmentation and 
Exposure to Political Difference 
Section 2.1.1 has highlighted that political participation is a complex phenomenon which 
encompasses a wide range of participatory activities. The multifaceted nature of political 
participation is also stressed by Vedel (2007), who proposes three axes for making sense of 
the political uses of the Internet, and distinguishes between information, discussion and 
mobilisation. Taking into account such a distinction, this section considers the links between 
the Internet, SNSs and political information, while the next two sections deal with political 
discussion and mobilisation respectively. 
Regarding the information axis, the contributions of the Internet are certainly manifold. 
According to McNair (2009), two main areas of the information environment have been 
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particularly affected by digital technologies. The first relates to the flow of information 
which has been heavily accelerated, while the second concerns the access to information, 
with the online medium offering countless choices and opportunities (McNair 2009). 
Citizens searching for political information can access online innumerable and diverse 
sources, ranging from political institutions, candidates and news organisations, to bloggers, 
video-sharing websites, non-profit organisations and private citizens (Bennett and Iyengar 
2008; Kenski and Stroud 2006; Tewksbury and Rittenberg 2012). Accordingly, Cavanaugh 
(2000) calls the Internet a political wall-mart, a single resource from which it is possible to 
obtain a wide variety of political information.  
Tewksbury and Rittenberg (2009) consider these changes in the information environment as 
an information revolution, and highlight their political consequences. They note that citizens 
are more and more likely to use the Internet to obtain political information and how, online, 
politically engaged citizens can take advantage of the richness of information and become 
more effective than ever in terms of political participation (Tewksbury and Rittenberg 2009). 
Other academics go even further and, considering the informative capabilities of the Internet, 
deem this medium as a potentially democratic device. For instance, Milakovich (2010) 
regards the increase of political information triggered by the Internet as an opportunity for 
the development of a more informed electorate, which is widely considered an essential 
prerequisite for a well-functioning democracy (Frey and Stutzer 2006; Gans, 2004; Sotirovic 
and McLeod 2004). Similarly, Fallows (2002) asserts that the Internet benefits democracy by 
expanding people’s horizons, exposing them to new ideas. In this sense, digital media have 
taken on a double role and, if on one hand they complement traditional media, on the other 
hand they can also operate as alternative information sources (Calenda and Mosca 2007). 
Alternative media can be defined as ‘‘any media that are produced by non-commercial 
sources and attempt to transform existing social roles and routines by critiquing and 
challenging power structures’’ (Atkinson 2006, p. 252). Alternative media aim to subvert the 
hierarchy of access characterising mainstream media (Atton 2002), and to fill the cultural 
and social gaps caused by the mainstream blockage of public expression (Downing 2001). 
The Internet has lowered the production and distribution costs for alternative media, making 
public affairs information more diverse and diffuse, and allowing such media to reach a 
wider audience (Leung and Lee 2014).  
The current transformations in the media and information environment, however, are not 
only due to the increase in available information but also to a surge in demand for such 
information. According to Bennett and Iyengar (2008), the Internet has played a decisive 
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role in this sense by shaping an information greedy culture, with citizens increasingly 
expecting accuracy, accountability and transparency from information sources, whether 
private or public. The Internet, with its limitless capacity for content diversity and quantity 
(Tewksbury and Rittenberg 2012), is the engine driving such a demand, facilitating the 
development of an open information environment (Milakovich 2010).  
Furthermore, digital media have, in part, changed the relationship between people and news. 
Hardy et al. (2009) observe that digital technologies have not only multiplied the number of 
information sources and the amount of available information, but they have also transformed 
the nature of information by providing increasingly interactive and networked content. The 
Internet has become a central news source and transformed the news experience in the 
following ways: it has made news portable, with some citizens accessing news on-the-go 
through their mobiles; news is now personalised, with Internet users frequently customising 
their homepage to include news from specific sources and about topics of interest; and news 
is also participatory, with some users contributing to the creation of news and its 
dissemination (Purcell et al. 2010). However, Jackson (2008) highlights how such 
participatory trends are somewhat counteracted by mainstream news outlets, which feed 
citizens a diet of news that encourages them to be apolitical spectators, and possibly deter 
them from looking for arenas like the Internet in which active engagement is celebrated.  
With respect to the potential participatory nature of online information, Chadwick (2012) 
introduces the concept of informational exuberance through which he aims to capture “the 
willingness of non-elites to contribute to the collective production, reworking, and sharing of 
media content” (p. 40). An example of informational exuberance is the so called citizen 
journalism which includes practices such as blogging about current affairs, posting 
eyewitness commentary, sharing, linking, rating and commenting on news material posted 
by other users or news outlets (Goode 2009). Most of these practices did not start with the 
Internet – for instance, there are news reports on TV which include eyewitness footage taken 
with mobile phones – but have certainly proliferated in the online environment. Social cues 
and personal recommendations today have a strong influence on the way people consume 
news online and on the sources they select (Messing et al. 2011), to the extent that news 
consumption is becoming a shared social experience, a trend influenced by the ascent of 
mobile connectivity, blogs and SNSs (Purcell et al. 2010).  
With regard to the specific case of SNSs, research attests to the relevance of these platforms 
as information sources and finds that one of the main motivations behind their usage is the 
  
49 
gathering of political information (Baresch et al. 2011; Hermida et al. 2011; Messing and 
Westwood 2012; Mitchell et al. 2013; Rainie and Smith 2012; Rainie et al. 2012; Vickery 
2009; Weeks and Holbert 2013). Messing and Westwood (2012) describe SNSs as news 
aggregators, in that they collect contents coming from a number of sources into a single 
location, a space in which news organisations and journalists – but also general users – 
operate as content distributors (Weeks and Holbert 2013). In a recent report from the Pew 
Research Center, Mitchell et al. (2013) find that the more time people spend on Facebook, 
the more likely they are to obtain news, and that some users, particularly young people, are 
exposed through SNSs to news that otherwise they might not get. Similarly, in Vickery’s 
(2009) qualitative study, participants cite Facebook as a major source of political 
information, many of them claiming to have discovered new sources of news through the 
links their friends post on this SNS. According to Vickery (2009), these results are indicative 
of a larger trend in which an increasing number of people are using SNSs as news 
aggregators.  
A particularly optimistic picture of the impact of the Internet and SNSs upon the political 
information environment has emerged from these first paragraphs. A voice outside this 
optimist chorus is Polat (2005), who identifies five factors limiting the contributions of the 
Internet to the creation of a more informed society. The first factor is the information 
overload. Polat (2005) stresses that humans can only process a limited amount of 
information. She refers to Percy Smith (1995), who argues that wide availability of 
information could negatively impact democracy, as citizens may feel overwhelmed and 
become dependent on external institutions to organise and understand such information.  
The second factor is the limited range of arguments resulting from media gatekeeping. 
Considering how in the US major media companies such as Time Warner and AOL have 
invested heavily in the web, and how search engines favour certain websites rather than 
others, Polat (2005) observes that the Internet may not be completely immune to the power 
structures operating in the offline world. By the same token, Brundidge (2007) points out the 
elitist nature of the online information environment which she believes to be dominated by a 
limited number of agenda setters (for a further discussion of the elitist character of the 
Internet see Section 2.2). However, Brundidge (2007) also recognises that these online 
agenda setters are not necessarily associated with major political parties and media and, 
consequently, do not always duplicate offline power structures.  
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The third and fourth factors identified by Polat (2005) are the difference among Internet 
users in terms of motivations and web usages (other scholars talk in this sense of usage gap 
as discussed in Section 2.2), and citizens’ unequal distribution of resources. In order to back 
up her argument, Polat (2005) considers the study of Shah et al. (2001) which shows that 
people with low education tend to use the Internet mainly for entertainment, while more 
educated people employ the Internet more for informational purposes. In the same vein, 
Jackson (2008) observes that if on one hand there has never been more information available 
to interested citizens, on the other hand it has never been easier for unengaged users to avoid 
political content. Hence, Polat (2005) argues that the Internet tends to benefit people who are 
already in a better position in terms of skills, income and physical access to political 
information. The third and fourth limitations identified by Polat (2005) are linked to 
Tichenor et al.’s (1970) knowledge gap theory. In agreement with van Dijk (2012), who 
notes that due to the Internet the information elite is likely to grow, Bimber (2003) applies 
such a theoretical framework to the online environment and concludes that the Internet could 
widen the gap between information rich and information poor (this position is shared by 
other scholars falling within the normalisers group, see Section 3.1).   
Finally, Polat (2005) recognises a fifth factor, also acknowledged by Bimber (2003), limiting 
the contributions of the Internet to the creation of a more informed citizenry. This factor is 
the high degree of selective exposure characterising the online environment. The alleged 
tendency of the Internet to promote selective exposure is an area of concern for a number of 
scholars who believe that this phenomenon will progressively lead to a more fragmented, 
polarised and, consequently, less-informed electorate (Bennett and Iyengar 2008; Habermas 
2006; Polat 2005; Sunstein 2001). The theory of selective exposure finds its roots in 
Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory and suggests that to elude cognitive 
discomfort, individuals tend to expose themselves to pro-attitudinal information while 
avoiding conflicting perspectives (Klapper 1960). To date, these theoretical claims have 
received mixed support (Brundidge 2007). As reported by Holbert et al. (2010, pp. 19-20), 
there are studies challenging the premise that ideological homogeneity is psychologically 
desirable (Frey 1986), and arguing that selective exposure does not necessarily lead to the 
avoidance of attitude-discrepant information (Chaffee et al. 2001; Garrett 2009; Webster 
2007). In the last decade, the changes which have occurred in the information environment 
have attracted renewed attention to the issue of selective exposure, with numerous 
researchers finding that the Internet tends to foster this phenomenon (Adamic and Glance 
2005; Bimber and Davis 2003; Nie et al. 2010; Stroud 2008; Tewksbury and Rittenberg 
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2009). Adamic and Glance (2005) study the links among the posts of a series of blogs, 
showing that Liberal blogs link primarily to other Liberal blogs, while the opposite happens 
for Conservative blogs. Similarly, Stroud (2008) establishes that people’s political beliefs 
relate to their media exposure, both online and offline. These findings are confirmed by Nie 
et al. (2010), who demonstrate that online consumers expose themselves to news content in 
line with their own political views.  
Along the same lines, Bimber and Davis (2003) analysed the audiences of campaign 
websites during the 2000 US presidential election, concluding that when compared with 
television and newspapers, the Internet provides the conditions most conducive to selective 
exposure. According to them, this is due to two structural aspects of this medium: the 
presence of a pro-active and self-selecting audience; and the abundance of information and 
the consequent proliferation of media choices (Bimber and Davis 2003). The active role of 
the audience in content selection and consumption is, in fact, a necessary condition to the 
occurrence of selective exposure (Dutta-Bergman and Chung 2005), with individuals who 
tend to select information strengthening their existing positions (Anduiza et al. 2009). In 
relation to the proliferation of media choices, Bennett and Iyengar (2008) talk of a shift from 
information commons to information stratamentation. They argue that fifty years ago it was 
possible to talk of information commons, as the information provided by news organisation 
was extremely homogeneous and standardised. The rise of the Internet and the resulting 
proliferation of information sources have led to the fragmentation of the information 
environment. This new information regime (Bimber 2003) is characterised by information 
stratamentation, namely a combination of segmentation and fragmentation of information 
(Bennett and Iyengar 2008).  
Tewksbury and Rittenberg (2009) believe that specialisation, segmentation, fragmentation 
and polarisation are inter-related phenomena. They describe specialisation as the tendency of 
some individuals to focus on certain topics, or the disposition of websites to tailor their 
content to specific audiences. In their view, the specialisation of news exposure can cause 
the segmentation of audiences and, ultimately, fragmentation which is defined as “the lack of 
widespread public exposure to some content of interest” (Tewksbury and Rittenberg 2009, p. 
196). They argue that a fragmented information environment is prone to polarisation which 
occurs when audience groups consume idiosyncratic content. Tewksbury and Rittenberg 
(2009) develop an interesting argument and claim that by providing “too much freedom”, by 
enabling users to focus on content and activities which are relevant to them, the Internet can 
lead to selective exposure and the exclusion of counter-attitudinal political information.  
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However, despite many speculations and theorisations, the relationship between the Internet 
and exposure to politically-diverse information is, today, still unclear. As shown, some 
research supports the argument that the Internet increasingly exposes individuals to pro-
attitudinal perspectives. On the other hand, there are many other investigations reporting that 
online users not only seek out attitude-consistent information, but also consume more 
attitude-discrepant information (Garrett 2009; Garrett et al. 2013; Johnson and Kaye 2013b; 
Jun 2012, Messing et al. 2011). In support of this stance, there is a strand of research 
asserting that Internet users can break away from the dynamics of selective exposure through 
accidental exposure to information. Brundidge (2010) speaks of inadvertency and argues that 
in the online environment, individuals are exposed to more political difference than they 
would be otherwise, even if only inadvertently. The inadvertency thesis is supported by 
several scholars (Baum 2003; Cornfield 2005; Lev-On 2008; Wojcieszak and Mutz 2009). 
For instance, Baum (2003) explains that during high-profile political events, people with 
limited political knowledge can learn more about politics simply by stumbling across 
information while browsing the Internet for entertainment or social networking. Similarly, 
Rainie et al. (2005) find that over a third of Internet users, rather than getting campaign news 
through a direct search, obtain this information accidentally, while surfing the web for 
different purposes. In the same vein, Tewksbury et al. (2001) observe that Internet users can 
acquire information in an incidental fashion, as “a byproduct of their other online activities” 
(p. 533). 
The issue of selective exposure has also been examined regularly in research focusing on 
SNSs. As with studies related to the Internet, research has produced contrasting findings in 
relation to these platforms. Messing and Westwood (2012) establish that on SNSs, the social 
endorsement of political stories coming from politically heterogeneous contacts can reduce 
partisan selective exposure. In line with Ismail and Abdul Latif’s (2013) study, Messing and 
Westwood (2012) explain this finding with the fact that SNS users operate in a context 
which emphasises social value over partisan affiliation. Bae (2013) and Lee et al. (2014) 
confirm that SNS usage can promote the exposure to political difference, with the Lee et al. 
(2014) attributing these findings to the capability of these platforms to support network 
heterogeneity. Vickery (2009), Kim (2011) and An et al. (2011) also establish that SNSs can 
expose users to cross-cutting opinions, but provide an alternative explanation for their 
results, ascribing them to the accidental exposure to information that can occur in these 
environments. For instance, An et al. (2011) find that on Twitter there is a non-negligible 
amount of indirect media exposure which expands the diversity of news that users are 
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exposed to, while Vickery (2009) explains that on Facebook people no longer have to seek 
out information, but rather the information is presented to them whenever they access the 
site. These findings, however, do not exclude the possibility of the occurrence of selective 
exposure on SNSs. For instance, in a qualitative content analysis of Facebook posts, Meyer 
(2012) observes that in the US, Republicans and Democrats have built highly partisan social 
media communities. Similarly, Weeks and Holbert (2013) show that, on SNSs, users can 
obtain information from both consonant and dissonant sources, and disseminate this 
information to other consonant or dissonant users. 
This section has highlighted how, first the Internet, and then SNSs, have revolutionised 
today’s information environment. Digital technologies have multiplied the number of 
information sources, complementing traditional media but also operating as an alternative to 
them. In addition, they have transformed the nature of information and made the information 
experience portable, personalised, participatory and social, thereby transforming the way 
individuals relate to sources of information in general. The main criticisms levelled against 
the Internet regarding its impact on information are related to the so-called information 
overload, to the increase of knowledge gaps between information rich and information poor, 
and to the creation of echo-chambers where users interact only with like-minded individuals. 
These criticisms are supported by numerous studies, but also contradicted by many others 
showing that: users value the diverse array of choices offered by the Internet; individuals can 
obtain political information they would not have got otherwise through the Internet and 
SNSs; and people can be exposed online to political difference, either deliberately or 
inadvertently. 
 
3.3 Political Discussion: Superparticipants, Third Spaces, Flaming and 
Echo-Chambers 
This section addresses how the Internet and SNSs operate with respect to political 
discussion, the second axis identified by Vedel (2007) in his categorisation aiming to 
facilitate the assessment of the political uses of digital technologies.  
Before assessing the links between the Internet and this phenomenon, a clarification of what 
is intended in this thesis as political discussion is in order. Schudson (1997) argues that not 
all political conversations are meaningful for democracy, and that political discussion should 
be persuasive, informative and focus on goals, issues, problem-solving, and public interests. 
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In contrast with such a stance, a more wide-ranging definition of political discussion is 
employed in the present research. This choice has been inspired by Papacharissi (2010) and 
her insightful book, A Private Sphere. Papacharissi (2010) observes that in the online 
environment the expression of political opinion overshadows the deliberation of public 
issues. She attributes this trend to the nature of cyberspace, which is at the same time private 
and public, and to the shift from traditional institutionalised politics to what Bennett (1998) 
describes as lifestyle politics (see Section 1.2). According to Papacharissi (2010), civic 
engagement has developed across converging and interlinked social, cultural, economic and 
political planes, and is shaped by citizens’ personal agendas. The private sphere is a sphere 
that connects “the personal to the political, and the self to polity and society” (Papacharissi 
2010, p. 164). In line with these considerations, this thesis places not only formal political 
debates and deliberation, but also more casual political conversations, under the umbrella of 
political discussion. 
With respect to formal political debate and deliberation, a rich and diverse academic 
literature has developed, tackling such a notion from multiple perspectives. Some authors 
focus on the process and on the conditions prompting deliberation (Briand 2006; Gutmann 
and Thompson 1996; Littlejohn and Domenici 2001), while others consider the outcomes of 
the deliberative process (Fischer 2003; Fishkin and Luskin 2005; Price et al. 2002) and its 
contribution to democracy (Bohman 1996; Dewey 1927; Habermas 1989; Dryzek 2000). 
Evans (2001) describes deliberation as a “particular form of dialogue associated with 
democratic decision making” (p. 776). In a deliberative process, actors operate together, they 
mutually respect and listen to each other, present their arguments reasonably and are willing 
to revise their initial stances (Gutmann and Thompson 1996).  
As previously said, more casual and less structured political conversations are also 
considered under the banner of political discussion in the present research. These types of 
conversation can be described as political talk, which refers to a “non-purposive, informal, 
casual, and spontaneous political conversation voluntarily carried out by free citizens, 
without being constrained by formal procedural rules and predetermined agenda” (Kim and 
Kim 2008, p. 54), and to “a public-spirited way of talking whereby citizens make 
connections from their individual and personal experiences, issues and so forth to society” 
(Graham and Hajru 2011, p. 20). Wyatt et al. (2000) establish that political matters are not 
discussed in isolation from other topics and that political and personal conversation form a 
continuum with one another. Wyatt et al. (2000, p. 88) highlight how several academics 
question the role of politics in everyday discussion (Eliasoph 1998; Noelle-Neumann 1993; 
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Schudson 1997). Schudson (1997), for instance, argues that politics is a complicated and 
divisive topic and often avoided in informal, casual conversations. In contrast, other political 
scientists such as Tocqueville (1969), Dewey (1927) and Barber (1984) contend that political 
discussion and everyday conversation mingle together, with interlocutors shifting between 
aimless chat about personal issues and the discussion of political subjects. Drawing on the 
same theoretical premise, Oldenburg (1999) develops the notion of third place, “a generic 
designation for a great variety of public spaces that host the regular, voluntary, informal, and 
happily anticipated gatherings of individuals’ and is a core setting of informal public life” (p. 
16). According to Oldenburg (1999), third places such as English pubs or French cafés 
strengthen citizenship, and are central to the development of communities and the 
democratic process.  
With regards to the impact of the Internet on political discussion, Levine (2000) draws 
attention to a shift that occurred at the start of the new millennium, with an increasing 
number of individuals moving to computer-mediated discussion spaces such as newsgroups 
and forums. Online discussion differs from its offline counterpart in that it tends to be 
written, asynchronous, anonymous (Lin, 2008), and simultaneously interpersonal and 
broadcast (Himelboim et al. 2009). The popularity and diffusion of digital tools for the 
discussion of political matters lies on certain archetypical assets of these technologies, such 
as the enormous amount of retrievable information available online (Papacharissi 2002). In 
this regard, Stromer-Galley (2003) finds that one of the main reasons individuals enjoy 
online political discussion is that they can obtain through this means new information which 
would otherwise be difficult to acquire.  Online, people can learn about a political topic of 
which they know little, but also obtain a deeper understanding of issues about which they are 
knowledgeable, learn about other people’s opinions, and better understand their own 
political beliefs and views (Stromer-Galley 2003). The online medium seems to facilitate the 
contribution of low-status participants (Rice 1993), and offers citizens a certain flexibility, 
enabling them to reach geographically distant interlocutors (Papacharissi 2002) and to fit 
political discussions within their daily schedules (Hauben and Hauben 1997).  
In an analysis of almost 40,000 authors in 20 political Usenet newsgroups, Himelboim et al. 
(2009) speak of discussion’s catalysts and find that “the flow of information from the 
content creators to the readers and writers is mediated by a few individuals who act as filters 
and amplifiers” (p. 771). These results support Lazarsfeld et al.’s (1948) Two-Steps Flow 
theory, according to which a limited number of opinion leaders play a central role in the flow 
of information from mass media to audience. The concept of discussion’s catalysts is 
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consistent with the typology of superparticipation developed by Graham and Wright (2014).  
In line with several empirical studies indicating the presence of a minority dominating online 
political discussion (Awan 2007; Davis 2005; Wright 2006), Graham and Wright (2014) 
confirm that superparticipants (in their categorisation they distinguish between superposters, 
agenda-setters and facilitators) quantitatively dominate online debates. Arguably, the more 
stimulating and novel findings of Graham and Wright’s (2014) investigation come from the 
qualitative content’s analysis of superparticipants’ posts. In contrast to the negative frame 
through which the presence of a dominant minority is often addressed (Dahlberg 2001), they 
establish that most superparticipants perform a positive role, as they do not attempt to stop 
other users from posting (i.e., curbing), or attack them (i.e., flaming), but undertake a range 
of positive functions such as helping other users, replying to debates, summarising longer 
threads for new discussants and engaging in rational critical debates. 
In relation to the specific case of SNSs, Kushin and Kitchener (2009) recognise that these 
platforms have created unprecedented opportunities for human-to-human interaction and 
grown into a unique arena for online discussion. Likewise, Bae (2013), considering the 2012 
South Korean presidential election, highlights the growing centrality of SNSs as a venue for 
citizens’ political conversations. In relation to Facebook, Roberts and Andersen (2009) 
demonstrate that, in the context of 2008 US presidential elections, this SNS was for college 
students a major forum for political discussion. Furthermore, in a discourse analysis of the 
Facebook page “Join the Coffee Party Movement,” Mascaro and Goggins (2011) establish 
that significant deliberative discourse among members emerges in this open public space.  
Grounded in a critique of Oldenburg’s third place, Wright (2012) emphasises the relevance 
of non-deliberative forms of online political discussion and introduces the concept of third 
spaces, described as “non-political online spaces where political talk emerges” (p. 5). One of 
the main differences between third place and third space is that the latter does not privilege 
place-based communities. Wright (2012) highlights how research investigating online 
political discussion tends to focus mainly on formal and explicit political spaces such as 
government-run forums or parties’ websites, ignoring the spaces where the majority of talk 
between “ordinary” citizens is likely to happen. In line with Papacharissi’s (2010) 
observations reported at the beginning of this section, due to the decentralisation 
characterising political communication today, which is linked to the rise of Bennett’s (1998) 
lifestyle politics, Graham and Hajru (2011) advocate for the adoption of a “porous approach 
to the ‘political’ in political talk” (p. 19) and stress the need to examine third spaces. 
Investigations focusing on political talk on third spaces suggest that it can be reciprocal, 
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reflexive and deliberative, holding the potential to mobilise citizens and lead them to 
political action (Graham 2010, 2012; Graham and Hajru 2011; Graham and Wright 2014). A 
less positive picture is painted by Jackson et al. (2013) in a quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of three general interest, UK-based online discussion forums, i.e., HotUKDeals, 
Digitalspy, and Mumsnet: playful and frivolous chat pervades these forums; users display 
little inclination to engage in political discussion; and an underlying passivity towards the 
political process and cynicism towards politics and politicians characterise the generated 
talk. With respect to SNSs, Wright et al. (2016) observe how there has been relatively little 
research focusing on how third spaces can form on SNSs. They note that only certain areas 
of these platforms – for instance, Facebook groups developing around fashion or football – 
can be considered third spaces, while this definition cannot be extended to highly political 
areas such as politicians’ Facebook pages or Twitter accounts. Wright et al. (2016) argue that 
social media are arenas in which the personal can overlap with the political, and where 
political talk is present and can even thrive.  
Third spaces are relevant also to the academic debate concerning one of the main criticisms 
levelled at the Internet as a political platform, namely its alleged tendency to promote 
political fragmentation (this issue has also been discussed in the previous section). Habermas 
(2006) argues that within liberal systems, the Internet will lead to the fragmentation of the 
mass audience, endangering communication in the established public spheres. One of the 
most prominent advocates of this position is Sunstein (2001), who suggests that in the online 
environment individuals tend to operate in echo-chambers, interacting with like-minded 
users. In the same vein, Davis and Owen (1998), despite recognising the potential of the 
Internet to draw into political discussions a wide variety of people in terms of viewpoint, 
background and location, conclude that online discussions are likely to be as narrow as the 
ones between neighbours. Similarly, focusing on Facebook, Kushin and Kitchener (2009) 
find that in terms of representation of viewpoints the contributions to a Facebook group 
focused on the debate over US policies regarding torture were highly skewed towards 
participants holding similar positions. These authors sustain the so-called homophily 
perspective, according to which online users tend to expose themselves to concurring 
opinions (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995).  
In contrast with the homophily perspective, there are a number of authors who contend that 
the Internet (Brundidge 2007; Stromer-Galley 2003; Zhang et al. 2013) and SNSs (Bae 2013; 
Kim 2011; Vickery 2009) offer opportunities for heterogeneous political discussions, i.e., 
discussion among individuals holding contrasting political views. In a qualitative study 
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targeting users of online political discussion groups, Stromer-Galley (2003) confirms this 
stance, finding that participants consider themselves to be exposed to different viewpoints, 
and that they appreciate and enjoy the diversity of people and opinions. Concentrating on 
third spaces, Graham and Harju (2011) and Wright et al. (2016) highlight that these forums 
are not strictly political, with users visiting them due to some kind of shared tie, meaning 
that political talk is more difficult to avoid and less likely to be polarised. Thus users may 
end up being exposed to politics inadvertently (see the previous section for a discussion of 
Brundidge’s – 2010 – inadvertency thesis). 
Finally, further concerns emerge because online discussions are often characterised by 
deception, incivility and impoliteness (Papacharissi – 2004 – distinguishes between uncivil 
behaviours which are harmful to democratic norms, and impolite behaviours which do not 
acknowledge the netiquette). The phenomenon of trolling is a typical example of online 
deception. As illustrated by Donath (1999), trolls infiltrate online groups, presenting 
themselves as individuals sharing the group interests and, once accepted, disrupt the 
proceedings of discussions. The presence of trolls in online forums can negatively influence 
users’ perceptions of other participants, limit self-revelations, encourage scepticism towards 
the revelations of others, ultimately leading to the discussants’ withdrawal (Dahlberg 2001). 
The anonymity inherent in using the Internet enables individuals to control the amount and 
type (true vs. fictitious) of identity they are disclosing, allowing behaviours such as trolling 
(Morrissey 2010). Postmes et al. (2002) indicate that anonymity can also allow people to 
stereotype and dismiss opinions of out-group members, i.e., individuals belonging to 
different social groups (Tajfel and Turner 1986), and affect the tone and the nature of 
discussion. With respect to this last issue, various scholars identify anonymity as a key 
determinant of the impoliteness, incivility and acts of attack (i.e., flaming) often encountered 
in online political communications (Davis 1999, 2005; Hill and Hughes 1998). Alonzo and 
Aiken (2004) describe flaming – which, like trolling, can intimidate individuals from 
participating in online discussions (Mitra 1997) – as “hostile intentions characterized by 
words of profanity, obscenity, and insults that inflict harm to a person or an organization 
resulting from uninhibited behaviour” (p. 205). The motivations behind these attacks range 
from enjoyment of confrontation, to personal satisfaction caused by the harassment of 
political adversaries, and the desire to express unpopular opinions suppressed in the offline 
world (Freelon 2010).  
In contrast with previous research, in a content analysis of 287 political newsgroup 
discussion threads, Papacharissi (2004) acknowledges the heated and confrontational nature 
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of online political discussion, but also establishes that incivility and impoliteness do not 
dominate these communications. Kushin and Kitchener (2009) support these findings and, 
focusing on Facebook political discussion, establish that the large majority of analysed 
discussion (75%) is devoid of flaming. They ascribe these results to the presence of identity 
attributes within this SNS. Halpern and Gibbs (2013) reach a similar conclusion in their 
investigation of the potential of social media to foster democratic deliberation. They infer 
that, in comparison to more anonymous and de-individuated websites like Youtube, SNSs 
with significant affordances of identifiability and networked information (e.g., Facebook) 
promote a greater level of politeness and are better suited for deliberation. Facebook profiles 
tend, in fact, to represent users honestly (Lampe et al. 2007), with individuals maintaining 
relatively open and recognisable Facebook profiles where even personal information such as 
photos, religion, interests and political affiliation are displayed (Ellison et al. 2011). In 
addition, Utz (2010) notes that even in the case of fake profiles, users can draw inferences 
about the real identity of others through the information provided by their Facebook contacts 
and the system (see Section 2.4 for a further discussion of the nonymous nature of 
Facebook). 
This section has examined how the Internet can affect political discussion. It has stressed the 
increase in numbers of individuals who are engaging in this type of political activity online 
due to the flexibility and multiplicity of discussion venues, both political and non-political, 
offered by digital technologies. Online political discussions seem to be monopolised by a 
number of superparticipants, a dominant minority, albeit one which seems to perform a 
positive function and foster the engagement of other users. With respect to SNSs, research 
establishes that these platforms have gradually become relevant arenas for political 
discussion and opened up unprecedented opportunities, both for political talk and more 
formal and deliberative forms of discussion. As with the consumption of political 
information, so with political discussion, one of the main criticisms of digital technologies is 
their alleged tendency to promote political fragmentation and polarisation, a viewpoint that 
that has attracted, so far, varying levels of support in research. A further concern raised by 
some academics is that, encouraged by the anonymous nature of the digital environment, 
deception, incivility and impoliteness often characterise online communications. However, 
such a criticism holds less true for SNSs like Facebook, due to the presence of significant 
affordances of identifiability and networked information. 
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3.4 Political Mobilisation: Slacktivism, Reinforcement and Mobilisation 
The previous two sections have dealt with the axes of information and discussion, spheres 
that fall within the communication dimension of political participation conceptualised in this 
thesis. This last section considers the third axis identified by Vedel (2007) to make sense of 
the political uses of the Internet, and discusses the contributions of the Internet and SNSs to 
the mobilisation dimension of political participation. Davis et al. (2007, p. 17) define 
mobilisation as “a specialized form of political communication, an attempt to do more than 
just inform, but to engage supporters to act.” Similarly, in this thesis, mobilisation is 
intended to mean a range of political activities aiming to influence governments’ actions or 
other individuals’ political behaviour. The literature examining the links between digital 
technologies and political mobilisation is rich and complex. It can be divided in two main 
streams of research, one concentrating on groups like social movements, political parties, 
etc. (e.g., Bennett and Segerberg 2012; Castells 2012; Gibson et al. 2003; Della Porta and 
Mosca 2005; van de Donk et al. 2004) and the other one focusing on individuals (e.g., 
Brodock 2010; Christensen 2011;  Hargittai and Shaw 2013). As citizens are the focus of the 
present thesis, this section concentrates on the latter stream of research.  
With respect to the contributions of the Internet to citizens’ mobilisation, academics seem to 
disagree on the mobilising power of this medium, replicating the debate between optimists, 
normalisers and pessimists which emerged in relation to political participation in general 
(see Section 3.1). Some researchers stress the capability of digital technologies to mobilise 
inactive citizens, peripheral group members and young people who tend to avoid more 
traditional and institutionalised forms of participation (Earl and Kimport 2011; Enjolras et al. 
2012; Lusoli and Ward 2003, 2006; Postmes and Brunsting 2002; Rice et al. 2013; 
Theocharis 2011). For instance, Enjolras et al. (2012) examine how social media affect 
participation in offline demonstrations, suggesting that these technologies can operate as an 
alternative to mainstream media and traditional political organisations, and reach different 
segments of the population. A mobilising effect is also found by Rice et al. (2013), who 
observe that college students participate less through traditional mechanisms than older 
people, but engage in other activities such as friending candidates or joining political groups 
on SNSs – actions that mobilise them and lead them to engage in the electoral and political 
process, both online and offline. Anduiza et al. (2009) argue that the Internet can influence 
mobilisation also by exposing citizens to an increased number of appeals to participate, and 
by multiplying the number of senders of such appeals (Verba et al.’s – 1995 – CVM explains 
the relevance of recruitment requests for the participation process, see Section 2.1.2). 
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Focusing specifically on SNSs, Earl and Kimport (2011) speak of supersize effect, believing 
that these platforms can increase the volume of mobilisation by lowering the thresholds of 
participation, and through the introduction of new forms of mobilisation. Along the same 
lines, Postmes and Brunsting (2012) note that, besides online equivalents of offline forms of 
participation such as petitions and letter writing, the last decade has also seen a rise in new 
forms of action such as defacements, virtual blockades, and site hijacking. Denning (2001) 
identifies three different online based mobilisation activities: activism, which comprises 
activities such as promoting a cause or coordinating and planning offline initiatives; 
hacktivism, which involves hacking techniques aiming to temporarily disrupt websites or 
limit the access to a target’s computer without causing any long-term damage; and 
cyberterrorism, which consists of activities intended to cause grave physical or economic 
damages to individuals or groups. 
Other scholars investigating the impact of digital tools on mobilisation paint a more negative 
picture. Contrasting with much of the research on Internet activism, Nielsen (2009) identifies 
three problems which can hinder activists: over-communication, miscommunication, and 
communication overload. Marichal (2013) asserts that the Internet, instead of fostering 
citizens’ mobilisation, can facilitate another form of political participation defined as 
microactivism which includes actions such as creating political Facebook groups, posting 
political articles on Twitter, and uploading political videos on Youtube. Microactivism does 
not aim to affect governments’ actions but echoes micro-level intentions (Marichal 2013). 
Morozov (2011) argues that microactivism can negatively affect citizens’ political 
engagement in that it facilitates slacktivism, which encompasses activities that satisfy 
people’s needs for social connection but detract from more formal and meaningful types of 
political participation, therefore having no impact on political outcomes. Associated with the 
phenomenon of slacktivism is that of clicktivism. Clicktivism relates to the trend of reducing 
political participation to clicking on a few links, as if such activities could have a political 
impact of their own (Karpf 2010). These observations are corroborated by several studies. In 
a paper investigating the connection between the UK Government's ePetitioning system and 
Facebook groups, Panagiotopoulos et al. (2011) find that the numbers of members in 
Facebook groups supporting specific petitions is not reflected in the number of signatures 
collected. Pickerill (2000, 2003) shows too that activists, particularly those engaged in direct 
action, see online activism as a deterrent and distraction from real world activities, or as a 
type of participation with a limited impact. Similar findings are produced by Gustafsson 
(2012), who determine that Swedish Facebook users – both activists and non-activists – see 
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their political participation on Facebook as a form of identity maintenance and do not regard 
these activities as meaningful political participation.  
Thus the two main arguments put forward by adherents of the slacktivism standpoint are that 
online activism is less effective than offline activism, and that it tends to replace traditional 
offline participatory forms. Christensen (2011) scrutinises these two criticisms and 
establishes that, while it is not possible to accurately assess the impact of online campaigns 
on offline decisions, not much evidence in support of the substitution thesis has been found. 
In opposition to the slacktivism perspective, Christensen (2011) argues that the Internet 
seems to be able to favour offline mobilisation and to invigorate citizens’ political 
participation. In this sense, he supports the mobilisation stance presented at the beginning of 
this section. 
Other researchers provide evidence in support of the reinforcement thesis (Brodock 2010; 
Mascheroni 2012; Neumayer and Raffl 2008). Brodock (2010) recognises that the Internet 
has furthered activists’ communication and organisational efforts, but also points out that 
these tools are exploited by a limited number of people, and thus offline dynamics are 
carried over into the online space. Considering the role of SNSs in the 2008 anti-FARC-
rallies, Neumayer and Raffl (2008) argue that, in countries with great social inequalities such 
as Colombia, using these platforms is a privilege granted to a relatively small elite. 
Substantiating the theory that offline participatory divides are replicated and reinforced 
online, Mascheroni (2012) establishes that political activity on SNSs is contingent and 
largely dependent on participants’ civic culture (i.e., pre-existing political engagement). 
However, Mascheroni (2012) also provides some support to the mobilisation stance and, 
taking the Popolo Viola movement as an example, indicates that fragmented and isolated 
individuals lacking resources for mobilisation in their offline contexts can build a sense of 
belonging on SNSs, and eventually mobilise offline. Hargittai and Shaw (2013), Nam 
(2012), and Oser et al. (2013) also find dual effects of the Internet on political mobilisation, 
backing up both the reinforcement and mobilisation theses. Hargittai and Shaw (2013) 
observe that the Internet may generate new pathways for mobilisation, but is unlikely to 
transform existing participatory patterns, with Internet skills strongly mediating the 
participation in online mobilisation activities. Similarly, Nam (2012) highlights that users 
who are politically active online do not differ categorically from those who participate 
politically offline. However, he also establishes that, while socio-economic divides appear in 
both online and offline mobilisation, the generational and racial gaps found offline are not 
replicated online (Nam, 2012). Finally, Oser et al. (2013) confirm the reinforcement 
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hypotheses establishing that advantaged citizens in terms of education and income are more 
politically active both online and offline, but on the other hand also corroborate the 
mobilisation thesis with respect to the involvement of young people in online activism. 
If researchers disagree on capabilities of digital technologies to mobilise citizens, there 
seems however to be a general consensus on the positive impact of the Internet on the 
initiatives of activists, which are intended in this thesis as a specific group of citizens 
characterised by high levels of political mobilisation. Kavada (2010) highlights that the 
mobilisation capability of the Internet is linked to its informative power, with this medium 
facilitating access to and dissemination of information, enabling rapid and cheap 
communication across geographical boundaries, and supporting coordination. In relation to 
this last point, the Internet has proved to be a low-cost operational and organisational tool 
without precedents (Bimber et al. 2005; Rheingold 2002), due to its ability to connect online 
and offline worlds (Davis et al. 2009; Wellman and Haythornthwaite 2002). Among the 
various digital tools, social media – particularly SNSs – have assumed a key role in activists’ 
repertoires. In a qualitative study, Obar et al. (2012) find that members of advocacy groups 
employ social media to communicate with citizens on a daily basis, and believe that these 
platforms have aided them in their advocacy and organisational efforts. Focusing on 
Facebook, Warren et al. (2014) reveal that activists use this SNS to seek and obtain 
information, promote social events, call for donations and volunteers, schedule plans, and 
discuss social issues. In a qualitative study involving Australian, American, and British 
activists, Vromen et al. (2015) confirm these findings and establish that all the studied 
groups embraced – whether enthusiastically or reluctantly – Facebook as an organisational 
tool. In a similar fashion, Valenzuela et al. (2012) and Theocharis (2011) find that SNSs like 
Facebook were instrumental to the organisation and coordination of Chilean and Greek 
youths’ protest activity.  
The links between the use of SNSs and protests have been the subject of many investigations 
since the explosion of the Arab Spring (Howard et al. 2011; Khamis and Vaughn 2012; Lim 
2012; Tufekci and Wilson 2012; Wolfsfeld et al. 2013). Khamis and Vaughn (2012) indicate 
Facebook as a key mobilising tool for the Egyptian protest movement. They argue that this 
platform became a forum for free speech and political networking, and offered a virtual 
space in which to assemble and organise protests. Facebook was employed by protesters as 
an information board to document protests and government brutality, enabling protesters to 
gain international support (Khamis and Vaughn 2012). The relevance of Facebook to the 
Egyptian revolution is confirmed in Tufekci and Wilson’s (2012) survey of people 
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participating in Tahrir Square protests. According to them, Facebook provided new sources 
of information not easily controlled by the regime, and influenced individuals’ decisions 
about protest participation, the logistics of the protests, and their likelihood of success 
(Tufekci and Wilson 2012). 
Lim (2012) explains that in Egypt social media enabled activists to reach and expand 
networks of disaffected Egyptians, frame issues, propagate messages, and finally transform 
online activism into offline protests. Similarly, Howard et al. (2011) indicate social media as 
instrumental to the Arab Spring, arguing that “a spike in revolutionary conversations often 
preceded major events on the ground” (p. 3). A study by Wolfsfeld et al. (2013) contradicts, 
in part, Howard et al.’s (2011) argument, and establishes that an increase in the use of social 
media is more likely to follow significant protest activity than to precede it. Wolfsfeld et al. 
(2013) explain this mechanism, observing that after an important political event people may 
turn to various media in order to obtain information about its consequences. They recognise 
that their findings may differ from Howard et al.’s (2011) because of the different samples – 
they focus on the general public rather than on activists – and the time scale – they examined 
usage of social media before and after the outburst of the initial protest, whereas Howard et 
al. (2011) analysed activities in the midst of the Arab Spring.  
This section has dealt with the impact of the Internet on citizens’ political mobilisation, and 
the contrasting evidence produced by research. Some scholars stress the capability of digital 
technologies to mobilise inactive citizens, members of peripheral groups and young people 
who tend stay away from more traditional and institutionalised forms of participation. They 
explain this mobilisation effect with the fact that the Internet can reduce the costs of 
participation in terms of required resources, multiply the requests for participation and lead 
to the emergence of new forms of participation (e.g., friending a candidate). Other academics 
speak of slacktivism, arguing that the newly emerged online participatory practices have no 
impact on political outcomes, and even detract from more formal and meaningful methods of 
political participation. Alternatively, other studies provide evidence in support of the 
reinforcement thesis which maintains that offline participatory divides are replicated and 
reinforced online. If scholars cannot agree on the impact of digital technologies on the 
mobilisation of non-activists, they tend to concur on the fact that the Internet, and more 
recently SNSs in particular, have become key tools in activists’ initiatives, including protest 
organisation and participation, a topic that has become particularly popular in academic 
research since the explosion of the Arab Spring. 
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4 APPROACH AND METHODS 
This chapter discusses the ways in which this thesis approaches the investigation of the 
contributions of Facebook to political participation, the methodological considerations which 
have driven the research, and the data collection and analysis procedures which have been 
employed. The present study was particularly complex in that it investigated the links 
between Facebook activity and political participation through a cross-national comparative 
approach and a mixed methods (MM) methodology. By doing so, it added two extra 
analytical layers that enriched the inquiry, but also required a solid methodological 
justification. The methodological complexity of the project is reflected in the structure of this 
chapter which is split into two main parts and comprises a total of seven sections.  
The first part of the chapter is organised in three sections and considers how political 
participation has been approached in this thesis. Firstly, the contrasting findings generated by 
academics with respect to the Internet, SNSs and political participation are considered, the 
limitations of the studies falling within this strand of research highlighted, and the ways the 
present research addressed those gaps presented. The second section explains the value of 
adopting a cross-national comparative approach when investigating the contributions of 
digital technologies to political participation, the challenges faced, and the operational 
choices made in this research. Finally, in the third section the purpose of this study is 
outlined and a series of research questions developed.  
The second part of the chapter includes four further sections and focuses on the 
methodological considerations and the methods adopted in the present study. The fourth 
section discusses the choice of the MM approach. It presents its philosophical underpinnings, 
clarifies how it can contribute to research examining the relationships between the Internet, 
SNSs and political participation, and describes the research process. In the fifth section, the 
sampling strategies for the quantitative and qualitative phases are presented, while the sixth 
section deals with the adopted research methods, i.e., online surveys and telephone/face-to-
face interviews, and explains the tools and procedures employed in the data analysis. Finally 
the seventh and last section concentrates on the ethical considerations and principles that 
have guided this study. 
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Figure 3 – Approach and Methodology: Conceptual Map 
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4.1 Conceptual Weaknesses in Internet and Political Participation Research: 
The Need for a Particularised Approach  
Section 3.1 has provided an overview of the state of Internet and political participation 
research. As explained, within this specific sub-field research has produced mixed evidence 
and generated an intense academic debate. Some scholars stress the positive influence of the 
Internet on political participation, while others minimise its mobilising power or emphasise 
its tendency to reinforce existing participatory trends. Similar findings emerge in relation to 
SNSs. 
After a careful review of the academic literature examining the links between the Internet, 
SNSs and political participation, two conceptual weaknesses characterising many studies 
falling within this strand of research have been identified – weaknesses that have, arguably, 
contributed substantially to the contrasting findings produced by optimists, pessimists and 
normalisers. The first conceptual weakness is the failure to consider the multidimensionality 
of political participation. As highlighted in Section 2.1.1 of this thesis, political participation 
is a multidimensional phenomenon encompassing many different types of activities which, 
despite falling under the same theoretical umbrella, are very different in terms of the 
resources they require (e.g., time and skills), the actual activities they involve, and the 
purposes driving them (political communication vs mobilisation). Despite the complexity of 
this phenomenon, only a few studies within this specific strand of research take into 
consideration the multidimensionality of political participation (Bimber et al. 2014; Calenda 
and Mosca 2007; Campante et al. 2013; Cantijoch 2012; Gibson and Cantijoch 2013; 
Kavanaugh et al. 2008; Macafee 2013; Nisbet and Scheufele 2004; Storsul 2014; Vaccari 
2012; Wang 2007). 
Researchers often distinguish between offline and online participation (e.g., Boulliane 2009; 
Jennings and Zeitner 2003), or between traditional and non-traditional participation (e.g., 
Kruikemeier et al. 2013; Schlozman et al. 2010; Towner 2013), but rarely take into account 
the differences between the activities considered when assessing the contributions of digital 
technologies. The limitations of such an approach become evident when looking at studies in 
which political participation has been operationalised multidimensionally. For instance, 
Kavanaugh et al. (2008) show that citizens with medium or low levels of political 
engagement participate much less than politically active citizens in online political activities, 
such as contacting public officials or contributing campaign donations. However, both 
groups display similar levels of participation in online news consumption and political 
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discussion. Nisbet and Scheufele (2004) also emphasise how the effects of the Internet on 
political participation change in relation to various political activities. They find that Internet 
usage has a limited impact on campaign participation, while it positively reinforces the 
exposure to and consumption of campaign information. In line with the 
communication/mobilisation distinction adopted in this thesis, Gibson and Cantijoch (2013) 
identify two dimensions of political participation: participation and passive engagement. The 
first encompasses six modes of participation (i.e., voting, party/campaign activities, protest 
activities, contacting, communal and consumerism), while the second dimension includes 
three modes of participation (i.e., news attention, discussion, expressive activities). Gibson 
and Cantijoch (2013) illustrate that offline activities falling within the first dimension are 
replicated online, whereas with regards to more passive modes of engagement, new forms of 
participation emerge. Vaccari (2012) also stresses the risks of oversimplification associated 
with a “one-size-fits-all” approach and, considering the links between offline and online 
participation, shows that individuals involved in more demanding offline forms of 
participation (e.g., attending rallies) engage in similar activities online, while people limiting 
their engagement to the consumption of political information on mass media replace TV – at 
least partially – with online sources.  
The effects of the Internet on political participation thus seem to differ across different forms 
of engagement (Bimber et al. 2014; Campante et al. 2013). Using an extensive data set 
drawn from the British Election Studies from 2001, 2005, and 2010, Bimber et al. (2014) 
distinguish between elite-directed acts (e.g., donating money, working for a party, etc.) and  
self-directed acts (e.g., political talk). They find that, while for elite-directed forms of 
participation the impact of digital media usage is mediated by political interest, digital media 
usage is positively and consistently associated with self-directed acts, even for individuals 
displaying low levels of political interest.  
Storsul (2014) reveals that SNSs are the main instrument employed by politically engaged 
young people for organising and coordinating political activities, but they are hesitant to use 
SNSs for political deliberation due to concerns about the way they present themselves and 
not wanting to appear very political. These findings are, however, not confirmed by Vitak et 
al. (2011), who show that young people engage mostly in activities on Facebook described in 
this thesis as communication activities (see Section 2.1.1), such as expressing political 
opinions. This inconsistency could be explained by the fact that Storsul (2014) focuses on 
politically active youths, while Vitak et al. (2011) concentrate on young people in general. 
These findings suggest that the contributions of digital technologies to political participation 
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tend to vary in relation to different political activities, and that there is a great deal of 
variation in the ways people use online tools. 
Considerations of the different uses of digital tools lead to the second conceptual weakness 
characterising many Internet and political participation studies, a flaw that may also play a 
part in the mixed picture that has emerged so far. Such a weakness is the over-generalised 
conceptualisation of Internet and SNS usage that has often led researchers to concentrate 
exclusively on the online/offline distinction, thus overlooking the impact of various usage 
practices. The limited explanatory power of the online/offline distinction in assessing a 
complex phenomenon such as that of political participation is also highlighted by Moy et al. 
(2005) and Tang and Lee (2013), who advocate an approach accounting for the different 
patterns in Internet and SNS usage. Regrettably, only a limited number of studies examine 
how different usage practices (e.g., information seeking, entertainment, etc.) can influence 
political participation (Ancu and Cozma 2009; Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Gil de Zúñiga et 
al. 2012; Kim 2006; Kim et al. 2013; Kruikemeier et al. 2013; Moy et al. 2005; Quintelier 
and Visser 2008; Rojas and Puig-i-Abril 2009; Scheufele and Nisbet 2002; Tang and Lee 
2013). In accordance with several studies focusing on traditional media (Norris 1996; Prior 
2005, 2007, Putnam 2000; Quintelier and Hooghe 2011; Zhang and Chia 2006), research 
illustrates that employing the Internet for entertainment purposes can contribute negatively 
to political efficacy, knowledge and participation, while informational usage is positively 
related to such variables (Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Kim et al. 2013; Rojas and Puig-i-
Abril 2009; Scheufele and Nisbet 2002). In line with these studies, Quintelier and Visser 
(2008) and Kim (2006) find that the political consequences of the Internet depend on the 
way the medium is employed, with certain usages (e.g., shopping online, following news, 
chatting, etc.) promoting participation and others (e.g., playing online games, etc.) inhibiting 
it. These findings provide an interesting contribution to the debate between Internet 
optimists, pessimists and normalisers, as they indicate that some Internet practices – such as 
online shopping or chatting – can lead to an increase in particular forms of political 
participation, independent of individuals’ levels of political engagement (Kim 2006; 
Quintelier and Visser 2008)  
Focusing on MySpace, Ancu and Cozma (2009) show that campaign involvement has a 
significant negative effect on the use of this SNS for social interaction, while is not 
significantly connected to the use of MySpace for information seeking and entertainment 
purposes. With respect to another activity falling under the mobilisation dimension, 
Valenzuela (2013) finds that participation in protests is positively associated with the usage 
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of social media for opinion expression and for joining causes, but not with news 
consumption. These results do not corroborate the positive impact of informational usage of 
digital technologies on political participation, but this could be due to the fact that Ancu and 
Cozma (2009) and Valenzuela (2013) focus on very specific types of political activities such 
as campaign involvement and protest participation. On the other hand, the positive link 
between informational uses of SNSs and political participation is confirmed in several other 
studies (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012; Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, and Zheng 2014; Tang and Lee 
2013; Valenzuela et al. 2012). These findings demonstrate the worth of considering different 
Internet and SNS usage practices in assessing the influence of these technologies on political 
participation. This argument is perfectly summarised by Papacharissi (2009), who observes 
that the Internet is a tool which does not itself possess the capacity to bring about social 
change, and that its impact on society and potential to empower or restrict individuals are 
determined by the ways in which it is used. 
The issues this section has raised, as Cantijoch (2012) also suggests, call for a shift in the 
ways political participation and Internet and SNS usage are operationalised in academia. In 
order to move away from the polarised debate between optimists, pessimists and 
normalisers, it would be beneficial to adopt a more particularised approach which takes into 
account individuals’ various usage practises and the different modes of participation. 
The present research attempted to do so, and with regards to the first conceptual weakness – 
namely the failure of considering the multidimensionality of political participation – it 
identified two different dimensions of political participation (see Section 2.1.1): the political 
mobilisation dimension, which encompasses activities influencing or aiming to influence 
governments’ actions and other individuals’ political behaviours, and the political 
communication dimension, which incorporates activities reflecting individuals’ interest and 
psychological involvement in politics. In doing so, it aimed to understand if the contributions 
of Facebook vary in relation to these two different typologies of political activities. 
In addition, the present study also tackled the second conceptual weakness, namely the 
overgeneralisation of Internet and SNS usage. It distinguished between different non-
political usages of Facebook, and assessed their links with political participation on this 
SNS. Scholars have developed numerous classifications of Internet usages (Kraut et al. 1998, 
Shah et al. 2001, Katz et al. 2001, Nie and Erbring 2002, Moy et al. 2005, Wang 2007, Foot 
et al. 2009). On the basis of these classifications, a categorisation of non-political usages of 
Facebook was developed in this thesis, and three usage dimensions identified: the 
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information dimension including activities such as consuming non-political news; the 
interpersonal communication dimension encompassing activities such as contacting family 
and friends; and the social recreation dimension embracing activities such as gaming (see 
Section 4.6.1, Table 1, for a full list of the activities falling in these theorised dimensions). 
 
4.2 Comparative Approach and Internet and Political Participation 
Research: The Role of Context  
The previous section has drawn attention to two conceptual weaknesses characterising many 
studies which examine the links between the Internet, SNSs and political participation, and 
stressed the advantages of moving away from the polarised debate between optimists, 
pessimists and normalisers. In doing so, it has explained that the present research aimed to 
tackle the highlighted gaps by adopting a particularised approach in its analysis of the 
contributions of Facebook to political participation, so as to take into account various usage 
practises and different modes of participation.  
However, the “one size fits all” approach often found in academic studies which focus on the 
Internet and political participation is not the only limitation characterising Internet and 
political participation research. As Anduiza et al. (2009) illustrate, within this subject area 
there is also a lack of cross-national comparative studies, with much research focusing on 
English-speaking countries, despite providing arguments more general in scope.  
In cross-national comparative research, comparison can be described as “the process of 
discovering similarities and differences among phenomena” (Warnick and Osherson 1973, p. 
7). Comparison is essential for any type of scientific enquiry that endeavours to discover 
conditions prompting variations in the phenomena under scrutiny (Przeworski and Teune 
1973; Smelser 1973; Warnick and Osherson 1973). Cross-national comparative research is a 
form of scientific analysis which makes comparison its focal point, and goes beyond the 
borders of one country by examining relationships between two or more variables within a 
defined number of nations (Przeworski and Teune 1973). Operations of this sort, in the 
forms of systematic observations across societies, date back to the Ancient Greece and can 
be found in the works of Herodotus, Thucydides and Aristotle (Warnick and Osherson 
1973).  
In the last few decades, comparative research has progressed and found application in a large 
variety of disciplines ranging from the natural to the social sciences. The popularity of the 
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comparative method within the latter has to be accredited to its numerous assets. Warnick 
and Osherson (1973) observe that cross-national research can facilitate the assessment of the 
generalisability of findings by testing them in diverse settings, something highlighted also by 
Moy et al. (2012), with specific reference to the field of political communication. 
Furthermore, comparative research can also perform a heuristic function, providing an 
effective venue for the generation of hypotheses and theories (Warnick and Osherson 1973). 
The relevance of this latter function is also stressed by Nowak (1977), who even argues that 
“in order to formulate and to test our theory in its general formulation, we usually need a 
cross-national study” (p. 15). Theory generation is, however, only one of the possible 
functions of comparative research, which, according to Landman (2008), can be driven by 
four mutually reinforcing objectives, some of which receive more emphasis than others 
according to the purpose of the study. These objectives are contextual description, 
classification, hypothesis testing, and prediction. 
Despite the advantages of the cross-national comparative method, there are not many 
comparative studies examining how digital technologies can contribute to political 
participation. This scarcity is surprising, especially considering the potential contributions of 
the comparative method to a strand of research characterised by contrasting evidence. 
Comparative studies are, in fact, often employed to three separate ends, as follows: to 
adjudicate between competing theories (Ragin and Rubinson 2009), as the gathering and the 
comparison of data from different contexts allow the elimination of rival explanations about 
particulars events, actors, structures, etc. (Landman 2008); to promote a deeper 
understanding of the phenomena under investigation (Hantrais and Mangen 1996); and to 
facilitate the testing of empirical relationships among variables (Lijphart 1975). These uses 
are all requisite in Internet and political participation research. 
The importance of considering contextual settings in assessing the impact of digital 
technologies on political participation is discussed in the insightful Digital Media and 
Political Engagement Worldwide, edited by Anduiza et al. (2012). Anduiza et al. (2012) 
identify three contextual variables expected to mediate the relationship between digital 
media and political participation: the digital divide, the media system, and the institutional 
setting. With regards to the digital divide, they observe that differences along the lines of 
access, use and competence necessarily affect citizens’ likelihood to become politically 
active online (Anduiza et al. 2012). Their analysis is informed by a wealth of cross-national 
perspectives offered by the various contributors to the book. For instance, Jensen and 
Anduiza (2012) stress how digital divides can limit citizens’ online political opportunities. 
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When considering individuals with the same level of age, education and income, they find 
that American citizens are more likely to participate online than their Spanish counterparts. 
The researchers explain this trend by the fact that Internet diffusion and penetration is 
highest in the US (Jensen and Anduiza 2012). By comparing the US and Spain, Jensen and 
Anduiza (2012) also contribute to the development of a general explanatory model of 
political participation. In both countries, the results confirm that offline political 
participation is positively affected by increased age, education and political interest, while 
for online political participation, Internet skills and the extent to which the Internet is 
integrated in people’s daily lives emerge as the key determinants of participation (Jensen and 
Anduiza 2012). Welp and Whiteley (2012) corroborate Jensen and Anduiza’s (2012) 
findings on the relevance of Internet skills and diffusion for online political activity. They 
note that in Peru, a country characterised by poor digital infrastructures, digital media cannot 
really assume a relevant role in political campaigns. On the other hand, in Brazil, where the 
level of Internet diffusion is relatively high, Internet activities can often operate as a 
substitute for more traditional campaigning activities (Welp and Whiteley 2012).  
The second contextual variable mediating the contribution of digital technologies to political 
participation identified by Anduiza et al. (2012) is media systems. According to Anduiza et 
al. (2012), the influence of media systems on citizens’ involvement in digital politics is 
linked to the role assumed by online media which can act as either complementary or 
countervailing agents. The first case often occurs in open media systems where the Internet 
tends to operate as an additional platform for the diffusion of media content. However, in 
more closed media systems, due to governmental regulation or pressures by more general 
societal and political actors, the Internet assumes a more countervailing posture (Anduiza et 
al. 2012). Hussain and Howard (2012) show that in Egypt and Pakistan, two countries with 
strong governmental control over the media and low trust in broadcast media, there has been 
a rise in online citizens’ journalism. Cantijoch (2012) argues that in a country such as Spain 
where the public broadcaster is the main source of news, and the other channels are limited 
by a public charter, online sources are crucial information channels for causes challenging 
the dominant political establishment. This applies also to the case of Italy, a country similar 
to Spain in terms of the media system (de Frutos García 2014; Hallin and Mancini 2004). 
Vaccari (2012) provides a sketch of the Italian media situation characterised by the 
dominance of broadcast television in many Italians’ information diet, with press usage 
behind that of other Western Democracies, and by Berlusconi’s control over TV, which was 
more evident when he was also Prime Minister. By owning the three main private television 
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channels, and influencing the public ones when in control of the government, Berlusconi has 
dominated the Italian political communication environment for many years. Because of this 
situation, unique among Western democracies, Berlusconi’s opponents are more inclined 
than other citizens to rely on online political information and to participate politically via the 
Internet (Vaccari 2012). 
Finally, Anduiza et al. (2012) observe that the political and institutional environment can 
impact upon the links between the Internet and politics. Particularly, they note that the 
impact of the Internet on the political realm is strongly influenced by laws on freedom of 
speech, electoral laws, campaign finance provisions, and the openness and responsiveness of 
political parties and governments to technological changes. In their comparative 
investigation on how people participate politically online and offline in Spain and the United 
States, Jensen and Anduiza (2012) confirm how differences between political systems and 
environments influence citizens’ political participation both online and offline. In particular, 
the authors attribute the different levels of direct contact with politicians – much higher in 
the United States than in Spain – to the different electoral systems of the two countries. They 
observe that the American electoral system places emphasis on candidates rather than parties 
and encourages direct contact with elected officials, while the Spanish system, where party 
organisations are the focus of political campaigning, discourages it (Jensen and Anduiza 
2012). In their contribution to Digital Media and Political Engagement Worldwide, Welp 
and Whiteley (2012) also confirm the role of political context in mediating the political 
opportunities offered by digital technologies. Their study on the use of digital media for 
contentious politics (i.e., protest activity) in Latin America compares protest movements in 
Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Peru, and Uruguay. The researchers conclude that in 
countries where democratic political institutions function relatively well (e.g., Uruguay), 
digital media reinforce rather than replace traditional channels of participation. On the other 
hand, in unstable democracies with weak and dysfunctional political institutions (e.g., 
Dominican Republic), digital technologies are a more attractive protest tool (Welp and 
Whiteley 2012).   
However, academics seem to disagree on the contexts in which citizens can best take 
advantage of digital technologies for their political participation. Some see digital media as 
anti-censorship agents and believe that they are most effective in the context of authoritarian 
regimes (Habermas 2006; Lysenko and Desouza 2010; Scholz 2010). In contrast, other 
researchers hold the view that individuals living under repressive regimes are less likely to 
have access to the Internet, and if they do have access they are more likely to be monitored 
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and censored (Glaisyer 2010; Herkenrath and Knoll 2011; van Dalen 2011). In this sense, 
using the Arab Spring as a case study, Wolfsfeld et al. (2013) recognise the relevance of 
social media in this context, but also stress the need for caution, observing that the 
populations with the greatest need to mobilise are also the ones that find it most difficult to 
exploit new media, due to the control their governments can exercise over these 
technologies.  
The studies presented in this section demonstrate how contextual intervening factors (i.e., 
media systems; political institution; digital divide) mediate the impact of the Internet on 
citizens’ political participation, and show the value of assuming a cross-national comparative 
perspective when dealing with this subject area. A cross-national comparative approach has 
been employed in the present research in order to contribute to the development of the field. 
As highlighted so far, the benefits of this approach and how it can help to shed light on the 
links between digital technologies and political participation are evident. However, the 
choice of embarking on cross-national comparative research is not a simple one, as this type 
of enquiry presents a series of theoretical and methodological challenges that require careful 
consideration. Using Kohn’s (1989) four models of cross-national comparison as framework, 
Livingstone (2003) identifies a series of theoretical and practical decisions that researchers 
have to make when engaging in cross-national research. These decisions include: how to 
approach cross-national comparison (i.e., Kohn’s four models); the selection of countries; 
the degree of methodological standardisation to pursue; and the position to assume on the 
emic-etic continuum when interpreting the data.  
With regards to the approach to cross-national comparison, Kohn (1989) classifies the 
various approaches according to their focus. He distinguishes between: nation as object of 
study; nation as context of study; nation as unit of analysis; and nation as component of a 
larger international or transnational system. This research falls within the third category 
developed by Kohn (1989), nation as unit of analysis, in that its objectives were to 
understand the diversity of national contexts and then develop a more general cross-national 
theory. Hence, the present thesis attempted to identify a series of factors which could help to 
clarify how Facebook can contribute to political participation (e.g., levels of Facebook 
activity; political engagement, media usage etc.) and test their relationships in two different 
national settings, Italy and the UK. The goal was to understand how and which contextual 
elements mediate the impact of Facebook on political participation, and to shed light on 
more general determinants of this complex phenomenon in order to develop a model 
explaining political participation on Facebook.  
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Such a goal has determined the position assumed in the interpretation of the data with 
regards to the emic (i.e., culture specific) and etic (i.e., universal) dimensions. The emic 
approach aims to assess how attitudinal and behavioural phenomena are expressed uniquely 
in each culture, while the etic approach is primarily interested in identifying universals 
(Moutinho and Hutcheson 2011). In this thesis, these two approaches were combined. The 
relationships between Facebook and political participation were first examined in relation to 
the specific cases of Italy and the UK. Then, having attained emic knowledge, analogies 
were sought in order to contribute to the development of a more general theory of Facebook 
political participation.  
With respect to the second consideration, namely country selection, this thesis focused on 
Italy and the United Kingdom. In the initial stages of a cross-national comparative research 
project, two crucial operations are to decide on the number of nations to include in the 
investigation, and to justify the selection of the countries. These two decisions can strongly 
affect the validity of the findings (Przeworski and Teune 1973). Theoretical, but also 
practical, considerations have guided the selection of Italy and the UK. With respect to the 
first sphere, the theory generation capacity of few-country studies played a central role. If 
few-country studies tend to limit the level of abstraction and strength of inferences resulting 
from the comparison, on the other hand they avoid conceptual stretching and present an 
advantage in terms of theory generation (Landman 2008), a venture which, as explained, is 
one of the main goals of the present research. In terms of practicality, Italy and the United 
Kingdom have been selected because they are the countries with which the researcher is 
most familiar, and his substantive knowledge is an advantage practically and 
methodologically in that it can facilitate equivalence in the cross-national comparison 
(Landman 2008).  
Equivalence, which refers “to the comparability of test scores obtained in different cultures” 
(van de Vijver 2003, p. 144), is a core issue in comparative analysis and is particularly 
relevant to studies employing surveys as a research method (Warnick and Osherson 1973), 
as the present one does. The issue of equivalence is strictly connected to that of 
methodological standardisation, as discussed by Livingstone (2003) in her analysis of the 
challenges encountered in cross-national comparative research. The present study aimed to 
identify context-specific factors mediating the impact of Facebook on political participation, 
but also to pinpoint more general determinants to combine with the contextual factors, in 
order to review and expand the existing explanatory models of political participation. In 
order to achieve this, a high degree of methodological standardisation was pursued, and 
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attention was devoted to guaranteeing equivalence in sample selection and recruitment, data 
collection methods and measurement procedures (see Sections 4.4.3, 4.5, and 4.6). In this 
sense, data collection was timed in order to achieve optimal comparability, and the levels of 
political participation in Italy and the UK were examined during a period of similar electoral 
activity. In both countries the data collection started in March and ended in December 2012. 
During this time frame, local elections were held across the UK (i.e., England, Scotland and 
Wales) and Italy in the same month, May, while neither country held general elections. 
In summary, the present study examined how Facebook can contribute to political 
participation through a cross-national comparative lens. It focused on Italy and the UK, and 
attempted to understand how and which contextual elements mediate the impact of Facebook 
on political participation, and to identify more general determinants of political participation 
in order to develop a model explaining political participation on this particular SNS. To this 
end, a high degree of methodological standardisation in relation to sampling, data collection 
and analysis, and a mediation between the emic and etic dimensions in the interpretation and 
discussion of the findings were sought.  
 
4.3 Research Questions: Multidimensionality, Usage Practices and Context 
The two previous sections have highlighted two conceptual weaknesses characterising many 
studies examining the contributions of the Internet and SNSs to political participation – the 
over-generalised conceptualisation of political participation and Internet and SNS usage – 
and the value of adopting a cross-national comparative approach within this strand of 
research. In the light of these considerations, the present study pursued two goals. The first 
was to understand how Facebook can contribute to British and Italian citizens’ political 
participation, by the following means: clarifying the links between Facebook, Internet and 
offline political participation; highlighting the advantages and limitations of this SNS as a 
political platform; and assessing if its contributions vary in relation to different forms of 
political participation and usage practices. These issues were considered in the different 
contexts of Italy and the UK, and particular attention was paid to how contextual elements 
typical of these two countries impacted on the results. The second aim was to identify other 
factors mediating the contributions of Facebook to political participation, in order to review 
and enhance the existing explanatory models of political participation and to develop a more 
general theory of Facebook political participation.  
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In order to achieve these goals the following three research questions (RQs) encompassing a 
series of sub-questions were developed. It is important to note that, differing from most 
Internet and political participation studies which focus heavily on the campaign environment 
(e.g., Bimber and Davis 2003; Curtice and Norris 2008; Davis et al. 2009; Dimitrova et al. 
2014; Rice et al. 2013), the present research investigated the contributions of Facebook to 
political participation mainly during non-electoral periods (see Timescale of data collection 
in Section 4.4.3). 
RQ 1: How does Facebook contribute to British and Italian citizens’ political participation?  
RQ 1.1: Is Facebook a relevant venue for political participation and what are the links 
between Facebook, Internet and offline political participation? 
RQ 1.2: What are the advantages and limitations of Facebook in terms of political 
participation? 
RQ 2: Do the contributions of Facebook to political participation vary depending on the 
political activity in question? 
RQ 2.1: Distinguishing between political communication and political mobilisation, 
how do the contributions of Facebook vary in relation to these two different typologies 
of political activity? 
RQ 2.2: How does Facebook contribute to British and Italian citizens’ consumption of 
political information? 
RQ 2.3: How does Facebook contribute to British and Italian citizens’ political 
discussion? 
RQ 3: What are the factors mediating the contributions of Facebook to British and Italian 
citizens’ political participation?  
RQ 3.1: How do demographic factors such as gender, age, education and occupation 
impact upon the links between Facebook and political participation? 
RQ 3.2: How does political engagement mediate the contributions of Facebook to 
political participation? 
RQ 3.3: How do the time spent on Facebook, the relevance of this SNS in people’s 
lives, Facebook non-political activity and different non-political usage practices 
(information vs communication vs social recreation) mediate the contributions of this 
SNS to political participation? 
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4.4 Research Design 
Bryman (2008) observes that “the practice of social research does not exist in a bubble, 
hermetically sealed off from the social sciences and the various intellectual allegiances that 
their practitioners hold” (p. 4). Even if not explicitly, the choice of research design and 
methods is, in fact, often driven by ontological and epistemological considerations (Bryman 
2008; Feilzer 2010). However, in practice, not only observations on the nature of knowledge 
and the social world, but also more practical elements can impact on the research design, 
elements such as personal and institutional interests, pressure from academic communities or 
methodological considerations on the best way to examine the phenomenon(a) under 
investigation (Wagner and Okeke 2009). Methodological rather than metaphysical concerns 
have shaped the design of the present research, with ontological and epistemological 
considerations impacting only in a secondary capacity. 
 
4.4.1 Pragmatism  and mixed methods research  
The approach to research adopted in this thesis reflects the principles of pragmatism as 
research paradigm. Drawing on the writings of Kuhn (1962, 1974, 2000), Morgan (2007) 
traces the development of the notion of paradigm and identifies four basic versions of this 
concept, i.e., paradigms as worldviews, epistemological stances, shared beliefs among 
members of a specialty area, and model examples of research. Morgan (2007) explains that 
all these versions treat paradigms as “shared belief systems that influence the kinds of 
knowledge researchers seek and how they interpret the evidence they collect” (p. 50), and 
differ only on the level of generality of such belief systems. As a research paradigm, 
pragmatism has stemmed from the works of American philosophers such as Dewey (1927), 
Mead (1934), Peirce (1997) and James (1907). In terms of ontology and epistemology, 
pragmatism finds itself between the realism of positivism/post-positivism and the relativism 
of constructivism. It recognises the existence of an external world independent from 
individuals’ minds, but it also acknowledges the relevance of social and historical contexts, 
and questions the certainty with which such an external reality can be known (Cherryholmes 
1992, 1994; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). Despite their common ground, pragmatism 
strongly differs from the positivist and constructivist paradigms in that it sanctions a shift 
from process to outcome. As contended by Dewey (1925), research paradigms such as 
positivism or subjectivism all seek to establish the truth, whether it is objective or relative, 
and produce knowledge that better represents reality (Rorty 1999). The Greek root of the 
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word “pragmatism” is pragma, meaning “result of action”, a root shared by words like 
“practice” and “practical.” Accordingly, pragmatism is less preoccupied with asking 
questions about the nature of reality and knowledge, and more concerned with how to 
contribute to what the researcher wants to achieve (Ansell 2007; Cherryholmes 1992, 1994; 
Hanson 2008; Morgan 2007; Rorty 1999). By shifting the focus from metaphysical to 
methodological concerns, a pragmatic researcher moves away from the 
positivist/constructivist divide, acknowledges that research methodologies are only tools 
designed to facilitate the understanding of the world, and that methods are secondary to 
research aims and questions (Cherryholmes 1994; Hanson 2008; Onwuegbuzie and Leech 
2005; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). 
By rejecting the enforced choice between positivism and constructivism, between 
quantitative and qualitative methods, by embracing them both and placing them at the 
service of the RQs, pragmatism emerges as the natural philosophical partner for the MM 
approach (Cherryhomes 1992, 1994; Creswell 2009; Feilzer 2010; Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie 2004; Maxcy 2003; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). However, adopting 
pragmatism as a research paradigm does not automatically result in MM studies. In fact if 
this were the case, it would lead to a new orthodoxy involving the erroneous belief that good 
social research necessarily requires the use of both quantitative and qualitative research 
(Greene et al. 2001; Rocco et al. 2003). This position would betray the founding principles 
of pragmatism, principles which place the RQ at the forefront of the scientific enquiry in 
order to overcome the dictatorship of the methods. A pragmatic researcher should, therefore, 
adopt a MM approach in cases when quantitative and qualitative approaches cannot provide 
adequate findings if employed on their own (Johnson et al. 2007; Tashakkori and Creswell 
2007), such as if the phenomena under investigation have different layers, and require 
quantitative methods to measure certain layers and qualitative methods for others (Feilzer 
2010). As the next section elucidates, this is exactly why a MM methodology has been 
chosen in the present study which, in this sense, can be seen as an example of genuine 
pragmatic research.   
 
4.4.2 Mixed methods approach: a sequential-explanatory research  strategy 
The MM approach combines qualitative and quantitative research methods within the same 
investigation (Alasuutari et al. 2008; Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie 2003; Tashakkori and 
Teddlie 1998), and it has emerged as a viable alternative to exclusively quantitative and 
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qualitative methodologies (Denscombe 2008). Johnson et al. (2007) trace the chronological 
development of the various research paradigms and methodologies. They indicate that after 
an early period, the 1950s to mid-1970s, dominated by the positivist paradigm and 
quantitative methodologies, from the mid-1970s to the 1990s the constructivist research 
paradigm and qualitative methodologies thrived in academia, with the MM approach 
emerging only in the last couple of decades (Johnson et al., 2007). In this sense, MM 
research could be interpreted as a response to the long-lasting paradigm war between 
positivism/post-positivism and constructivism/interpretivism (Creswell and Plano Clark 
2011). 
In terms of research, the MM approach presents a series of attractive features that have 
contributed to its increasing popularity. As indicated by several MM experts (Axin and 
Pearce 2006; Bryman 2008; Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Denscombe 2008; 
Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie 2003), the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods 
can enable the researcher to achieve the following: offset weaknesses of both methods; 
produce a more complete picture of the phenomenon under investigation; and build upon or 
enhance the initial findings produced by one method with those from another method. In 
addition, the MM approach offers an advantage in cross-national studies, as the assessment 
of the phenomenon(a) under inquiry through a quantitative and a qualitative lens can limit 
the measurement issues often characterising this type of research (Yaprak 2003).  
Most of the studies examining the impact of digital technologies on political participation 
reported in the literature review are quantitative in nature, and almost all of them employ 
surveys as research method (e.g., Ancu and Cozma 2009; Hoffman et al. 2013; Holt et al. 
2013; Tang and Lee 2013; Towner 2013; Vitak et al. 2011). Only some of the considered 
political participation studies adopt a qualitative approach (e.g., Fenton and Barassi, 2011; 
Gustafsson 2012; Mascheroni 2012; Storsul 2014; Vraga et al. 2015; Vromen et al. 2015; 
Zavestoski et al. 2006). This methodology seems more popular in research dealing with the 
mobilisation dimension of political participation, with an increasing number of publications 
concentrating on specific case studies and using qualitative methods such as focus groups 
and interviews (e.g., Gustafsson and Wahlström 2008; Khamis and Vaughn 2012; Wulf et al. 
2013).  
While there has been a growth in qualitative investigations, MM studies are still scarce in 
Internet and political participation research, and only few of the reviewed papers present a 
MM component (Kavanaugh et al. 2008; Valenzuela 2013; Valenzuela et al. 2012; Welp and 
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Wheatley 2012). A study not mentioned in the literature but relevant to this thesis is that of 
Colombo et al. (2012). This investigation examines the influence of the Internet on political 
engagement rather than on political participation, and it is particularly pertinent to the 
present research because it adds a comparative component to the MM methodology. 
Colombo et al. (2012) combine data from the European Social Survey concerning 15 
European Countries to data generated by a survey and series of focus groups with Spanish 
participants. Their study gives primacy to the quantitative phase, and employs qualitative 
data only to complement the quantitative findings. Even more skewed towards the 
quantitative component are Valenzuela (2013) and Valenzuela et al.’s (2012) investigations 
where the qualitative phase is strongly overshadowed by the quantitative one, with 
qualitative results not even considered in the discussion of the findings. 
More balanced is Kavanaugh et al.’s (2008) research which uses a text-book MM 
methodology. Their research involves two waves of random sample household surveys, in 
addition to interviews with government representatives and citizens, and homogenous focus 
groups with survey participants. Through a second qualitative lens, Kavanaugh et al. (2008) 
try to elaborate on quantitative findings and understand more deeply the links between 
Internet use and political participation. In the quantitative phase they find evidence that the 
Internet can benefit not only politically active citizens, but also less politically active 
participants. These findings are confirmed in the second qualitative phase which also helps 
to shed light on the mechanisms behind this process. Focus groups, in fact, indicate that 
digital technologies, particularly blogs, help to engage less politically active individuals by 
favouring exchanges with other citizens through ad-hoc political talk and knowledge sharing 
(Kavanaugh et al. 2008). This study exemplifies how the application of a second layer of 
enquiry which differs from the first – in this case a further qualitative phase – can enhance 
and explain the findings generated through a single method, enabling a more thorough 
examination. 
The present research was inspired by Kavanaugh et al.’s (2008) approach rather than 
Colombo et al.’s (2012). Accordingly, it adopted a sequential-explanatory MM design, with 
the quantitative and qualitative phases assuming the same relevance, both contributing to 
each of the RQs presented in Section 4.3 (for a classification of MM designs see Creswell – 
2009).  
The sequential-explanatory MM strategy entails the collection and analysis of quantitative 
data in the first phase, and the collection and analysis of qualitative data in the second stage, 
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thus resulting in a more detailed exploration (Creswell 2009). Considerations of the 
limitations of research investigating the impact of the Internet on political participation have 
driven the choice of this particular MM design. As stressed in Section 4.1, two conceptual 
weaknesses characterise many studies falling within this strand of research and only a few 
take into account the multidimensionality of political participation and the difference 
between various Internet and SNS usage practices. Therefore, even if most research within 
this field is quantitative in nature, the links between different forms of political participation 
(political communication vs mobilisation) and various Internet and SNS usages (information 
vs communication vs entertainment) have not been subject to many quantitative 
investigations and thus require further examination.  
The decision to include a second qualitative phase derived from considerations on how 
qualitative data could usefully supplement and extend the quantitative analysis. Greene et al. 
(2001) observe that, used in isolation, survey research does not offer much in terms of 
explanation of findings, and that in-depth interviews, when combined with this method, can 
illustrate and enhance quantitative findings. One advantage of MM research is that it 
facilitates the discovery of mechanisms responsible for producing associations (Axin and 
Pearce 2006), with qualitative data helping researchers to explain relationships established 
during the quantitative phase (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2004, 2005). 
As explained in Creswell’s (2009) taxonomies of MM designs, in MM studies the researcher 
can choose to give equal priority to both quantitative and qualitative phases, or prioritise the 
quantitative or the qualitative phase. In sequential-explanatory MM design, priority is 
typically given to the quantitative approach because it comes first and often represents the 
main aspect of the whole data collection process (Ivankova et al. 2006). Nonetheless, as 
previously stated, in this research both quantitative and qualitative phases have been 
weighted equally. The reason for this choice is related to the state of Internet and political 
participation research. Given that contrasting evidence characterises this research strand, 
identifying the general relationships between variables is as important as understanding the 
reasons behind these links, and, therefore, qualitative tools are needed as much as 
quantitative ones.  
The quantitative results strongly shaped the subsequent qualitative phase, as they guided the 
selection of its participants (see Sections 4.4.3 and 4.5) and indicated the themes and issues 
to pursue in the interviews (this process can be easily grasped in Chapter 5 in which the 
results of this study are presented). With regard to this last point, for example, one of the 
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findings of the quantitative phase was the strong correlations between Facebook, Internet, 
and offline political participation (see Section 5.1.1, Table 8). However, correlation analysis 
does not highlight the directions of these associations, and the interviews tried to establish 
whether it is citizens who are already politically active offline and on other online platforms 
who extend their participation to Facebook, or if political participation can start on this SNS 
and move then to other channels.  
Regarding the integration of the qualitative and quantitative methods, in the present study the 
quantitative phase has linked with the qualitative phase in the four stages shown in Figure 4.  
Figure 4 – Mixed Methods Sequential-Explanatory Design: Integration of the Quantitative 
and Qualitative Phases 
Quantitative 
Phase
Qualitative 
Phase
Data Collection
Employing quantitative 
results  for the 
identification of topics to 
pursue in the interviews
Data Interpretation
Combining quantitative 
and qualitative results to 
answer the research 
questions
Sampling 
Using the quantitative 
samples as sampling 
frames for the qualitative 
ones
Data Analysis
Exploring and explaining 
quantitative results  
through the qualitative 
phase
 
In summary, a sequential-explanatory MM strategy has been adopted in this research. The 
relationships between different forms of political participation, different channels of 
participation (i.e., Facebook, the Internet, and the offline world), and various non-political 
usages of Facebook were examined through a series of online surveys. Then, in-depth 
interviews were used to explain and build upon what surfaced in the quantitative phase. 
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4.4.3 The research process   
The present research adopted, therefore, a sequential-explanatory MM approach, combining 
online surveys to telephone and face-to-face semi-structured interviews. This section 
describes in detail the research process.  
Participants’ eligibility: To be eligible for the present study participants had to be 
Facebook users, between the age of 18 and 65, and either British or Italian citizens. 
Underage users were excluded from the study in order to avoid ethical issues. Users over 65 
years were not considered because they represent a very small fraction of the Italian and 
British Facebook populations, and finding participants for this age group could have proved 
problematic (see Facebook statistics in Appendix A). 
Timescale of data collection: The data collection for the quantitative and qualitative phases 
occurred in both countries mostly during a non-electoral period, from March to December 
2012. In the ten months during which the data collection was carried out, local elections 
were held in Italy and the UK in the first weeks of May while no other elections were held in 
the remaining nine months. Surveys were circulated on Facebook between March and June, 
and interviews held between October and December.  
Piloting the questionnaire: Before starting the quantitative data collection, two pilot 
surveys were distributed to a convenience sample of 12 BPs and 12 IPs. Having completed 
the surveys, participants were asked the following questions:  
a) How long did the questionnaire take? 
b) Were all the words understood? 
c) Were there any questions you found difficult to understand and/or reply to? 
d) Was there anything else you did not understand? 
e) How did you find the questions’ sequencing and questionnaire layout? 
f) Do you have any suggestions to improve the survey? 
 
Participants’ comments and suggestions were considered and minor changes related to the 
structure of the survey and the wordings of questions were implemented. 
Quantitative research process: Two questionnaires (see Appendix E), one for the IS and 
one for the BS were created through the website Bristol Online Surveys 
(www.survey.bris.ac.uk). The questionnaires were identical with the exception of minor 
modifications on some items to reflect differences in language or relevant options (i.e., party 
affiliation and political knowledge, see pp. 305-307 and 315-317). For the first quantitative 
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phase, the intended strategy was to randomly select a series of Facebook groups, and 
circulate the questionnaires among their members. The criterion for the group selection was 
to identify groups containing in their titles the names of the five biggest British and Italian 
cities in terms of population. The ten groups with the most members were chosen for each 
city. Among these, three groups for each city were randomly selected and questionnaires 
posted on their walls. The idea was to focus on non-political groups rather than political ones 
so as to include in the sample both politically active and less politically active users. 
However, after circulating the questionnaires in various Facebook groups for a period of ten 
days, no responses were recorded. At this point, it was thought that the recurrence on 
Facebook of malicious links and hoaxes could have impacted negatively on users’ 
willingness to click on a link from an unknown source. For this reason, snowball sampling 
was used instead of random sampling, and a new recruitment strategy devised. In the new 
recruitment strategy, again Facebook was used as the recruitment platform. The researcher 
approached several of his Facebook contacts who were part of his social and professional 
circles, who fitted the eligibility criteria for the study, and who guaranteed a certain degree 
of variation in terms of demographics and levels of Facebook and political activity. These 
potential participants were provided with two links, one to the survey and the other to a 
website which offered information about the study (https://sites.google.com/site/projectqmu 
and https://sites.google.com/site/progettoqmu). They were asked to complete the online 
questionnaires and circulate them among their network. In addition, given that the great 
majority of initial BPs were Scottish, it was requested that the first wave of recruits target 
English, Welsh and Northern Irish friends, to guarantee as balanced as possible a 
representation of the countries of the Union. 
Post-stratification of the quantitative samples: To further increase the representativeness 
of the recruited samples, a post-stratifying criterion was also applied. Age was chosen as a 
stratifying criterion for two reasons. The first reason was related to the availability of 
Facebook statistics.  The main source of Facebook statistics used in this thesis was the 
website Socialbakers, which only provided statistics on the age composition of the British 
and Italian Facebook populations and did not offer any data in relation to other demographic 
variables such as gender, education and occupational levels (see Appendix A). The second 
reason was the relevance of age to the political participation phenomenon (as discussed in 
Section 2.1.2). Through a series of calculations, it was ensured that the age group ratios of 
the two samples were consistent with the ones of the target populations (see Appendix B for 
a calculation of the age ratios). The quantitative data collection ended once the required 
  
87 
number of participants for each age group was reached. In certain age groups (i.e., 18-24; 
25-35; and 45-65) participants exceeded the required number. In this case, some participants 
were randomly selected and excluded from the study. Thus from the initial 483 participants, 
196 for the BS and 196 for the IS were randomly selected according to their age. 
Qualitative research process: A total of 26 telephone/face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews – 13 with BPs and 13 with IPs – were held. The purpose of the qualitative strand 
was to explain and develop quantitative results. In order to achieve this goal, the quantitative 
sample was utilised as the sampling frame for the subsequent qualitative phase. At the end of 
the online survey, respondents were asked to provide their contact details if they wanted to 
take part in an interview. As for the first quantitative stage, in the qualitative phase a non-
probability sampling strategy was used. The selection of the qualitative sub-sample occurred 
according to several criteria such as the identification of particularly significant quantitative 
results, unexpected non-significant quantitative results, extreme cases and demographics. 
The intent was to generate qualitative samples which would vary in terms of age, gender, 
and levels of Facebook, Internet, and offline political participation and Facebook non-
political activity (see Appendix D for the composition of the qualitative samples and 
participants’ profiles). Through this purposive process 10 BPs and 11 IPs were selected. The 
remaining participants were recruited through a further snowballing procedure. This second 
sampling stage was not anticipated and was implemented because among the respondents 
who volunteered for the interviews, there were no political activists between the age of 18-
24 and individuals with very limited levels of political activity and engagement. It was 
deemed that these two profiles were needed to offer a full account of the contributions of 
Facebook to political participation. 
Rewards: Incentives in the form of gift certificates were used to promote the participation in 
the online surveys and interviews, a strategy also adopted in other studies focusing on SNSs 
(Vitak et al., 2011; Zube et al., 2009). To encourage the participation in the quantitative 
phase participants were entered in a draw. One BP and one IP were then randomly selected 
and awarded a £30 and a €30 voucher respectively, while a £10 or a €10 voucher were 
offered to all participants for taking part in the interviews. 
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4.5 Sampling Strategy 
This section discusses the sampling strategies adopted in the quantitative and qualitative 
phases of this research. Before examining in more detail the quantitative and qualitative 
sampling procedures, considerations about sampling in cross-national research are in order. 
Compared to single-nation studies, sampling in cross-national research involves an extra 
layer of complexity (Lynn 2003; Lynn et al. 2006). Issues can derive from the 
incomparability of the samples or sampling frames and the application of different sampling 
techniques and procedures (Milliman and Von Glinow 1998; Yaprak 2003).  
The comparability of the samples can be further enhanced by ensuring the equivalence of the 
study populations of each nation, so as to generate matched samples (Braun 2003; Hofstede 
1980, 2001; Lynn et al. 2007; Milliman and Von Glinow 1998; Reynolds et al. 2000; Yaprak 
2003). This approach is often adopted in cross-national research. One potential example is 
that of the European Social Survey (ESS), an academically driven cross-national survey 
measuring attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty 
European nations (ESS 2014). To achieve optimal comparability, the principle of 
equivalence is applied to sample selections in the ESS. Equivalent sampling procedures are 
implemented in all participating countries. To this end, strict sampling guidelines are 
imposed, e.g., “samples must be representative of all persons aged 15 and over resident 
within private households in each country, regardless of their nationality, citizenship or 
language; individuals are selected by strict random probability methods at every stage; quota 
sampling is not permitted at any stage,” etc. (ESS 2014). Through the application of these 
sampling procedures, the ESS provides a valuable data set which has also been used in 
political participation studies, such as that by Melo and Stockemer (2014) on the links 
between age and political participation, or that by Hooghe and Marien (2013) on the relation 
between political trust and various forms of political participation.  
Another example of equivalence in sampling is offered by Xenos et al. (2014) in their 
investigation on the impact of social media use on young people’s political engagement in 
the contexts of Australia, the UK and the USA. They develop matched samples by limiting 
the survey populations to individuals aged 16-29 in all three countries, and by systematically 
recruiting participants so as to create samples that mirror census data in each country on key 
demographic variables such as gender and age. Like in the ESS and Xenos et al.’s (2014) 
study, a sampling strategy aiming to achieve the equivalence of the study populations has 
been adopted in the present research for both the quantitative and qualitative phase. 
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In their exploration of the MM literature, Teddlie and Yu (2007) find that sequential 
quantitative-qualitative sampling is the most common sampling technique, with many 
studies adopting probability and purposive sampling strategies sequentially. A sequential 
quantitative-qualitative sampling strategy has been employed in the present study, but 
purposive rather than probability sampling was used in both phases. The original plan was to 
combine probability and purposive but due to problems in the recruitment of participants 
through random procedures (see previous section for further details on the recruitment 
process), a new sampling strategy had to be devised.  Snowball sampling was thus identified 
as the sampling strategy best suited to the Facebook environment, as already suggested by 
Bhutta (2012). Snowball sampling is based on a chain-referral process which capitalises on 
social connections. The recruitment process begins with a small number of participants 
falling within the target population who then recommend other people for the study (Bhutta 
2012). Several SNSs and political participation studies presented in the literature review use 
snowball sampling (Ancu and Cozma 2009; Gustafsson 2012; Obar et al. 2012; Tufekci and 
Wilson 2012). For instance, in their study on MySpace and campaign involvement, Ancu 
and Cozma (2009) announced their survey on several MySpace pages dealing with US 
politics, encouraging participants to distribute the survey link to their own friends. Another 
example is that of Tufekci and Wilson (2012) who, like in the present research, employ 
snowball sampling out of necessity. In their investigation on the role of Facebook during the 
Egyptian uprising, initially they conducted face-to-face interviews, approaching participants 
in the streets around Tahir Square. However, because of continuous interruptions and 
participants’ anxiety, they dropped this strategy and shifted to a snowball-sampling 
approach. 
In the present study, Facebook was employed as a recruitment platform in which the 
researcher’s Facebook friends were initially targeted and asked to circulate the surveys 
among their networks. As participants were recruited through a non-probability sampling 
technique, the British sample (BS) and Italian sample (IS) cannot be considered 
representative of the target populations. Nonetheless, some measures were implemented to 
improve the samples’ representativeness. Firstly, the sizes of the two samples were 
calculated taking into account the sizes of the British and Italian Facebook populations at the 
time of data collection (see Appendix A). Considering these figures, using a confidence 
interval of 95% and allowing for a 7% error, it was calculated that both the BS and the IS 
required 196 participants (see Appendix B for a detailed calculation of the samples’ sizes).  
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To further increase the representativeness of the recruited samples, a post-stratifying 
criterion was also applied. The application of weight after survey completion, in order to 
make the sample more representative of the target population, is a procedure often followed 
in Internet survey studies (Atkeson 2010) and is indicated by Bhutta (2012) as a method 
particularly valuable for Facebook-drawn samples. Age was chosen as a stratifying criterion 
due to its relevance for political participation (see Quintelier – 2007 – for a comprehensive 
account), and because it was the only demographic statistic provided about British and 
Italian Facebook users by Socialbakers, the main source of Facebook statistics employed in 
this thesis (see Post-stratification of the quantitative samples in the previous section).  
Sampling in MM studies involves a combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques 
(Teddlie and Yu 2007). Onwuegbuzie and Collins (2007) identify eight MM sample designs, 
which vary in relation to the sequence of the components (i.e., concurrent or sequential 
designs) and the relationship between the qualitative and quantitative samples. With regards 
to the relationships between the quantitative and qualitative samples, samples can be any of 
the following: identical, when the same participants take part in the two phases; parallel, 
when samples are different but drawn from the same population; nested, when one sample is 
a subset of the other sample; and multilevel, when the two samples are drawn from different 
populations (Onwuegbuzie and Collins 2007). In this research, a sequential quantitative-
qualitative nested/parallel sampling strategy was implemented.  
The purpose of the qualitative strand of the present study was to explain and develop 
quantitative results. In order to achieve this goal, as often happens in MM sequential studies 
(Teddlie and Yu 2007), the quantitative sample was utilised as the sampling frame for the 
subsequent qualitative phase. Like in the first quantitative phase, a non-probability sampling 
strategy was used also in the second stage of the research. The combination of non-
probability sampling schemes is indicated by Onwuegbuzie and Collins (2007) as the most 
common sampling strategy in MM research.  
In line with several authors’ guidelines for the definition of the size of qualitative samples 
(Guest et al. 2006; Onwuegbuzie et al. 2004; Warren 2002), a total of 26 interviews – 13 for 
the BS and 13 for the IS – were held. Selection of the interviewees was based on several 
criteria, such as the identification of particularly significant quantitative results, unexpected 
non-significant quantitative results, extreme cases and demographics. The intent was to 
generate qualitative samples which varied in terms of age, gender, and levels of Facebook, 
Internet, and offline political participation and Facebook non-political activity (see Appendix 
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D for the composition of the qualitative samples and participants’ profiles). This strategy has 
been inspired by Kavanaugh et al. (2008), who select focus group participants for the second 
phase of their MM study on the basis of their levels of political participation and Internet 
use, trying to guarantee diversity in gender and age.  
This purposive process, however, did not enable the recruitment of participants with certain 
profiles (i.e., young political activists, and individuals with low levels of political activity). 
As these two profiles were deemed necessary to offer a full account of the contributions of 
Facebook to political participation, a further snowballing procedure was added (see 
Qualitative research process in the previous section for further details). 
 
Figure 5 - Sequential Quantitative-Qualitative Nested/Parallel Sampling 
 Quantitative 
Sample
196 British 
Participants Nested: 
Sub-samples of the 
quantitative ones
Snowball 
Sampling
196 Italian 
Participants
 Qualitative 
Sample
Purposive 
Sampling
Snowball 
Sampling
Parallel: 
Drawn from the same 
population of the 
quantitative samples
10 British 
Participants
11 Italian 
Participants
3 British 
Participants
2 Italian 
Participants
 
 
In summary, a sequential quantitative-qualitative nested/parallel sampling strategy was 
implemented in this research. In both phases, non-probability-sampling techniques were 
used. In the quantitative strand, participants were recruited through a chain-referral process. 
In the qualitative phase of the study, a sub-sample of the quantitative samples was selected 
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on the basis of participants’ scores on a number of key variables (e.g., age, gender, Facebook 
non-political activity, Facebook political participation, political engagement, etc.). As the 
quantitative sampling frame did not provide participants with certain characteristics, a 
further chain-referral stage was added. In each stage of this research pragmatism guided the 
sampling process, and the initial sampling strategies were modified and adjusted in order to 
deal with unexpected issues. Teddlie and Yu (2007) deem such a proactive, flexible and 
creative approach to sampling crucial to the success of a MM study. A detailed description 
of the composition of the quantitative and qualitative samples can be found in Appendix C 
and D respectively. 
 
4.6 Research Methods 
In the first quantitative stage, self-administered online surveys explored citizens’ 
participation in communication and mobilisation activities across three channels of 
participation (i.e., Facebook, the Internet, and the offline world), examining the relationships 
among them and various non-political usages of Facebook. Self-administered online surveys 
are questionnaires that participants can complete on their own through a website. They 
guarantee the absence of interview effects on respondents and more convenience for 
participants, as they can complete the questionnaire at their chosen time and place (Bryman 
2008). Online surveys are a popular tool in research investigating the influence of the 
Internet and SNSs on political participation (Ancu and Cozma 2009; Bartlett et al. 2013; 
Baumgartner and Morris 2010; Halpern and Lee 2011; Hoffman et al. 2013; Holt et al. 2013; 
Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012; Lew et al. 2011; Macafee 2013; Towner 2013; Vesnic-Alujevic 
2012; Vitak et al. 2011).  
Two questionnaires (see Appendix E) – one for the IS and one for the BS – were created and 
circulated through Facebook (see Section 4.4.3 for a detailed description of the research 
process). Bhutta (2012) observes that SNSs are a valuable tool for survey based research as 
they speed up the research process and reduce its costs.  Bhutta (2012) also comments on the 
value of Facebook for survey research, identifying it as the SNS best suited to this method, 
due to the following factors: the size of its user base; its intensive use; and the presence of 
features like the News Feed and Groups which promote the circulation of information and 
connections among users. The online surveys aimed to measure participants’ scores on a 
series of relevant variables and examine the links between them (see Section 4.6.2 for an 
explanation of the questionnaire variables and Appendix F for the coding sheet). Due to the 
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adopted sampling strategy (see Section 4.5), it has not been possible to estimate survey 
response rates. 
Quantitative results were further explored in the second qualitative phase through a series of 
interviews (see the attached CD for the interviews transcripts), a research tool often used in 
qualitative studies investigating the links between the Internet, SNSs and political 
mobilisation (Khamis and Vaughn 2012, Valenzuela et al. 2012; Valenzuela 2013; Welp and 
Wheatley 2012; Wulf et al. 2013). Semi-structured interviews rather than structured 
interviews were chosen because they grant a higher degree of flexibility to the researcher. 
An interview guide (see Appendix G) listing the main issues to be explored during the 
interviews was developed. This guide was loosely followed, with the researcher delving into 
the various topics with a degree of depth appropriate to interviewees’ responses. Such an 
approach allowed the emergence of unanticipated topics, such as the presence of certain 
Facebook contacts limiting participants’ political participation on this SNS or the impact of 
the negative perception of mainstream media on Facebook political participation. 
It is important to note that the qualitative phase started only after the analysis of the 
quantitative data was completed. Details on the timescale of the data collection and 
recruitment process for both the quantitative and the qualitative phases can be found in 
Section 4.4.3. 
 
4.6.1 Questionnaire variables 
As described in Section 4.4.3, in the first quantitative stage of the present research online 
surveys explored citizens’ political participation across three channels of participation (i.e., 
Facebook, the Internet, and the offline world), and examined the relationships among these 
activities and other relevant variables. This section illustrates the various variables examined 
in the questionnaires. 
Demographics: The demographic variables included gender (Male, Female), age (18-24, 
25-34, 35-44, 45-65), level of education (Less than Upper Secondary Education, Upper 
Secondary Education, Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary Education, First Stage of Tertiary 
Education, Second Stage of Tertiary Education) and level of occupation (Unemployed, 
Student, Blue collar worker, White collar worker, Small employer and own account worker, 
Intermediate and lower supervisor, Large employer, manager and professional). Participants’ 
level of education was assessed through Eurostat’s (2007) International Standard 
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Classification of Education (ISCED), while participants’ occupational status was measured 
through the European Socio-economic Classification (ESeC) (Harrison and Rose 2006). 
Both classifications have been developed by Eurostat for the purpose of cross-national 
comparison.  
Media usage: Participants’ media usage was assessed through five survey items adapted 
from Kenski and Stroud (2006) and Moy et al.’s (2005) investigations on the connection 
between Internet use and political participation. Respondents were asked how much time 
they usually spend daily consuming TV, newspapers and/or magazines, the radio, and the 
Internet (excluding Facebook). The usage time for each of these media was recorded on a 
five-point scale (1= None at all, 2= Less than 1 hour, 3= 1 to 3 hours, 4= 3 to 5 hours, 5= 
More than 5 hours).  
Facebook activity: Facebook activity was assessed through three main measures: Facebook 
usage time, Facebook perceived relevance, and Facebook non-political activity. The 
composition and range of these measures are presented in Table 1, p. 96. 
With regards to Facebook usage time, participants were asked how much time they usually 
spent daily on Facebook. This variable was measured on a four-point-scale (1= Less than 1 
hour, 2= 1 to 3 hours, 3= 3 to 5 hours, 4= More than 5 hours). 
Facebook perceived relevance is a summated rating scale of four items each bearing equal 
weight (Cronbach’s α = .765) drawn from the Facebook intensity scale developed by Ellison 
et al. (2007). Facebook perceived relevance aims to assess the relevance of Facebook in 
participants’ lives.  
To assess the relevance of Facebook, respondents were asked to indicate their agreement on 
a five-point Likert-type scale (1= Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither agree nor 
disagree, 4= Agree, 5= Strongly Agree) to four statements:  
a) Facebook is part of my everyday activity 
b) I feel out of touch when I haven't logged onto Facebook for a while 
c) I feel I am part of the Facebook community  
d) I would be sorry if Facebook closed down  
 
Facebook non-political activity is a summated rating scale composed of nine items each 
bearing equal weight (Cronbach’s α = .866). The usage of summated rating scales is a 
common practice in political participation research (Calenda and Meijer 2009; Foot et al. 
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2009; Kenski and Stroud 2006; Kavanaugh et al. 2009; Moy et al. 2005; Verba et al. 1995; 
Vitak et al. 2011; Wang 2007). To establish the levels of Facebook non-political activity, 
participants were asked how often during the last six months they had engaged through 
Facebook in various non-political activities (1= Never, 2= Rarely, 3= Sometimes, 4= Often, 
5= Very often). These activities included:  
a) Watching/listening/reading non-political news 
b) Visiting profiles of non-political actors or organisations  
c) Searching for non-political initiatives 
d) Contacting family and friends 
e) Non-political talk  
f) Sharing information on non-political initiatives  
g) Posting/uploading non-political material  
h) Organising non-political initiatives  
i) Joining a non-political group  
 
In order to assess whether the contributions of Facebook to political participation vary 
according to different usage practices, the Facebook non-political activity scale was split into 
three sub-scales, each dealing with a different usage dimension: the Facebook information 
dimension which incorporates the activities a, b, c; the Facebook interpersonal 
communication dimension  encompassing the activities d, e, f; and the Facebook social 
recreation dimension including the activities g, h, i.  
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Table 1 – Facebook Activity: Scales and Indexes 
 
Items Range 
Facebook Perceived 
Relevance 
 Facebook is part of my everyday activity 
 I feel out of touch when I haven't logged onto Facebook 
for a while 
 I feel I am part of the Facebook community  
 I would be sorry if Facebook closed down 
From 4 (No relevance)  
to 20 (High relevance) 
Facebook Non-Political 
Activity 
 Watching/listening/reading non-political news 
 Posting/uploading non-political material 
From 9 (Never)  
to 45 (Very often) 
  Visiting profiles of non-political actors or organisations   
  Contacting family and friends   
  Non-political talk  
  Searching for non-political initiatives  
  Sharing information on non-political initiatives  
  Organising non-political initiatives  
  Joining a non-political group   
Facebook Information 
Dimension 
 Watching/listening/reading non-political news 
 Visiting profiles of non-political actors or organisations 
 Searching for non-political initiatives 
From 3 (Never)  
to 15 (Very often) 
Facebook Interpersonal 
Communication Dimension 
 Contacting family and friends 
 Non-political talk 
 Sharing information on non-political initiatives 
From 3 (Never)  
to 15 (Very often) 
Facebook Social Recreation 
Dimension  
 Posting/uploading non-political material 
 Organising non-political initiatives 
 Joining a non-political group 
From 3 (Never)  
to 15 (Very often) 
 
Political engagement: The surveys also tapped into respondents’ political attitudes. A 
political engagement index was developed on the basis of Verba et al.’s (1995) 
conceptualisation of political engagement (see Section 2.1.2). This additive index is built on 
five items each bearing equal weight: political interest, political knowledge, partisanship, 
internal political efficacy, and external political efficacy. 
In line with several political participation studies (Kenski and Stroud 2006; Kim 2006; Wang 
2007), political interest was measured by asking respondents how often  they follow what is 
going on in government and public affairs (1= Never, 2= Rarely, 3= Sometimes, 4= Often, 
5= Very often). 
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A five-item index drawn from Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993) was developed in order to 
determine participants’ political knowledge. This index contains five survey-items testing 
participants’ knowledge about positions held by politicians, the leaderships of political 
parties, the results of the most recent general elections, the ideological positioning of 
political parties, and the working of the political systems of their countries. For each 
question participants were provided with five possible answers, with only one correct answer 
for each question. Wrong responses were coded as 0, right responses as 1. Delli Carpini and 
Keeter’s (1993) index was originally created for investigations based in the US. For the 
purpose of this research the questions have been modified to suit British and Italian political 
systems and scenarios. 
To assess respondents’ partisan affiliation, BPs were asked if, generally speaking, they 
usually think of themselves as:  
a) Conservative  
b) Labour  
c) Liberal Democrat 
d) Other  
e) No affiliation  
 
Different options were presented to IPs:  
a) Popolo della Libertà  
b) Partito Democratico  
c) Terzo Polo  
d) Other 
e) No affiliation  
 
These political parties/coalitions were selected on the basis of the results of the 2010 British 
general election and the 2008 Italian general election – the top three parties/coalitions in 
terms of votes were chosen. In relation to their level of partisanship, participants were asked 
to reveal their level of support for the preferred political party/movement. This measure was 
recorded on a six-point scale (0= Not applicable, if they answered No affiliation in the 
previous question, 1= Not strong at all, 2= Not strong, 3= Neither strong nor weak, 4= 
Strong, 5= Very strong).  
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As explained in Section 2.1.2, research distinguishes between internal and external political 
efficacy (Delli Carpini 2004; Kenski and Stroud 2006; Kavanaugh et al. 2008). Internal 
political efficacy was operationalised by asking respondents to indicate their agreement on a 
five-point Likert-type scale (1= Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither agree nor 
disagree, 4= Agree, 5= Strongly agree) with the statement: “Public officials don't care about 
people like me.” The same 5-point scale was used to measure external political efficacy and 
the statement participants had to agree with was: “Sometimes politics seems so complicated 
that a person like me can't really understand it.”  
Table 2 – Political Engagement Index 
 
Items Range 
Political Engagement  Political Interest From 5 (No engagement) 
  Partisanship to 25 (Very high engagement) 
  Political Knowledge   
  External Political Efficacy   
  Internal Political Efficacy  
 
Political participation: This study employed three general measures of political 
participation: Facebook political participation, Internet political participation, offline 
political participation, and a series of derivate measures (see Table 3). These measures are 
summated rating scales (Cronbach’s α = .948; .936; .927) assessing the samples’ levels of 
participation across ten political activities:  
a) Organising/participating in a political initiative, meeting, rally and/or protest  
b) Forming/joining a group or an organisation developed around politics  
c) Soliciting others to support or oppose a particular political party, candidate, and/or 
initiative  
d) Contacting a political party, candidate, government department and/or local council 
e) Consumption of political news 
f) Learning about a political initiative, meeting, rally and/or protest 
g) Learning about a political initiative, meeting, rally and/or protest in which you took 
part 
h) Learning about a group or an organisation developed around politics  
i) Engaging in formal and informal political discussions  
j) Expressing a political opinion 
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The political activities examined in the present research were adapted from a number of 
political participation studies (Calenda and Meijer 2009; Foot et al. 2009; Kavanaugh et al. 
2008; Kenski and Stroud 2006; Moy et al. 2005; Verba et al. 1995; Wang 2007). The idea 
was to focus on political activities that could be carried out on each of the considered 
political participation channels, in order to compare the samples’ levels of political 
participation across Facebook, the Internet (excluding Facebook), and the offline world. For 
this reason, activities relating exclusively to the Facebook and online dimensions, such as 
posting a link about politics, becoming a ‘‘fan’’ of a political candidate or group, etc., which 
were considered, for instance, in Vitak et al.’ (2011) study, were not examined in the present 
research. 
Participants were asked how often (1= Never, 2= Rarely, 3= Sometimes, 4= Often, 5= Very 
often) in the last six months they engaged in each of the considered activities across three 
different channels of participation: Facebook, the Internet, and the offline world. With 
regards to the consumption of political news (i.e., activity e), consumption of political news 
offline is  an average measure generated by combining three questionnaire items respectively 
measuring TV, radio and press consumption of political news. 
In order to understand whether the impact of Facebook on political participation varies 
according to the typology of political activity in question, Facebook, Internet and offline 
political participation have been split into two sub-scales each dealing with a different 
dimension of political participation: the mobilisation dimension which incorporates the 
activities a, b, c, d, and g; and the communication dimension encompassing the activities e, f, 
h, i, and j. Through this operation, six further measures of political participation were 
created: Facebook, Internet and offline political communication, and Facebook, Internet and 
offline political mobilisation. 
Finally, respondents’ participation in information related political activities (i.e. activities e, 
f, h) was examined using three measures: Facebook, Internet and offline political 
information. 
Using twelve different measures of political participation (see Table 3) may confuse the 
reader and complicate the understanding of the quantitative data. However, this is a 
necessary outcome for ensuring a thorough examination of a complex phenomenon such as 
that of political participation, and the implementation of that particularised approach crucial 
for the development of the field (see Section 4.1). 
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Table 3 – Political Participation Scales 
 
Items Range 
Facebook/Internet/ 
Offline Political 
Participation 
 Organising/participating in a political initiative, meeting, 
rally and/or protest on Facebook/ the Internet/ offline 
From 10 (Never) 
to 50  (Very often)  
  Forming/joining a group or an organisation developed 
around politics on Facebook/ the Internet/ offline 
 
  Soliciting others to support or oppose a particular 
political party, candidate, and/or initiative on Facebook/ 
the Internet/ offline 
 
  Contacting a political party, candidate, government 
department and/or local council on Facebook/ the 
Internet/ offline 
 
  Consumption of political news on Facebook/ the Internet/ 
offline 
 
  Learning about a political initiative, meeting, rally and/or 
protest on Facebook/ the Internet/ offline 
 
  Learning about a political initiative, meeting, rally and/or 
protest on Facebook/ the Internet/ offline in which you 
took part 
 
  Learning about a group or an organisation developed 
around politics on Facebook/ the Internet/ offline 
 
  Engaging in formal and informal political discussions on 
Facebook/ the Internet/ offline 
 
  Expressing a political opinion on Facebook/ the Internet/ 
offline 
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Table 3 – Political Participation Scales (continued from previous page) 
 
Facebook/Internet/ 
Offline Political 
Communication  
 Consumption of political news on Facebook/ the Internet/ 
offline 
 Learning about a political initiative, meeting, rally and/or 
protest on Facebook/ the Internet/ offline 
 Learning about a group or an organisation developed 
around politics on Facebook/ the Internet/ offline 
 Engaging in formal and informal political discussions on 
Facebook/ the Internet/ offline 
 Expressing a political opinion on Facebook/ the Internet/ 
offline 
From 5 (Never)  
to 25 (Very often) 
 
Facebook/Internet/ 
Offline Political 
Information  
 Consumption of political news on 
Facebook/Internet/offline 
 Learning about a political initiative, meeting, rally and/or 
protest on Facebook/ the Internet/ offline 
 Learning about a group or an organisation developed 
around politics on Facebook/ the Internet/ offline 
From 3 (Never)  
to 15 (Very often) 
 
 
Items Range 
Facebook/Internet/ 
Offline Political 
Mobilisation  
 Organising/participating in a political initiative, meeting, 
rally and/or protest on Facebook/ the Internet/ offline 
 Forming/joining a group or an organisation developed 
around politics on Facebook/ the Internet/ offline 
 Soliciting others to support or oppose a particular 
political party, candidate, and/or initiative on Facebook/ 
the Internet/ offline 
 Contacting a political party, candidate, government 
department and/or local council on Facebook/ the 
Internet/ offline 
 Learning about a political initiative, meeting, rally and/or 
protest on Facebook/ the Internet/ offline in which you 
took part 
From 5 (Never)  
to 25 (Very often) 
  
102 
4.6.2 Quantitative data analysis 
Considerations of the purpose of the present research, the nature of the samples and the data 
have guided the selection of tools for the quantitative and qualitative data analysis. 
Descriptive statistics were employed in order to analyse quantitative data. Many of the 
studies focusing on SNSs presented in the literature review use descriptive statistics, at least 
as the first step in the analysis of quantitative data (Ancu and Cozma 2009; Bartlett et al. 
2013; Baumgartner and Morris 2010; Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012; Halpern and Lee 2011; 
Hoffman et al. 2013; Holt et al. 2013; Lew et al. 2011; Macafee 2013; Rainie and Smith 
2012; Towner 2013; Vesnic-Alujevic 2012; Vitak et al. 2011). Descriptive statistical tools 
were deemed appropriate to the goal of the quantitative phase (i.e., to identify relationships 
between variables and highlight trends to be further explored through the interviews), and 
the general exploratory purpose of the study (i.e., not to achieve generalisation but rather to 
generate hypothesis and theories). 
The non-probabilistic nature of the samples (see Section 4.5) has also influenced the choice 
of descriptive statistics. In this regard, in a political participation study, Calenda and Mosca 
(2007) explain that samples characterised by strong non-probabilistic components cannot 
produce strong inferences, and descriptive statistical tools are preferable to inferential ones. 
Measures of central tendency and distribution, bar charts, box plots and histograms were, 
therefore, employed to identify patterns in the quantitative data. As in other studies focusing 
on SNSs and political participation (Ancu and Cozma 2009; Lew et al. 2011; Macafee 2013; 
Vesnic-Alujevic 2012; Valenzuela et al. 2012), these analytical tools were combined with 
correlation analysis to assess the relationship between identified relevant variables.  
Non-parametric rather than parametric statistical techniques were applied due to the non-
normal distribution of the data, and the ordinal or nominal nature of the questionnaire’s 
variables. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with Lilliefors correction – which is best used for 
sample sizes of more than fifty with unknown population mean and variance (Lilliefors 
1967) – was run to assess the normality of the distributions of scores. The test established 
that the data were not normally distributed (p. < .05) and, consequently, medians rather than 
means and interquartile range (IQR) rather than standard variation were used. 
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Table 4 – Testing the Normality of the Data: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test with Lilliefors 
Significance Correction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
With respect to the correlation analysis, considering the ordinal nature of most of the 
questionnaire variables (see previous section), Spearman rank coefficient rather Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient was used to assess the strength of correlations between the considered 
variables. The correlations between nominal variables such as gender, occupation, party 
affiliation, etc. and political participation were assessed, instead, through Cramer’s V. 
 
4.6.3 Qualitative data analysis 
In the second phase of the study, interviews were held and their content examined through a 
thematic analysis, a method enabling analysis and interpretation of data through the 
identification of common patterns (Boyatzis 1998). Thematic analysis is a popular method in 
qualitative data analysis and is often used in qualitative studies investigating the links 
between the Internet, political participation and mobilisation (Gustafsson 2012; Gustafsson 
and Wahlström 2008; Kavanaugh et al. 2008; Khamis and Vaughn 2012; Marichal 2013; 
Storsul 2014). The present research utilised thematic analysis to extract themes from the 
interviews. Such themes were first used to clarify quantitative data, and then, drawing from 
the theories which emerged in the literature, employed for the development of theories and 
models explaining the contributions of Facebook to political participation.  
 British Sample Italian Sample 
Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig. 
Facebook Political Participation .192 .000 .107 .000 
Internet Political Participation .144 .000 .132 .000 
Offline Political Participation .141 .000 .096 .000 
 Facebook Communication Dimension .144 .000 .082 .003 
 Facebook Mobilisation Dimension .266 .000 .144 .000 
 Internet Communication Dimension .124 .000 .130 .000 
 Internet Mobilisation Dimension .261 .000 .202 .000 
 Offline Communication Dimension .125 .000 .105 .000 
 Offline Mobilisation Dimension .298 .000 .184 .000 
 Facebook Non-Political Activity .081 .003 .066 .035 
Political Engagement .118 .000 .084 .002 
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Using NVivo, “an example of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis soft-ware” (Gibbs 
2002, p. xxii), a number of thematic categories were identified. The themes were established 
in a two-step process in which theory-driven and data-driven coding were combined (see 
Boyatzis – 1998 – and Braun and Clarke – 2006 – for a discussion of inductive and 
theoretical thematic analysis). This approach reflects the MM nature of the present research, 
in which the qualitative phase follows the quantitative one with the intent of explaining and 
expanding on its findings. In the first step, codes were developed on the basis of the review 
of the relevant academic literature (i.e., theory-driven coding) and quantitative results (i.e., 
data-driven coding). Finally, during the analysis of the qualitative data, further codes were 
added. Once the qualitative data were coded, relevant themes were identified. This was an 
iterative process in which themes evolved during the qualitative analysis. The identified 
themes displayed in Table 5 are thus the results of a hybrid (both theoretical and inductive) 
thematic analysis; based on the codes developed from the literature and the analysis of 
questionnaires and interviews, it was possible for themes to emerge inductively. See 
Appendix H for further clarification on the coding process and on how the various codes 
have informed the themes. 
Table 5 – Thematic Analysis: Identified Themes  
 
Cluster 
 
Themes 
FACEBOOK 
USAGE 
Importance of Facebook in people’s lives 
Negative perception of Facebook  
Facebook replacing other Internet tools 
Facebook as an all-encompassing platform 
Mainly non-political usage  
Mainly political usage by highly politically active users 
 
POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
Facebook as main online political platform 
Political relevance of other online platforms and websites 
Involving new participants 
Facilitating participation 
Bringing politics into everyday life 
Virtuous circle 
Facebook usage gap 
Need of digital skills 
Relevance of privacy concerns 
Relevance of political interest 
Relevance of political knowledge and internal political efficacy 
Relevance of external political efficacy 
Relevance of affiliation to a party or movement 
Relevance of the amount of Facebook usage 
Lack of time inhibiting participation 
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Table 5 – Thematic Analysis: Identified Themes (continued from previous page)  
 
Cluster 
 
Themes 
POLITICAL 
INFORMATION 
 
The flexibility and speed of online information 
The variety of online sources 
The interactive nature of online information 
Facebook and proliferation of sources 
The networked nature of Facebook information 
Viral information on Facebook 
Facebook as activator of the information search process 
Issues of credibility of Facebook political information 
Exposure to pro-attitudinal political information 
Exposure to political difference on Facebook 
Exposure to political difference through active selection 
Accidental exposure to political difference 
Interaction and exposure to political difference 
Presence of established media institutions on Facebook 
Facebook as source of alternative information 
Negative perception of established media institutions 
Support for established media institutions 
 
POLITICAL 
DISCUSSION 
 
Flexibility and exposure to political information 
Expanding and diversifying the discussion network 
A more politically diverse discussion network 
Limited control over discussion and its participants 
Harsher and more aggressive tones online 
More honesty and participation in online discussion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POLITICAL 
MOBILISATION 
Low efficacy of political initiatives 
More communication than mobilisation 
Growing relevance of Facebook in activists’ repertoires 
Promoting grassroots single-issue mobilisation 
More information on political initiatives 
Bypassing traditional mobilisation channels 
Detachment from traditional politics 
Interdependence between Facebook and offline political participation 
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4.7 Ethical Considerations  
In the last decade, the Internet has assumed a key role in the life of millions of people, 
providing researchers with a wide range of new ways to examine human behaviours and 
interactions. This has led to the development of Internet-based research, which can be 
broadly defined as “research which utilizes the Internet to collect information through an 
online tool, such as an online survey; studies about how people use the Internet, e.g., through 
collecting data and/or examining activities in or any online environments; and/or, uses of 
online datasets or databases” (Buchanan 2010, p. 90). However, as well as offering new 
opportunities and channels through which to investigate human behaviour, the Internet also 
raises a series of new ethical challenges that researchers have to face. Given the perpetual 
evolving nature of the Internet, the field of Internet research ethics, which emerged as a sub-
discipline of research ethics in the 1990s, is constantly redefined by emerging challenges 
(Buchanan 2010).  
In order to deal with this uncertainty, the Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) 
developed a set of guidelines for Internet research (AoIR 2002, 2012). One of the AoIR’s 
first recommendations to researchers is to turn, in the first instance, to their own discipline-
specific principles and practices. However, because online research occurs in a dynamic field 
where new technologies and tools are constantly developing, ethical questions and dilemmas 
can often emerge which are not directly addressed in extant statements and guidelines (AoIR 
2012).  
This research complies with Queen Margaret University’s (QMU) Research Ethics 
Guidelines (QMU 2008), according to which the main ethical issues to be considered in 
research are: confidentiality; privacy; obtaining informed consent; communicating 
appropriately with participants; and safe storage of participants’ data.  
With regard to confidentiality, Russell and Purcell (2009) argue that the greatest potential 
risk in online research is the breach of confidentiality, namely sharing purposely or 
unintentionally participants’ responses with individuals not associated with the research. The 
breach of confidentiality can be avoided by not requesting identifiable information (Russell 
and Purcell 2009). However, when rewards are offered, like in the present research (see 
Rewards in Section 4.4.3), participants’ personal details are required and thus this measure 
cannot be implemented (Eynon et al. 2008). Another strategy to assure confidentiality is 
anonymising the collected data and removing all labels and titles that can lead to 
identification in the presentation of findings (Walliman 2006). According to QMU’s (2008) 
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ethical guidelines, data sets are to be anonymised as soon as it is reasonable to do so. In this 
research, the data was anonymised at the end of the analysis of qualitative data. With regards 
to the presentation of research findings, no particular ethical issues emerged in the discussion 
of the quantitative data. In contrast, as participants’ quotes have been used in the 
presentation of qualitative findings, the participants’ identities have been protected through 
the allocation of pseudonyms. 
Appropriate data storage is another central ethical requirement in research (QMU 2008). 
Following QMU’s Data Protection guidelines, research data and participants’ information 
was computerised and password protected so that only authorised people (i.e., the researcher 
and the supervisory team) had access to them. 
A further key issue in research ethics is obtaining informed consent. Every ethical code 
guiding research on human subjects gives primacy to the obtainment of participants’ fully 
informed voluntary consent (Gregory 2003). As indicated by AoIR’s (2002) guidelines, the 
principle of informed consent entails the explanation of the research process and of how the 
material about/from the participants will be used (e.g., how identities will be protected).  The 
issue of informed consent in Internet research has recently returned to the fore with Kramer 
et al.’s (2014) so called Facebook experiment which has provoked an outcry of criticism. As 
anticipated in Section 2.4, p. 36, the experiment was conducted on Facebook users and 
manipulated the extent to which people were exposed to emotional expressions in their News 
Feed. The main ethical issue with this study is that Facebook users did not give informed 
consent. Kramer et al. (2014) explain that the study is consistent with Facebook’s Data Use 
Policy to which all users agree prior to creating a Facebook account, and argue that the 
agreement to this data use policy constitutes the informed consent for the research. However, 
as highlighted by the “Editorial Expression of Concern” published in the Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, the Facebook use policy 
does not satisfy the same requirements of informed consent forms and it does not allow 
participants to opt out (Verma 2014). Taking these elements into account, it is possible to 
conclude that the Facebook experiment did not comply with the ethical requirement of 
informed consent. 
In order to guarantee informed consent in the present study, a consent form was inserted at 
the beginning of the online questionnaires and participants were provided with a link to a 
web page explaining the purpose and process of research and the handling of personal data 
(see Appendix E). This choice is consistent with Walliman’s (2006) recommendation: 
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“questionnaires should always provide the necessary written information as an introduction” 
(p. 155), and with AoIR’s (2002, 2012) guidelines which stress that in order to protect 
human subjects’ rights to privacy, confidentiality, autonomy, and informed consent, 
participants should be approached at the very beginning of research and asked for consent.  
Finally, a potential ethical issue with the present study could derive from the usage of gift 
certificates to promote participation in the online surveys and interviews (see Section 4.4.3 
for an explanation of the recruitment process). There is considerable confusion regarding the 
ethical appropriateness of using incentives in research with human participants, because 
rewards can exert undue influence on people’s likelihood of participating (Grant and 
Sugarman 2004). Grant and Sugarman (2004) shed light on this matter and find that the use 
of incentives to recruit and retain research subjects is innocuous, except in the following 
cases: when the subject is in a dependency relationship with the researcher; when the risks 
are particularly high; when the research is degrading; when the participant has a strong 
aversion to the study and will only consent if the incentive is large. Considering that none of 
these conditions apply to the present study, the usage of incentives can be deemed 
appropriate.  
This section has presented the various procedures implemented in order to guarantee the 
fulfilment of basic ethical requirements in research such as confidentiality, informed 
consent, anonymity, and privacy. Before starting the data collection, ethical approval for this 
project was sought and gained from QMU’s ethical committee (see Appendix I for the 
ethical approval form). 
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5 RESULTS 
This chapter is structured in three main sections, each dealing with one of the three RQs 
developed in Section 4.3, plus a final section in which the main findings are summarised. 
Given the complex nature of the study, which approaches the phenomenon of political 
participation from multiple angles, this chapter focuses exclusively on the presentation of the 
results. A more comprehensive and critical discussion of the findings, and of their 
contributions to the current critiques and debates on the impact of the Internet on political 
participation, can be found in the next chapter. 
The first section deals with RQ 1 and examines the contributions of Facebook to British and 
Italian citizens’ political participation. In particular it seeks to determine the relevance of 
Facebook as a platform for political participation, the ways in which offline and online 
political participation relate to political activities carried out through this SNS, and finally 
the advantages and limitations of Facebook as a political platform.   
The second section focuses on RQ 2. It assesses whether the contributions of Facebook to 
political participation vary depending on the type of political activity being carried out (i.e., 
political communication vs political mobilisation), and examines how this SNS can influence 
the consumption of political information, and political discussion in general. 
The third section relates to RQ 3, and aims to establish the factors mediating the 
contributions of Facebook to British and Italian citizens’ political participation. In particular 
it looks at how demographic factors, political engagement, and Facebook activity intervene 
in this equation. 
Finally, the main findings produced in relation to the three RQs are summarised in the fourth 
and final section.  
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5.1 Research Question 1 – Facebook and Political Participation 
RQ 1: How does Facebook contribute to British and Italian citizens’ political participation?  
RQ 1.1: Is Facebook a relevant venue for political participation, and what are the links 
between Facebook, Internet and offline political participation? 
RQ 1.2: What are the advantages and limitations of Facebook in terms of political 
participation? 
 
5.1.1 Research Question 1.1  –  Relevance of Facebook as a political platform  
RQ 1.1: Is Facebook a relevant venue for political participation, and how do offline and 
Internet political participation relate to political participation carried out through this 
SNS?  
The figure below highlights the main findings produced in relation to the above RQ. 
Figure 6 – Relevance of Facebook as a Political Platform: Main Findings  
Limited levels of 
participation across the 
three considered channels 
(i.e., Facebook, the 
Internet, offline)
Relevance of 
Facebook as 
Political Platform
Non-political 
usage overshadowing 
political one, 
particularly in
 the BS 
IPs displaying 
slightly higher levels 
of political 
participation  than 
BPs, particularly on 
Facebook  
Promoting the
 political participation of 
citizens lacking motivation, 
restrained by health related 
issues, or  not aware of 
participation 
opportunities
Supporting 
mainly politically 
active users
BPs employing other 
online platforms and 
websites for political 
participation in 
conjunction with or 
instead of Facebook
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In the analysis of quantitative and qualitative results, the relevance of Facebook as political 
platform was assessed in two steps.  Firstly, samples’ Facebook political participation was 
compared to their Facebook non-political activity, and then it was measured against their 
Internet and offline political participation (see Section 4.6.1 for an explanation of the various 
scales and indexes employed in the present research).  
The goal of the first comparison was to determine how politics fits into a larger pattern of 
Facebook usage, and if this SNS is mainly used for non-political purposes (see Appendix J 
for more figures, i.e., boxplots, bar charts, and histograms, displaying the quantitative 
results).  
Table 6 – Facebook Non-Political Activity and Political Participation: Descriptive Statistics* 
 
British Sample Italian Sample 
Median IQR Median IQR 
Facebook Political Participation  
 
15 14 24 18 
Facebook Non-Political Activity 28 10 32 10 
  
  * 10 (Never), 20 (Rarely), 30 (Sometimes), 40 (Often), 50 (Very often) 
 
Figure 7 – Facebook Non-Political Activity and Political Participation: Box Plots 
 
 
 
10 (Never) 
20 (Rarely) 
30 (Sometimes) 
40 (Often) 
50 (Very Often) 
 
  
112 
The Facebook non-political activity scale is composed by nine survey-items, while the 
Facebook political participation scale comprises ten items (see Section 4.6.3, Table 1 and 
Table 3). In order to enable a comparison between the two scales, the samples’ scores on 
Facebook non-political activity have been ratioed up. The comparison of Facebook political 
participation and Facebook non-political activity produced three main findings:  
 Taking into account the medians and range of the Facebook political participation 
scale, both samples, and in particular the BS, exhibited limited levels of political 
participation through this SNS.  
 There was a discrepancy in terms of Facebook political participation among the two 
samples, with IPs slightly more active than BPs. In relation to this measure, IPs 
displayed a greater range of scores.  
 Both samples engaged more often in Facebook non-political activities than in 
political ones. The difference between the political and non-political usage of 
Facebook was more marked in the BS. 
 
The samples’ greater non-political usage of Facebook was confirmed in the qualitative phase 
of the study. Interviews showed that, except for certain users displaying very high levels of 
political participation and interest (see participants’ profiles on Appendix D and the full 
interviews transcripts in the attached CD), Facebook was mainly used by interviewees as a 
non-political platform. This trend surfaced particularly among BPs. Such findings are 
illustrated in the following quotes. 
 [Mainly non-political usage]: 
Ciro – IP: “[Facebook] is a social interface. For instance, if I don’t have to study or work, 
I log in, if only to make conversation. For me it has mainly a social function.” 
Lesley – BP: “I use [Facebook mainly] for social communication … I don’t really use it 
for political [purposes].”  
Alex – BP: “I think most people I know use Facebook quite superficially, and I am in the 
music scene so I use Facebook mainly for music related activities.”  
Hilary – BP: “I use Facebook more to connect with friends and I don’t really like to bring 
politics into it … So I just keep Facebook as a sort of light-hearted [platform] … I don’t 
even share my political views on Facebook.”  
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Andrew – BP: “Most of my friends are not interested in politics … I guess that’s 
probably why I don’t use Facebook so much, because I have different interests now … I 
used to use it just a bit more … just to pop nonsense to friends and to find friends or for 
friends to find me … [When I was on Facebook more often] I don’t remember seeing too 
many [political links], mostly [stuff] like dogs getting electrocuted or people falling off 
skateboards, you know this Jackass stuff.” 
Alastair – BP: “I would say that political activity takes up less than 40% of my Facebook 
usage. The rest of the time it is just used for having fun with friends and things.” 
[Mainly political usage by highly politically active users]: 
Rachel – BP: “I would define myself as a political animal … a lot of what I do on 
Facebook is either Political, with a big P, [related to party politics], or political, with a 
small p [related to single-issue and local campaigns].”  
Vincent – BP: “If my parents, my family, were using Facebook more I would use it to 
keep in touch with them, but my parents don’t have Internet access. I do keep in touch 
with old friends, university friends, school friends on Facebook, but mostly I use it for 
politics because this is what I’m interested in and most of my friends are interested in.”  
 
Another important finding emerging from Table 6 is IPs’ higher levels of Facebook political 
participation. Such a discrepancy between the two samples was even more evident in the 
interviews. In this sense, the qualitative phase showed that BPs often employed a number of 
other websites in conjunction with or instead of Facebook for participating politically, 
whereas in the IS, Facebook was by far the most relevant online political platform. For the 
consumption of political information, other than newspaper websites – which were 
frequently used by IPs – BPs often combined Twitter with Facebook, or even preferred to 
use only Twitter. Similarly, the website of the activist movement 38 Degrees assumed a 
central role in the BS’s political mobilisation. 38 Degrees is one of the UK's biggest 
campaigning websites, and BPs used it extensively together with or as an alternative to 
Facebook, particularly for contacting elected officials. Furthermore, in line with findings 
which emerged regarding the consumption of political information and political 
mobilisation, as well as for political discussion, Facebook was combined in the BS with 
other online platforms such as Twitter, RIC, Reddit, and newspaper websites.  
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[Facebook as main online political platform]: 
Ciro – IP: “Facebook is the place where I discuss politics and socially relevant themes, I 
don’t really use any other website in particular ... I would say that Facebook is the virtual 
place I prefer to interact socially and, consequently, also for political communication 
purposes.”  
Mario – IP: “Anyone who organises a political initiative employs [Facebook] as the only 
tool to attract people, and all the other tools are dying away.” 
Raffaella – IP: “[Facebook] is the tool through which I obtain most information, political 
and non-political.” 
 [Political relevance of other online platforms and websites]: 
Alex – BP: “38 Degrees … would send you a letter to send to MPs. You can write your 
own words if you want but they do everything for you. All you have to do is put your 
name in, your address and click send, and this letter that they wrote will go straight off to 
the MPs.” 
Callum – BP: “[For talking about politics] I don’t just use Facebook online; of course 
there is also Twitter. I’m also quite active on RIC.” 
Hazel – BP: “I use a variety of things. I use both Facebook and Twitter … I have also 
joined 38 Degrees and linked with them. So I have done some things with them locally 
like handing in a petition to my MP.” 
Tracey – BP: “I am also on Twitter and I do follow a lot [of political] bloggers and other 
politicians.” 
It was thus established that both samples engaged more often in non-political activities 
through Facebook. The next step was to compare participants’ Facebook political 
participation to their Internet and offline political participation. In this case, the aim was that 
to ascertain if participatory trends found offline and on other online platforms were 
replicated on this SNS. 
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Table 7 – Political Participation: Descriptive Statistics* 
 
 
British Sample Italian Sample 
Median IQR Median IQR 
Facebook Political Participation  
 
15 14 24 18 
Internet Political Participation  
 
17 12 20 13 
Offline Political Participation  16 10 22 14 
 
  * 10 (Never), 20 (Rarely), 30 (Sometimes), 40 (Often), 50 (Very often). 
 
Figure 8 – Facebook, Internet and Offline Political Participation: Box Plots 
 
 
Table 7 and Figure 8 illustrate the following: 
 Trends which emerged in regards to Facebook political participation (i.e., the 
samples’ limited levels of participation, and the difference between the two samples, 
with IPs slightly more active than BPs) were confirmed in relation to Internet and 
offline political participation. 
 There were greater differences between the two samples in terms of Facebook 
political participation. 
 Taking into account the range of the considered scales, there were minimal 
differences between samples across the three channels of political participation.  
10 (Never) 
20 (Rarely) 
30 (Sometimes) 
40 (Often) 
50 (Very Often) 
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 However, it is worth noting that Facebook was the least used channel for political 
participation in the BS, while the Internet was the most used one. Exactly the 
opposite happened in the IS. 
 
The links between Facebook, Internet and offline political participation were further 
examined through a correlation analysis. This was the first step in assessing the tendency of 
Facebook to reinforce existing patterns of participation, or rather, to promote the 
participation of new audiences.  
There is no consensus among academics concerning the guidelines for the interpretation of 
the strengths of correlations (Bryman and Cramer 2011). In this thesis, the strengths of 
correlations were interpreted according to Cohenn’s (1988) categorisation, which is one of 
the most commonly used in social sciences: < .1= Trivial; .1 – .299= Small; .3 – .499= 
Moderate; > .5 = Large; > .7 = Very Large. 
Table 8 – Facebook, Internet and Offline Political Participation: Correlation Analysis – 
Spearman's rho 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
 
The correlation analysis illustrated that in both samples Facebook, Internet and offline 
participation were either largely or very largely correlated to each other. These results 
confirm a strong link between Facebook, the Internet and the offline world in terms of 
political participation. However, correlation analysis does not highlight the directions of 
associations, and, therefore, these findings could back up both the mobilisation and 
reinforcement stances (see the debate between optimists, normalisers and pessimists in 
Section 3.1). On the one hand, they could mean that citizens who are already politically 
active offline and on other online platforms extend their participation to Facebook. On the 
other hand it could also be that citizens with limited levels of political participation started to 
engage politically on Facebook and then moved to other channels.  
 
Internet 
Political 
Participation 
Offline Political 
Participation 
British 
Sample 
Facebook Political 
Participation 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.733** .660** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
Italian 
Sample 
Facebook Political 
Participation 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.703** .712** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
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The qualitative phase played a crucial role in shedding light on this particular issue. The 
interviews mostly confirmed the reinforcement stance, but also provided some evidence in 
support of the mobilisation hypothesis. Facebook clearly aided the participation of citizens 
who were already politically active. At the same time, this SNS appeared to be able to 
facilitate the participation of individuals who were less politically active either because they 
lacked the motivation, or were limited by health-related issues, or simply were not aware of 
participation opportunities. Nonetheless, a minimum level of political interest seemed to be 
required in order for someone to participate at all, and the interviews indicated that the use of 
Facebook alone was not able to trigger the participation of individuals who were politically 
apathetic. 
[Involving new participants]: 
Alex – BP: “Before I had joined Facebook … my participation was quite low. I was just 
going to the really big demonstrations, [big events that made] lazy people like me get off 
their backside and go along, but now with Facebook because it is so easy I do participate 
more than I used to.” 
Tracey – BP: “It may sound really silly, but people who do have bad asthma – they may 
not be able to go out and meet other people and talk about it. [Facebook can] provide 
them with a means of accessing information that otherwise are not going to get … I think 
Facebook must have really changed the lives of young people who are unwell or 
otherwise can’t communicate with other people.” 
Helen – BP: “[I do not participate politically offline because of] personal [health-related] 
reasons … I would say Facebook has increased the amount of initiatives I participate in.” 
Antonio – IP: “[Through Facebook] you can definitely reach a larger audience … I used 
Facebook to advertise a series of meetings in various Italian cities. [At these meetings] I 
met many young people who I had never seen before and who told me that they got to 
know about these initiatives only because of Facebook.”   
[Relevance of political interest]: 
Ellie – BP: “[Among my Facebook friends I have] some people who are interested in 
politics. [They] sometimes [post] comments, but … I don’t read them that much because 
I’m not interested in it.” 
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In summary, with regards to the contributions of Facebook to political participation, in both 
samples the non-political usage of Facebook outweighed its political usage, suggesting that 
this SNS is mostly used for non-political purposes. The two samples displayed limited levels 
of Facebook, Internet and offline political participation in general. With respect to these 
measures, IPs exhibited slightly higher scores than BPs, particularly with regards to 
Facebook political participation. IPs’ higher usage of Facebook for political participation 
was even more evident in the qualitative phase, which showed that BPs often employed 
other online platforms in conjunction with or instead of Facebook for participating 
politically, whereas in the IS, Facebook was by far the most relevant online political 
platform. Quantitative and qualitative data also indicated that, in both samples, Facebook 
was employed much more for political participation by individuals displaying high levels of 
political interest and political activity on other online platforms and offline. However, in 
certain rarer cases, Facebook also operated as an activator of the political participation 
process, promoting the involvement of citizens who had limited levels of political 
participation either because they lacked motivation, were restrained by health-related issues, 
or simply were not aware of participation opportunities.  
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5.1.2 Research Question 1.2 – Advantages and limitations of Facebook as a 
political platform 
RQ 1.2: What are the advantages and limitations of Facebook in terms of political 
participation? 
Figure 9 – Advantages and Limitations of Facebook as a Political Platform: Main Findings 
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The advantages of Facebook as a political platform and the factors limiting political 
participation on this SNS were explored through the qualitative data. The thematic analysis 
of the interviews shed light on the mechanisms by which Facebook can promote political 
participation, and indicated two main explanations for the SNS’s capacity to do so.  Firstly, 
the greatest political affordance of this SNS appeared to be a practical one, namely the 
potential it offers for lowering the thresholds of participation. BPs and IPs employing 
Facebook politically stressed the ways in which this platform had made their political 
participation more flexible and resource-convenient. 
 [Facilitating participation]: 
Helen – BP: “Nowadays people want everything in one place because it’s more 
convenient [and] you need less time … For example people used to chat on MSN and 
people stopped using it and now they chat on Facebook because it’s easier. Now people 
get the news on Facebook which is easier – it’s all a matter of convenience.” 
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Alastair – BP: “[Sometimes, when you try to promote a cause] face-to-face, people zone-
out … they get bored, whereas on Facebook they can just read it in their own time.” 
Vincent – BP: “People find it easier to engage [politically through Facebook] because … 
if you are doing something and you’ve got 10 minutes, you can read something … you 
can read a comment, you can leave a comment, so you can engage in a way you couldn’t 
in the past.” 
Hazel – BP: “I will attend meetings and things, but when I either haven’t got the time to 
attend a meeting or I feel tired I can still get involved because I can just log into 
Facebook.” 
Mario – IP: “[Facebook] has had the positive effect of cutting the time it takes to circulate 
information. Now it is so easy to create an event and send the invite to a large number of 
people.” 
Giuliano – IP: “I definitely participate more, because even if I sit on a chair in front of my 
computer, I can afford to interact with who before you would have met in some public 
rally, and only if you were lucky.” 
Interviews also suggested a second reason that could explain the capacity Facebook has for 
fostering political participation. The communicative and informative power of this SNS can 
expose users to political information on a daily basis, and promote political interest and 
knowledge, activating a virtuous circle that can lead to more resource-expensive forms of 
participation. This political affordance of Facebook seemed to hold particular relevance for 
the mobilisation of users displaying limited levels of political participation. 
[Bringing politics into everyday life]: 
Vincent – BP: “Facebook gives you some interaction with politics on a daily basis that 
maybe you wouldn’t have if you didn’t have Facebook”. 
Tracey – BP: “[Facebook] certainly has changed how I participate and how I 
communicate with other people about politics because it has provided me with a kind of 
very informal forum for sharing stories … In that respect it very much brought [politics] 
into my everyday life, rather than only being interested in politics during election time or 
local elections. I think it is more of a day-to-day thing.”  
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[Virtuous circle]: 
Hazel – BP: “[Facebook] made me more aware politically, and by making me more 
aware I then felt that I had to make other people more aware … I have also signed up to 
the Labour party, which is something I would never have dreamt of before.” 
Helen – BP: “I have only recently started to become politically active on Facebook, I 
haven’t always been. The first two, three years, nothing at all … Maybe because I was 
new to it, I didn’t have many friends. I think it’s important having friends who post 
political information to get you interested in that, but at that point I don’t think any 
friends posted anything, and also I didn’t use it as much as I use it now.” 
Vincent – BP: “I have friends who are clearly much more interested [and engaged] than 
they use to be. [I have seen] people who maybe were marginally interested in politics 
before become extremely engaged [because of Facebook], to the extent that they started 
to show more interest in party politics … I know people who … are going on a 
demonstration, they are going on a rally, they are joining a group because of the 
information that they got from Facebook … many people are much more active than 
maybe they would had been if they hadn’t been on Facebook” 
Thus the two main affordances of Facebook in terms of political participation which 
surfaced as a result of the interviews are its capacity to make participation easier, and the 
ways in which it provides politically relevant information which can in turn lead to other 
forms of participation. Nonetheless, the previous section has shown that this SNS was used 
politically only by a limited number of people, and more by IPs than BPs. In this sense the 
thematic analysis highlighted two main factors possibly limiting the contributions of 
Facebook to political participation. The first is the non-universality of this SNS, with some 
participants stressing that Facebook reaches only part of the British and Italian populations, 
as shown in Appendix A, and requires digital skills that not all individuals hold.  
[Facebook usage gap]: 
Rachel – BP: “Facebook is not yet universal. [For instance,] Friends of Union Terrace 
Gardens has members who are not online at all … so it actually does post things to 
people.” 
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Mario – IP: “Anyone who organises an event uses [Facebook] as the only tool and … 
probably this is a negative thing as people who do not participate digitally cannot get this 
information. We have to remember that Facebook is a niche … because there is a big part 
of the population who does not use this website.”  
[Need of digital skills]: 
Kaye – BP: “[I don’t participate much online and on Facebook because] I only had a 
computer for about 3 years. Before that I didn’t have [one, and] I didn’t use computers. I 
have learned fairly recently, so I would say it’s still not second nature to me in the way 
that it will probably be to some young children who have grown up always having one.”   
The interviews suggested that a second factor which could limit the contributions of 
Facebook to political participation is the semi-public nature of this platform and the 
associated privacy concerns. Participants, particularly BPs, expressed concerns about their 
privacy on Facebook. IPs were also concerned about their privacy, but they appeared to 
worry more about the institutional rather than the social side of it (the social side of privacy 
refers to individuals’ control over their personal information, while the institutional one 
concerns the usage of personal data by large organisations and corporations – Raynes-Goldie 
2010). Privacy in the Facebook environment seemed to be a bigger issue for BPs when 
considering political participation, with the presence of certain contacts and identity 
attributes (i.e., pieces of information about a user’s identity) inhibiting their political activity. 
In order to manage this tension, participants resorted to a series of disclosure strategies, 
including the creation of multiple profiles, communication via private messages, and self-
censorship. 
[Relevance of privacy concerns]: 
Antonio – IP: “When you talk about politics you have to be careful about what you write, 
what you share, because today institutions exercise a strict control.” 
Lesley – BP: “I think I’m very sceptical about the information taken rather than given. 
The minute you put something on Facebook is owned by Facebook … It’s about personal 
privacy and personal space I suppose, and choice.”  
Andrew – BP: “I [don’t like] the idea that [a Facebook account has] got my name on it. 
I’m a bit reluctant to speak to people when they know who I am, they know who my 
friends are, they know what I look like, they know my name … I guess I have never 
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really been an open person, I always preferred to get to know someone well before 
actually opening up and being myself, whilst on Facebook you are kind of exposed.”  
Alex – BP: “I have … an extra Facebook page which is under my real name because that 
it is the name I use for writing music. I don’t do politics on the music [page]. I don’t mix 
them.” 
Hilary – BP: “[I don’t use Facebook much for political purposes as] there are some 
people I don’t really want to know what my political views are because … a lot of the 
time some people can’t get past it. Sometimes, [I discuss politics on Facebook in] a 
private message thread [which] is not public for everyone to see, and that will be [only] 
with a few friends.” 
In summary, with regards to the advantages and limitations of Facebook as a political 
platform, the interviews suggest that the greatest political affordance of this SNS is a 
practical one, namely the capacity Facebook has for reducing the thresholds of participation, 
thus making political participation more flexible and less resource-expensive (e.g., less 
demanding in terms of time). As indicated by participants, the second main advantage of 
Facebook in terms of political participation is its informative and communicative power. By 
exposing users to political information, this SNS can in fact trigger a virtuous circle, 
increasing political interest and knowledge, and eventually leading to political participation. 
A suggested limitation of Facebook as a political tool which surfaced in some interviews is 
the non-universality of this SNS which reaches a relatively small part of the British and 
Italian populations (see Appendix A), and requires digital skills that certain citizens lack. 
Finally, the semi-public nature of Facebook and the associated privacy concerns also 
appeared to restrain users’ political participation. This was particularly true for BPs who 
seemed to be more sensitive than IPs about the amount of information made public on 
Facebook, and the presence of certain Facebook contacts. 
 
 
  
124 
5.2 Research Question 2 – Facebook and Different Types of Political 
Activities 
RQ 2: Do the contributions of Facebook to political participation vary depending on the 
political activity in question?  
RQ 2.1: Distinguishing between political communication and political mobilisation, 
how do the contributions of Facebook vary in relation to these two different typologies 
of political activity? 
RQ 2.2: How does Facebook contribute to British and Italian citizens’ consumption of 
political information? 
RQ 2.3: How does Facebook contribute to British and Italian citizens’ political 
discussion? 
 
5.2.1 Research Question 2.1  –  Political Communication vs Political Mobilisation 
RQ 2.1: Distinguishing between political communication and political mobilisation, 
how do the contributions of Facebook vary in relation to these two different typologies 
of political activity? 
Figure 10 – The Contributions of Facebook to Political Communication and Mobilisation: 
Main Findings 
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Section 4.1 highlighted a conceptual weakness common in Internet and political participation 
studies, namely the failure to grasp the multidimensionality of political participation. In 
order to address this limitation and to assess whether the contributions of Facebook to 
political participation vary in relation to different types of political activities, two dimensions 
of political participation have been conceptualised in this thesis: the political communication 
dimension and the political mobilisation dimension (see Section 2.1.1). The first step in 
assessing potential variations in the impact of Facebook on political communication and 
mobilisation was comparing the samples’ scores relating to these two dimensions. 
Table 9 – Political Mobilisation and Communication: Descriptive Statistics* 
 
British Sample Italian Sample 
Median IQR Median IQR 
Facebook Political Mobilisation  5 5 10 9 
Facebook Political Communication 10 10 15 10 
Internet Political Mobilisation 5 5 7 6 
Internet Political Communication 11 8 12 8 
Offline Political Mobilisation 5 3 8 7 
Offline Political Communication  11 8 13 9 
 * 5 (Never), 10 (Rarely), 15 (Sometimes), 20 (Often), 25 (Very often). 
 
Figure 11 – Facebook, Internet and Offline Political Communication and Mobilisation: Box 
Plots 
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The results displayed in Table 9 and Figure 11 show that: 
 The participatory discrepancy between BPs and IPs which resulted in relation to 
Facebook, Internet and offline political participation – with IPs slightly more active 
than BPs, particularly on Facebook – was repeated even when a distinction was 
made between political mobilisation and political communication.  
 With regards to the usage of the various considered channels (i.e., Facebook, the 
Internet, and the offline world), as with the general measures of political 
participation, Facebook remained the most used channel for both communication 
and mobilisation activities in the IS, and the least used one in the BS. It has to be 
noted that the differences between the channels in terms of usage were minor. 
 Both samples engaged more often in political communication activities than political 
mobilisation ones.  
 The BS displayed the lowest possible levels of political mobilisation in each 
considered channel. In relation to these measures IPs were slightly more active than 
BPs, but their participation remained limited. IPs also exhibited a greater range of 
scores than BPs.  
 With respect to political communication, BPs demonstrated limited participation on 
all three considered channels. Even if the differences among the three channels were 
minimal, Facebook emerged as the least used political communication channel in the 
BS. IPs displayed moderate levels of participation in relation to this measure. 
  
With regards to the differences between the political communication and mobilisation 
dimensions, the samples’ higher scores on the political communication scales could suggest 
that Facebook contributes more to this particular dimension. However, considering that the 
tendency to engage more often in this type of activity was replicated in the other channels of 
participation, this notion was further explored in the qualitative phase. 
The thematic analysis of the interviews proposed two explanations for the quantitative 
findings. The first is that participants engaged more often in political communication 
activities because they required fewer resources. Among the various resources, time 
appeared to be the one impacting most upon political participation. 
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[Lack of time inhibiting participation] 
Luigi – IP: “I would like to participate in political initiatives but [it] would mean 
committing myself in a way I cannot afford nowadays in terms of time.”  
Luca – IP: “[With regards to my limited political participation] it is a question of time 
management – if I have free time I prefer to spend it doing something else.” 
Tracey – BP: “I don’t know whether it is just a time thing, whether I just haven’t had time 
or I didn’t know that those things were on or available for me”  
 
The second explanation for the higher levels of participation in political communication 
activities is the samples’ scepticism towards the efficacy of political initiatives such as 
protests or rallies. 
[Low efficacy of political initiatives]: 
Callum – BP: “When [the government] makes decisions that I disagree with … I don’t 
think there is very much I can do about them … So I suppose in a sense I feel that 
marching won’t really make a difference.” 
Alessandro – IP: “I do not participate because, in one way or another, people come off 
worse. [The police always cause] trouble so people [won’t] speak of the real problem but 
of the incidents which happened during the protest. In this way, the initiative becomes 
useless.” 
Rosaria – IP: “I believe that a march cannot change things, therefore … we should 
probably try to find other ways, rather than protests, marches or sit-ins.” 
The issue of the efficacy of political initiatives is strictly linked to citizens’ perception of the 
responsiveness of political institutions to their actions, which, in turn, relates to the issues of 
political disenchantment and democratic deficit (see Section 1.2). Qualitative data strongly 
confirmed the existence of a detachment from traditional political institutions and 
institutionalised forms of political participation, in particular in the IS. This phenomenon 
could be one of the reasons behind participants’ scepticism towards the efficacy of political 
initiatives, and their low levels of participation in mobilisation related activities. 
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[Detachment from traditional politics]: 
Vincent – BP: “We get politicians and traditional media talking about apathy [but] I don’t 
think that people aren’t interested in politics or even that they are apathetic. I think that 
most people feel they don’t have a good choice in elections so they make the decision not 
to vote, even if they are quite engaged in politics themselves, because a lot of people 
don’t identify with any particular party.” 
Rachel – BP: “Politics has become a dirty word … joining a political party has become a 
discredited thing ironically at the same time … membership of Protection of Birds, 
Friends of the Earth, national trusts and all those kinds of organisations has gone up. I 
think that to a very large extent people are expressing their politics through non-party 
political organisations.” 
Mario – IP: “I feel strongly detached from institutional politics … it is a common feeling, 
the so-called anti-politics, which in my opinion is not really anti-politics but rather a 
disaffection towards the political class.”  
Raffaella – IP: “I am not very eager about politics because in Italy wherever you turn 
corruption comes up.”   
Luca – IP: “I cannot identify my [political] ideas with current movements [and parties] 
and it is not worth participating in activities other than evaluation, information-gathering, 
etc.”  
The detachment between participants and political institutions – evident in both samples but 
especially in the IS – which emerged in the interviews was corroborated by the quantitative 
samples’ composition in terms of party affiliation – with 46% of IPs and 33% of BPs 
claiming not to support any parties or movements (see Appendix C, Figures C5 and C6) – 
and the quantitative scores on the political engagement index. Political engagement was 
evaluated in the present research through five measures: political interest, political 
knowledge, partisanship, external and internal political efficacy (see Section 4.6.1, Table 2).  
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Table 10 – Political Engagement: Descriptive Statistics* 
 
 
British Sample Italian Sample 
Median IQR Median IQR 
 
Political Engagement 16 5 15 5 
    Political Interest 4 2 4 2 
    Partisanship 2 3 1 3 
    Political Knowledge 4 1 4 2 
    External Political Efficacy 3 1 2 2 
    Internal Political Efficacy 4 2 3 2 
 
     *Political Engagement index: 5 (None), 10 (Low), 15 (Moderate), 20 (High), 25 (Very high) 
       Measures of Political Engagement: 1 (None), 2 (Low), 3 (Moderate), 4 (High), 5 (Very high). 
 
Figure 12 – Measures of Political Engagement: Bar Charts 
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 In both samples, and particularly in the IS, the scores for partisanship and external 
political efficacy were lower than the ones for the other measures forming the 
political engagement index.  
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Among the measures composing the political engagement index, partisanship and external 
political efficacy (see Section 2.1.2 for a definition) are arguably the measures that best 
reflect the relationships between individuals, government, and political parties. The samples’ 
lower scores on such measures confirmed the detachment between participants and political 
institutions. Considering this political disenchantment – which surfaced even more strongly 
in the interviews – and the costs (i.e., required resources) of mobilisation activities, 
qualitative data indicated that the contributions of Facebook to the mobilisation dimension 
tend to be limited to politically active individuals, with less politically active citizens 
employing this SNS mainly for political communication activities.  
[More communication than mobilisation]: 
Vincent – BP: “Mostly [Facebook] helps people to get information. People can form 
networks of friends with similar views and … can share information so much easier.”  
Ciro – IP: “[On Facebook] there is information but not much mobilisation.” 
Martina – IP: “[Facebook appears to be more useful] in terms of communication. I don’t 
know to what extent it can lead to the involvement in a political campaign … There are 
people who participate politically through Facebook. They engage in political discussion, 
but then they don’t go beyond their PCs. It is a huge step to pass from there to a square.” 
With respect to the contributions of Facebook to the mobilisation dimension of political 
participation, interviews with British and Italian activists (i.e., individuals who displayed 
high levels of political mobilisation) attested to the relevance of Facebook in activists’ 
political repertoires. In both samples activists stressed how Facebook has become a central, 
sometimes primary, tool for the organisation of political initiatives, a tool particularly 
suitable to single-issue campaigning. In addition, some participants commented on the 
capacity this SNS has to boost their mobilisation by exposing them to more information on 
political initiatives. This information was often related to local rather than national events, 
reaching them through grassroots channels, thus bypassing traditional political institutions 
such as parties or trade unions. 
 
 
 
  
131 
[Growing relevance of Facebook in activists’ repertoires]:  
Alastair – BP: “[Facebook] has become a more an integral part of a campaign. When I 
was involved in one election campaign, even few years ago, it was very traditional, 
whereas as soon as more recent campaigns happened the first thing we did was to assign a 
social media person so I think it has become an integral part of the campaign.” 
Mario – IP: “Facebook has become the main communication channel [for activists] and 
many other tools used in the past … have lost their importance.” 
Francesca – IP: “[Within activist groups] Facebook has become the main means of 
communication – also because you can use it on mobiles as well as on computers, it is the 
fastest and cheapest method of communication.”  
[Promoting grassroots single-issue mobilisation]: 
Vincent – BP: “[Facebook] gives more power to ordinary people. Maybe 20 years ago 
most of this stuff was done in a formal party political way or through trade unions. 
Facebook has given much more ability to ordinary people who aren’t affiliated to any 
bureau organisation to organise things for themselves, to communicate and to get on. So 
politics, political organisation has become more of a grassroots thing … On Facebook 
people organise more at the grassroots level [and] on single-issue subjects … and less 
along the parties’ political lines.” 
Rachel – BP: “Friends of Union Terrace Gardens which is a group set up to protect a 
Victorian Central Garden in central Aberdeen: [this] organisation largely started up on 
Facebook and as a Facebook group … we set up a Facebook page and invite people to it, 
and that sort of Facebook page has remained our major channel of communication.” 
Tracey – BP: “I am actually involved with an asthma charity in the UK which is quite 
concerned to get asthma recognised by more members of parliament and health officials. 
I am involved in petitions on that side … and I think that [Facebook] was definitely very 
helpful with the campaign because it enabled us to reach far more people”. 
Raffaella – IP: “I am part of an association that organises events in order to improve the 
tourism in our town … The local leader of the 5 Stars Movement … created a Facebook 
group [which became a message-board for our town] … Our association organises events 
and through the Facebook group we keep in touch with each other and promote our 
initiatives... Everything started on Facebook.” 
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[More information on political initiatives]: 
Hazel – BP: “Before Facebook I wouldn’t have known that [political] meetings were 
happening, so I wouldn’t have known to have an opportunity to attend so I have got more 
involved.” 
Francesca – IP: “In certain ways I participate more [politically because of Facebook], in 
the way that I get to know about certain events … so even if I don’t leave the house for 
five days, through Facebook I get to know if there is a political initiative happening.”  
[Bypassing traditional mobilisation channels]: 
Vincent – BP: “[Before Facebook] it was difficult [to get to know about political 
initiatives] because if you weren’t a member of some organisation, if you weren’t a 
member of a trade union or a political party, it could only be pot-luck really if you had 
found out there was some sort of rally.” 
Luca – IP: “Probably [without Facebook I wouldn’t have known about many political 
initiatives], in particular events happening locally ... It would have been much harder to 
get this information through other channels. [On Facebook] information comes to you 
even if you don’t have a direct link with the [political] initiative ... [Facebook] is certainly 
one of the most powerful tools in creating a link between initiatives and people”  
When discussing their usage of Facebook for political purposes, both British and Italian 
activists stressed the relationship between Facebook and offline participation, describing 
political activity on Facebook as rooted in and supporting their offline activity. 
[Interdependence between Facebook and offline political participation]: 
Mario – IP: “[Facebook] participation is the cause, the organisation, while the effect is 
offline participation.” 
Francesca – IP: “I think that Facebook supports political entities which already exist ... 
the online cannot exist without the offline, while the offline could survive without the 
online.” 
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Antonio – IP: “I could not engage in politics only on Facebook or online, but also I could 
not engage in politics using only the old methods … I think that Facebook is a very useful 
tool, in certain cases essential, but not sufficient on its own … Without offline 
organisation, including small practical things such as requesting a square [for a rally], 
printing the flyers, organising a press conference, etc. … [online activism] cannot work.”    
Hazel – BP: “[I use Facebook to promote offline political initiatives]. I have created 
[Facebook] events for next Saturday …  trying to make local people aware of the dangers 
of the privatisation of the NHS and how they can get involved locally.” 
In conclusion, as was the case for the more general measures of political participation 
considered in the previous chapter, so in relation to political communication and 
mobilisation, IPs were slightly more active than BPs, particularly on Facebook. Both 
samples engaged more often in political communication activities than in mobilisation ones 
– moderate vs limited or no participation –, a trend confirmed in all three considered 
participation channels. The qualitative data suggested two main reasons behind such a 
difference. The first is that political communication activities are less resource-expensive 
(e.g., less demanding in terms of time) than the ones falling within the mobilisation 
dimension. The second reason is the scepticism shown by BPs and IPs towards the efficacy 
of political initiatives, with participants – in particular IPs – expressing disenchantment and 
distrust towards the political establishment and doubting its responsiveness to their actions. 
The qualitative data revealed that, given the costs in terms of resources and perception of the 
efficacy of mobilisation activities, the contributions of Facebook to the mobilisation 
dimension tend to remain limited to participants who are already politically active, with less 
politically active participants employing this SNS mainly for political communication 
activities. Facebook emerged as a key tool in activists’ political repertoires, often replacing 
other online platforms and offline methods used to communicate, organise and promote 
political initiatives. 
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5.2.2 Research Question 2.2 – Facebook and the consumption of political 
information 
RQ 2.2: How does Facebook contribute to British and Italian citizens’ consumption of 
political information? 
Figure 13 – Facebook and Political Information: Main Findings
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Similarly to the more general measures of political participation, the relevance of Facebook 
as a political information source for BPs and IPs was assessed by comparing the samples’ 
consumption of political information across the considered channels.  
Table 11 – Political Information: Descriptive Statistics* 
 
British Sample Italian Sample 
Median IQR Median IQR 
Facebook Political Information 6 6 9 7 
Internet Political Information 7 6 8.50 7 
Offline Political Information  6 3 7.83** 5 
   *3 (Never), 6 (Rarely), 9 (Sometimes), 12 (Often), 15 (Very often).                                          
** The peculiar value in the IS is due to the fact that one of the measures composing the 
Offline Political Information scale, namely “Consumption of political news offline” is an 
average measure generated by combining three questionnaire items measuring respectively 
TV, radio and press consumption of political news (see Appendix E). 
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Figure 14 – Facebook, Internet and Offline Political Information: Box Plots 
 
 
 
Table 11 and Figure 14 indicate that two trends already highlighted in relation to the 
measures of political participation considered so far emerged also for this type of activity: 
 IPs consumed more political information than the BPs, particularly on Facebook. 
The levels of consumption of political information were limited for the BS and 
moderate for the IS.  
 In both samples, the differences among the considered information channels 
were limited. Facebook was the most used source for political information in the 
IS, while for the BS the most used source was the Internet. 
 The main difference from the political participation measures considered so far 
occurred in the IS. While for the other political participation measures IPs scored 
the lowest in the Internet-related measures, in this case the least used political 
information sources were the offline ones (i.e., television, the press and the 
radio). It also has to be noted in this case that the differences between the 
various channels were minor. 
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The contributions of Facebook to the consumption of political information were further 
explored through the qualitative data. Interviews highlighted the relevance, advantages and 
limitations of Facebook as a political information source and shed light on the nature of the 
political information circulating within this SNS. With regards to the relevance of Facebook 
as a political information source, qualitative data confirmed the higher usage of this SNS by 
IPs. The interviews produced a more positive picture than that which arose out of the 
quantitative data, with both BPs and IPs acknowledging the value of Facebook as a source of 
political information. In this sense, two main findings emerged. One relates to the Internet in 
its totality, and is the increasing importance of online information sources in citizens’ 
information diet. The other refers to the specific case of Facebook, and is the capacity this 
SNS has to foster the consumption of political information.   
With regards to the first finding, from all of the interviews it was evident that the Internet has 
become a dominant component in participants’ informational diet, in some cases entirely 
replacing offline sources. The qualitative data suggested that the flexibility and speed of 
online information, the variety of online sources, and the interactive nature of online 
information are instrumental to the success of this medium. 
[The flexibility and speed of online information]: 
Alex – BP: “I used to buy [newspapers] a lot [but] now I hardly buy them. I read them 
online. I can read them on my telephone as well when I’m on the bus.” 
Kaye – BP: “[Online news is] a lot faster than television news. [I like that] because it 
gives you the feeling that’s what’s happening right now.” 
Carmela – IP: “I rarely follow news on TV – I prefer it online. It is easier for me as I am 
always using smartphones and I am not home very often.” 
[The variety of online sources]: 
Helen – BP: “I prefer Facebook [and] online sources because online [information] is not 
just coming from one source. You can check different sources instead of just watching 
the news which is one source.” 
Antonio – IP: “The world of online information is terribly richer in terms of offers and 
expertise. [Sources] which are not valued in mainstream media find expression thanks to 
the free nature of the web.” 
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[The interactive nature of online information]:  
Lesley – BP: “I’d usually use newspaper websites if I have to find something specific 
because … through the archives you can find something quite easily, whereas it would be 
very difficult looking through … a pile of newspapers.” 
Helen – BP: “[Online] you can choose the articles you want to read, with the news you 
have to watch everything.” 
Raffaella – IP: “[Online] there is a greater exchange of news: you can comment on a 
news piece, you can share it.” 
Concerning the specific case of Facebook, this SNS certainly contributed to the diffusion of 
political information in the considered samples. Some particularly enthusiastic participants 
depicted Facebook as a powerful tool which operates as an information catalyst. Facebook 
gathers information originating from many different sources and, through various modes of 
communication (e.g., sharing, liking, commenting, etc.), conveys this information to a 
multitude of users. The qualitative data suggested a number of reasons behind the 
informative power of Facebook: the proliferation of sources, with numerous users operating 
as information broadcaster; the networked and, sometimes, viral character of Facebook 
information; and the capability of this SNS to trigger the information search process. 
[Facebook and proliferation of sources]: 
Rachel – BP: “[Facebook] has broadened the sources and taken them closer … to the 
actual source.” 
Ciro – IP: “By being connected on Facebook, it is as if we can open a window on the 
world from which we can obtain all possible information and not only the 50, 100 news 
stories that we can get through TV news programs.” 
Alessandro – IP: “Through Facebook, sometimes I read articles that I would have never 
came across ... because a friend can post articles [from] pages and newspapers I don’t 
follow.” 
Raffaella – IP: “Whether you want it or not, on Facebook you [see information about 
politics] as everyone publishes political news constantly.” 
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[The networked nature of Facebook information]: 
Vincent – BP: “[On Facebook] you will find people who will post the same article you 
would come across on a website or TV, but you would also find a larger variation … The 
participation of so many people means that you get a larger net cast on the Internet … I 
read stuff from sites that I wouldn’t have known even existed if a friend or another 
person, a friend of friend, hadn’t found it and posted it [on Facebook].” 
Antonio – IP: “Social networks are able to fill informative gaps that sometimes not even 
the web can touch. It is easier to find a news story by quickly logging into Facebook than 
going to look for it in the ocean of the web.” 
1. [Viral information on Facebook]: 
Luigi – IP: “It’s like when you go fishing. [On Facebook], instead of using one fishing 
rod you use many of them. There’s the news I get and the news my contacts get. 
Therefore, there is an invasion of news.” 
Ciro – IP: “It is a sort of media contagion. Information and communication travel on 
increasingly extended tracks: the information that should go from A to B is read by C, a 
third individual who interacts with A. Consequently, new connections are born according 
to the topics rather than people’s will.”  
2. [Facebook as activator of the information search process]: 
3.  
Ellie – BP: “Sometimes if I see a post on Facebook I may go on the BBC website and 
look at the news. Facebook is not really my main source of information [but sometimes 
it] triggers something.”  
Francesca – IP: “Through Facebook you can obtain [political] information … you read a 
status update and then you go to look for information related to that status update.” 
Ciro – IP: “[On Facebook] it can happen that by opening a link from La Repubblica I see 
articles from that website on the side bar. In this way I am consulting La Repubblica even 
if I didn’t connect to the Internet with that intent … it is about the hyper-textual 
navigation” 
If the main advantages of Facebook in terms of political information are linked to the 
proliferation of sources, the networked nature of information, and the ability to trigger the 
information search process, the main limitation – which was strongly evident from both 
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British and Italian interviews – concerns the credibility of the information circulating within 
this SNS.  Both samples acknowledged the abundance of bogus information, and highlighted 
the issue of credibility of Facebook sources, in particular the credibility of those sources not 
associated with popular media broadcasters. 
[Issues of credibility of Facebook political information]: 
Lesley – BP: “[On Facebook] there are so many things that are urban myths … I think a 
lot of the causes [you find on there] are urban myths too and so I like to take time to have 
a look at some of the websites and check where the things are coming from.” 
Kaye – BP: “Newspapers have to go over [the sources] they get their stories from and 
make sure to some extent that these are as much as possible true whereas [on Facebook] 
people can write any odd thing and … lots of people would probably believe it.”  
Luca – IP: “Facebook pays a price which is linked to its success. In my experience the so-
called fakes – pictures that are not real, information that is not real, news that is not real –
are certainly present.” 
After assessing the advantages and limitations of Facebook as information source, the 
interviews explored the nature of political information circulating on this SNS. Qualitative 
data indicated the presence on this SNS of information coming from both mainstream media 
and alternative sources, the different perceptions that the two samples tend to have of 
mainstream media, and the potential for exposure to conflicting political information on 
Facebook. 
In relation to this last issue, interviews illustrated that individuals can be exposed to political 
difference through Facebook. This finding is particularly valuable because, as highlighted in 
sections 3.2 and 3.3, one of the most common criticisms of the Internet concerns its tendency 
to promote selective exposure, with Internet users operating in echo-chambers (Sunstein 
2001). In the interviews, BPs and IPs confirmed that on Facebook they often obtained 
information in line with their political beliefs. Nonetheless, they also acknowledged that they 
may be exposed to conflicting political information, either directly, by selecting contrasting 
sources themselves, or accidentally. In the latter case, the News Feed plays a crucial role as 
it enables users to passively view the activities of their network. The interviews revealed that 
when users obtain information accidentally, they are more likely to be exposed to conflicting 
political views than when they purposefully search for information. 
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[Exposure to pro-attitudinal political information] 
Antonio – IP: “Both offline and on Facebook, 80%, 90% of the time I obtain [political 
information] from sources which hold the same political views as I do.” 
[Exposure to political difference on Facebook]: 
Kaye – BP: “[On Facebook] I came across people with completely opposing views.”  
Helen – BP: “I think seeing [through Facebook] that people have [different] views, 
maybe kind of pushes you to look for things, to seek out alternative news, or to the 
develop a view on it.” 
Luigi – IP: “Facebook has no filters. I have more than 1000 contacts … I know the 
political views of 20% of those contacts while I have no idea for the rest. [On Facebook] 
you have a surplus of news which comes from everywhere.” 
Giuliano – IP: “I have two, three [Facebook] contacts that [hold political views 
completely opposite to mine].”  
[Exposure to political difference through active selection]: 
 Antonio – IP: “I understand that on certain issues I also need to see how different 
political forces think and act. For this reason, sometimes I look for [politically diverse] 
information sources.”  
 [Accidental exposure to political difference]: 
Kaye – BP: “I didn’t particularly seek out [contrasting political information] but now 
[through Facebook] it comes to me.”  
Mario – IP: “Facebook provides [information] as soon as you log in. Even if you don’t 
want you see this information. Therefore, because this information is imposed, in the 
sense that you don’t look anymore for information but the information is there and you 
see it … your information is widened and [more politically diverse] in comparison to the 
past.”  
However, interviews showed that not all Facebook users were able to gain access to counter-
attitudinal political information, and that the presence of a politically-heterogeneous network 
of contacts was instrumental to the accidental exposure to political difference. Nonetheless, 
the exposure to political difference is not guaranteed by the presence of politically 
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heterogeneous contacts, as interaction with such contacts is also required. This is linked to 
the way the News Feed works and specifically to the EdgeRank algorithm (see Section 2.4, 
p. 36). As a result of the EdgeRank algorithm, if a user does not interact with a contact over 
a certain period of time, this contact’s activities will stop appearing in the News Feed. 
Consequently, as highlighted by a BP, lack of interaction could limit the exposure to 
politically diverse information. 
[Interaction and exposure to political difference]: 
Callum – BP: “[On Facebook] I get a certain [political] range but not that bigger range.  
[This is] partly because Facebook tends to hide from me the people I don’t interact with. 
[Among my Facebook contacts] there are probably people who have different political 
views to me but I don’t really talk to them”. 
The interviews also shed light on another aspect of political information circulating on 
Facebook, namely the balance between mainstream and alternative sources in participants’ 
Facebook informational diet. Qualitative data attested to the presence on this SNS of 
information coming from a variety of sources, ranging from mainstream and established 
media to alternative sources such as blogs and Facebook pages. BPs consumed political 
information coming mainly from established sources (e.g., BBC, the Guardian, etc.) A 
similar pattern emerged among IPs, who nonetheless attributed greater relevance to 
alternative sources than their British counterparts. In this sense, IPs stressed the user-
generated nature of this information and the fact that it appears to be free from the influence 
of traditional media and political institutions.  
[Presence of established media institutions on Facebook]: 
Vincent – BP: “[On Facebook] I think that most people are still using the traditional 
sources for their information … and they are using Facebook as a means to [distribute] 
that information, maybe, to a broader range of people.” 
Alastair – BP: “The Independent, the Guardian and BBC News are the ones that get 
posted the most [on Facebook].” 
Alessandro – IP: “[On Facebook I] find news from [popular newspapers] such as Il 
Mattino or La Repubblica.” 
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[Facebook as source of alternative information]: 
Kaye – BP: “I would definitely say that on Facebook [you can find] stuff that is not 
necessarily reported … It happens more that people pick up on little stories, like an MP 
who has claimed so much on expenses, and just share them among people … Probably a 
newspaper will not do it in that way because Facebook is a lot more informal I would 
say.” 
Tracey – BP: “On Facebook, often people are posting from websites that are not 
necessarily mainstream so it is not from the Guardian, the Times or the Daily Mail or 
even the BBC, and you can often get quite different types of stories, perhaps ones that are 
more informal or something like that.” 
Giuliano – IP: “I imagine Facebook as a big container, a newspaper that is not made by 
the political establishment which is clearly self-referential and tries to promote its 
positions. I see it as a huge multimedia container made by the people for the people … to 
share contents that can be of interest for common people and therefore that are not 
imposed.” 
Alessandro – IP: “[The news] is always distorted in TV, radio and even online 
newspapers. Maybe they don’t tell you something, they tell you only what they want, 
while when you go on Facebook you see people who know about politics and you see 
that they know about stuff that TV, radios and newspapers often don’t say.”  
In the considered samples it seemed, therefore, that Italians attributed greater value to 
alternative sources than their British counterparts. This could have been due to BPs’ and IPs’ 
different perceptions of traditional and established media institutions which were evident 
from the interviews. IPs were more sceptical of mainstream media, particularly TV, than 
BPs. They often questioned the independence of mainstream media from the political 
establishment, depicting Facebook and the Internet in general as realms immune to the 
corrupting influence of politics. The picture was more mixed in the BS, with some 
participants describing established media institutions such as the BBC as reliable and 
objective, and others expressing a more disenchanted and oppositional view. 
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[Negative perception of established media institutions]: 
Lesley – BP: “In this country, people have this assumption that the BBC is squeaky clean 
and beautiful and impartial and will give them very thorough information on everything 
… That really annoys me and … over the last decade with the involvement of Britain 
along with the United States in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and Iraq [it became very 
clear that this is not the case].”  
Andrew – BP: “[I tend to stay away from mainstream media] because it’s politically 
motivated, and it shouldn’t be really – it should be impartial and I don’t think that it is.” 
Giuliano – IP: “The [Berlusconi’s] government had almost total control over information 
and the people who wanted to know more had to go online.” 
Antonio – IP: “In Italy, official information is in the hands of a limited number of 
businesses, financial and industrial groups, and the space for necessary information is 
limited. Online, there is a much wider space where people can find and produce 
information.”  
[Support for established media institutions]:  
Vincent – BP: “You hear people complain that newspapers are all owned by rich 
capitalists and the BBC is maybe not totally independent as it should be. So people do 
complain about the state of the media in the UK, maybe a little bit unfairly, as I think it’s 
relatively free in the UK compared to some places.”  
Kaye – BP: “I would say that any news channel worth its salt will definitely try to make 
sure that they weren’t so biased that they were actually wrecking the story … I would say 
definitely the BBC, they always try to be fair.” 
Hilary – BP: “I only go to a proper source like the BBC.” 
Alastair – BP:  “I would recognise bias and I would look for it just to see if I thought the 
source was a bit biased one way or the other, but also I never suspected that the 
government has control of the stations here.” 
The samples’ different perceptions of mainstream media, in particular TV, could also 
account for their different scores in terms of media usage time (see Section 5.3.3, Table 16, 
for samples’ Facebook usage time). 
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Table 12 – Media Usage Time: Descriptive Statistics* 
 
British Sample Italian Sample 
Median IQR Median IQR 
TV Usage Time 3 1 2 1 
Radio Usage Time 2 0 2 1 
Press Usage Time  2 1 2 1 
Internet Usage Time**  3 1 3 2 
* 1(None at all), 2 (Less than 1 hour), 3 (1 to 3 hours), 4 (3 to 5 hours), 5 (More than 5 hours.      
** Internet Usage Time does not include the time spent on Facebook. 
 
As Table 12 indicates, the two samples in fact displayed the same scores in relation to the 
various media, except for TV, with IPs watching less TV than BPs. It is interesting to see 
how in both samples the Internet (in the BS in conjunction with TV) was the most used 
medium. 
To summarise, scores for the consumption of political information were consistent with 
scores for the other measures of political participation: IPs were slightly more active than 
BPs – moderate vs limited participation, particularly on Facebook. Both samples valued 
digital sources of information, and recognised that Facebook can contribute to the diffusion 
of political information by operating as an information catalyst. Data suggested that the 
informative power of Facebook rests on the proliferation of information sources, the 
networked and sometimes viral character of Facebook information, and the SNSs’ capacity 
to trigger the information search process. On the other hand, its main limitation is linked to 
the credibility of information circulated on Facebook, with participants highlighting the 
abundance of bogus information and unreliable sources.  
With regards to the nature of Facebook information, both BPs and IPs stressed that they can 
obtain politically diverse information through this SNS, by actively selecting to access such 
information or, more frequently, by being accidentally exposed to it. Data suggested that in 
order for accidental exposure to occur, the presence of a politically heterogeneous Facebook 
network – and interaction with such a network – is needed.  
Finally, both samples confirmed the presence of information originating from popular media 
broadcasters and information arising from alternative sources (e.g. blogs, Facebook pages). 
Both samples tended to consume mainly political information from established sources, but 
IPs seemed to value alternative sources more than their British counterparts. This is most 
likely linked to IPs’ more negative perception of mainstream media, of TV in particular.  
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5.2.3 Research Question 2.3 – Facebook and political discussion 
RQ 2.3: How does Facebook contribute to British and Italian citizens’ political 
discussion? 
Figure 15 – Facebook and Political Discussion: Main Findings
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As with the other measures of political participation used, the samples’ scores for political 
discussion were compared across the three considered channels. 
Table 13 – Political Discussion: Descriptive Statistics* 
 
British Sample Italian Sample 
Median IQR Median IQR 
Facebook Political Discussion   2 2 3 3 
Internet Political Discussion 
 
1 2 1 2 
Offline Political Discussion  
 
2 2 3 3 
    *1 (Never), 2 (Rarely), 3 (Sometimes), 4 (Often), 5 (Very often). 
Table 13 demonstrates the following: 
 As seen in the other measures of political participation, the IS exhibited slightly 
higher scores (i.e., moderate) than the BS (i.e., limited).  
 The main difference between these scores and the other measures of political 
participation relates to how the scores were distributed across the channels. Both 
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samples displayed the lowest possible level of Internet political discussion, while 
scoring the same with regards to Facebook and offline political discussion. 
 
The quantitative results were supported by the qualitative data. Participants observed that 
Facebook frequently replaced other online platforms, in particular in the IS, but did not 
become a substitute for offline discussion. In relation to this last point, Facebook operated as 
an additional discussion venue for individuals already interested in politics. These 
participants deemed Facebook a valuable tool that can increase the frequency of political 
discussion. Furthermore, interviewees identified a number of possible reasons behind the 
capacity Facebook has for promoting political discussion: the flexibility of Facebook – it can 
be accessed throughout the day from both computers and mobiles, enabling users to fit 
political discussions into their daily schedules (another reference to the flexibility of 
Facebook as a political platform is made in Section 5.1.2); the constant exposure to political 
information and news shared by politically interested Facebook friends; and the expansion 
and diversification of the discussion network. 
[Flexibility and exposure to political information]: 
Alastair – BP: “I’ll say I’ve become more involved in political discussion because of 
[Facebook as] you can access it any time, while you are not always with people who want 
to have political discussions … I hang around with a lot of political friends; they 
constantly post articles, views and things.” 
Tracey – BP: “I am much more involved with the political discussions online because [of 
Facebook]. [One of its advantages it is that] as soon as somebody posts an article you can 
go and read it and then write a response to it, whereas if you are looking at newspapers 
you maybe won’t remember to discuss a particular article or something that you have 
seen with somebody if they are not there at the time.” 
[Expanding and diversifying the discussion network]: 
Tracey – BP: “Because I really use Facebook as a means to stay in contact with people I 
no longer see, whether because they live in another country or they have moved on …[on 
Facebook I tend to communicate]  more generally with people that actually I don’t have 
face-to-face contact with.” 
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Mario  IP: “[Facebook] is a tool which opens the discussion up to people you wouldn’t 
have spoken with offline … it can happen that you communicate with people you don’t 
meet every day, but only talk to digitally.” 
Antonio – IP: “[Facebook] has increased the number of people I can reach. It enabled me 
to build a network of relations that I didn’t have before, or only had in a limited way 
because I would have to travel or use the phone [to communicate with them].” 
Ciro – IP: “[On Facebook] when you say something, you speak – so to say – to seven 
hundred people rather than to three people … When a political discussion happens on 
Facebook, very often people who are contacts of my interlocutors and are not my friends 
tend to join in.” 
The expansion of the discussion network, which participants highlighted as one of the 
greatest affordances of this SNS in terms of political discussion, plays a crucial role with 
regards to the exposure to political difference, an issue addressed also on the previous 
section. In this respect, participants recognised that by discussing politics with a wider range 
of people, often including people they would not normally have any interaction with, they 
tended to be exposed on Facebook to more varied political views than they would be offline, 
and on other Internet platforms such as forums or discussion lists. 
[A more politically diverse discussion network]: 
Rachel – BP: “[On Facebook I] probably discuss [politics] with a slightly different 
population [from] when I discussed within the sort of closed [Internet] forums … I think 
Facebook has broadened [the discussion in comparison to] these sorts of closed forums 
and closed discussion lists [as there is a] much wider breadth of people.” 
Alastair – BP: “[On Facebook] I tend to comment on friends’ statuses and their friends 
can get involved, especially if it’s a page or an event because it’s so public and there is 
lots of different views coming in. So [in these occasions] I talk to people with more 
different views than myself.” 
Martina – IP: “On Facebook you tend more [than offline] to interact with people who 
think differently from you. On the other hand, in a political meeting taking place outside 
the Internet, meeting people face-to-face, it’s clear you’ll meet people who think like 
you.”  
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Luigi – IP: “Offline discussion, with some exceptions, is often limited to persons who 
think like you, whereas online you have a global village where you can interact with a 
bigger and more diverse range of people.”  
However, despite the fact that participants acknowledged the value of Facebook and the 
Internet as additional venues for political discussion, most of them stressed their preference 
for offline discussion over computer-mediated discussion. Both BPs and IPs noted the more 
confrontational nature of online discussion and how not being able to interpret a person’s 
body language or tone of voice, the way you could in a face-to-face interaction, can often 
lead to misunderstandings and to harsher and more aggressive dialectical exchanges. In this 
regard, an IP made a very interesting point and spoke of right of inclusion with reference to 
the limited control Facebook users have over their public conversations and on the people 
who can intervene. 
[Limited control over discussion and its participants]: 
Luca – IP: “There is a difference between face-to-face and online discussion. I would call 
it the right of inclusion. If I talk to an individual about politics, I wilfully chose to talk 
with that particular person. At some point, if another person … interferes in our 
discussion both of us have to agree that he can participate … Therefore, in face-to-face 
discussion, the participants’ control is extremely high. The problem with online 
discussion, which is characterised by a freer access, is that … the possibility of someone 
interfering is much higher ... In offline communication, I select the participants, set the 
tone and I can choose how to direct the conversation, [but it is] very difficult to do this 
online.”   
[Harsher and more aggressive tones online]: 
Tracey – BP: “On Facebook … I think there is a tendency that people will anticipate what 
the person is going to say next and then be quite aggressive in their tone, and that has 
happened to me before where I have been discussing something and then the person 
which I have been discussing [it] with has become very aggressive because I can’t see 
their point of view or my opinion is different from theirs.” 
Callum – BP: “Face-to-face discussions are very different from online discussions. 
[Online] it’s sometimes possible to be misunderstood [because these types of 
interactions] don’t fully include the tone of voice.” 
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Martina – IP: “The visual contact is important because often misunderstandings happen 
on the web. You don’t hear the tone of voice. For instance, I am a person who uses irony 
a lot and I have to be careful when I write because if I joke in a certain way and a person 
can’t see my face or hear the tone of my voice, he can get offended. [On Facebook] I 
have been targeted and people intervened in the discussions to harass me and I had to 
block them … I use my real name, surname, and picture but some people create fake 
profiles and they feel protected because they are anonymous, and know that they can 
offend because they will not face the consequences.” 
Ciro – IP: “The communication mediated by computers and which happens through 
social networks [such as Facebook] exaggerates a series of dynamics which lead to 
confrontation. This is because when a person writes, he concentrates on replying to what 
has been said by the other person, without considering the facial expressions, the smiles, 
the natural pauses which occur in the spoken language, and therefore there is a ping pong 
of sharp replies which can sometimes appear harsh and stir up troubles in the long run.”  
The samples thus identified the physical absence, and consequently the absence of visual and 
acoustic cues in conversation, as the main difference between online and offline discussions. 
According to participants, such a difference can often lead to misunderstandings and 
confrontation. However, the physical absence in online conversation was not unanimously 
considered detrimental to the quality of discussion, with some participants believing that it 
could actually foster greater honesty and encourage participation. 
 [More honesty and participation in online discussion]: 
Alastair – BP: “I prefer [discussing politics] online only because if you are in a discussion 
with someone and you do it face-to-face, it is easy to get too involved.” 
Andrew – BP: “I think you can be a lot more open online ... It’s difficult to talk to people 
about [certain] things whereas online you can say whatever crazy [thing] you want.” 
Ciro – IP: “It seems that [online] more people feel that they can express an opinion. This 
is due to the lack of direct contact, as if they can avoid a negative look or comment 
people tend to speak up more” 
To conclude, similarly to all the considered measures of political participation, IPs 
participated slightly more than BPs in political discussions – moderate vs limited 
participation. The difference with the other measures was that for both BPs and IPs the 
  
150 
Internet was the least used venue for political discussion, while Facebook and the offline 
world were equivalent in terms of scores.   
Interviews indicated that Facebook can contribute to political discussion by operating as an 
additional discussion venue for individuals already interested in politics. Facebook often 
replaced other online platforms, in particular in the IS, but did not become a substitute for 
offline discussion. Participants who used this SNS for political discussion highlighted how it 
could promote their participation by providing flexibility and expanding and diversifying 
their discussion networks. As a result, participants believed that they encountered a wider 
range of political views through Facebook than they would offline or through other online 
platforms. Despite these advantages, both BPs and IPs tended to prefer offline discussion to 
computer-mediated discussion. Participants stressed the benefits of body language and tone 
of voice as communication aids in face-to-face  discussion, noting the often more 
confrontational nature of online discussion, in which the absence of visual and acoustic cues 
can often lead to misunderstandings and to harsher, more aggressive exchanges. 
Nonetheless, some participants seemed to value such a physical absence arguing that it can 
promote honesty and encourage wider participation in political discussion. 
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5.3 Research Question 3 – Factors Mediating the Contributions of Facebook 
to Political Participation 
RQ 3: What are the factors mediating the contributions of Facebook to British and Italian 
citizens’ political participation? 
RQ 3.1: How do demographic factors such as gender, age, education and occupation 
impact upon the links between Facebook and political participation? 
RQ 3.2: How does political engagement mediate the contributions of Facebook to 
political participation? 
RQ 3.3: How do the time spent on Facebook, the relevance of this SNS in people’s 
lives, Facebook non-political activity and different non-political usage practices 
(information vs communication vs social recreation) mediate the contributions of this 
SNS to political participation?  
 
Figure 16 – Factors Mediating the Contributions of Facebook to Political Participation: Main 
Findings 
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5.3.1 Research Question 3.1 – Demographic variables and political participation 
RQ 3.1: How do demographic factors such as gender, age, education and occupation 
impact upon the links between Facebook and political participation?  
As outlined in Appendix C, the samples were consistent in terms of age range, but differed in 
regard to gender, education and occupation. BPs had higher educational and occupational 
levels than IPs, and the BS consisted of a higher percentage of women than the IS (63% vs 
47%). In order to assess the relationship between political participation and these variables a 
correlation analysis was run. 
Table 14 – Political Participation and Demographic Variables: Correlation Analysis – 
Cramer’s V* 
 
Facebook  
Political 
Participation 
Internet 
Political 
Participation 
Offline 
Political 
Participation 
British 
Sample 
Gender Cramer’s V Value .480 .515 .461 
Approx. Sig. .048 .010 .075 
Age Cramer’s V Value .442 .426 .408 
Approx. Sig. .063 .156 .268 
Education Cramer’s V Value .455 .402 .434 
Approx. Sig. .012 .418 .046 
Occupation  Cramer’s V Value .384 .391 .371 
Approx. Sig. .740 .623 .829 
Italian 
Sample 
Gender Cramer’s V Value .415 .443 .430 
Approx. Sig. .748 .361 .459 
Age Cramer’s V Value .493 .422 .450 
Approx. Sig. .075 .572 .224 
Education Cramer’s V Value .473 .387 .449 
Approx. Sig. .193 .951 .198 
Occupation Cramer’s V Value .452 .437 .455 
Approx. Sig. .489 .332 .094 
* Significant correlations in bold. 
 
 
As Table 14 shows: 
 In the two samples all demographic variables were either moderately or largely 
correlated to the three considered scales of political participation.  
 Among the various correlations, only four in the BS (i.e., gender with Facebook and 
Internet political participation, and education with Facebook and offline political 
participation) were statistically significant. 
 Focusing on Facebook political participation, the main difference between the 
samples emerged in relation to gender. Among the considered demographic 
variables, gender displays the largest correlation with Facebook political 
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participation in the BS, whereas in the IS it is the variable with the smallest 
correlation. 
 
As correlation analysis does not show the directions of correlations, a series of graphs was 
produced to display the samples’ political participation scores in relation to the various 
categories of gender, age, education, and occupation, in order to understand how the various 
demographic variables related to political participation (see Section 4.6.1 and Appendix C 
for an explanation of the various categories). 
 
 
Figure 17 – Facebook Political Participation by Gender: Box Plots  
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Figure 18 – Facebook Political Participation by Age: Box Plots 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 – Facebook Political Participation by Occupation: Box Plots 
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Figure 20 – Facebook Political Participation by Education: Box Plots 
 
The previous four figures indicate that in terms of Facebook political participation: 
 In the BS males were more politically active than females. This participatory gap 
between males and females did not emerge in the IS.  
 In the IS older people (i.e., 45-65) participated more than younger ones, while a 
clear pattern could not be identified in the BS. 
 In the IS, participants falling within the managers and professionals category 
displayed higher levels of participation than the ones falling within the other 
occupational categories. As with age ranges, a clear pattern within the range of 
occupations could not be identified in the BS. 
 In both samples, no relevant differences were evident in relation to the two 
considered educational categories. 
 
Considering the higher levels of participation of British male participants, the gender 
discrepancy between the samples (i.e., higher percentage of females in the BS) could be one 
of the reasons behind the samples’ different levels of political participation (i.e., IPs were 
slightly more active than BPs, particularly on Facebook). However, the relationship between 
gender and political participation in the BS has not been corroborated in the qualitative phase 
of the study, in which the most politically active BPs were women (see the participants’ 
profiles in Appendix D). Among the other three considered demographic variables, the 
interviews supported the results produced in the quantitative phase with regards to age, while 
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the relevance of education and occupation was not confirmed. Older participants therefore 
tended to be more politically active than younger ones not only on Facebook, but also on the 
Internet in general, as well as offline. 
Thus there were mixed, sometimes conflicting, results with regards to the relevance of 
demographic variables (i.e. gender, age, education, and occupation) for Facebook political 
participation. Taking into consideration the quantitative results, among the considered 
variables gender and age appeared to be the most relevant ones in terms of Facebook 
political participation. However, interviews confirmed only the relevance of age, and 
suggested that political activity on Facebook is dependent upon pre-existing political 
participation and interest more than on anything else (see next section). 
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5.3.2 RQ 3.2 – Political engagement and political participation 
RQ 3.2: How does political engagement mediate the contributions of Facebook to 
political participation? 
Political engagement and its measures are identified in the literature as important predictors 
of political participation. Their links with Facebook, Internet, and offline participation were 
assessed through a correlation analysis. 
Table 15 – Political Participation and Political Engagement: Correlations Analysis –
Spearman's rho 
 
Facebook 
Political 
Participation 
Internet 
Political 
Participation 
Offline 
Political 
Participation 
British 
Sample 
Political  
Engagement 
Correlation Coefficient .335** .471** .474** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
         Political  
         Interest 
Correlation Coefficient .465** .580** .557** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
         Partisanship Correlation Coefficient .211** .220** .261** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .003 .002 
         Political 
         Knowledge  
Correlation Coefficient .312** .457** .420** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
         External  
         Political  
         Efficacy  
Correlation Coefficient -.126 -.118 -.007 
Sig. (2-tailed) .079 .100 .927 
         Internal  
         Political  
         Efficacy 
Correlation Coefficient .271** .419** .377** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
Italian 
Sample 
Political  
Engagement 
Correlation Coefficient .566** .502** .604** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
         Political  
         Interest 
Correlation Coefficient .509** .513** .562** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
         Partisanship Correlation Coefficient .447** .394** .454** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
         Political  
         Knowledge  
Correlation Coefficient .289** .311** .375** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
         External  
         Political  
         Efficacy  
Correlation Coefficient .163* .087 .147* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .023 .223 .040 
         Internal  
         Political  
         Efficacy 
Correlation Coefficient .268** .243** .309** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .000 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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The correlation analysis indicated that:  
 In the IS political engagement had a large correlation with Facebook, Internet and 
offline political participation, while in the BS it was only moderately correlated to 
these scales.  
 In the BS the correlations between political engagement and Facebook political 
participation were lower than the ones between political engagement and Internet 
and offline political participation, a pattern which seemed to apply to all the 
considered measures of political engagement.  
 When the various measures of political engagement were taken into account, in both 
samples political interest was the one consistently displaying the largest correlations 
with the considered political participation scales.   
 The main differences between the two samples emerged in relation to partisanship 
and external political efficacy.  
 With regards to external political efficacy, in the BS this measure displayed small 
and negative correlations with the three considered political participation scales. 
However, these correlations were not statistically significant. In the IS these 
correlations were slightly higher (i.e., small/moderate) but positive. In both samples, 
among the various measures of political engagement external political efficacy was 
the one displaying the smallest correlations. 
 With respect to partisanship, the correlations found in the IS were larger (i.e., 
moderate) than the ones found in the BS (i.e., small). In the BS, this measure 
presented small correlations with the three considered scales of participation, while 
in the IS was moderately correlated to these measures.  
 
The links between political participation and political engagement were further explored in 
the qualitative phase. Most of the quantitative findings are supported by qualitative data. The 
interviews confirmed that, among the various measures of political engagement, political 
interest was the most strongly and consistently linked to political participation. As stressed in 
Sections 5.1 and 5.2, politically interested individuals were the ones who participated the 
most across the three considered channels.  
[Relevance of political interest]: 
Alex – BP: “[My limited political participation is probably linked to the fact that] I am 
not very interested and … passionate about politics … I have a little bit of passion but not 
enough to parley my own.” 
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With regards to the other components of the political engagement index, political knowledge 
emerged as particularly relevant to political participation, as already highlighted in Section 
5.1.2 (i.e., virtuous circle). In addition, political knowledge appeared to impact positively on 
individuals’ understanding of politics and confidence to participate politically (i.e., internal 
political efficacy). External political efficacy also seemed to influence participants’ levels of 
political participation not only on Facebook but also on the Internet and offline. 
[Relevance of political knowledge and internal political efficacy]: 
Andrew – BP: “I started becoming interested in politics very recently. So I still feel I 
have a lot to learn, so you know I’m not too active just now because I still feel that I’m 
learning.” 
Helen – BP: “I’m aware of what I post in the sense that if I’m not really informed on a 
subject I will not comment until I know what I’m talking about in that sense, because if 
everyone can see I don’t want to look like a fool.” 
Ellie – BP: “I feel I don’t have enough background knowledge to be able to discuss 
[politics], I would just end up rambling really … [I don’t participate politically because] I 
don’t have a strong opinion and I don’t feel I would be able to help out, to be honest.”  
[Relevance of external political efficacy]: 
Callum – BP: “When [the government] makes decisions that I disagree with, then by the 
time I’ve already found out about them they have already been made, I don’t think there 
is very much I can do about them.” 
Alessandro – IP: “[I don’t participate in politics] – I don’t like it because [the 
government] is all talk but no action. Even with the financial crisis, they sad that they 
were going to cut this and that, but really they should cut their own wages. [They don’t 
care about people’s needs], they are only there to make money.” 
With respect to the last measure composing the political engagement index, namely 
partisanship, the qualitative data contradicted in part the quantitative data, indicating 
partisanship as an important factor determining the contributions of Facebook to political 
participation. This applies not only to IPs, as the quantitative results suggested, but also to 
BPs, with participants involved in party politics also particularly active on this SNS. 
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[Relevance of partisanship]: 
Rachel – BP: “I am member of the Greens and the Greens use Facebook to some extent to 
communicate internally. Although most of that internal communication goes off in 
private mailing lists, there is a public face of communication that’s from Facebook out to 
the world and so I do that.” 
Antonio – IP: “[I work] for Rifondazione Comunista and [I deal] with immigration 
related issues. Therefore, for me politics is also a job… In this sense Facebook helped me 
a lot [as] I write for a series of online newspapers and circulate my articles through 
Facebook.”   
Linked to partisanship is party affiliation which refers to the alliance to a specific party. The 
present research adopted a bottom-up approach in examining the contributions of Facebook 
to political participation, focusing on citizens rather than political institutions. Given this 
focus, the role of political parties or movements has been investigated only to a limited 
extent (a more detailed discussion of this issue can be found in Section 6.7). Given the 
samples’ composition, with certain parties under-represented in the samples (see Appendix 
C) and the way party affiliation has been operationalised (see Section 6.7), it is not clear 
how, in the context of this study, the alliance to specific political forces can mediate the 
contributions of Facebook to political participation. Nonetheless, qualitative data seemed to 
suggest that rather than the alliance to a specific political party, it is the degree of such an 
affiliation that matters in terms of political participation on Facebook. Among the 
interviewed participants, with the exception of Hilary whose political activity on Facebook is 
limited due to concerns about the semi-public nature of this SNS (see Section 5.1.2), those 
who were active in party politics – regardless of the party – displayed the highest levels of 
Facebook political participation (see participants’ profiles in Appendix D).  In this sense, the 
only notable difference emerged with regards to a participant affiliated to the M5S, a party 
that, as noted in Section 1.3, uses the Internet and SNSs as their key communication and 
mobilisation tools. This participant stressed the centrality of Facebook for the activities of 
the M5S, a finding which did not seem to apply to other political parties. Similarly, even if to 
a much lesser degree, in the BS affiliation to the political movement 38 Degrees appeared to 
be related to Facebook political participation.  
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 [Relevance of affiliation to a party or movement]: 
Giuliano – IP: “Four or five years ago the 5 Stars Movement started with people 
connecting through online platforms such as Meet Up. [At the time], Facebook was not 
so popular in Italy like it is today, so we started using the Meet Up platforms, then all the 
activity related to the discussion, the organisation of meetings and initiatives moved to 
Facebook.”  
Alex – BP: “[Facebook] helped … to connect people with these big massive … 
programmes like this 38 Degrees, and I think that without Facebook I would have had 
less interaction with them.”  
To recapitulate, political engagement and its measures (i.e., political interest, political 
knowledge, internal and external political efficacy, and partisanship) presented important 
links with political participation in general, and also with political participation carried out 
specifically through Facebook. In both samples political interest was the measure displaying 
the largest correlations with Facebook political participation, with qualitative data also 
confirming that politically interested individuals were the ones using Facebook the most for 
political purposes.  
Partisanship also emerged as an important factor mediating the contributions of Facebook to 
political participation. While quantitative data indicated the relevance of this measure only 
for the IS, the qualitative phase suggested that a strong affiliation to a political party is 
positively related to the usage of Facebook for political participation for both IPs and BPs.  
Likewise, political knowledge, internal and external political efficacy seemed to have a 
positive influence on political participation, even if to a lesser degree than political interest 
and partisanship. Among these three measures, political knowledge appeared to be the most 
relevant one. 
The data did not offer a clear picture of the links between affiliation to specific political 
parties and political participation on Facebook. However, it seemed that, rather than the 
alliance to a specific political party, it is the degree of the affiliation that matters the most. 
The only notable exception was a participant affiliated to an Italian party, the M5S, for 
which Facebook is the most crucial political communication and organisational tool, and for 
whose supporters high levels of online political activities are typical. 
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5.3.3 Research Question 3.3 – Facebook activity and political participation                                                                        
RQ 3.3: How do the time spent on Facebook, the relevance of this SNS in people’s 
lives, and Facebook non-political activity mediate the contributions of this SNS to 
political participation? 
This sub-section discusses how usage time, amount of Facebook non-political activity, 
relevance and perception of Facebook affects political participation, then moves on to 
examine the impact of different Facebook non-political usage practices. As shown in Section 
4.6.1 where the questionnaire variables are explained, Facebook activity is assessed through 
three main measures: Facebook usage time, Facebook perceived relevance, and Facebook 
non-political activity.  
Table 16 – Facebook Usage Time, Facebook Perceived Relevance, and Facebook Non-
Political Activity: Descriptive Statistics* 
 
British Sample Italian Sample 
Median IQR Median IQR 
Facebook Usage Time 2 1 2 2 
Facebook Perceived Relevance 14 4 13 4 
Facebook Non-Political Activity 25 9 29 9 
  
* Facebook Usage Time: 1 (Less than 1 hour), 2 (1 to 3 hours), 3 (3 to 5 hours), 4 (More than 5 hours). 
    Facebook Perceived Relevance: 4 (None), 8 (Low ), 12 (Moderate ),  16 (High), 20 (Very high). 
    Facebook Non-Political Activity: 9 (Never), 18 (Rarely), 27 (Sometimes), 36 (Often), 45 (Very often). 
 
Figure 21 – Facebook Usage Time: Histograms 
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Figure 22 – Facebook Perceived Relevance: Box Plots 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23 – Facebook Non-Political Activity: Box Plots 
 
 
4 (None) 
8 (Low) 
12 (Moderate) 
16 (High) 
20 (Very high) 
 
9 (Never) 
18 (Rarely) 
27 (Sometimes) 
36 (Often) 
45 (Very Often) 
 
  
164 
As Table 16, Figures 21, 22, and 23 show, unlike for Facebook political participation, the 
two samples scored more similarly on the other considered measures of Facebook activity: 
 Both samples perceived Facebook to have a moderate or high relevance in their 
lives, with the BS scoring slightly higher on this measure than the IS.   
 Considering the distribution of scores, IPs spent somewhat more time on Facebook 
than their British counterparts. 
 The main difference between the two samples related to Facebook non-political 
activity, with IPs engaging more often than BPs in non-political activities through 
this SNS. 
 
The links between these measures and Facebook Political Participation are assessed through 
a correlation analysis. 
 
Table 17 – Facebook Activity: Correlation Analysis – Spearman's rho 
 
Facebook 
Political 
Participation 
British 
Sample 
Facebook Usage Time Correlation Coefficient .415** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Facebook Perceived  
Relevance 
Correlation Coefficient .313** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Facebook Non-Political 
Activity 
Correlation Coefficient .461** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Italian 
Sample 
Facebook Usage Time Correlation Coefficient .467** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Facebook Perceived  
Relevance 
Correlation Coefficient .394** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Facebook Non-Political 
Activity 
Correlation Coefficient .382** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
 
According to the correlation analysis: 
 In both samples the considered measures of Facebook activity were all moderately 
correlated to Facebook political participation.  
 In the IS Facebook usage time displayed the largest correlation with Facebook 
political participation, whereas in the BS the largest correlation was with Facebook 
non-political activity. 
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As explained in Section 4.1, a conceptual weakness of many studies investigating the impact 
of the Internet on political participation is the over-generalisation of Internet usage. To 
address such a gap, the present research examined whether the contributions of Facebook to 
political participation vary according to the different non-political usages of this SNS.  In 
order to do so, the Facebook non-political activity scale was split into three different usage 
dimensions, and the relationships between these dimensions and Facebook political 
participation were assessed through a correlation analysis. 
 
Table 18 – Facebook Non-Political Usages: Descriptive Statistics* 
 
British Sample Italian Sample 
Median IQR Median IQR 
Facebook Information  8 3 10 4 
Facebook Interpersonal Communication 8 4 9 4 
Facebook Social Recreation  8 4 10 4 
 
  * 3 (Never), 6 (Rarely), 9 (Sometimes), 12 (Often), 15 (Very Often). 
 
Figure 24 – Facebook Non-Political Usage Dimensions: Box Plots 
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When the three considered Facebook usages are taken into account, it emerges that: 
 In the two samples, the differences between the three non-political usage dimensions 
are minimal. 
 Like for the other measures of Facebook activity IPs score higher than BPs in all 
considered usage dimensions.  
 
Table 19 – Facebook Political Participation and Facebook Non-Political Usages: Correlation 
Analysis – Spearman's rho 
 
Facebook 
Political 
Participation 
British 
Sample 
Facebook Information 
 
Correlation Coefficient .402** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Facebook Interpersonal  
Communication  
Correlation Coefficient .443** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Facebook Social 
Recreation  
Correlation Coefficient .395** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Italian 
Sample 
Facebook Information 
 
Correlation Coefficient .374** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Facebook Interpersonal  
Communication  
Correlation Coefficient .378** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Facebook Social 
Recreation  
Correlation Coefficient .291** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
 
The correlation analysis indicated that: 
 The two samples displayed similar correlations between the considered Facebook 
non-political usages and Facebook political participation (i.e., small/moderate). 
 In both samples, the social recreation dimension displayed smaller correlations with 
Facebook political participation in comparison to the other two usage dimensions. 
 
Quantitative data established, therefore, that Facebook usage time, Facebook perceived 
relevance, and Facebook non-political activity are all somewhat related to Facebook political 
participation. The links between these measures were further explored in the qualitative 
phase.  
With regards to the relevance of Facebook in people’s lives, the surveys showed that 
Facebook was perceived by both samples as highly relevant to them. With some exceptions 
– as Lesley’s quote below exemplifies – this finding was confirmed in the interviews. 
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[Importance of Facebook in people’s lives]: 
Francesca – IP: “Facebook is the first page I open when I access the Internet [and it] has 
become my main tool to keep in touch with friends.”  
Carmela – IP: “I could never think of closing my Facebook account, if only for all the 
connections that I have built at the professional level.” 
 [Negative perception of Facebook]: 
Lesley – BP: “[Facebook] can draw you in and become a big time-waster and this is 
something I cannot afford to do ... as a self-employed person. [Twitter] is very quick and 
less of a time-waster than Facebook.”   
Even if BPs scored higher than IPs on the Facebook perceived relevance scale, the 
qualitative data indicated that the importance of Facebook in participants’ lives was higher in 
the IS. For IPs, Facebook was the most commonly used Internet tool for both political and 
non-political activities (see Section 5.1.1 for the results related to the relevance of Facebook 
as a political platform). IPs observed that Facebook has replaced many other online 
platforms, with Internet activity becoming almost entirely Facebook activity in certain cases, 
a trend less likely to be found among BPs and that could, in part, explain IPs’ higher levels 
of political participation on Facebook. 
 [Facebook replacing other Internet tools]: 
Rachel – BP: “Facebook … replaced things I used to do. In the days before Facebook 
there were a few closed forums … and private discussion lists and I used to be very active 
in those.”  
Luigi – IP: “Facebook is the only social network I participate in. I don’t even have a 
profile on Twitter … it is not because I like it, [but] I found myself on it and I don’t want 
to have profiles [on other websites as] it would become too distracting.” 
Alessandro – IP: “Most of the times I use Facebook because it is the only social network 
which allows you to see so many things together – from politics to sport and everyday 
stuff.”  
In relation to the various non-political usages of Facebook, it was not clear from the 
quantitative data whether there was a specific non-political use which was preferable to 
others. These results were confirmed in the interviews which indicated that Facebook was 
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used as an all-encompassing platform, a tool to engage in a wide range of activities rather 
than being employed for one particular goal. BPs and IPs often used this SNS to keep in 
touch with friends, to obtain information, for entertainment purposes (e.g., organising a night 
out or playing games), for work, for studying and even for dating purposes. These usages 
varied from user to user. 
[Facebook as an all-encompassing platform]: 
Lesley – BP: “I use [Facebook mainly] for social communication. I use it for 
communicating events that I’m running, for example workshops and courses that I’m 
running, occasionally for commenting on somebody’s photograph or maybe put a link to 
something interesting.”  
Hilary – BP: “Basically [I use Facebook] just to be in touch with friends – I’ve got 
friends in all parts of the world and that’s mainly why; [I use it] just to keep in touch with 
all of them. I like to use it for light-hearted chat and I like to see if someone puts an event, 
ok I’m attending that event – that’s what I really like to use it for.” 
Hazel – BP: “On Facebook, other than political activities, I play games and I do chat to 
friends sometimes, keep up to date as to what friends are doing and family as well.”  
Alastair – BP: “[Facebook is used] to keep in touch with friends, communicate with 
friends, organising parties and things … I mainly use it just to kill time, just if I’ve got 
nothing to do, I go on Facebook.” 
Helen – BP: “[I use Facebook] for chatting, reading news, reading pages … I would say 
fifty-fifty for information and entertainment.” 
Ciro – IP: “Very often [I use Facebook] to share information, thoughts, moods, images. I 
use it as a way to promote certain activities I organise or simply in a more light-hearted 
and informative way.” 
Carmela – IP: “During the day I often check my Facebook page, and as I follow several 
newspapers I am constantly informed … I don’t lose anything. So you can use this tool 
for informative purposes rather than for entertainment. Actually sometimes I have read 
something first on Facebook, and only after on newspapers websites” 
Francesca – IP: “Basically I use Facebook to communicate with people, and also to share 
non-political and political information.” 
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Rosaria – IP: “I use Facebook for work and for silly things.”  
Giuliano – IP: “I use it for my company that deals with online sales … I have created a 
Facebook page because it gives you more opportunities to interact with people … I have 
reached 4000 contacts and I publish offers, I post pictures, I publish any relevant news 
there. [Also I use it] to keep in touch with friends and family.”  
Gaia – IP: “On Facebook I contact and keep in touch with friends. Then I post music, lose 
time, read the news … and I even use it for university.” 
The correlation analysis did not clarify the ways in which different non-political usages of 
Facebook relate to political participation on this SNS. Among the considered usage 
dimensions, the social recreation dimension displayed the smallest correlations with 
Facebook political participation. However, the differences between this and the other 
dimensions were minor. The interviews shed light on this issue and indicated that the various 
dimensions did not impact differently on political participation on this SNS. For instance, 
Hazel, one of the most politically active participants, used Facebook also for entertainment, 
while Gaia, despite employing Facebook for information purposes, exhibited limited levels 
of political activity on this SNS. It thus appeared that rather than the non-political ways 
people used Facebook, it was the general level of Facebook activity that mattered in terms of 
political participation. The correlation analysis shown in Table 17 highlighted the moderate 
correlations between Facebook political participation, Facebook usage time, and Facebook 
non-political activity. These links appeared even stronger when the interviews were also 
considered. The qualitative data, in fact, illustrated that the more time people spent on 
Facebook and engaged in on-site activities, the more likely they were to participate 
politically. In fact, simply by being on Facebook users can be exposed, often accidentally, to 
political information through the News Feed, and learn more about politics that way (see 
Section 5.1.2).  
[Relevance of the amount of Facebook usage]: 
Helen – BP: “The amount of usage, the pages that you like [affect your political 
participation on Facebook], because the more time you spend on it the more things you 
discover, you start liking more and more pages, and those pages post links…” 
Francesca – IP: “I must admit that Facebook is the first page that I open when I access the 
Internet. [For this reason most of the political information that I get] comes from 
Facebook … Even if I didn’t want to get this information I would get it anyway, because 
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by being on Facebook information comes from friends’ status updates  to pages that I 
follow.”  
Ciro – IP: “If you spend a number of hours on Facebook you will come cross hundreds of 
links, and some of these could be political ones and get your attention. On a daily basis, I 
am not really active, in the sense that I don’t look for stuff, but I can read, for instance, 
twenty articles that I get through the News Feed.” 
In summary, both samples, and in particular IPs, perceived Facebook as a platform highly 
relevant to them. While BPs tended to use Facebook in conjunction with other online 
platforms such as Twitter, for IPs Facebook was the most commonly used Internet tool for 
both political (see Section 5.1.1) and non-political activities, a finding which could explain 
IPs’ higher levels of political participation on Facebook. 
The non-political usages of Facebook varied from user to user, with the platform used for a 
wide array of activities ranging from communication and entertainment to information and 
work related activities. However, it appeared that, rather than the ways people use this SNS, 
it is the time spent on Facebook and the levels of participation in non-political activities that 
contribute the most to political participation. In this sense, interviews showed that the News 
Feed plays a central role by assuming a broadcasting function and disseminating political 
and non-political information to which users are often exposed accidentally. 
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5.4 Summary of Findings 
RQ 1: How does Facebook contribute to British and Italian citizens’ political participation?  
 RQ 1.1: Is Facebook a relevant venue for political participation and what are the 
links between Facebook, Internet and offline political participation? 
- In both samples the non-political usage of Facebook overcame the political 
usage, suggesting that this SNS is mostly used for non-political purposes. 
- The two samples displayed limited levels of participation across the three 
considered channels (i.e., Facebook, the Internet, and offline). The 
differences between the two samples were minimal, but IPs exhibited higher 
scores, particularly with regards to Facebook political participation.  
- BPs often employed other online platforms in conjunction with or instead of 
Facebook for participating politically, whereas in the IS Facebook was by 
far the most relevant online political platform. 
- The relevance of Facebook as a political platform was much higher for 
individuals displaying high levels of political participation.  
- Facebook can operate as an activator of the political participation process 
and also promote the involvement of citizens who have limited levels of 
political participation because they lack motivation, are restrained by health-
related issues, or simply are not aware of participation opportunities. In 
relation to the latter scenario (i.e., lack of information), political 
participation can begin on this SNS and then flow into other channels. 
 
 RQ 1.2: What are the advantages and limitations of Facebook in terms of 
political participation? 
- According to the interviews, the greatest political affordance of Facebook is 
a practical one. This SNS can reduce the thresholds of participation, making 
political participation more flexible and less expensive in terms of resources, 
e.g., time.  
- The second main advantage of Facebook in terms of political participation is 
its informative power. By exposing users to political information, it can 
trigger a virtuous circle, increasing political interest and knowledge, 
eventually leading to political participation. 
- A limitation of Facebook as a political platform is the fact that this SNS is 
not a universal tool. Facebook reaches a relatively small part of the British 
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and Italian populations, and requires digital skills that not every citizen 
holds. 
- The semi-public nature of Facebook and the associated privacy concerns can 
have a restraining effect on users’ political participation. Privacy in the 
Facebook environment appeared to be a bigger issue for BPs, with the 
presence of certain contacts and of identity attributes often inhibiting their 
political activity. 
 
RQ 2: Do the contributions of Facebook to political participation vary depending on the 
political activity in question??  
 RQ 2.1: Distinguishing between political communication and political 
mobilisation, how do the contributions of Facebook vary in relation to these two 
different typologies of political activity? 
- As the general measures of political participation indicated, the same was 
found with regards to political communication and mobilisation: IPs were 
slightly more active than BPs, particularly on Facebook. 
- Both samples tended to engage more often in political communication 
activities than mobilisation ones – moderate vs limited or no participation –, 
a trend confirmed in all three considered participation channels. 
- The samples’ higher participation in political communication activities can 
be attributed to two causes. The first is that these activities are less resource-
expensive than the ones falling within the mobilisation dimension (e.g., less 
demanding in terms of time). The second is the scepticism shown by BPs 
and IPs towards political initiatives. Participants, in particular IPs, often 
queried the efficacy of political initiatives, expressing disenchantment 
towards the political establishment and doubting its responsiveness to 
citizens’ actions. 
- Given the costs and perception of the efficacy of mobilisation activities, the 
contributions of Facebook to the mobilisation dimension remained limited to  
participants who were already politically active, with less politically active 
participants tending to employ Facebook mainly as a communicative and 
informative political tool. 
- Facebook emerged as a key tool in activists’ political repertoires, often 
replacing other online platforms and offline methods which had previously 
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been employed for communicating, organising and promoting political 
initiatives. 
 
 RQ 2.2: How does Facebook contribute to British and Italian citizens’ 
consumption of political information? 
- The trends which emerged in relation to the other considered measures of 
political participation were confirmed also with regards to the consumption 
of political information, with IPs slightly more active than BPs, particularly 
on Facebook – moderate vs limited participation.. 
- Participants remarked that Facebook can contribute to the diffusion of 
political information by operating as an information catalyst. Interviews 
suggested that the informative power of this SNS rests on the proliferation of 
information sources, the networked and sometimes viral character of 
Facebook information, and its capability to trigger the information search 
process. 
- The main limitation of Facebook in terms of political information is linked 
to the credibility of the political information circulating on this SNS, with 
participants highlighting the abundance of bogus information.  
- Users acknowledged that they were exposed to politically diverse 
information through Facebook, by directly selecting this information or, 
more commonly, by being accidentally exposed to it. 
- Both samples confirmed the presence on Facebook of information from 
popular media broadcasters and information from alternative sources (e.g., 
blogs, Facebook pages). BPs consumed mainly political information from 
established sources. The same applied to IPs who, however, seemed to value 
alternative sources more than their British counterparts. 
- The greater value that IPs attributed to alternative sources is most likely 
linked to their perception of mainstream media. IPs were more sceptical than 
BPs of mainstream media, particularly of TV which was their least used 
medium. They questioned the independence of mainstream media from the 
political establishment, and often depicted Facebook, and the Internet more 
generally, as realms immune to the corrupting influence of politics. 
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 RQ 2.3: How does Facebook contribute to British and Italian citizens’ political 
discussion? 
- Like for all other measures of political participation, IPs participated slightly 
more than BPs in political discussions – moderate vs limited participation. 
The difference with the other measures is that for both BPs and IPs the 
Internet was the least used venue for political discussion, while Facebook 
and the offline world were equivalent in terms of scores.  
- Facebook seemed to contribute to political discussion by operating as an 
additional discussion venue for individuals who were already interested in 
politics.  
- Facebook often replaced other online platforms, in particular in the IS, but 
did not become a substitute for offline discussion.  
- Facebook can promote political discussion by making it more flexible and 
expanding and diversifying the discussion networks.  
- Because of the expansion and diversification of the discussion networks, 
participants were exposed on Facebook to more political difference than 
they experienced offline and on other Internet platforms.  
- Both BPs and IPs tended to prefer offline discussion to computer-mediated 
discussion. Participants stressed the importance of the physical elements of 
offline discussion, e.g., body language. They noted the more confrontational 
nature of online discussion and how the absence of visual and acoustic cues 
can often lead to misunderstandings and to harsher and more aggressive 
exchanges. However, the physical absence in online conversation was not 
unanimously considered detrimental, with some participants arguing that it 
can encourage honesty and foster participation. 
 
RQ 3: What are the factors mediating the contributions of Facebook to British and Italian 
citizens’ political participation?  
 RQ 3.1: How do demographic factors such as gender, age, education and 
occupation intervene in the links between Facebook and political participation? 
- Quantitative and qualitative data produced contrasting pictures with regard 
to the links between demographic variables (i.e., gender, age, education, and 
occupation) and political participation on Facebook. According to the 
quantitative results, among the considered variables, gender and age 
appeared to be the most relevant ones, with females in the BS and younger 
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people in the IS less politically active than males in the BS and older people 
in the IS. However, interviews confirmed only the relevance of age – in both 
samples – and suggested that political activity on Facebook is related to pre-
existing political participation and interest more than to anything else. 
 
 RQ 3.2: How does political engagement mediate the contributions of Facebook 
to political participation? 
- Political engagement and its measures (i.e., political interest, political 
knowledge, internal and external political efficacy, and partisanship) 
demonstrated important links with political participation in general and, 
consequently, also with political participation carried out through Facebook.  
- In both samples political interest was the measure displaying the largest 
correlations with Facebook political participation. Qualitative data also 
confirmed that politically interested individuals tend to be the ones who 
employ Facebook the most for political purposes.  
- Political knowledge, internal and external political efficacy appeared also to 
mediate the contributions of Facebook to political participation. Among 
these three measures, interviews indicated political knowledge as the most 
relevant one (i.e., virtuous circle). 
- Partisanship also emerged as highly relevant to political participation on 
Facebook. While quantitative data suggested that this measure was more 
relevant to the IS, the qualitative data indicated that a strong affiliation to a 
political party strongly affected the usage of Facebook for political 
participation, for both IPs and BPs.  
- The data did not offer a clear picture on how the affiliation to specific 
political parties can impact on political participation on Facebook. It seemed 
that, rather than the alliance to a specific political party, it is the degree of 
such an affiliation that matters the most. The only notable exception was 
found in relation to an Italian participant affiliated to the M5S, a party whose 
members employ Facebook to a great extent for communication and 
organisation purposes.  
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 RQ 3.3: How do the time spent on Facebook, the relevance of this SNS in 
people’s lives, Facebook non-political activity and different non-political usage 
practices (information vs communication vs social recreation) mediate the 
contributions of this SNS to political participation? 
- Both samples perceived Facebook as highly relevant to them. While BPs 
often used Facebook in conjunction with other online platforms such as 
Twitter, for IPs Facebook was the dominant Internet tool for both political 
and non-political activities. This finding could explain, in part, IPs’ higher 
levels of political participation on Facebook 
- The non-political usages of Facebook varied greatly from user to user. 
Facebook appeared to be an all-encompassing platform allowing participants 
to engage in a wide array of activities, ranging from communication and 
entertainment to information and work related activities. 
- Rather than the ways people used this SNS, it seemed that it was the time 
spent on it in general, and the levels of participation in non-political 
activities, that contributed the most to political participation. By simply 
being on Facebook users can be exposed, often accidentally, to political 
information through the News Feed. This accidental absorption of political 
information can eventually lead to participation in other political activities. 
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6 DISCUSSION 
This research examines the contributions of Facebook to citizens’ political participation in 
Italy and the United Kingdom. It is an exploratory study which aims to add to the existing 
academic debates on the links between digital technologies and political participation, and to 
indicate new avenues for the development of this strand of research.  
This chapter is organised in seven main sections and offers a discussion of the findings 
produced in the quantitative and qualitative phases of the present investigation. The first two 
sections highlight the value of adopting a cross-national comparative approach and identify 
contextual factors which impact upon the relationship between Facebook and political 
participation. The first section examines the ways in which different media and political 
landscapes can influence citizens’ media habits and affect the contributions of digital 
technologies to political participation. The second section focuses on the ways in which 
privacy concerns and self-presentation on Facebook affect political activities carried out on 
this online platform, and how the influence of these concerns varies in the two considered 
samples.  
While the first two sections discuss how political participation on Facebook can be affected 
by factors typical of the British and Italian contexts, the next sections work towards devising 
a general theory of Facebook political participation. The third section deals with the alleged 
tendency of digital media (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3) to promote political fragmentation and 
polarisation, and makes the argument that Facebook can potentially counteract such trends. 
The fourth section explores the process of political participation in the Facebook 
environment and the capacity that this SNS has to promote what can be described as 
information-led mobilisation. The fifth section draws attention to the limits of Facebook as a 
political platform and to its links with the offline world, and asserts that in such a setting new 
and old media logics and practices blend and compete. Taking into consideration the 
previous sections and chapters, an explanatory model focusing specifically on Facebook 
political participation is developed in the sixth section. Finally, in the seventh section the 
limitations of the present research are discussed and fruitful avenues for further research 
indicated. 
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6.1 Contextual Factors and Political Participation: Media and Political 
Landscapes in Italy and the UK   
In this and the next section the differences between the BS and IS in terms of political 
participation are considered, revealing the value of adopting a comparative cross-national 
approach. The previous chapter showed that IPs were more politically active than BPs on 
Facebook, particularly with regards to the consumption of political information. The same 
applies to the Internet and the offline world, but in these two channels the differences 
between the samples were less marked. This section considers how such a participatory gap 
could be in part ascribed to contextual factors specific to Italy and the UK. In Digital Media 
and Political Engagement Worldwide, Anduiza et al. (2012) stress that “online practices do 
not exist in a vacuum but are related and linked to institutional contexts, levels of 
technological development, and extant political practices and orientations” (p. 245). Anduiza 
et al. (2012) identify three contextual variables expected to mediate the relationship between 
digital media and political participation: the digital divide, the media system, and the 
institutional setting. The present research reaches a similar conclusion independently of the 
above work and attests to the relevance of such variables also for Facebook political 
participation. The thematic analysis of the interviews indicated in fact that the media 
landscapes of Italy and UK, and the diverse political settings of these two countries, could 
explain to a certain extent the participatory gap between the samples. 
With respect to the media scenarios, results clearly showed that Facebook was the most 
commonly used online political platform in the IS. In contrast, BPs’ online political activity 
was more fragmented, with other platforms such as Twitter used in conjunction or instead of 
Facebook (see Section 5.1.1). These usage patterns are confirmed by data on the penetration 
of Twitter in the British and Italian online populations. As shown in a 2013 study of 
PeerReach, an Amsterdam based social media start-up that provides influence metrics, 
Twitter has a much higher penetration in the UK (12% of all Internet users) than it has in 
Italy (5% of all Internet users). These figures are supported by Cremonesi et al.’s (2014) 
recent study which, comparing Facebook and Twitter, finds that far fewer Italians use 
Twitter for political purposes. 
Another factor worth considering which relates to the media landscapes of Italy and the UK 
is the impact that a participant’s perception of traditional media, particularly of TV, could 
have on her/his political usage of Facebook. Results indicated that IPs were much more 
critical of traditional media than BPs due to the ties these media have with the political 
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establishment (see Section 5.2.2). As indicated by the data, this negative perception pushed 
some IPs to seek out alternative political information sources, including Facebook. In 
support of this argument, several studies establish that alternative media usage is driven by 
pre-existing political attitudes and negative perceptions of mainstream news organisations 
(Christie 2009; Leung and Lee 2014). These studies also indicate that SNSs such as 
Facebook are often employed as alternative information sources, enabling users to bypass 
mainstream media (Leung and Lee 2014; Vicari 2013; Vromen et al. 2015).   
It could be argued that the two samples’ different perceptions of traditional media are shaped 
by the different media systems of Italy and the UK. In their influential book, Comparing 
Media Systems, Hallin and Mancini (2004) differentiate between the Mediterranean or 
Polarised Pluralist model, the North-Central European or Democratic Corporatist model, and 
the North Atlantic or Liberal model (see Political Communication Cultures in Europe, edited 
by Pfetsch – 2014 – and particularly Hardy’s – 2008 – Western Media Systems, for critiques 
of this categorisation). The British media system falls within the latter model which is 
characterised by the professionalisation of journalism, a “fact-centred” reporting style and an 
institutionalised separation between media and political parties. Nonetheless, it is still 
impossible to completely separate the British media from the political establishment, as the 
British press is dominated by political parallelism. In contrast, according to Hallin and 
Mancini (2004), the national public broadcaster, the BBC, combines relative political 
independence with responsiveness to public taste and a public service orientation.  
The Polarised Pluralist model is typical of Southern European countries such as Italy and is 
characterised by close ties between media and the world of politics. In the Mediterranean 
model, media tend to represent the wide range of political forces fighting to make their 
voices heard, rather than operating as watchdogs of the political establishment. The close 
relationship between media and political parties in Mediterranean European countries has 
contributed to the development of a pluralistic media system, in which media outlets often 
operate as collaborators with the political power (Hallin and Mancini 2004). In the case of 
Italy, TV – the medium that IPs criticised the most – is arguably less pluralist than other 
media. This is due to an Italian anomaly, namely Berlusconi’s ownership of the Mediaset 
group, a situation which makes Italy a unique case in Europe. Berlusconi is both leader of 
the centre-right coalition and owner of Mediaset, the main private Italian television 
broadcaster. In addition, given his leadership of the Forza Italia party, he also influences the 
public broadcaster RAI (the institutional structure of RAI – the governing board is formed by 
five members, three representative of the majority and two of the opposition – is to blame for 
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this inconvenience). The highly politicised nature of Italian media is confirmed in numerous 
investigations (Agostini 2012; Ciaglia 2013; de Frutos García 2014; Hanretty 2007, 2010; 
Reporters Without Borders 2003; Spada 2012). Among these, the study by Ciaglia (2013) is 
particularly interesting in the context of the present thesis as it compares the links between 
media and political systems, focusing on the cases of the BBC and RAI. Ciaglia (2013) 
observes that the British government has an important role in electing members of the Trust 
governing the BBC. However, while in Britain there is a process in place to verify the 
professional qualifications of the elected trustees, in Italy the board of directors of RAI is 
elected purely on parliamentary basis (as explained above, the five members of the board are 
comprised of three majority representatives, and two from the opposition) and reflects the 
power balance of the parties in the Italian Parliament. 
Being so strongly influenced by political forces, it would be possible to contend that Italian 
traditional media fall short in their key role, namely providing citizens with information of 
national relevance in order to enable them to effectively participate in the democratic 
process. The limited capacity of the media – in particular of the public broadcaster – to 
adequately inform the Italian public, which would also explain why IPs valued alternative 
stories circulating on Facebook more than BPs, is backed up by a recent cross-national study 
comparing the influence of public and private broadcasters on knowledge of public affairs 
across Britain, Canada, Norway, Italy, Japan and South Korea (Soroka et al. 2013). Soroka et 
al. (2013) find that in the UK people who watch BBC news are more informed about public 
affairs than those who regularly consume news on the leading commercial channel, ITV. In 
contrast, the knowledge gap in Italy between consumers of public and private news is 
minimal. Soroka et al. (2013) hold the view that this could be related to the British and 
Italian media systems and argue that “the institutional framework of the public broadcaster 
influences its mandate to inform and enlighten” (p. 735). Taking into account the levels of 
institutional independence the public broadcaster has from the political process (i.e., de jure 
independence), they reason that “autonomy from everyday politics should serve to enhance 
journalistic objectivity and generally to enable editors and journalists alike to pursue and 
report stories in the manner most consistent with the goals of public broadcasting” (p. 735). 
As also explained by Hallin and Mancini (2004), while the BBC has a high degree of de jure 
independence, RAI is one of the least independent public broadcasters in the countries 
considered in Soroka et al.’s (2013) investigation. Considering these findings, it can be 
reasoned that by failing in their informative role, Italian TV broadcasters (the RAI for the 
reasons presented above, and the Mediaset channels for obvious ownership-related issues) 
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have encouraged Italian citizens to migrate online in order to obtain less biased political 
information.  
The results from the present study therefore suggest that media systems exert a certain 
influence on a population’s political engagement through Facebook and other online 
platforms, whether for issues of government control over the media, lack of trust in media 
institutions, or issues related to media ownership.  In support of these findings, Cantijoch 
(2012) argues that in a country such as Spain, with a similar media system to Italy (de Frutos 
García 2014; Hallin and Mancini 2004), where the public broadcaster is the main source of 
news and the other channels are limited by a public charter, online sources are crucial 
information channels for causes challenging the dominant political establishment. Hussain 
and Howard (2012) show that in Egypt and Pakistan, two countries with strong 
governmental control over the media and low trust in broadcast media, there has been a rise 
in online citizens’ journalism. Similarly, Davis et al. (2009) predict that the political use of 
digital technologies will be greater in countries with relatively fragmented and less trusted 
media systems. This is amplified in the case of Italy, where, due to the Berlusconi anomaly, 
part of the Italian population has migrated to online platforms such as Facebook to obtain 
alternative information. This shift is demonstrated by several studies which find that 
individuals opposing Berlusconi’s political coalition are more inclined to rely on online 
political information and to participate politically through the Internet (Itanes 2008; Vaccari 
2006, 2012). 
Having considered the potential influence of the media systems of Italy and the UK, it is also 
possible that the different political scenarios of the two countries contributed to the 
participatory gap between the samples of this study. In recent years the relevance of online 
platforms, particularly of Facebook, as alternative venues for political participation has 
further increased in Italy, due to the emergence of a new political force, the M5S. Campante 
et al. (2013) confirm that the effects of the Internet on citizens’ political participation can 
change due to the activity of an online grassroots protest movement, as the M5S was in its 
early form, which takes advantage of digital technologies to engage disenchanted and 
demobilised citizens. The M5S developed initially as an online protest movement which 
took advantage of Italians’ disenchantment towards the existing political class and became a 
potent national political force (see Section 1.3). The Internet is the M5S’s major 
organisational and communication tool (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013), with the blog 
beppegrillo.it operating as their main house organ (Tipaldo and Pisciotta 2014). 
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Supporters of this party typically demonstrate high levels of online activity – a trait 
confirmed in the case of Giuliano, an activist involved with the M5S (see Section 5.3.2) – 
and utilise the Internet and Facebook for information and participatory activities more than 
citizens with left-wing orientations, and much more than individuals affiliated to right-wing 
political parties (Cremonesi et al. 2014). Another common characteristic of the grillini (this 
is how the supporters of the M5S are described by Italian media, referencing the leader of 
the movement, Beppe Grillo) is their detachment from and even hostility towards the current 
Italian political class and institutions (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013; Campante et al. 2013; 
Roncaralo 2014). 
The anti-establishment stance of the M5S has been central to the movement’s 
communication strategy; their continuous attacks on professional politicians and established 
parties appealed to Italians’ sense of political disenchantment, attracting a lot of support 
among voters. This pronouncement of political disenchantment among Italian citizens was 
confirmed in the present research – IPs were more critical of their political class than BPs 
were of theirs (see Section 5.2.1) – and is supported by several authors (Almond and Verba 
1963; Curran et al. 2014; Donovan and Onofri 2008; Roncaralo 2014; Sani 1989).  Donovan 
and Onofri (2008) stress that the main trait of Italian political culture today remains to be the 
chronic and long term dissatisfaction with the political system. Similarly, in a recent study 
based on a content analysis of television news and survey in 11 nations, including Italy and 
the UK, Curran et al. (2014) show that there is a widespread political disenchantment across 
the world, with Italy and Japan identified as the two countries in which the highest 
percentage of people believe that voting makes little or no difference.  
Considering Italians’ political disenchantment, Campante et al. (2013) employ the notions of 
voice and exit developed by Hirschman (1970) to analyse the success of the M5S and their 
usage of digital technologies. According to their analysis, citizens particularly dissatisfied 
with mainstream Italian politics have used the Internet as an exit option to express their 
political views, and have voiced their displeasure by casting protest votes. They reason that 
the M5S embodies the potential of digital technologies to transition from exit devices into 
novel sources of voice within mainstream politics (Campante et al. 2013). Focusing on 
Facebook, Barisione et al. (2014) support this consideration and establish that in Italy people 
using Facebook as a political information source are particularly critical of all political 
leaders, while regular viewers of entertainment TV programs display more pro-Berlusconi 
attitudes. These findings support the idea that the Internet plays a central role in supporting 
the activities of alternative and oppositional forces (Papacharissi 2009) by altering the 
  
183 
balance of resources among the various political actors and reducing the costs of information 
and communication so to benefit minor parties, fringe movements and smaller groups 
(Bimber 2003; Norris 2001; van de Donk et al. 2004). In this sense it is possible to talk of 
equalisation. Such a notion refers to the opportunity, offered by digital technologies, for 
outsider and oppositional organisations to compete on level ground with mainstream 
political institutions (Davis et al. 2009).  A prime example of equalisation arises out of two 
relatively recent events in Italy, the V-Day of 2007 and the No B-Day of 2009: two political 
protests against Berlusconi and his coalition which were organised entirely through online 
methods, exemplifying how use of the Internet can overturn the asymmetry in visibility 
between established and oppositional political forces (Vergani 2011). The V-Day and B-Day 
are emblems of online political participation in Italy, effectively marking the dawn of the 
M5S.  
While in Italy a citizen’s political affiliation clearly determines her/his preference of media 
channel(s) (Barisione et al. 2014), it is not possible to identify such an obvious pattern in the 
UK. Focusing on the 2010 British general elections, Gibson et al. (2010) show that Liberal 
Democrat, Green, and UKIP supporters are more politically active online than Labour and 
Conservative supporters, who display very similar levels of involvement to one another. 
However, these discrepancies among supporters of various British parties are not as marked 
as in the Italian case. This is less true for the specific case of Scotland: in the context of the 
2011 election, the SNP and its candidates had the greatest online presence and the largest 
following (Baxter and Marcella, 2013), a trend confirmed in the recent Scottish 
Independence Referendum. Unfortunately, due to the way party affiliation was 
operationalised in the present research, and because no SNP supporters took part in the 
interviews, the links between the affiliation to this party and Facebook political participation 
were not examined in this thesis (see Section 6.7 for a discussion of this issue). On the basis 
of the findings from the present research, it could be argued that, unlike in Italy, the political 
disenchantment in Britain – the presence of which became evident in this thesis (see Section 
5.2.1) and in several other investigations (Donovan and Onofri 2008; Hansard Society 2013, 
2014; Whiteley 2012) – found no outlet in the form of an oppositional political force able to 
compete with more established parties by exploiting the affordances of the Internet. In the 
British political scenario, the 38 Degrees movement is the political entity most similar to the 
M5S and, as shown in the case of Alex, connection with this movement can promote 
Facebook political participation (see Sections 5.1.1 and 5.3.2). However, despite its success 
(as reported by Chadwick – 2013 – in 2012 it had a membership of over 1 million), 38 
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Degrees’ activist base and its impact on the political process cannot be compared to those of 
the M5S. The absence of a political force capable of appealing to the widespread political 
disenchantment, combined with the lower levels of political parallelism in British TV, could 
explain why affiliation to a certain political party in the UK does not affect levels of political 
usage of digital technologies as strongly as in Italy.  
Drawing on the results of the present research and the findings of several academic studies, 
this section has highlighted the presence of three contextual factors mediating the 
contributions of Facebook to political participation and accounting, in part, for IPs’ higher 
levels of political participation through this SNS. The first factor is the different levels of 
usage and relevance of various online platforms in these two countries.  Facebook is by far 
the dominant SNS in Italy, while in the UK other platforms such as Twitter are used in 
combination with or even as replacements for Facebook. The second contextual variable is 
the differences in the media systems of the two countries, the Italian system demonstrating 
higher levels of political parallelism and what can been defined as the Berlusconi anomaly. 
These two elements have led part of the Italian electorate to develop a negative perception of 
mainstream media and to migrate to online platforms such as Facebook in order to obtain 
alternative political information. Finally, the third contextual factor is the presence of a 
political party such as the M5S whose supporters are particularly active online and which 
embodies the political disenchantment towards the political class and establishment, making 
full use of the communicative and organisational affordances of online platforms such as 
Facebook. After careful consideration it is possible to claim that due to these three 
contextual factors Italian Facebook users are more likely than their British counterparts to 
participate politically through this SNS.   
 
6.2 Facebook as Political Front Stage: Privacy, Self-Presentation and 
Political Participation  
The previous section argued that the variation in levels of Facebook political participation 
between samples could be attributed to differences in the media and political scenarios of 
Italy and the UK. Interviews, however, suggested an additional explanation for this 
participatory gap. From the qualitative data it appeared that the privacy concerns of 
Facebook users and the semi-public setting of the site have a varying impact on Facebook 
political participation across the two samples. The presence of Facebook friends with 
contrasting political views to the user in question was a bigger issue for BPs, with network 
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heterogeneity having a stronger restraining effect on  British users’ political participation 
than it did for IPs (see Section 5.1.2). 
To understand the links between political participation, privacy, and the semi-public nature 
of the Facebook environment, it is necessary to consider the purpose and orientation of 
political participation on SNSs. As explained in Section 2.1.1, one of the most influential and 
widely used theorisations of political participation is the one developed by Verba et al. 
(1995). According to such a theorisation, which has been adopted in many studies 
investigating the impact of the Internet on political participation (e.g., Calenda and Meijer 
2009; Dimitrova et al. 2014; Dutta-Bergman and Chung 2005), political participation aims to 
affect governments’ actions and, consequently, is a government-oriented activity. However, 
considering the changes in citizens’ participatory repertoires (i.e., Norris’ – 2002 – 
democratic phoenix) and the rise of lifestyle politics (Bennett 1998) highlighted in Section 
1.2, Verba et al.’s (1995) conceptualisation appears too narrow in that it excludes more 
personalised and communicative forms of political participation (e.g., consumption of 
political information, political talk, and political consumerism) which assume a central 
relevance in online platforms such as SNSs. 
SNSs, particularly Facebook, appear in fact to be well suited to this latter type pf 
participation, precisely because they are tools for self-affirmation (Toma and Hancock 
2013), providing individuals with a stage for crafting a self-image and promoting such an 
image beyond intimate circles (van Dijck 2013). Consistent with research on online dating 
(Ellison et al. 2006), Zhao et al. (2008) argue that Facebook-built identities are usually 
neither manifestations of the true selves commonly seen in anonymous online environments, 
or of the real selves shown face-to-face. Rather they are expressions of hoped-for possible 
selves which are essentially highly socially desirable identities which individuals aspire to 
have (Zhao et al. 2008).  
Political acts on this SNS (e.g., liking a page or a link, joining a group, updating a status, 
etc.) are not necessarily intended to affect government actions or influence other individuals’ 
behaviours, but could rather be interpreted as identity statements. Such a conception is 
shared by several authors (Gustafsson et al. 2008; Macafee 2013; Marichal 2013; Sanford 
and Rose 2007; Ward and de Vreese 2011). For instance, in his research on Facebook 
political groups, Marichal (2013) suggests that Facebook political activity should be 
interpreted more as a discursive performance designed to express an idealised political 
identity, and less as an action or series of actions intending to promote social and political 
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change. Similarly, Gustafsson et al. (2008), focusing on Swedish Facebook users, determine 
that both politically active and non-active participants consider their participation in political 
Facebook groups and other campaign-related activities as a form of semi-public identity 
management. Along the same lines, Macafee (2013) finds that one of the main motivations 
driving young people’s political usage of Facebook is to present themselves to their peers in 
a certain way; the other two main motivations are social engagement and the sharing of 
information. 
Research illustrates that the ways in which individuals employ SNSs are influenced by 
considerations of their privacy and audiences. Livingstone (2008) explains that online 
privacy is undermined by the very nature of SNSs and notes how these online platforms 
display, as standard, personal information that previous generations have regarded as private, 
notably age, politics, income, religion, and sexual preference. As explained in Section 2.3, 
identity management on SNSs is a particularly complex process due to the emergence of 
networked publics which are shaped by the presence of invisible audiences, the formation of 
a collapsed audience, and the blurring of public and private spheres (boyd 2011). In her book 
on the social lives of networked teens, boyd (2014) further stresses that what makes 
impression management on SNSs so complicated is the networked settings where teenagers 
operate. Using these online platforms, self-presentation is constructed through information 
explicitly provided by users, what their friends share, and how other people respond to these 
activities (boyd 2014). To successfully participate on SNSs, users therefore have to take into 
account the ways in which others might interpret their behaviours (Kimmons 2014), and 
subsequently develop a series of disclosure strategies (Vitak 2012). Among the various 
disclosure strategies users can adopt, Sleeper et al. (2013) and Brake (2014) highlight that 
the most common one is self-censorship. This behaviour is consistent with the lowest 
common denominator strategy identified by Hogan (2010), which consists of making 
disclosures that are appropriate for all members of the network (Marwick and boyd 2011; 
Vitak 2012). In the same way, drawing from 40 in-depth interviews with Italian Facebook 
users, Litt (2012) shows that users often implement strategies of content homogenisation so 
as to manage their online presences in ways which are acceptable to most of their contacts.  
The above studies demonstrate that SNS users’ self-presentation and online activities are 
influenced by perceptions of their imagined audiences. The present research indicated that 
this principle also applies to political participation and finds support in several other 
investigations (Gustafsson 2012; Storsul 2014; Thorson 2014; Vromen et al. 2015; 
Weinstein, 2014). Focusing on political talk, Thorson (2014) observes that there is a high 
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level of variation among Facebook users in what is perceived to be acceptable to post. In 
order to preserve one’s reputation and avoid possible offence or misinterpretation, a user 
may engage in protective strategies and endorse a neutral version of politics (Thorson 2014). 
Likewise, concentrating on non-organised respondents, Gustafsson (2012) indicates that on 
Facebook, engagement in politically related activities is often limited by users’ reluctance to 
make their political views known. Weinstein (2014) corroborates these findings in relation to 
a specific group of Facebook users – politically engaged youths – and establishes that while 
most will express their political identity online, a minority of users (20% of the sample) 
refrain from sharing. These users may mask their identities on SNSs due to personal 
concerns about privacy, perceptions of their audiences as uninterested or hostile, and the 
possibility that expressing political opinions online may have unwanted implications in their 
offline lives. Focusing also on politically engaged youths, Vromen et al. (2015) and Storsul 
(2014) produce similar results. The former determine that young activists in the UK are 
sensitive about the public visibility of social media and often use email lists to protect their 
anonymity. Storsul (2014) finds that teenagers’ high awareness of self-representation 
influences how they use Facebook for political purposes. They are careful in selecting which 
groups to join and which causes to support, and try to avoid standing out as very political,  
something that also clearly emerged in the present study (see Section 5.1.2) during the 
interview with Hilary (BP). In this sense, Storsul (2014) confirms the relevance of the lowest 
common denominator strategy also for political participation on SNSs, with teenagers 
perceiving engagement in political debate as particularly risky and only posting things that 
they believe most of their friends will not find offensive.  
In light of these considerations, Goffman’s (1957) dramaturgical approach is a fruitful 
framework through which to examine the dynamics of self-presentation, and how these 
dynamics can affect Facebook political participation. As discussed in Section 2.3, Goffman 
(1959) approaches the issue of self-presentation from a dramaturgical perspective, describing 
the interactions between individuals and their audiences as performance. This performance is 
given on a front stage, as opposed to the back stage which is the place where individuals 
retreat and step out of their role and thus where a more authentic self resides. Such a 
dramaturgical approach emphasises the dichotomy between the public and the private. The 
private refers to the realm of personal intimacy, to something hidden or withdrawn, while the 
public constitutes what is open, revealed, or accessible (Slater 1998; Weintraub 1997). 
Goffman’s (1959) original approach focuses on face-to-face situations, in which interaction 
is considered “the reciprocal influence of individuals upon one another’s actions when in one 
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another’s immediate physical presence” (p. 26). Focusing on TV, Meyrowitz (1985) applies 
Goffman’s model to electronic broadcasting media and, considering  the blurring of the 
public/private boundaries caused by the diffusion of electronic media, updates the model by 
adding a middle region which “contains elements of both the former onstage and offstage 
behaviour, but lacks their extremes” (p. 78). This middle region, however, is not applicable 
to Facebook where the front stage is magnified, leading to a hyper-ritualisation. The concept 
of hyper-ritualisation is developed in Goffman’s (1979) later work when he examines the 
representation of gender in magazine advertisements in which, he explains, an editing of real 
life and an exaggeration of its rituals occurs. Similarly, Aspling (2011) contends that 
Facebook activity is concerned with staging a successful character through performances 
that exaggerate Goffman’s model. Aspling (2011) argues that Facebook users operate on a 
front stage that covers a variety of social relations and is even more public and intensified 
than the Goffmanian front stage. For these reasons Facebook users are controlled in their 
behaviour, careful to portray only the most successful and interesting sides of their lives 
(Aspling 2011). In this sense, Madden and Smith (2010) show that in order to craft their 
hoped-for online personas, Facebook users adopt a set of counter-measures such as un-
tagging photos or deleting wall posts that might place them in a negative light so to make 
sure that the presentation is balanced the way they want it to be. In his study on political 
Facebook groups, Marichal (2013) develops a similar argument and describes Facebook as a 
digital front stage. He asserts that in the Facebook nonymous (as opposed to anonymous) 
environment, users seek to construct idealised political identities and employ Facebook 
groups for expressive political performance. 
Facebook can therefore be considered a digital front stage, where self-presentation is crucial. 
In their quest for acceptance and popularity, Facebook users craft their identities so as to 
appeal to their social network. Despite living in an era in which freedom of expression is 
highly valued, SNS users resort to various tactics including self-censorship in order to stage 
a successful character. Qualitative data from the present research suggested that the 
composition of a user’s social network plays a key role in the likelihood of an individual 
engaging in protective self-presentation, a type of self-presentation aimed at avoiding 
disapproval (Arkin 1981). This can clearly be seen in the interviews with Hilary and Callum 
who both attributed their lack of political participation on Facebook to the presence of 
people with contrasting political beliefs in their Facebook networks (see Section 5.1.2). The 
links between network composition and political participation are highlighted by numerous 
authors. Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) speak of cross-pressures restraining political engagement, 
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and several studies find that exposure to opposing political opinions can inhibit participation 
(Dilliplane 2011; Hayes et al. 2006; Knobloch-Westerwick and Johnson 2014; Matthes 
2012; Moy et al. 2001; Mutz 2002; 2006; Visser and Mirabile 2004). Some authors explain 
these links with reference to the theory of selective exposure presented in Section 3.2. For 
instance, Hayes et al. (2006), Mutz (2002, 2006) and Visser and Mirabile (2004) reason that 
the exposure to opposing political opinions can lead to psychological ambivalence and 
decrease expression of political opinion and participation. Mutz (2006) associates the 
exposure to contrasting political ideas, which she names cross-cutting exposure, to the 
heterogeneity of the discussion network. She argues that in cross-cutting networks people 
tend to withdraw from political activity, not only because of political ambivalence but also 
so as not to endanger social relationships (Mutz 2006). 
Regarding the specific case of SNSs, Rui and Stefanone (2013) demonstrate a positive 
association between audience diversity and protective self-presentation. Grevet et al. (2014) 
investigate political disagreements on Facebook among politically engaged users, 
determining that participants who perceive more variety among their friends participate less 
than those perceiving more homogeneity. Similarly, Vraga et al. (2015) examine how 
individual predispositions, perceptions of the Facebook political climate, and network 
characteristics influence the posting of political content on Facebook. Their results suggest 
that predispositions like political interest and conflict avoidance impact on users’ perception 
of the political climate and the potential for contentious political disagreement that influence 
willingness to post about politics.  
Particularly relevant to the present study is Kwon et al.’s (2014) article which applies 
Noelle-Neumann’s Spiral of Silence theory to SNSs. In her study on public opinion 
formation, German political scientist Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann (1974) develops the Spiral 
of Silence theory. The core tenet of this theory is that people are inclined towards social 
conformity when expressing their opinions. People form impressions of the distribution of 
opinions through media messages and interpersonal encounters. When they think they are in 
the minority, they tend to avoid isolation by keeping their opinions to themselves and 
aligning to observed standards.  In this sense, public opinion can be conceived of as the 
product of individual opinions selectively expressed as a response to perceived social 
consensus (Noelle-Neumann 1974, 1993). Kwon et al. (2014) establish that exposure to 
diverse opinions on SNSs is positively associated with self-censorship of political expression 
and explain this association though the Spiral of Silence theory. They argue that three 
elements typical of SNSs – reduced privacy, integration of multiple social contexts, and 
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increase in exposure to different opinions – affect users’ willingness to express political 
opinions. Furthermore, they contend that the effects of these three elements are contingent 
upon users’ perceptions of the level of private-ness of communication offered by the 
technology (Kwon et al. 2014). Their arguments find support in Hampton et al.’s (2014) 
recent study for the Pew Research Center. Hampton et al. (2014) examine the potential of 
social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter to operate as alternative discussion venues 
for individuals holding minority views in relation to the Snowden leaks, also considering the 
willingness of users to talk about the leaks in various face-to-face and online settings. Their 
study shows that people were less willing to discuss the Snowden revelations on social 
media than they were in person and, in line with the Spiral of Silence theory, that in both 
settings participants were more likely to voice their opinion if they perceived that their 
audience shared their views (Hampton et al. 2014).  
However, scholars have not reached an agreement concerning the restraining effect of 
network heterogeneity on political participation, with several studies also finding positive 
links between political heterogeneity, political participation and knowledge (Bae 2013; Ikeda 
and Boase 2012; Kwak et al. 2005; Scheufele et al. 2004, 2006). Similarly, in the present 
research, the network heterogeneity associated with the semi-public nature of Facebook did 
not limit all participants’ political participation on Facebook. In particular, the likelihood of 
engaging in protective self-presentation on Facebook appeared to vary in the two considered 
samples. BPs were more likely to be affected by network heterogeneity and to limit their 
political participation on Facebook due to the presence of certain people within their network 
(see Section 5.1.2). However, caution is required before attributing the varying impact of the 
semi-public nature of Facebook on political participation to national factors. The previous 
section discussed the ways in which the differences between the samples’ political 
participation on Facebook can be linked to the diverse media and political scenarios of Italy 
and the UK. It was possible to develop such an argument given the presence of a great deal 
of research dealing with these issues. In contrast, there is a substantial lack of studies 
examining privacy and self-presentation from a cross-national perspective (see Section 6.7). 
As such, the findings in this study could simply be peculiar to the two selected samples, 
rather than linked to characteristics of British and Italian cultures.  
This section has highlighted the relevance of self-presentation in relation to Facebook 
political participation. The present investigation indicated that privacy concerns and the 
semi-public nature of Facebook had a varying impact on the samples’ political participation. 
In order to explain this outcome, the purpose and orientation of political participation on 
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SNSs were considered. In this sense, it appears that political participation in the Facebook 
environment does not necessarily aim to influence governments or other citizens, but can 
also be interpreted as a form of identity-management. Facebook can be described as a 
political front stage where users engage in elaborate performances to express idealised 
political identities. To this end, considerations about audiences are paramount and 
individuals often resort to protective strategies such as self-censorship in order to preserve 
their images. According to the findings of this study, the presence of friends holding 
contrasting political views can limit a person’s political participation. This occurred 
particularly in the BS. In the previous section the differences between the samples’ levels of 
political participation were, in part, attributed to contextual factors (i.e., media and political 
scenarios) characterising Italy and the UK. Here, the participatory gap has been explained 
with the fact that the semi-public nature of Facebook and network political heterogeneity 
produced a stronger restraining effect on BPs’ political participation. 
 
6.3 Facebook as a Potential Antidote against Political Fragmentation and 
Polarisation 
In the two previous sections, differences in the samples’ scores have been considered and 
contextual factors mediating the contributions of Facebook to political participation 
identified. This and the next section move away from the emic dimension and adopt a more 
etic approach (see Section 4.2 for an explanation of the emic-etic distinction). In doing so, 
they discuss results that are common to both samples and work towards the development of a 
more general theory of Facebook political participation.  
This section focuses in particular on one of the main criticisms levelled against digital 
media, namely their potential to encourage political fragmentation and polarisation (Bennett 
and Iyengar 2008; Habermas 2006; Polat 2005; Sunstein 2001; Tewksbury and Rittenberg 
2009). As highlighted in Section 3.2, this possible limitation of digital technologies has been 
explained with reference to their alleged tendency to foster selective exposure. Research has, 
however, produced contrasting evidence in this regard, with some studies confirming that the 
Internet and SNSs increasingly expose individuals to pro-attitudinal perspectives (Adamic 
and Glance 2005; Bimber and Davis 2003; Kushin and Kitchener 2009; Meyer 2012; Nie et 
al. 2010; Stroud 2008) and others establishing that these technologies can promote the 
exposure to political difference (An et al. 2011; Bae 2013; Halpern and Gibbs 2013; 
  
192 
Hermida et al. 2011; Kim 2011; Kushin and Kitchener 2009; Lee at al. 2014; Messing and 
Westwood 2012; Mitchell et al. 2013; Vickery 2009).  
In line with Weeks and Holbert’s study (2013), the present investigation provided elements 
in support of both stances and found that Facebook users are exposed to both consonant and 
dissonant political information (see Section 5.2.2). Results suggested that the likelihood of 
encountering political difference is strictly linked to the ways Facebook users obtain 
information: when participants actively search for and select political information, they often 
end up consuming content which reinforces their political views, while when the 
consumption is accidental, the possibility of being exposed to political difference increases.  
In accordance with this finding, research highlights that the circulation of information on 
SNSs can occur through either voluntary or accidental mechanisms, with users proactively 
selecting the information by following or visiting pages/profiles of news broadcasters, or 
accidentally stumbling upon content shared by their network while navigating a SNS (Barker 
et al. 2013; Leung and Lee 2014; Weeks and Holbert 2013). Among the various Internet 
tools, users of SNSs appear to be particularly prone to accidental exposure (Baresch et al. 
2011; Chadwick 2012). In this sense, Lerman and Ghosh (2010) analyse the mechanisms of 
news diffusion on SNSs and speak of information contagion. By means of sharing, liking 
and retweeting, accidental exposure to information can easily occur, as individuals do not 
always choose what to consume, often accepting information which is presented to them by 
others (Chadwick 2012). Considering such dynamics, SNS users could therefore bypass 
selective exposure which relies on the active role of the audience (Dutta-Bergman and 
Chung 2005) and encounter political difference. Focusing on the case of Facebook, Kushin 
and Kitchener (2009) support this theory and argue that the push feature of this SNS may 
increase the exposure to contrasting viewpoints, leading eventually to discussion among 
opposing parties. This position is shared by Halpern and Gibbs (2013), who highlight how 
Facebook can expand the information flow, with posts reaching not only the intended 
audience but also the poster’s broader social network and friends of friends, enabling the 
development of discussions involving more diverse viewpoints. The present research 
confirmed these findings and indicated that the News Feed plays a central role in this process 
by assuming a broadcasting function and disseminating information to which users are often 
exposed accidentally.  
It is evident, as also noted by Pedroni et al. (2014), that dynamics surprisingly consistent 
with mass media models in terms of passivity, content production and content consumption 
apply to Facebook (this issue is further addressed in Section 6.5). As is customary with 
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traditional (i.e., push) media, Facebook users can passively consume information posted by 
their contacts (i.e., friends and pages they follow) through the News Feed. However, they 
can  also choose to follow a certain page or news outlet, in this way making a conscious 
choice and operating proactively, a distinctive element of new (i.e., pull) media audiences 
(see Section 2.2, p. 25, for a distinction between push and pull media). These dynamics are 
congruent with Tewksbury and Rittenberg’s (2012) analysis of the process behind the online 
consumption of news and political information which is described by them as a multistep 
process.  
As previously touched upon, when users actively search for and select political information, 
usually it will be content which reinforces their current viewpoints. Whereas, when users 
accidentally stumble upon and consume information that they did not necessarily seek out, 
they are far more likely to be exposed to political difference. Nonetheless, it must be noted 
that the results showed that active selection of information does not automatically lead to 
selective exposure, with individuals who display high levels of political interest and 
partisanship searching occasionally for politically-diverse information (see Antonio’s quote 
at p. 140). Johnson and Kaye (2013b) confirm this possibility and find that deliberate 
exposure to political difference could be driven by a genuine interest in knowing both sides 
of an issue or by the desire to obtain ammunition to use against the opposing side. These 
findings are supported by Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng (2009), who establish that, while 
attitude-consistent exposure dominates online, the selection of counter-attitudinal 
information is more likely among participants with greater interest in politics and stronger 
party preference, and by Knobloch-Westerwick and Johnson (2014), who determine that 
greater political interest increases online news use which, in turn, reduces selective exposure 
to attitude-consistent news. 
Active selection of information therefore does not necessarily result in selective exposure. 
Similarly, accidental exposure does not guarantee on its own the access to counter-attitudinal 
political information. Results showed that in order to obtain politically diverse information 
through the accidental route, and to bypass selective exposure, a politically interested and 
politically-heterogeneous network of contacts is required (see Section 5.2.2). The relevance 
of the Facebook network for the information gathering process is stressed by several authors 
such as Vickery (2009), Lampe et al. (2012), and Lee et al. (2014). The first states that the 
level of political involvement of one’s network strongly influences the degree of exposure to 
political information, while Lampe et al. (2012) claim that users with larger and more 
diverse networks will most likely obtain less redundant information. Along the same lines, 
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Lee et al. (2014) emphasise that SNS usage is positively associated with network 
heterogeneity which leads, in turn, to the consumption of non-consonant political 
information. The findings of the present research regarding the differences between 
Facebook, Internet and offline political discussion (see Section 5.2.3) and the proliferation of 
information sources (see Section 5.2.2) support these assertions. As discussed in Section 2.3, 
one of the greatest affordances of SNSs, which can be described as social supernets (Donath 
and boyd 2004), is precisely that of facilitating relationship maintenance, enabling users to 
keep up with larger networks than would be possible in the offline world  (Donath and boyd 
2004; Ellison et al. 2011; Hampton et al. 2011). In line with Ellison et al.’s (2011) 
considerations, the ability of SNSs to enlarge individuals’ social networks has important 
consequences as it can expose users to more diverse weak ties and expand the range of 
available information sources (see Granovetter – 1973 – for an account of the impact of 
weak ties on the diffusion of information). Therefore, it would be plausible to contend that 
the expansion and diversification of users’ social networks made possible by Facebook can 
promote cross-cutting discussion and the consumption of politically diverse information. 
Nonetheless, the results from the present research demonstrated that the presence of a 
diverse, politically heterogeneous network of contacts is not in itself enough to guarantee 
exposure to political difference. Due to the EdgeRank algorithm which regulates the flux of 
information appearing on users’ News Feeds, interaction with a diverse range of contacts 
would also be required, and thus lack of interaction, or interaction with limited audiences, 
can possibly lead to selective exposure (see Callum’s quote at p. 241). 
Taking into account the findings discussed above, the Dual Routes of Exposure Model (see 
Figure 25) is developed. According to this model, exposure to political information can 
occur on this SNS through two routes: the direct route and the accidental route. In the direct 
route users have control over the flow of information and actively select information 
according to personal preferences, interests and habits, thus allowing selective exposure to 
take place. The direct route, however, does not guarantee selective exposure, as users may 
purposefully consume politically diverse information. In the present research, interviews 
suggested that this latter scenario is most likely to occur for individuals with high levels of 
political interest and/or partisanship. 
In the accidental route, users are passively and inadvertently exposed to information. 
Similarly to the direct route, this can lead to exposure to both reinforcing and counter-
attitudinal content. The former can occur if users interact exclusively with politically 
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uninterested or politically contiguous contacts. Conversely, in the presence of a politically 
interested and politically heterogeneous network, Facebook users may bypass selective 
exposure and acquire counter-attitudinal political information.  
Figure 25 – Facebook and Selective Exposure: The Dual Routes of Exposure Model 
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The present study therefore contributes to the strand of research investigating the 
relationship between the Internet and the phenomenon of selective exposure. Focusing on the 
case of Facebook, it provides evidence in support of Brundidge’s (2010) inadvertency thesis. 
In the Facebook environment the diffusion of information is both an intentional and 
incidental process, and users may be inadvertently exposed to political difference. Through 
what has been labelled by Lerman and Ghosh (2010) as information contagion, users are 
presented with new opportunities to expand their discussion and information networks, thus 
making these networks more heterogeneous. As a result, the tendency of Internet users to 
operate in echo-chambers, where they interact only with like-minded individuals (Sunstein 
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2001), is somewhat counteracted on Facebook, a platform which can operate as a potential 
antidote against political fragmentation and polarisation. However, caution is advisable in 
this line of argument, as Facebook is not immune to selective exposure. Accidental exposure 
to counter-attitudinal perspectives is, in fact, only a component of the information 
consumption process, with most users still consuming political information which is 
continuous with their own views and engaging in discussion with like-minded individuals. 
 
6.4 Political Participation in the Facebook Era: Information-Led 
Mobilisation  
The previous section has shown that by operating as a broadcasting platform abiding 
partially by dynamics characterising traditional mass media, Facebook can limit selective 
exposure and counteract, in part, political fragmentation and polarisation. The broadcasting 
features of this SNS, as will appear later in this section, also affect its capacity to contribute 
to the political participation of citizens with limited levels of political engagement and 
participation. Section 3.1 indicated that research in relation to this issue has produced 
contrasting evidence and generated an intense academic debate. Some scholars stress that the 
Internet and SNSs can mobilise new audiences and generate new forms of participation (i.e., 
optimists), while others minimise their mobilising power, emphasising their tendency to 
reinforce existing participatory trends (i.e., normalisers), or highlighting their limited or even 
negative influence on political participation (i.e., pessimists). This thesis contributes to such 
a debate and establishes that the contributions of Facebook to political participation vary in 
relation to pre-existing levels of political participation and engagement, and the considered 
types of political activity (i.e., communication vs mobilisation). 
Quantitative and qualitative results indeed revealed that these two issues are strictly inter-
related, suggesting that politically active individuals are the ones who take more advantage 
of the mobilisation affordances of Facebook (see Section 5.2.1), whereas less politically 
active participants employ this SNS mainly as a communicative and informative political 
tool. From the interviews it appeared that, by becoming so deeply embedded in people’s 
daily habits, Facebook has emerged as an important political communication channel. In 
contrast, its contributions to more resource-expensive activities (i.e., political mobilisation) 
tend to be limited to politically active citizens. The value of these findings is confirmed by 
several investigations which consider the multidimensionality of political participation (see 
Section 4.1). For instance, Kavanaugh et al. (2008) establish that citizens with medium/low 
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levels of political engagement participate much less than politically active citizens in online 
formal political activities such as contacting public officials or donating to campaigns. 
However, both groups show similar levels of participation with regards to news consumption 
and political discussion. A similar picture also emerges in relation to SNSs by combining the 
investigations of Storsul (2014) and Vitak et al. (2011). Storsurl (2014) reveals that these 
platforms are crucial for organising and coordinating political activities, while Vitak et al. 
(2011) show that young people engage on Facebook mostly in activities falling within the 
communication dimension of political participation, such as expressing political opinions. 
Such an inconsistency can be explained by the fact that Storsul (2014) focuses on politically 
active youths, while Vitak et al. (2011) concentrate on young people in general. In line with 
the results of this thesis, these findings suggest that these two different groups may use SNSs 
in different ways: the former taking advantage of the mobilisation affordances of these 
online platforms, the latter limiting their participation to communication-related activities. 
Hence it appears that the main contribution of Facebook to political participation, in 
particular with regards to individuals who do not fall within the activist group, is within the 
political communication dimension. Research confirms the relevance of SNSs as political 
discussion platforms (Kushin and Kitchener 2009; Mascaro and Goggins 2011; Roberts and 
Andersen 2009) and political information sources (Baresch et al. 2011; Hermida et al. 2011; 
Messing and Westwood 2012; Mitchell et al. 2013; Rainie and Smith 2012; Rainie et al. 
2012; Vickery 2009; Weeks and Holbert 2013). However, the fact that Facebook tends to 
contribute mainly to the communication dimension of political participation does not have to 
be undervalued and perceived as a limitation. Numerous studies, in fact, emphasise the links 
between political communication on SNSs and other forms of political participation 
(including offline participation), with consumption of political information often propelling 
such a shift from one mode of engagement to another (Cantijoch et al. 2013; Copeland and 
Bimber 2015; Della Porta 2012; Enjolras et al. 2012; Gustafsson 2012; Hamilton and Tolbert 
2012; Hargittai and Shaw 2013; Rojas and Puig-i-Abril 2009; Towner 2013; Yamamoto et 
al. 2013). The present research establishes that, through either direct selection or accidental 
exposure (see previous section), Facebook can contribute to the diffusion of political 
information and potentially activate a virtuous circle, resulting in what could be described as 
information-led mobilisation. The notion of the virtuous circle is introduced by Norris 
(2000) who, with reference to political communication, speaks of “a ratcheting process that 
over the long term gradually reinforces the activism of the active” (p. 309). The findings of 
this thesis suggest that the virtuous circle goes beyond politically active individuals, 
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applying also to less politically engaged users. This is exemplified in the case of Hazel 
whose political interest was stirred by the information she obtained on Facebook and whose 
political participation originated on this SNS and subsequently was transferred to other 
channels (see her quote at p. 121). 
In relation to the mobilisation dimension, the present research shows that Facebook is a key 
tool for activists in that, as confirmed in numerous investigations (Khamis and Vaughn 2012; 
Obar et al. 2012; Storsul 2014; Theocharis 2011; Tufekci and Wilson 2012; Valenzuela et al. 
2012; Vromen et al. 2015; Warren et al. 2014), it can aid their mobilisation efforts by 
offering additional venues of participation, facilitating the organisation and promotion of 
political initiatives, and enlarging their political networks (see Section 5.2.1). Interviewed 
activists remarked that mobilisation on Facebook often does not derive from traditional 
political institutions such as parties or trade unions, and is more grassroots and single-issue 
in nature. These findings gain support in Bimber (1998), Anduiza et al. (2009), and Davis et 
al. (2009), who highlight that protest networks and single-issue campaigns have benefited 
more than traditional political institutions from digital technologies. In addition, these results 
are congruent with Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012) logic of connective action according to 
which action is based on personalised frames and the sharing of information through 
personal networks, and Castells’ (2012) culture of autonomy, in which individuals define 
their actions according to their values and interests, independently from the institutions of 
society.  
Irrespective of the agents of mobilisation, the present investigation establishes that 
individuals’ political interest remains crucial in triggering participation. This study therefore 
provides strong support to the normalisers’ stance and suggests that, as a political platform, 
Facebook aids mostly individuals who are already politically active. Similarly to the 
tendency of Facebook to support mainly political communication activities in the cases of 
less politically active users, this finding should not be perceived in a negative light, as it is 
by the advocates of the rich-get-richer hypothesis (see Section 3.1). In fact, the activities of 
political activists can have an indirect effect on less politically engaged individuals, in turn 
encouraging their participation. Focusing on the 2005 British election, Curtice and Norris 
(2008) acknowledge that political activists may be the only ones taking advantage of the 
political affordances of digital technologies, but also reason that these activists may then 
disseminate political information more widely, even reaching less engaged voters. Similar 
findings are produced by Vaccari et al. (2013), who analysed Twitter discussions during the 
Italian 2013 general election, confirming the connection between online discussion and 
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offline participation. They indicate that consuming political information and engaging in 
discussion online affect face-to-face political discussion directly, impacting on those citizens 
who engage politically online, and also through a more indirect route, in that highly 
politically interested individuals can spread the messages encountered online to their offline 
personal networks (Vaccari et al. 2013). These results tie in with Graham and Wright’s 
(2014) analysis of superparticipation in online political discussion, with superparticipants 
undertaking a range of positive functions such as helping other users, replying to debates, 
and summarising longer threads for new discussants (see Section 3.3). The findings of these 
studies confirm the value of Katz and Lazarfield’s (1955) Two-Step Flow of Communication 
Model which, in contrast with the linear models of communication such as Shannon and 
Weaver’s (1949) Mathematical Theory of Communication and Berlo’s (1960) Sender-
Message-Channel-Receiver Model of human communication, highlights the role of 
interpersonal relations and opinion leaders in mediating the effects of mass media on 
individuals. 
The present research demonstrates that such an indirect effect can occur also on Facebook, 
with the broadcasting affordances of this SNS playing a crucial role in this instance. As 
shown, for example, in the case of Helen (see her quote at p. 121), by exposing its users to 
other contacts’ political activities through the News Feed, Facebook can encourage political 
interest and lead to the participation of less politically active users. In order to activate this 
process, a minimum level of political interest seems, nonetheless, to be required (see Section 
5.1.2). The links between accidental exposure to information and political participation are 
highlighted in several studies. Cho and Rudolph (2008) observe that political participation is 
geographically clustered. They contend that this clustering cannot be explained solely by 
individuals’ active involvement in social networks and highlight the importance of casual 
observation (i.e., witnessing the activity of geographically contiguous individuals can lead to 
participation). Similarly, Bond et al. (2012), focusing specifically on Facebook, Morris and 
Morris (2013), and Copeland and Bimber (2015) examined political participation during the 
2012 American presidential campaign and show that incidental exposure to political 
information could exert a mobilising influence. Particularly relevant to the findings of the 
present research is Gustafsson’s (2012) investigation. Gustafsson (2012) establishes that 
individuals active in organisations consider Facebook as key channel for intra-organisational 
communication, for obtaining political news and influencing their contacts. On the other 
hand, he finds that many non-organised respondents – even if they do not actively participate 
in political discussions or other political activities themselves – are still affected by other 
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users’ recruitment attempts and the information shared by others (e.g., information about 
initiatives or links posted by friends). These results are consistent with what is described by 
Hamilton and Tolbert (2012) as accidental mobilisation.  
The present study thus backs up the normalisers’ stance, but also provides evidence in 
support of the mobilisation hypothesis, with the mobilisation of less-politically active 
participants occurring as a consequence of their engagement in communication activity (i.e., 
virtuous circle) or endorsed by the actions of politically active individuals (e.g., accidental 
mobilisation). These findings suggest, as noted by several participants (see Section 5.1.2), 
that the greatest political affordance of Facebook is its informative and communicative 
power and its capability to bring politics into people’s day-to-day lives.  According to the 
results, the communicative power of this platform and its consequent mobilisation capacity 
are dependent upon two factors. The first factor is the expansion and diversification of users’ 
networks. As discussed in the previous section, Facebook simplifies the management of a 
larger number of social relationships, and facilitates interactions with users who are 
geographically distant or are not part of one’s network. Due to the expansion of users’ 
networks, a proliferation of political information sources occurs and users can potentially be 
exposed to a greater and more diverse range of recruitment attempts. The second factor is the 
flexibility that this SNS offers to its users who can access their accounts from any location 
and at any time of the day through mobile technologies. Facebook can therefore promote 
political mobilisation by reducing the thresholds of participation, providing more flexibility 
in terms of time and space. This is key for the mobilisation of users who are less politically 
engaged due to lack of resources (e.g., time) or health-related issues. The value of digital 
technologies for this latter category of citizens is highlighted in several studies (Anderberg 
and Jönsson 2005; Cheta 2004; Trevisan 2012, 2013), and was evidenced by the comments 
of Helen, who for health-related reasons could not participate in offline political activities, 
and Tracey, who was involved in campaigns aiming to raise awareness of asthma (p. 131). 
The enhanced flexibility offered by Facebook is not only instrumental to the influx of non-
activists, but it also leads to an increase in activists’ mobilisation efforts, as shown by 
Giuliano’s and Hazel’s quotes (p. 133), findings that confirm the super size effect of SNSs 
on political participation theorised by Earl and Kimport (2011). 
This section has offered an analysis of the political affordances of Facebook, the SNS par 
excellence. It highlighted that Facebook can aid both individuals who already engage in 
politics and less politically active citizens, with the former taking advantage of the 
mobilisation capabilities of this SNS, and the latter employing it mainly as a political 
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communication and informative tool. Activists presented Facebook as a key tool for the 
organisation of political initiatives, enabling them to quickly communicate and coordinate, 
and to operate independently from traditional political institutions such as parties and trade 
unions. In this sense, this SNS emerges as particularly effective in supporting personalised 
action frames and single-issue campaigns. Concerning the contributions of Facebook to 
citizens who engage to a lesser degree in offline and online political activities, the 
informative power of and flexibility offered by this platform come into play. Facebook can 
make participation more flexible in terms of time and place, facilitating for instance 
individuals who do not participate due to lack of time or health-related issues. In addition, 
the presence of a politically active Facebook network can expose users, often accidentally, to 
political information, promoting political interest in the long run and producing a 
mobilisation effect.  
 
6.5 The Relevance of the Offline Dimension and the Merging of New and 
Old Media Logics 
The previous section stressed the ways in which Facebook can promote the circulation of 
political information, and can support mobilisation, aiding not only politically active 
individuals but also citizens demonstrating limited levels of political participation. However, 
to avoid unrealistic and over-optimist predictions, it is also necessary to acknowledge the 
limits and drawbacks of this SNS as a political platform. In this regard, the first issue to be 
considered is the extent of the presence and relevance of politics in the Facebook 
environment. The quantitative phase of this study indicated both samples’ limited levels of 
Facebook political participation, and both quantitative and qualitative data established that 
the non-political usage of Facebook tended to exceed the political one (see Section 5.1.1). 
These findings suggest that Facebook is mostly used for non-political purposes, and confirm 
that political usages of SNSs are often overshadowed by social interaction and entertainment 
(Baumgartner and Morris 2010; Fuchs 2014; Mascheroni 2012). However, as in the 
quantitative phase participants demonstrated low scores not only on Facebook but also on 
the other two considered channels of political participation (i.e., the Internet and the offline 
world), it is possible to hypothesise that two other factors, besides the ones discussed in the 
previous sections, could influence the samples’ limited levels of Facebook political 
participation. The first factor, as highlighted in the interviews, is participants’ political 
disenchantment which limited participants’ political participation, particularly with regards 
to political mobilisation activities (see Section 5.2.1), while the second is the timescale of the 
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data collection. Since, as observed by Wang (2007), most of the studies examining the links 
between the Internet and political participation focus heavily on the campaign environment 
(e.g., Bimber and Davis 2003; Curtice and Norris 2008; Davis et al. 2009; Dimitrova et al. 
2014; Rice et al. 2013), the data collection in the current investigation was consciously 
carried out mostly in non-electoral periods (see Timescale of data collection in Section 
4.4.3). Considering that political activity online, and also offline, fluctuates according to the 
proximity of elections, reaching its peaks in periods immediately prior to elections (Jensen 
and Anduiza 2012; Larson 2014), the choice of this specific timescale could have in part 
impacted on the samples’ levels of political participation. In light of these considerations, on 
the one hand it would be plausible to assume that Facebook is mainly used for non-political 
purposes, but on the other hand it has to be acknowledged that the gap between political and 
non-political usages which surfaced in this thesis will most likely close during electoral 
periods. 
Going back to the limitations of Facebook as a political platform, as stressed in Rachel and 
Mario’s interviews, it clearly emerged in the present research that Facebook is not universal 
(see quotes at pp. 121-122). As shown in Appendix A, Facebook reaches around 50% of the 
British population, while in Italy its penetration is even lower, approximately 40% 
(Socialbakers 2013). In Section 2.2 the notion of digital divide was introduced, referring to 
the gap in access to and usage of digital technologies (van Dijk, 2009). Taking into account 
the gap between Facebook users and the rest of the population who are not on this SNS, it 
would be possible to talk of the presence of a Facebook divide. In this sense van Dijk (2012) 
stresses that modern society is in the process of becoming a network society, but cannot yet 
be considered as such because there are segments of the population that do not have access 
to or that scarcely use digital technologies. Unsurprisingly, several studies focusing on the 
Italian and British contexts show that TV remains the main source of political information, 
principally for older people, with the Internet and SNSs gradually growing in importance, 
particularly for younger people (AGCOM 2013; Chadwick 2013; Cremonesi et al. 2014; 
Dutton and Blank 2013; Gibson et al. 2010; Papathanassopoulos et al. 2013; Scaglioni, and 
Sfardini 2013; Williamson 2010). This trend has been confirmed in the 2015 British general 
election, with the televised debates dominating the political campaign. Among the studies 
reported above, Papathanassopoulos et al.’s (2013) is particularly worth mentioning, as it 
also focuses – among other countries (11 in total) – on Italy and the UK. This study indicates 
that the proportion of people claiming to regularly view television news is higher than that 
applicable to the Internet in 9 out of 11 countries. Italy shows the highest average in terms of 
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TV news consumption, while the exceptions are Norway and South Korea, two countries 
whose populations have widespread access to broadband Internet (Papathanassopoulos et al. 
2013). 
Aside from media habits, the present study suggests another possible reason behind the 
popularity of traditional media as political information sources. Although the relevance of 
SNSs as political information sources is constantly growing, with many users relying on 
political information obtained through these platforms, concerns about the credibility of this 
information surfaced in the interviews, with participants stressing the abundance of bogus 
news on Facebook (see Section 5.2.2). In the same vein, Gangadharbatla et al. (2014) show 
that, despite the fact that young adults prefer to use social media for news gathering, they 
still perceive traditional media as more credible. Likewise, comparing SNSs to eight other 
online information sources (i.e., political blogs, political websites, candidates’ websites, 
candidates’ blogs, YouTube, online broadcast TV news, online cable TV news, and online 
newspapers), Johnson and Kaye (2014) establish that politically interested users rank these 
online platforms as the least credible source. 
In light of the non-universality of Facebook, its questionable credibility as a political 
information source, and the enduring reliance of people on traditional media, considerations 
of the ways in which political organisations, candidates and movements should harness 
Facebook, and online media more generally, are required. This study establishes that 
Facebook can be a valuable campaigning tool but, as presented in Appendix A, the Facebook 
population has very specific characteristics. Hence to develop effective political campaigns, 
political entities have to cater also to those individuals who are not on this SNS. For 
instance, Rachel provided an example of how integration of both new and more traditional 
methods can overcome this usage (often generational) gap. She mentioned the case of 
Friends of Union Terrace Gardens (see p. 121), a Scottish based organisation aiming to 
prevent large scale development in Aberdeen’s Union Terrace Garden. She explained that in 
order to reach its older members, this organisation has combined online communication tools 
(i.e., Facebook page and website) with more traditional methods such as letters. Therefore, 
when activists use Facebook as the only mobilisation platform, they deprive the citizens who 
are not on this SNS of a wealth of information and, consequently, limit their opportunities of 
participation. 
In this sense some of the most politically active participants (e.g., Mario and Francesca) 
stressed that the mobilising force of Facebook seems to depend, at least in part, on its 
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connection with the offline world, with this SNS mainly supporting political entities that 
already exist and operate offline (see quotes at p. 132). Despite his techno-optimism, even 
Castells (2010, 2012) acknowledges that the new social movements which use the Internet as 
their main organisational forum “do not exist only on the Internet [but] also root themselves 
in their local lives, and in face to face interaction” (Castells 2010, p. 11), and can operate as a 
transformative force only by reclaiming urban spaces. Kavada (2010) also stresses that 
online communication does not necessarily lead to durable and effective activists’ networks, 
with regular face-to-face meetings still necessary. Fuchs (2014) is even more categorical 
and, assuming a social deterministic stance, he argues that “there are no Twitter-, Facebook- 
or YouTube- revolutions. Only people who live under certain social conditions and organize 
collectively can make rebellions and revolutions. Technology is, in itself, not a revolution” 
(Fuchs 2014, p. 102).  
The necessity and value of integrating online and offline activities is demonstrated by the 
accomplishments of political movements and parties which have used the online/offline 
inter-relation to their advantage. Hara (2008) highlights that a distinctive advantage of 
MoveOn, a popular US based public policy advocacy and political action group, is its ability 
to bridge online and offline worlds. In Italy, following this example, the M5S built its 
success by combining online activity with an offline presence in public squares, with 
activities on the beppegrillo.it blog and SNSs spreading out to the local/offline level and 
creating opportunities for involvement (Barbieri 2014; Bartlett et al. 2013; Bordignon and 
Ceccarini 2013). Such an interplay between online activism and offline actions was crucial 
also to the Spanish Indignados, who exploited digital platforms such as Facebook for the 
organisation of mass gatherings in the streets (Micóa and Casero-Ripollés 2014).  
The strong connection between the online and offline dimensions of political participation is 
arguably linked to the hybrid nature of today’s media. With reference to the case of the M5S, 
Barisione et al. (2014) stress the hybrid and interconnected nature of contemporary media 
systems, where political actors can obtain coverage and be successful even in arenas where 
they don’t play a direct role (i.e., Grillo in TV). The notion of hybridity in today’s media is 
tackled by Chadwick (2013) in his recent work, Hybrid Media Systems. Taking into account 
the changes in today’s political communication environments due to the diffusion of new 
communication technologies, Chadwick (2013) considers the interaction among political 
actors, media, and publics in the US and the UK, and develops the notion of the hybrid 
media system. The hybrid media system “is built upon interactions among old and new 
media logics – where logics are defined as technologies, genres, norms, behaviors, and 
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organizational forms – in the reflexively connected fields of media and politics” (Chadwick 
2013, p. 4). The hybrid media system is therefore characterised by adaptation and 
interdependence, conflict and competition between newer and older media practices in the 
fields of media and politics. This idea is, in a way, linked to Jenkins’s (2006) notion of 
media convergence, defined as a “flow of content across multiple media platforms” (p. 3), an 
ongoing process that does not lead to the displacement of traditional media but to an 
interaction between different media practices and platforms (Jenkins 2006).  
Chadwick (2013) highlights a series of implications that such a hybridity has on political 
communication, implications that have been confirmed also in the present research. With 
respect to the sphere of political activism, Chadwick (2013) uses as an example the political 
activist movement 38 Degrees which, akin to the M5S or the Indignados, integrates offline 
and online repertoires to its advantage. He observes how new media can aid and fuel 
grassroots activism, but also stresses the ways in which organised parties, candidates’ 
campaigns, and the mass medium of television still dominate politics today. Consequently, 
he maintains that in the hybrid media system there is an asymmetrical interdependence 
between newer and older media logics, which is evident in election campaigning where the 
balance remains skewed towards the latter (Chadwick 2013). 
In relation to the consumption and production of news, Chadwick (2013) notes how in the 
hybrid media system there is a balance between the older logics of transmission and 
reception and the newer logics of circulation, recirculation, and negotiation. Through new 
media, individuals and activist groups can intervene in the news-making process. In this 
sense, it is possible to talk of informational exuberance, namely “the willingness of nonelites 
to contribute to the collective production, reworking, and sharing of media content” 
(Chadwick 2012, p. 40). Yet professional media broadcasters find new opportunities and 
resources online, dominating in this setting as well as offline. The results of the present 
research clearly highlighted such trends, with participants stressing that, despite the 
multiplication of sources and the greater availability of alternative information, content 
produced by established media organisations still monopolises their informational diet (see 
Section 5.2.2). 
Therefore, in today’s political communication environment old and new media logics 
integrate and compete with one another. Considering Altheide and Snow’s (1979) theoretical 
approach to media logics and applying it to social media, Klinger and Svensson (2014) argue 
that these platforms are characterised by a logic which is different to, but also overlaps, that 
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of traditional mass media. As exemplified in the table below, taking into account three sub-
dimensions (i.e., production, distribution and media usage) they distinguish between mass 
media and network media logics. 
Table 20 – Mass Media Logic vs Network Media Logic 
 Mass Media Logic Network Media Logic 
 
Production 
 
Expensive information selection  
and content generation  
by professional journalists  
according to news values 
 
Inexpensive information selection  
and content generation  
by (lay) users according to their 
individual preferences 
 
Distribution 
 
Content selected by  
expert/professional gatekeepers 
 – based on established news values – 
distributed to a paying 
 fixed audience 
 of subscribers 
 
Users are like intermediaries,  
distributing popular content,  
sometimes like a chain letter, within 
networks of like-minded others 
 
Media Usage 
 
Location bound mass audience  
with limited selective exposure 
 oriented towards passive  
consumption of information,  
based on professional selection 
 
Interest-bound and like-minded  
peer networks with highly selective 
exposure oriented towards interaction 
through practices of updating 
Adapted from Klinger and Svensson (2014, p. 6) 
 
With reference to Chadwick’s (2013) notion of the hybrid media system, Klinger and 
Svensson (2014) acknowledge that mass media logic is not becoming obsolete and marginal 
and that it overlaps and interacts with network media logic. On the other hand, they also 
stress that these two logics are distinct and “social media platforms follow other rules of the 
game than traditional mass media” (Klinger and Svensson 2014, p. 11). The findings of this 
thesis advocate for a different interpretation and suggest the rise of a media logic that is 
based on a number of principles exemplary of mass media, to which it adds novel elements 
characteristic of new media. In this sense, rather than speaking of a brand-new media logic, 
it would be more appropriate to talk of an evolved media logic. In their influential article, 
“The End of Mass Communication?”, Chaffee and Metzger (2001) identify three defining 
features of mass communication:  mass production, lack of individual control, and the 
presence of a limited number of available channels. Considering the rise of new media, they 
warn researchers not to apply old models of mass communication to new media because of 
their key differences to traditional ones. Their observations are valid with regards to content 
production and availability of communication channels, but less relevant to the role of the 
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audience: in the new media environment, users are not always in control and the 
communication process is not always a two-way interactive exchange. In this sense, Sections 
6.3 and 6.4 have shown how Facebook users can obtain political information through either 
proactive selection, abiding by dynamics unique to new media, or through accidental 
exposure via the News Feed, in line with the broadcasting model of communication which 
typifies traditional media. Users’ partial lack of control over the information and recruitment 
attempts to which they are exposed, and the consequent effect on their political participation, 
could also explain why it appeared in the present research that Facebook political 
participation is influenced more by the time users spent on it and their levels of participation 
in non-political activities, rather than the different ways people employ this SNS (see Section 
5.3.3). These findings disagree with numerous studies establishing that informational usages 
of digital technologies tend to promote political participation while entertainment related 
usages hinder it (Bakker and de Vreese, 2011; Kim et al., 2013; Rojas and Puig-i-Abril, 
2009; Scheufele and Nisbet, 2002). 
This section began by highlighting the limitations of Facebook, stressing the fact that this 
SNS is not universal and how in Italy and the UK TV remains the main source of political 
information. It then considered the links between Facebook and the offline world and 
suggested that the mobilising force of this platform rests, at least in part, on its connection 
with the offline world, as demonstrated by the success of the M5S and 38 Degrees. In light 
of these considerations, Chadwick’s (2013) notion of the hybrid media system has been 
examined and validated through the findings produced in the present study. Keeping in mind 
this hybridity, the final part of the section reasoned that, with regards to Facebook and online 
platforms more generally, it is not possible to speak of a new media logic, but would be 
more appropriate to talk of an updated or even merged media logic which combines elements 
of both old and new media in terms of content production, consumption and dissemination. 
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6.6 The Particularised Model of Facebook Political Participation 
In Section 2.1.2, various models of political participation were presented: the Social 
Psychological Model, the Rational Choice Model, the General Incentives Model, the 
Mobilisation Model, and the Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM). These models identify a 
number of determinants of political participation: resources, recruitment requests, political 
engagement, social norms, expected benefits, and (selective, outcome, process, and 
ideological) incentives. Furthermore, there are number of other factors such as demographic 
variables (i.e., gender, age, education, and occupation) and media usage, the association of 
which to political participation has been highlighted by research. These factors are not 
directly included in the above models but their impact on political participation can be 
explained employing these models as frameworks (see p. 20).  
Taking into account such models and the findings of the present research, a model of 
Facebook political participation is developed in this section. After considering how the 
contributions of Facebook to political participation vary in the Italian and British contexts, 
the differences among various forms of political participation and Facebook usage practices, 
and the links between Facebook, Internet and offline political participation, six clusters of 
factors affecting Facebook political participation have been identified: resources, recruitment 
requests, political engagement, Facebook usage, contextual factors, and Internet and offline 
political participation. These clusters encompass a number of sub-components (25 in total), 
together forming the Particularised Model of Facebook Political Participation (PMFPP), see 
Figure 26. 
Some of the clusters within the PMFPP have already been identified in previous models of 
political participation. Resources, recruitment requests, and political engagement, for 
instance, form Verba et al.’s (1995) CVM which is arguably the most influential model of 
political participation developed thus far. Resources are identified by Verba et al. (1995) as 
the main component of their model and the present research confirms their relevance with 
respect to political participation on Facebook. For instance, the tendency of both samples to 
engage more often in political communication activities than in mobilisation ones (see 
Section 5.2.1) can be explained through a resource-based approach, with the first type of 
activity easier to engage in because less resource-expensive than the ones falling under the 
mobilisation dimension.………………………………………………………………………
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Figure 26 – The Particularised Model of Facebook Political Participation 
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In the present study, time and digital skills emerged as the most relevant resources for 
participants’ Facebook political participation. The importance of time is evident when 
looking at how Facebook can aid citizens’ political participation, particularly in relation to 
individuals demonstrating low levels of political activity. As highlighted in Section 5.1.2 and 
discussed in Section 6.4, Facebook promotes political participation by making it more 
flexible. Facebook users can access their accounts from any location and at any time of the 
day, a flexibility which can bring politics into users’ day-to-day lives, facilitating more 
political participation. These findings accrue support in Papacharissi (2002) and Hauben and 
Hauben (1997) who, focusing on political discussion, stress that the online medium 
guarantees greater flexibility by allowing users to reach geographically distant interlocutors 
and enabling them to fit political discussions within their daily schedules, and in Gustafsson 
(2012) and Vromen et al. (2015) who concentrate specifically on SNSs, emphasising that 
these platforms can reduce the thresholds of participation, decreasing the costs of 
communication and coordination. 
With regards to the relevance of digital skills for Facebook political participation, the case of 
Kaye (see quote at p. 122) is emblematic and shows, as also highlighted by Borrero et al. 
(2014), Gangadharbatla et al. (2014), and Hargittai and Shaw (2013), how proficiency in the 
usage of digital technologies can positively influence the likelihood of engaging in political 
activities on SNSs. Digital skills are linked to the notion of digital literacy which falls within 
the larger concept of media literacy, namely “the ability to access, analyse, evaluate and 
create messages across a variety of contexts” (Livingstone 2004, p. 3). Digital literacy in 
Gilster’s (1997) original account refers to a set of information skills required on the Internet. 
However, due to changes in the online environment and in today’s society, such a notion has 
evolved, becoming much broader, now encompassing skills relating to the creation and 
sharing of content, as well as users’ expression, interaction and engagement (see Meyers et 
al. – 2014 – for a detailed discussion of digital literacy and the evolution of such a notion).  
Researchers dealing with the issue of the digital divide also stress the links between digital 
skills and the usage (both political and non-political) of online technologies. In this sense, 
Jenkins (2006) argues that the major drawback of media convergence is the participation 
gap. Media convergence encourages users to engage in content production and distribution, 
activities which require access to technologies and specific skills, resulting in the exclusion 
of certain audiences (Jenkins 2006). Similarly, van Dijk (2009) refers to a usage gap and 
finds that experienced users, people with high education, and young users employ online 
applications more than inexperienced users, people with low education, and senior users. 
  
211 
The influence of education on Internet usage has also been established by Bonfadelli (2002), 
who determines that more educated people use the Internet in a more information-oriented 
way, while less educated users are more prone to an entertainment-based use (see Section 4.1 
for an explanation of the differing impact of informational and entertainment uses of the 
Internet on political participation). Congruently, in a recent report for the European 
Commission, Pantea and Martens (2013) show that tertiary education is negatively correlated 
with time spent on leisure websites and positively associated with time spent on service 
websites. In light of these findings, the links found in the present research between age, 
education, occupation and political participation (see Section 5.3.1) could be explained, in 
part, on the basis of differences in digital skills. 
The second component of the CVM and the primary element of another model of political 
participation, the Mobilisation Model (see Section 2.1.2 for literature highlighting the impact 
of the recruitment network on political participation) are recruitment requests, i.e., requests 
to participate politically. As is the case for resources, the present study confirms the 
relevance of recruitment requests for Facebook political participation. As shown in Figure 
26, the amount of recruitment requests to which Facebook users are exposed is linked to the 
size of the Facebook network, the presence of politically active contacts within the network 
and interaction with such contacts. In Section 2.4, it was indicated that Facebook can help in 
the management of a larger number of social relationships. Its infrastructure and features 
facilitate interactions with users who are geographically distant or are not part of one’s 
network, hence expanding users’ recruitment networks, consequently providing individuals 
with more chances to participate. Anduiza et al. (2009) underline the links between online 
recruitment networks and political participation, arguing that the Internet can influence 
mobilisation by exposing citizens to an increased number of appeals to participate and by 
multiplying the number of senders of such appeals. Along the same lines, Kim and Khang 
(2014) apply the CVM to political participation on SNSs, establishing that, among the three 
components of the model, recruitment is the most directly related to political participation. 
Results from the present study are consistent with Anduiza et al.’s (2009) and Kim and 
Khang’s (2014) findings, and show that the main advantage of Facebook in terms of political 
mobilisation is that of exposing individuals to a greater amount of information on political 
initiatives (see Section 5.2.1). Similarly for political discussion, the expansion of the 
discussion network supported by Facebook can lead to more participation (see Section 
5.2.3). The presence of a political network seems particularly important for individuals with 
limited levels of political engagement, as it means they can be accidentally exposed to 
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political information, a process that in the long run can increase political interest and lead to 
political participation (see Section 5.1.2). However, as also discussed in Section 6.3 with 
regards to the exposure to political difference, due to the EdgeRank algorithm the presence 
of a political network is not enough to guarantee exposure to political information, as 
interaction with politically active contacts is also necessary for political stories to appear in 
the News Feed. 
The final component of Verba et al.’s (1995) model is political engagement. Among the 
various factors mediating the contributions of Facebook to political participation in the 
present study, political engagement appeared the most relevant one, together with Internet 
and offline political participation (see section 5.1.1 and 5.3.2). In this sense, findings suggest 
that political engagement intervenes in the process whereby the Facebook recruitment 
network can lead to the mobilisation of less politically active individuals, with a mobilisation 
effect occurring only if these users hold a minimum level of political engagement. As per 
Verba et al.’s (1995) theorisation, political engagement is considered in this thesis as 
citizens’ psychological predisposition towards politics and encompasses five linked but 
different components: political interest, political knowledge, internal and external political 
efficacy, and partisanship (see Section 2.1.2 for the definitions of these terms and literature 
examining the ways in which they are linked to political participation). Political interest is 
the measure presenting the strongest links with Facebook political participation, with data 
strongly suggesting that politically interested individuals are the ones who employ Facebook 
the most for political purposes (see Section 5.3.2). In addition, considering that the general 
pattern established by research is that political interest increases with age (Holt et al., 2013; 
Mascherini et al., 2009; Putnam, 2000), the relationship between age and political 
participation which surfaced in the present investigation (see Section 5.3.1) could also be 
explained with reference to this factor. Partisanship, political knowledge, internal and 
external political efficacy also mediate the contributions of Facebook to political 
participation. As highlithed in Section 5.3.2, among these measures, data suggested that 
political knowledge and partisanship impact the most on Facebook political participation. 
Internal political efficacy appeared to be dependent, at least in part, on levels of political 
knowledge, while external efficacy in particular seemed relevant mainly to more resource-
expensive political activities, such as participating in political initiatives. The final factor to 
be considered is party affiliation, which is not part of Verba et al’s (1995) conceptualisation 
of political engagement, but is related to partisanship. Party affiliation has surfaced as an 
important factor in the IS, given the presence within the Italian political scenario of a 
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political party like the M5S which employs the Internet as its main organisational and 
communication tool and whose supporters are particularly active on SNSs (see Section 6.1).  
Considerations of the Italian and British political scenarios lead to a fourth cluster within 
PMFPP, that of the contextual factors. As recognised by the model’s creators, Verba et al. 
(1995), the CVM can only provide a partial account of political participation, a phenomenon 
which is influenced by myriad other factors and motives that are not included in this 
theorisation. As evident in Figure 26, the present research goes beyond such a model and 
includes two other clusters of factors: contextual factors and Facebook usage. With respect 
to the contextual factors cluster, the presence of two different spheres becomes apparent: the 
media sphere and the political sphere. The political sphere encompasses three elements. One, 
as said, is the presence of political forces – not necessarily parties – employing Facebook 
extensively for both campaigning and communication purposes, whose supporters 
demonstrate high levels of online political activity. As it appeared in the cases of M5S in the 
IS and 38 Degrees in the BS (see Section 5.3.2), individuals supporting parties or 
movements that are particularly active on Facebook are more likely to engage politically 
through this SNS. 
Another factor related to the political scenarios is the proximity of electoral periods in that, 
as explained in Section 6.5, citizens and political parties’ political activity escalates closer to 
elections. It would be possible to reason that proximity to elections impacts on political 
participation by increasing the amount of recruitment requests, the levels of partisanship and 
political interest.  
The third politically-related factor is the degree of political disenchantment. Research attests 
to the widespread detachment from traditional political institutions in both Italy and the UK 
(Curran et al. 2014; Donovan and Onofri 2008; Hansard Society 2013, 2014). This has been 
confirmed in this thesis, in particular with respect to the IS. The findings of the present study 
suggest that political disenchantment can impact on Facebook political participation in 
several ways. Firstly, political disenchantment can result in decreased levels of participation 
in activities falling within the mobilisation dimension. This clearly surfaced in both samples, 
with participants often doubting the efficacy of political initiatives and expressing scepticism 
towards the responsiveness to such activities by the political establishment (see Section 
5.2.1), an issue strongly linked to the external political efficacy construct. However, political 
disenchantment can also have a positive effect on Facebook political participation. In fact, it 
can push citizens closer to anti-establishment protest movements – as the M5S was in its 
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early form – that are highly reliant on online platforms such as Facebook to engage 
disenchanted and demobilised citizens. Furthermore, the disengagement from traditional and 
institutionalised forms of participation can lead to the new and unconventional participatory 
practices (Norris’ – 2002 – democratic phoenix) and to the rise of lifestyle politics for which 
Facebook appears particularly suitable, as stressed in Section 6.2.  
Alongside the political sphere, the contextual factors cluster also includes four media-related 
components. One is the penetration of other online platforms such as Twitter, which in this 
thesis was identified as one of the possible reasons behind the participatory gap between the 
IS and the BS (see Section 6.1). In this regard, IPs’ online political participation is 
concentrated on Facebook, whereas BPs’ participation is diluted across a series of additional 
online platforms. Another relevant component of the contextual factors cluster is media 
usage. Media usage is shaped by people’s perception of mainstream media which, in turn, is 
influenced by a country’s media system. This issue is thoroughly analysed in Section 6.1 
which explains that IPs’ higher levels of Facebook activity, both political and non-political, 
could be in part attributed to the fact that some Italians rely more on the Internet as an 
information source than their British counterparts, a practice linked to their negative 
perception of mainstream media due to the high political parallelism typical of the Italian 
media system.  
Elements of the media scenario such as the penetration of other online platforms and the 
perception of traditional media are linked to the fourth cluster of the PMFPP, that of 
Facebook usage. This cluster embraces seven components: time spent on Facebook, 
perception of Facebook, relevance of Facebook in one’s life, self-presentation, the semi-
public setting of Facebook, privacy concerns, and the heterogeneity of the Facebook 
network. The first three components are closely interrelated and influenced by the media 
scenario. Data showed that participants’ Facebook political participation is connected to the 
perception they have of the platform, a finding that confirms the findings of Weinstein 
(2014), Lupia and Philpot (2005) and Gillan (2008), who all establish that the adoption of a 
technology and the ways people use it are determined by the attitudes and perceptions they 
hold towards it. This appears, for instance, in the case of Lesley, who displayed limited 
levels of Facebook political participation and considered Facebook a time-waster (see her 
quote at p. 167). The opposite occurs for Giuliano who employs Facebook extensively for 
political purposes and values such a platform because he sees it as free from the control of 
the political elites. In the case of Giuliano, it is evident that the perception of Facebook can 
be influenced by how individuals view traditional media, something clearly noticeable in the 
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IS (see quotes at p. 143). The relevance of the perception of Facebook for political 
participation carried out on this SNS can be explained through Parasuraman’s (2000) 
construct of technology readiness, which refers to the propensity to use technology in order 
to pursue certain goals in day-to-day life or at work. This construct is formed by four 
components: optimism and innovativeness (i.e., contributors), and discomfort and insecurity 
(i.e., inhibitors). Optimism denotes a positive perception of a technology because of its 
ability to offer increased control, flexibility and efficiency. Innovativeness indicates an 
individual’s tendency to be a technology pioneer. Discomfort is a perceived lack of control 
over a certain form of technology which leads to feelings of being overwhelmed by it, while 
insecurity refers to feelings of distrust towards a form of technology and scepticism about its 
ability to function (Parasuraman 2000). 
Related to the perception of Facebook is the relevance that this SNS has in one’s life which, 
as shown by both quantitative and qualitative data (see Section 5.3.3), also impacts on the 
likelihood of participating politically on this SNS. The relevance of Facebook is linked to the 
penetration of other online platforms, and can help to explain the differences in Facebook 
political participation between the two samples, with IPs often replacing many other online 
tools with this SNS (see Section 5.1.1). The links between the relevance of Facebook and 
political participation can be explained through Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur’s (1976) Media 
System Dependency Theory according to which the more that individuals rely on media to 
meet their needs (e.g., surveillance, social utility, and fantasy-escape), the more important 
media will be in their lives and the greater the effects that media will produce on them. 
Relevance and perception of Facebook are connected to another item of the Facebook usage 
cluster, i.e., the time users spend on the platform. Time spent on Facebook is a key factor, 
particularly for individuals displaying limited levels of political participation who can be 
accidentally exposed to political information while navigating the website (see Section 
5.2.2). In light of a conceptual weakness of many Internet and political participation studies 
(i.e., the overgeneralisation of Internet and SNS usage), the present investigation attempted 
to clarify whether the contributions of Facebook to political participation vary according to 
different usage practices. Research suggests that individuals employ this SNS for a number 
of reasons, e.g., to keep in touch with friends and family, to relieve boredom, to find 
information or seek advice, for game-playing/entertainment (Mitchell et al. 2013; Lampe et 
al. 2008). These findings are confirmed in the present study in which Facebook emerged as 
an all-encompassing platform through which participants engage in a wide array of activities 
ranging from communication and entertainment to information and work related activities 
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(see Section 5.3.3). Interestingly, the present research indicated that rather than the ways 
people use this SNS, it is the time they spend on it that matters the most in terms of political 
participation because simply by being on Facebook, users can be exposed to political 
information and requests for participation through either the News Feed or direct 
messages/posts.  
The other components of the Facebook usage cluster were discussed in Section 6.2, which 
highlighted how privacy concerns and dynamics related to users' self-presentation can affect 
both political and non-political Facebook usage, with participants resorting to private 
messages, creation of alternative profiles, and even self-censorship in order to avoid 
disapproval and present their hoped-for identities. In this sense, the composition of users’ 
Facebook network and the semi-public setting of Facebook are crucial, with the presence of 
politically heterogeneous contacts having, in certain cases, a restraining effect on political 
participation (see Section 5.1.2). With regards to privacy concerns, data indicated that 
participants worry about both social and institutional privacy (Raynes-Goldie 2010). The 
social side of privacy refers to individuals’ control over their personal information which is 
undermined by the semi-public setting of Facebook and the condensed audience typical of 
this environment. In contrast, institutional privacy concerns relate to the usage of personal 
data by corporations such as Facebook, and, as the case of Lesley shows (see her quote at p. 
122), they are connected to how this SNS is perceived (i.e., a company profiting from the 
exploitation of users’ information) and can limit the levels of Facebook activity. Vitak 
(2012) and Vitak and Ellison (2012) confirm the value of what was established in the present 
research and show that, due to privacy concerns, users can end up limiting their onsite 
activity and connections with friends, and the presence of certain individuals or groups 
within their network can lead them to censor updates or use alternative channels. 
A useful theoretical framework which explains the links between the components of the 
Facebook usage cluster and Facebook political participation is Venkatesh et al.’s (2003) 
Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology. According to this theory, the 
likelihood of adopting and employing a new form of technology depends on four core 
determinants: performance expectancy, which refers to the expected benefits of the usage of 
a technology; effort expectancy, namely the expected ease of use of a new technology; 
facilitating conditions, which concern the perceived availability of resources and support for 
a particular use of the technology; and social influence, which indicate users’ perception of 
how significant others (e.g., family and friends) believe they should use the technology. In 
the context of the PMFPP, performance expectancy, expected benefits, and facilitating 
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conditions are elements related to and shaping the perception of Facebook, while social 
influence is connected to users’ self-presentation. Borrero et al. (2014) test the Unified 
Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology and Parasuraman’s (2000) technology 
readiness construct on SNSs. They confirm that technology readiness, effort expectancy, 
social influence, and performance expectancy significantly influence students’ intentions to 
adopt SNSs for expressive participation, a form of participation entailing the public 
expression of social orientations (Puig-i-Abril and Rojas 2007) in online social movements 
(Borrero et al. 2014). Similar findings are produced by Weinstein (2014), who establishes 
that expression on SNSs is conditioned by organisational policies, personal image and 
privacy, perceived alignment with civic goals, attitudes toward the platform(s), and 
perceptions of audience(s). The results of these studies show the value of the Social-
psychological model of political participation presented in Section 2.1.2, according to which 
political behaviour can be explained in terms of expected benefits and social norms 
(Fishbein 1967; Muller 1979). 
Finally, the last cluster forming the PMFPP is Internet and offline political participation, 
which has a direct or indirect relationship with all the other components of the model. From 
both the quantitative and qualitative results (see Section 5.1.1) of the present study it appears 
that the most important predictor of Facebook political participation is political participation 
itself, both on the Internet and offline. In this sense, as stressed in Section 6.4, this thesis 
strongly supports the normalisers’ stance and suggests that, in terms of political 
participation, Facebook contributes the most to individuals who are already politically 
active. 
Taking into consideration previous models of political participation and the findings from 
the present research, the PMFPP has been developed in this section. This model 
encompasses six clusters of factors, i.e., resources, recruitment requests, political 
engagement, Facebook usage, contextual factors, and Internet and offline political 
participation, and 25 sub-components, i.e., time, digital skills, network size, political 
network, interaction with political network, political interest, political knowledge, internal 
political efficacy, external political efficacy, partisanship, party affiliation, political 
disenchantment, proximity of electoral periods, media systems, perception of mainstream 
media, media usage, penetration of other online platforms, perception of Facebook, 
relevance of Facebook in one’s life, time spent on Facebook, privacy concerns, political 
heterogeneity of Facebook network, the semi-public nature of the Facebook setting, and self-
presentation. This model is “particularised” in the sense that numerous elements coming 
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from a wide array of different but interlinked spheres have been considered in its 
development. However, despite its span, the PMFPP can by no means be considered a 
conclusive one as it is based on factors arising out of the data of the present study, and 
shaped by the pursued lines of enquiry. In doing so, it has excluded a number of factors, such 
as incentives or specific usages (e.g., information vs entertainment) of other media like TV 
or radio, although research has indicated their relevance for political participation (see 
Section 2.1.2). Nonetheless, the PMFPP remains a detailed, thorough and original account of 
this highly contingent phenomenon and certainly sheds light on the links between Facebook 
and political participation. 
 
6.7 Limitations and Further Research 
The author is confident of the academic rigour of the present study and the value and novelty 
of its findings. Nonetheless, there are a series of limitations that need to be acknowledged 
and addressed. Such limitations range from issues related to the sampling strategy and the 
cross-national comparative approach to certain choices made in the design and the 
development of the study, such as the items and variables included in, or rather excluded 
from, the survey, and the lines of enquiry pursued in the interviews. 
Starting with the sampling strategy, as explained in Section 4.4.3, the original plan was to 
employ probability sampling in the first quantitative phase of the study and purposive 
sampling in the following qualitative phase. The adoption of probability sampling would 
have increased the likelihood of obtaining representative samples of the British and Italian 
Facebook populations and, consequently, the generalisability of the results. However, for the 
reasons explained in Section 4.4.3, it was not possible to implement random sampling, and 
snowball sampling was chosen instead. This could have lead to an error of coverage, which 
manifests when there is a difference between the target population and the sampling frame in 
that some segments of the population are systematically excluded from the sample (Fricker 
2008). In order to limit such an error the sample sizes were calculated taking into account the 
sizes of the British and Italian Facebook population, confidence intervals were applied, and 
the samples obtained were post-stratified so that they mirrored the respective Facebook 
populations in terms of age (see Section 4.5). These counter-measures were adopted to try to 
increase the representativeness of the samples, but even so the generalisability that random 
samples would have guaranteed could not be achieved.  
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As explained, snowball-sampling was employed. The principal downside of this sampling 
technique is sample bias where individuals with larger networks are oversampled whereas 
more isolated participants tend to be excluded (Heckathorn 1997). Another possible problem 
with snowball-sampling is that participants may misinterpret the purpose and design of the 
study and recruit inappropriate volunteers (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981). In order to avoid 
these two possible issues the author directly targeted participants in order to guarantee a 
certain degree of variation in terms of demographics and levels of Facebook and political 
activity, provided them with clear instructions to which type of people the questionnaire 
should have been forwarded to. Furthermore, information on the eligibility criteria and the 
purpose of the study were inserted at the beginning of the questionnaires, and a micro-site 
where participants could obtain more in-depth information about the research was created 
(see the questionnaires in Appendix E).   
The value of having more representative samples certainly has to be acknowledged. 
However, it could be argued that for the purpose of the present research, random samples are 
desirable but not necessary. This study was, in fact, exploratory in nature, and did not aim to 
generalise its findings, but rather it attempted to generate and test theories. Representative 
samples would have offered a more robust base for the development of the theories, but by 
no means does the value and rigour of the present study rest on the random nature of the 
samples. In addition, it has to be noted that this is a MM study which combined interviews 
with questionnaires and was not based exclusively on quantitative data. The first quantitative 
phase did not assume priority and its goal was to determine the relationships between the 
considered variables and indicate trends to be further explored and examined in greater depth 
in the interviews (see Section 4.4). In light of these considerations, the adoption of non-
random samples in the quantitative phase has to be regarded only as a minor limitation. 
The recruitment of the two quantitative samples through a non-random procedure creates an 
issue also in terms of the comparability of the samples’ scores. In this regard, Lynn et al. 
(2007) stress that, to enable comparison between nations, sample designs for cross-national 
surveys must meet two fundamental criteria: first, probability sampling must be used; 
second, there must be equivalence in the studied populations of each nation. As mentioned 
before, despite various attempts, the first condition could not be satisfied and non-random 
samples were used. This, however, did not impact excessively on the present research given 
its aims. Concerning the second condition, in pursuit of samples’ equivalence, 
methodological standardisation was sought. Attention was devoted to guaranteeing 
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equivalence in sample selection and recruitment (see Sections 4.4.3 and 4.5), and data 
collection methods and measurement procedures (see Sections 4.4.3 and 4.6).  
Nonetheless, given the non-probabilistic nature of snowball sampling, discrepancies in the 
samples’ demographic compositions could not be avoided (see Appendix C). While the two 
samples are very similar in terms of the age composition due to the applied post-stratification 
procedure, the BS presents a higher percentage of females than the IS and higher levels of 
education and occupation. As explained in Section 5.3.1, such a gender gap could be one of 
the reasons behind the samples’ differences in Facebook political participation, with IPs 
slightly more active than BPs. Research has, in fact, established that males are traditionally 
more politically active than females (Atkeson and Rapoport 2003; Burns et al. 1997; 
Coonway 2001), a trend which surfaced in the quantitative data of the present study, but only 
in the BS. Considering the quantitative results, the non-equivalence of the samples in terms 
of gender could have contributed to the samples’ participatory gap and therefore has to be 
seen as a limitation because it did not enable an optimal comparison of the samples’ scores. 
Qualitative results, however, reversed this picture. In line with  Bengtsson and Christensen 
(2012), who find that women outweigh men in their sample of Internet activists , and suggest 
that the Internet may help to even out the gender gap found in numerous studies of political 
participation (e.g., Norris 2002; Verba et al. 1995), the qualitative results of the present 
research discarded the relevance of gender for Facebook political participation and indicated 
alternative explanations for the samples’ participatory gap (e.g., negative perception of 
traditional media, self-presentation, etc.). Taking into account the qualitative findings, as for 
the usage of random sampling, the non-equivalence of the samples is only a minor limitation 
of this research and its impact on the results is limited. 
Also related to the comparability of the samples’ scores is the issue of response styles. Van 
Herk et al. (2004) warn that in cross-cultural surveys, scores of rating scales are often 
compared at face value, without considering response styles like acquiescence and extreme 
response. Van Herk et al. (2004) examine response styles in six countries (i.e., Greece, Italy, 
Spain, France, Germany, and the UK) and establish that acquiescence and extreme response 
are more present in the Mediterranean than in North-Western Europe, findings confirmed 
also by Harzing (2006) in a larger study focusing on 26 countries. This could suggest that in 
the present investigation the differences in scores between the two samples could be affected 
by Italians’ propensity towards extreme responses. This possibility has to be rejected, as 
qualitative results confirm what was established in the surveys, namely IPs’ higher political 
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usage of Facebook, and indicate a series of possible explanations which exclude the impact 
of response styles on the results. 
Hence in terms of sampling strategy and comparability of results, no major limitations can 
be found in this study. On the other hand, certain choices made in the design and the 
developments of the research have proved to be more problematic. The first doubtful choice 
was that of not measuring the size of participants’ Facebook network in the survey. Such a 
choice appears even less understandable since Ellison et al.’s (2007) Facebook intensity 
scale, from which the Facebook perceived relevance scale has been drawn (see Section 
4.6.1), includes an item to assess the size of the Facebook network. The decision to exclude 
this item from the questionnaire was taken after the piloting of the surveys, as several 
participants commented on their excessive length. Aiming to simplify the online 
questionnaire to boost response rate, the author decided to exclude a number of survey items, 
among which was the question assessing network size. Such a choice was questionable, 
considering also what emerged in the review of the literature with regards to relevance of 
network size for political participation (see Section 2.1.2). Conveniently, the combination of 
a qualitative phase to the quantitative one enabled the author to remedy this misjudgement 
and explore the links between network size and Facebook political participation through the 
interviews. 
Whereas for the size of the Facebook network, imprecisions in the surveys were rectified in 
the qualitative phase, the same did not happen for party affiliation. As explained in Section 
5.3.2, data did not offer a clear picture of how affiliation to a specific political party can 
mediate contributions of Facebook to political participation, with the only exception found in 
relation to the M5S. This unclear picture is linked to the lines of enquiry pursued in this 
study. In the initial stages of study design, the author specifically decided to assume a 
bottom-up approach, focusing on how citizens can employ Facebook for political purposes 
outside electoral periods, rather than examining how political parties can take advantage of 
this online platform. In doing so, party affiliation was deemed a secondary variable. Its links 
with Facebook political participation were not explored in the interviews, while it was 
inserted in the survey only to assess the amount of participants who did not consider 
themselves affiliated to any political party or movement, as an indication of the samples’ 
levels of political disenchantment. The focus was, therefore, on the non-affiliation rather 
than on the allegiance to a party or movement.  
  
222 
However, from the interview with Giuliano, an activist of the M5S, it clearly appeared that 
affiliation to this party can affect Facebook political participation, which shows the worth of 
considering party affiliation when examining the contributions of this SNS to citizens’ 
political participation. In the light of this finding, it would have been interesting to assess the 
relationship between Facebook political participation and the affiliation to a party like the 
SNP, which in the context of the 2011 Scottish Election had the greatest online presence and 
the largest following on social media (Baxter and Marcella 2013), a trend confirmed also in 
the recent Scottish Independence Referendum. Unfortunately, it was not possible to test such 
a relationship through the quantitative data, given the way party affiliation was 
operationalised in the survey. Participants were provided with a list of three parties they 
could choose from (considering the results from the previous Italian and British general 
elections, the top three parties in terms of votes were chosen) plus an “Other” and a “No 
Affiliation” options (see Section 4.6.1). The possibility to specify a party was not offered to 
participants selecting the “Other” option. This turned out to be a mistake as 25% of the BPs 
and 27% of IPs chose this option and their party affiliation could not be established. While 
for the M5S, the interview with an activist highlighted the relevance of the affiliation to this 
movement/party for Facebook political participation, no interviews were held with 
supporters of the SNP, which is questionable also considering that the present research was 
carried out in Scotland, and qualitative data were not able to rectify this oversight. Taking 
into account such a limitation, which is probably the major one of the present study, it would 
be interesting to replicate this research during electoral periods – the 2016 Scottish 
Parliament general election, for instance, would provide the perfect scenario for such an 
exercise – and specifically address the links between party affiliation and political 
participation on SNSs.  
The findings this thesis also suggests a number of possible venues to pursue which would 
further the development of the field. Considering the conceptual weaknesses characterising 
Internet and political participation research (see Section 4.1), this study distinguished 
between political communication and mobilisation and assessed if the contributions of 
Facebook can vary in relation to these two different arrays of political activities. Future 
studies could distinguish, instead, between institutionalised forms of political participation 
and individualised lifestyle oriented political activities, or between locally and nationally 
oriented political participation. While in this thesis the tendency of SNSs to support lifestyle 
politics have been addressed (see Section 6.2), even if in a limited capacity, the 
local/national distinction has been ignored despite qualitative results suggesting that 
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Facebook is particularly effective when it operates in support of offline-based entities 
operating at the local level (see Section 5.2.1). This was a conscious choice necessitated by 
the complexity of the study. Through a MM approach and a cross-national comparative lens 
the present research dealt with a wide array of issues: it looked at the links between 
Facebook, Internet and offline political participation, focused on the 
communication/mobilisation distinction, specifically considering activism, political 
discussion, and consumption of political information, and assessed how different Facebook 
usage practices can affect political participation on this SNS. Considering the intricacy of 
this project, adding other variables and distinguishing between local and national political 
participation would not have been feasible. 
Finally, this study could be criticised because, despite being a cross-national comparative 
one, it has focused very much on the individual level and has not looked at how, for instance, 
culture can affect Facebook political participation. Moy et al. (2012) and Reyfe (2001) 
observe that political communication research is often characterised by methodological 
individualism, ignoring the fact that political communication is cultural as well as attitudinal. 
This trend is possibly linked to difficulties in operationalising something as fuzzy as culture, 
and the resources required to assess its influence on behaviours and attitudes. In 
Modernization and Postmodernization, Inglehart (1997) highlights, for example, how 
political participation is strictly linked to culture. Inglehart (1997) observes that 
industrialisation leads to changes such as mass mobilisation and diminishing differences in 
gender roles, and theorises that economic development, cultural change, and political change 
are interlinked and follow, to some extent, predictable patterns, “a trajectory that is generally 
called Modernization” (p.7). It could be argued that Inglehart (1997) was able to develop 
such a comprehensive theory thanks to the vast data set provided by World Values Surveys, 
which covered approximately 60,000 participants in 43 countries, mirroring 70% of the 
world’s population. However, not every study can count on such an impressive data set and 
with smaller samples caution must be applied as findings might not be transferable to larger 
populations. Considerations of the sampling strategy and methodology adopted in the present 
study have guided the choice of focusing on the individual level. As explained before, non-
random sampling has not proven problematic in the context of this research given its 
exploratory nature. However, it would have been an issue if the research attempted to 
attribute differences in the samples’ scores to cultural factors on the basis of approximately 
400 questionnaires and 24 interviews with non-random and non-representative samples.  
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Where possible, differences in the samples have been explained with reference to the 
national context. As per Section 6.1, the samples’ participatory gap on Facebook was 
ascribed to the contrasting media and political landscapes of Italy and the UK, a line of 
argument possible to develop because of the great deal of research dealing with these issues. 
In contrast, the stronger restraining effect of privacy concerns and political heterogeneity of 
the Facebook network on Facebook political participation observed in the BS was not linked 
to cultural characteristics of the British and Italian populations. It would be interesting to 
explore this relationship, considering the substantial lack of research examining privacy and 
self-presentation from a cross-national perspective. To date, the great majority of studies 
examining self-presentation and communicative practices on SNSs are uni-cultural. Those 
investigations assuming a cross-national and cross-cultural perspective often focus on the 
individualism/collectivism dichotomy theorised by Hofstede (1980) and, comparing Western 
and Asian countries, demonstrate that online self-presentation is sensitive to national culture 
(Doherty and Schlenker 1991; Gudykunst et al. 1987, 1996; Kim and Papacharissi 2003; Rui 
and Stefanone 2013; Yoo et al. 2014; Zhao and Jiang 2011). Gudykunst et al. (1987) stress 
that members of individualistic cultures value personal achievement more than members of 
collectivistic ones, and are characterised by higher public self-consciousness, i.e., the 
awareness of the self in relation to others (Fenigstein et al. 1980), an element which impacts 
on their communicative strategies and practices. Because they are more concerned about the 
influence of negative comments on their images, they engage in strategic self-presentation 
more often than members of collectivist cultures in order to maintain positive self-images 
(Doherty and Schlenker 1991). These findings are confirmed by Rui and Stefanone (2013), 
also with respect to SNSs, and other cross-national studies which highlight the links between 
national culture, the individualism/collectivism dimension, privacy concerns and self-
disclosure (Bellman et al. 2004; Miltgen and Peyrat-Guillard 2014; Posey et al. 2010). 
Hofstede’s approach is not flawless (see McSweeney – 2002 – for a critique, and Hofstede – 
2002 – for a response) but his framework, in particular the individualism/collectivism 
dimension, could potentially elucidate the links between political participation and self-
presentation in digital settings. Applying this framework to Internet and political 
participation research would be a novelty, perhaps an interesting avenue to pursue in the 
future, as it is something that has thus far not been done, despite the staggering number of 
studies falling within this strand of research. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
Drawing from an extensive and unique data set acquired by combining a cross-national 
comparative approach and a MM methodology, this thesis examines the contributions of 
Facebook to citizens’ political participation in Italy and the UK. As such, citizens rather than 
political institutions are the focus of the present research. 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, there has been a proliferation in the last decade of academic 
studies investigating the links between digital technologies and citizens’ political 
participation. The present study differs from other investigations in this area in three ways. 
Firstly, the majority of research focuses heavily on the campaign environment (e.g., Bimber 
and Davis 2003; Curtice and Norris 2008; Davis et al. 2009; Dimitrova et al. 2014; Rice et 
al. 2013). The data for this study were gathered mostly in a non-electoral period and thus the 
contributions of Facebook to citizens’ political participation were assessed independently of 
the electoral process, which usually sees a rise in political participation (see Sections 4.3 and 
4.4.3). Secondly, two conceptual weaknesses characterising many Internet and political 
participation studies were identified: the failure to consider political participation as a 
multidimensional phenomenon and an over-generalised approach to Internet and SNS usages 
(see Section 4.1). Intending to determine whether the contributions of Facebook vary in 
relation to different political activities or usage practices, the present study has tackled the 
two identified weaknesses by distinguishing between political mobilisation and political 
communication activities, and between three Facebook non-political usages, i.e., 
information, interpersonal communication, and social recreation. Finally, in response to the 
lack of cross-national comparative studies in this subject area (see Section 4.2), the 
contributions of Facebook to citizens’ political participation were examined in the different 
contexts of Italy and the United Kingdom. The comparative element proved particularly 
useful as it enabled the identification of contextual conditions prompting variations in 
political participation, and shed light on more general determinants of this complex 
phenomenon.  
This research makes four main contributions to the field of political communication, and 
more specifically to the strand of research examining the impact of digital technologies on 
political participation. The first contribution is the Particularised Model of Facebook 
Political Participation (PMFPP) which illustrates the various factors mediating the links 
between Facebook and political participation in the contexts of Italy and the UK. Secondly, 
the present study sheds light on the ways that Facebook functions as a political platform and 
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highlights that dynamics typical of both new and traditional media are in action on this SNS. 
The third contribution is the Dual Routes of Exposure Model (DREM) which offers 
clarification on the alleged tendency of digital technologies to promote selective exposure 
and, consequently, political fragmentation and polarisation. Finally, the present study also 
highlights the sterility of the debate between optimists, normalisers, and pessimists, cutting 
through the polarised evidence to indicate potentially fruitful approaches which could further 
the development of the field of Internet and political participation research. 
The PMFPP can be considered the end product of this research, and is arguably the most 
original and valuable contribution of the four outlined above. The adoption of a cross-
national approach, which highlighted the relevance of context, and implementation of a MM 
methodology, which enabled the identification of a series of factors promoting and inhibiting 
political participation, as well as enabling the investigation of the dynamics of such a 
phenomenon in the Facebook environment, have proved instrumental to the development of 
this explanatory model. After consideration of a great deal of academic literature, it is safe to 
claim that the PMFPP is the first model of Facebook political participation developed thus 
far. It encompasses six clusters of factors affecting political participation on this SNS – 
resources, recruitment requests, political engagement, Facebook usage, contextual factors, 
and Internet and offline political participation – and comprises a total of 25 components (see 
Figure 26 in Section 6.6). Resources, political engagement, and recruitment requests have 
already been accounted for in other political participation models (see Verba et al.’s – 1995 – 
CVM in Section 2.2.1). Similarly, the strong links between offline and online political 
participation have been highlighted by numerous studies (see the studies supporting the 
normalisers’ stance in Section 3.1). In the PMFPP, these factors are combined with 
numerous others falling within the contextual factors and Facebook usage clusters.  
Political participation has thus emerged in this thesis as a complex phenomenon which can 
be shaped by a myriad of factors ranging from external, context-related ones such as media 
and political landscapes, to more personal, subjective ones such as self-presentation, pre-
existing levels of political engagement, and the nature and size of the Facebook network. In 
relation to the latter group of factors, much of the research has examined the links between 
political participation and political engagement, resources and recruitment network (see 
Section 2.1.2), whereas less attention has been given to how self-presentation can influence 
political participation. Recently, an increasing number of investigations have focused on 
such a topic. The present study complements research in this area (Gustafsson 2012; Storsul 
2014; Thorson 2014; Vromen et al. 2015; Weinstein 2014) and, in line with existing 
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empirical evidence, shows that the dynamics of self-presentation have an impact on political 
participation on SNSs. This thesis not only determines that self-presentation needs to be 
taken into account when examining political participation on Facebook, which can be 
described as a digital front stage (Marichal, 2013), but it also demonstrates that self-
presentation is a highly important factor in determining users’ likelihood of engaging in 
political activity through such a platform. In fact, as discussed in Section 6.2, the 
participatory gap between the samples in the present research (i.e., IPs are more politically 
active than BPs particularly on Facebook) can be, in part, ascribed to the stronger restraining 
effect that the semi-public nature of this SNS and the associated privacy concerns had on 
BPs’ Facebook political participation. Due to the exploratory nature of this study, it was not 
possible to establish if this finding relates only to the considered samples or is linked to 
differences in the British and Italian cultures. In this sense, the potential links between self-
presentation and culture could be an interesting point to explore in future research (see 
Section 6.7). 
With respect to the contextual factors cluster, this thesis confirms the relevance of three 
contextual variables identified by Anduiza et al. (2012) as mediators of the relationship 
between digital media and political participation: digital divides, media systems, and 
institutional settings. Besides attesting to the relevance of these three variables for Facebook 
political participation, the present study also sheds light on the process by which they can 
influence the likelihood of participating politically through Facebook in the specific contexts 
of Italy and the UK (see Section 6.1). As such, the study makes the argument that the 
differences between the samples in terms of political participation can be, to some extent, 
attributed to three main contextual factors linked to the two countries’ different media and 
political landscapes. The first is the penetration and diffusion in the UK of other online 
platforms such as Twitter, with BPs often employing such platforms in conjunction with or 
as an alternative to Facebook, whereas Facebook is by far the most dominant SNS in the IS. 
The second factor is IPs’ more negative perception of mainstream media, particularly TV, 
which has pushed them to seek alternative political information sources and which is 
arguably linked to the high levels of political parallelism characterising the Italian media 
system, and also to what has been described in this thesis as the Berlusconi anomaly. The 
third factor regards the political scenario and is the presence in Italy of the M5S, a political 
party which is highly reliant upon online platforms like Facebook to engage disenchanted 
and demobilised citizens, and whose supporters characterise themselves for their high levels 
of online political activity.  
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The value of the PMFPP rests on the integration of personal, subjective factors (e.g., self-
presentation, political engagement, etc.) with external, context-related ones (e.g., media and 
political scenario). It therefore highlights that the contributions of digital technologies must 
be analysed in context, within the larger patterns they fit into, and cannot be examined in 
isolation. From this thesis, it becomes clear that the contributions of Facebook to political 
participation are better understood if considered within the hybrid media system in which 
this SNS operates (see Section 6.5). This study stresses that Facebook remains a niche (i.e., 
Facebook divide). This SNS is just one tool in the extensive and diverse political arsenal 
available to citizens, and perhaps the most effective way in which it can aid political 
participation is in bridging the online/offline divide, integrating and supporting other media 
and offline activities.  
Similarly, Facebook cannot be considered in total isolation from the political scenarios in 
which citizens operate. The intent of this thesis was to study how Facebook can contribute to 
citizens’ political participation beyond the electoral process, focusing exclusively on citizens 
and, somewhat naively, putting aside political institutions. Despite attempting to do so, 
political parties nonetheless entered into the picture. This suggests that, regardless of the rise 
of lifestyle politics (Bennett 1998), political institutions are still at the centre of the political 
process. Therefore, the ways citizens employ online technologies to participate politically 
and the ways political institutions use these to tools to engage with citizens are two sides of 
the same coin, and both have to be taken into consideration for the development of a 
thorough account of the contributions of Facebook to political participation.  
Despite its span, the PMFPP can by no means be considered a conclusive model, due the 
complexity and contingent nature of political participation. Nonetheless, it provides a 
detailed, thorough and original account of the links between Facebook and political 
participation. Such a model could be expanded by analysing the contributions of Facebook to 
political participation in other national contexts, in order to identify additional contextual 
factors intervening in this equation. The PMFPP has been developed through an exploratory 
approach that, drawing on results obtained from purposive samples, enabled the researcher to 
probe into the links between Facebook political participation and a wide number of 
variables. It would be interesting to test the generalisability of the model by replicating this 
study with representative samples of the British and Italian Facebook populations. 
Representativeness is an issue typical of Facebook-drawn samples (Bhutta 2012), but Gjoka 
et al. (2010) shows that through the application of an advanced crawling technique it is 
possible to obtain a representative sample of Facebook users. The usage of representative 
  
229 
samples would not only enable the testing of the generality of the PMFPP, but could also be 
employed to look at how culture can impact on Facebook political participation, further 
enhancing the model (see Section 6.7 for a more detailed discussion of the limitations of the 
present study and venues of further research). 
This thesis offers a second contribution to the field in considering the ways Facebook 
operates as a political platform. Research has shown the relevance of this SNS as a political 
tool (see Sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4). The present study goes a step further and sheds light 
on the processes of political participation on this SNS. In this regard, it establishes that 
dynamics typical of both new and traditional media are in action on this SNS (see Section 
6.5). Pedroni et al. (2014) note that Facebook exhibits features surprisingly consistent with 
mass media models, in terms of passivity, content production and content consumption. The 
present research substantiates this claim and highlights its consequences for political 
participation. It indicates that certain features of Facebook can restrict the users’ control over 
transmission and consumption of content, thus inhibiting the freedom typically granted to 
audiences by new media. Facebook activity occurs on two main pages: the Wall and the 
News Feed (Caers et al. 2013). Due to newly implemented privacy settings, users have a lot 
of control over their Wall, but they exercise less control over the News Feed which updates 
them on the activities of their network (e.g., likes, groups joined, status updates, etc.). The 
presence of the News Feed partially limits users’ control over the distribution of content, 
enabling Facebook to operate as a broadcasting platform, generating and disseminating 
customised news stories. As discussed in Section 6.4, the present research demonstrates that 
this broadcasting aspect has important implications for political participation, particularly for 
users characterised by limited levels of political activity who can be exposed through the 
News Feed, often accidentally, to political information. Such a process can activate a 
virtuous circle, which can eventually lead to engagement in other forms of political 
participation.  
In contrast to the negative narratives promoted by the advocates of the rich-get-richer 
hypothesis (e.g., Bimber 2001, 2003; Bonfadelli 2002; Schlozman et al. 2010; Weber et al. 
2003), the present study re-evaluates the presence of a dominant minority of politically 
active citizens and, adding to existing empirical evidence, illustrates that what emerged in 
relation to mass media and other digital technologies in Katz and Lazarfield’s (1955) Two-
Step Flow of Communication Model, Graham and Wright’s (2014) account of 
superparticipation in online discussion forums, and Hamilton and Tolbert’s (2012) accidental 
mobilisation, is even more evident in the Facebook environment due to the way the News 
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Feed functions. It suggests, then, that politically active Facebook users can operate as 
participation intermediaries and foster the participation of citizens with limited levels of 
participation by exposing them to their political activities, often through the News Feed.  
The broadcasting character of the News Feed has important repercussions also for the 
scholarly dispute on the alleged potential of digital media to promote selective exposure, 
political fragmentation and polarisation (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3). The present research 
helps to clarify matters through the development of the DREM, which can be considered the 
third main contribution of this thesis. As discussed in detail in Section 6.3, the DREM 
explains how political information can be consumed in the Facebook environment and 
illustrates that exposure to political information can occur on this SNS through two routes: 
the direct route and the accidental route. In the direct route, users have control over the flow 
of information and actively select information according to personal preferences, interests 
and habits. Facebook users can therefore choose to follow a certain page or news outlet, in 
this way making a conscious choice and operating proactively, a distinctive characteristic of 
new (i.e., pull) media audiences. On the other hand, in the accidental route users are 
passively, and sometimes inadvertently, exposed to information through the News Feed, in 
line with the broadcasting model of communication which typifies traditional media. Given 
that the active role of the audience in content selection and consumption is a necessary 
condition for the occurrence of selective exposure (Dutta-Bergman and Chung 2005), this 
thesis makes the argument that, as a result of the broadcasting function of the News Feed, 
Facebook can counteract selective exposure and operate as a potential antidote against 
political fragmentation and polarisation. This, however, does not mean that Facebook is 
immune to selective exposure. Accidental exposure is, in fact, only one component of the 
information consumption process, and most Facebook users still consume politically 
contiguous information and engage in discussion with like-minded individuals.  
The fourth contribution of the present research is to help clear up the debate between Internet 
optimists, normalisers, and pessimists presented in Section 3.1. This study provides evidence 
in support of both the reinforcement and mobilisation hypotheses, while discarding the 
pessimistic stance. It finds that Facebook can further increase the political activity of 
politically active citizens by offering additional venues of participation. At the same time, it 
shows that this SNS can aid users with limited levels of political participation by reducing 
the thresholds of participation and expanding their recruitment networks, consequently 
exposing them to more political information and participation opportunities. Furthermore, 
distinguishing between political mobilisation and communication, the present research 
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determines that the contributions of Facebook to political participation vary in relation to the 
different types of political activity undertaken. Politically active participants are those who 
take more advantage of the mobilisation affordances of Facebook, whereas less politically 
active participants employ this SNS mainly as a communicative and informative political 
tool (see Section 6.4).  
This study complements the work of other researchers who also find that digital technologies 
can have dual effects on political participation, supporting both the reinforcement and 
mobilisation positions (e.g., Bimber et al., 2014; Gibson and Cantijoch 2013; Mascheroni 
2012; Hargittai and Shaw 2013; Nam 2012; Oser et al. 2013). Like these studies, the present 
research considers the multidimensionality of political participation and distinguishes 
between different participatory modes. By doing so, it tackles a conceptual weakness typical 
in Internet and political participation studies (see Section 4.1), and highlights the 
restrictiveness and sterility of the dispute between optimists, normalisers, and pessimists. 
Hence this thesis adds to an existing commentary, refining it through an in-depth theoretical 
discussion grounded on a unique set of data generated through an innovative approach 
combining cross-national research to a MM methodology.  
The present research confirms that the effects of digital technologies on political 
participation are manifold – reinforcement does not exclude mobilisation and vice versa – 
and must be assessed as part of a continuum, rather than being considered in neat, mutually 
exclusive categories. Therefore, this thesis demonstrates beyond doubt that the polarised 
approach which typifies the debate between optimists, normalisers, and pessimists is far too 
narrow to provide a thorough account of the links between digital technologies and citizens’ 
political participation. In this sense, to allow for development in this area of research, it 
would be beneficial – as done in this thesis – to adopt a more particularised approach, which 
offers further discriminatory power by taking into account the differences between the 
various Internet tools, types of political activities, and usage practices. It would also be 
useful to venture into less established and more novel methodological approaches in order to 
build original data sets and thus to stretch the boundaries of the field. 
Before concluding, some observations on the applicability of the findings of the present 
research are needed. History shows that SNSs are relatively transient, as demonstrated by the 
cases of MySpace and Bebo, which have passed from headline news into gradual oblivion – 
due also to the rise of a formidable competitor like Facebook. It has to be recognised that 
Facebook could share a similar fate. Several commentaries in the press report an alleged 
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haemorrhage of Facebook users, particularly among the youngest members who are 
decamping to alternative SNSs such as Snapchat or Instagram (Lorber 2014; Wakefield 
2014). Since a veil of secrecy hovers over Facebook statistics – a conduct questionable for 
an organisation which built its success on users’ sharing of information – these 
commentaries are often supported by anecdotal evidence. Nonetheless, a recent study by the 
digital consultancy, iStrategy Labs (2014), provides some hard evidence in support of these 
arguments: data generated by Facebook itself for its Social Advertising platform shows that 
Facebook has lost over three million US teen (13 to 17 years old) users since 2011 (whereas 
the 55+ age group has increased significantly). This exodus could be explained by the 
increasing presence of teens’ parents on this SNS, as shown in a research by the Pew 
Research Centre (Madden et al. 2013). Nonetheless, despite losing part of its young user 
base, Facebook remains the most dominant SNS worldwide, with 890 million daily active 
users (Socialbakers 2015), and its demise appears to be distant.  
If and when this demise occurs, the author is confident that the findings of this thesis will 
still find application as they can be extended to other SNSs, and in certain cases to digital 
technologies in general. Evidence about the role of self-presentation, information-led 
mobilisation, and the exposure to political difference will remain valid as long as there are 
platforms sharing both the pull and push features of Facebook on which, as highlighted in 
this section, such findings rest. In contrast, the results concerning the role of media and 
political scenarios and more general determinants of political participation (e.g., political 
engagement, resources, recruitment network, etc.) can be extended to the Internet as a whole, 
as can the value of implementing more particularised approaches and less established 
methodologies. 
Finally, the author would like to end this thesis with a quote that perfectly encapsulates the 
essence of its title, “ ‘It’s Complicated’: Facebook and Political Participation in Italy and the 
UK”  – drawn explicitly from  the titles of boyd’s (2014) account of the lives of networked 
teens and Vitak et al.’s (2011) analysis of undergraduate students’ Facebook political 
participation. This quote comes from one of the scholars who has most inspired this thesis 
and best grasped the nature of the strand of research to which the present study contributes.  
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Almost a decade has passed since Chadwick (2006) wrote the influential Internet Politics. 
After so many years, as shown in this thesis, his final remarks still remain relevant today:  
Internet politics is a fast moving field characterized by uncertainty, paradox, 
overstatement and understatement. This fluidity is what makes it a fascinating area of 
study. When trying to make generalizations, perhaps the best we can hope for is an 
appreciation of the radically contingent nature of the field, and there is little likelihood 
that this facet is going to change in future (Chadwick, 2006, p. 326). 
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Appendix A – Facebook Statistics for Italy and the UK 
The source of these statistics is Socialbakers, one of the biggest Facebook statistics portals in 
the world.  
 
United Kingdom 
 
British Facebook Population: 
- 28,940,400 (Socialbakers 2011) 
- 30,265,580 (Socialbakers 2012) 
- 30,157,300 (Socialbakers 2013) 
 
 
Penetration of online population: 61.02% (Socialbakers 2013) 
 
Penetration of total population: 51.61% (Socialbakers 2013) 
 
 
Figure A1 – Distributions of Age Groups in the British Facebook Population 
 
                                                                                           Source: Socialbakers 2012 
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Italy 
 
Italian Facebook Population: 
- 18,438,760  (Socialbakers 2011) 
- 19,211,580 (Socialbakers 2012) 
- 21,721,940 (Socialbakers 2013) 
 
Penetration of online population: 70.85 % (Socialbakers 2013) 
  
Penetration of total population: 38.16 % (Socialbakers 2013) 
 
 
Figure A2 – Distributions of Age Groups in the Italian Facebook Population 
 
                                                                                           Source: Socialbakers 2012 
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Appendix B – Sizes of Samples and Age Ratios 
Table B1 – Calculation of Sizes of Samples and Age Ratios 
The target population was given by the Facebook population minus underage and over 65 users. 
 
 
Italian Facebook Population 
 
British Facebook Population 
 
19211580 
   
30265580 
  
 
% n % 
 
% n % 
13-15 0.08 1536926 
  
0.07 2118591 
 16-17 0.07 1344811 
  
0.06 1815935 
 18-24 0.24 4610779 0.289157 
 
0.26 7869051 0.309524 
25-34 0.26 4995011 0.313253 
 
0.26 7869051 0.309524 
35-44 0.19 3650200 0.228916 
 
0.17 5145149 0.202381 
45-54 0.1 1921158 0.120482 
 
0.1 3026558 0.119048 
55-64 0.04 768463.2 0.048193 
 
0.05 1513279 0.059524 
65+ 0.02 384231.6 
  
0.03 907967.4 
 Sum 
 
19211580 15945611 
  
30265580 25423087 
 
 
Italian Target Population British Target Population 
 
15945611 
   
25423087 
   
The sizes of the British and Italian target populations at the time of the data collection were 
considered in the calculation of the samples’ sizes.                 
Through www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html using a confidence interval of 95% and allowing 
a 7% error, it was calculated that both the BS and the IS required 196 participants. 
      
7% error, 95%CI    Italian Target Population: 15945611        Italian Sample Size:  196 
        
7% error, 95%CI    British Target Population: 25423087       British Sample Size: 196 
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To increase the representativeness of the recruited samples a post-stratifying criterion was 
applied and the samples were weighted on the basis of the age distributions of the Italian and 
British Facebook Populations. The 45-54 and 55-65 age categories were unified due to their 
small sizes. 
 
Table B2 – Post-Stratification of the Samples 
  
Italian Facebook Population British Facebook Population 
  
19211580 
  
30265580 
  
  
% n % % n % 
 
18-24 0.24 4610779 0.289157 0.26 7869051 0.309524 
 
25-34 0.26 4995011 0.313253 0.26 7869051 0.309524 
 
35-44 0.19 3650200 0.228916 0.17 5145149 0.202381 
 
45-65 0.14 2689621 0.168675 0.15 4539837 0.178571 
 
Sum 
 
15945611 15945611 
 
25423087 25423087 
        
  
Italian Sample 
 
British Sample 
  
% Sample size %   Sample size 
 
18-24 0.27 53 
 
0.28   55 
 
 
25-34 0.31 61 
 
0.29 57 
 
 
35-44 0.24 47 
 
0.21 41 
 
 
45-64 0.18 35 
 
0.22 43 
 
 
Sum 
 
           196 
  
   196 
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Appendix C – Composition of Quantitative Samples 
This appendix presents the composition of the British and Italian quantitative samples in 
terms of gender, age, education, occupation, and party affiliation. As shown in Appendix A, 
Socialbakers provided information about the sizes of the British and Italian Facebook 
populations and their age compositions. However, no information was offered with regards 
to gender, education and occupation. In order to obtain relevant statistics for these 
demographics, the researcher tried to contact Facebook through different means (e.g., e-
mails, phone, feedback forms, etc.). Regrettably, Facebook proved to be completely 
unresponsive, and no other sources providing information on the composition of the target 
populations in terms of gender, education, and occupation were found. 
 
Gender: As shown in the table and figures below, the BS contained a higher percentage of 
females than the IS.   
 
Table C1 – Samples by Gender: Frequencies and Percentages 
 Frequency Percent 
 British Sample Female 123 62.8 
Male 73 37.2 
 Italian Sample Female 93 47.4 
Male 103 52.6 
 
Figure C1 – Samples by Gender: Pie Charts 
 
 
 
Considering that no information on the gender composition of the British and Italian 
Facebook populations could be found, the samples have been compared to the British and 
Italian Internet population instead. According to data from the ISTAT (2012), the gender 
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composition of the IS reflected that of the Italian Internet population where the gender gap is 
gradually decreasing (Females 47%; Males 53%). A recent report from Oxford Internet 
Institute (Dutton and Blank 2013) shows that the digital gender divide has also been steadily 
decreasing in the UK where there is no longer a statistically significant gender gap in 
Internet access. In this sense, given that the BS was skewed in terms of gender (i.e., higher 
percentages of females), it cannot be considered representative of the British Internet 
population with regards to this variable.  
Age: The samples’ age compositions were very similar. Age was the demographic variable 
used as post-stratifying criterion (see Section 4.4.3), and in relation to this variable the two 
samples were representative of the British and Italian Facebook populations (Appendix A). 
 
Table C2 – Samples by Age: Frequencies and Percentages 
 Frequency Percent 
 British Sample 18-24 55 28.1 
25-34 57 29.1 
35-44 42 21.4 
45-65 42 21.4 
Total 196 100.0 
 Italian Sample 18-24 53 27.0 
25-34 60 30.6 
35-44 47 24.0 
45-65 36 18.4 
Total 196 100.0 
 
 
Figure C2 – Samples by Age: Pie Charts 
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Education and occupation: The samples differed in terms of educational level and 
occupational status. The IS exhibited lower levels of education and occupation when 
compared to the BS. 
Table C3 – Samples by Education: Frequencies and Percentages 
 Frequency Percent 
British Sample  Less than Upper Secondary Education 6 3.1 
Upper Secondary Education 38 19.4 
Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary Education 14 7.1 
First Stage of Tertiary Education 127 64.8 
Second Stage of Tertiary Education 11 5.6 
Total 196 100.0 
Italian Sample  Less than Upper Secondary Education 5 2.6 
Upper Secondary Education 94 48.0 
Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary Education 16 8.2 
First Stage of Tertiary Education 71 36.2 
Second Stage of Tertiary Education 10 5.1 
Total 196 100.0 
 
 
Table C4 – Samples by Occupation: Frequencies and Percentages 
 Frequency Percent 
British Sample  Large employer, manager and 
professional 
60 30.6 
Intermediate and lower supervisor 34 17.3 
Small employer and own account 
worker 
15 7.7 
White Collar Worker 25 12.8 
Blue Collar Worker 3 1.5 
Unemployed 12 6.1 
Student 47 24.0 
Total 196 100.0 
Italian Sample  Large employer, manager and 
professional 
20 10.2 
Intermediate and lower supervisor 5 2.6 
Small employer and own account 
worker 
30 15.3 
White Collar Worker 47 24.0 
Blue Collar Worker 4 2.0 
Unemployed 25 12.8 
Student 65 33.2 
Total 196 100.0 
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As appears in the above tables, there were a few educational and occupational categories that 
applied only to a limited number of participants (e.g., less than upper secondary education or 
blue collar worker). To better compare the samples’ educational and occupational levels, 
various categories were merged. In terms of education, two educational categories were 
developed: “Less than Tertiary Education” and “First and Second stage of Tertiary 
Education”.  
With regards to occupation, considering the ESeC’s guidelines for a three category 
classification were followed (ISER 2011), and the “Working Class”, “Intermediate”, and 
“Managers and professionals” categories were generated. In addition, the categories 
“Students” and “Unemployed”, which were not included in the ESeC’s classification were 
also merged so to form a fourth category.  
Table C5 – Samples by Education: Frequencies and Percentages with Merged Categories 
 Frequency Percent 
British Sample  Less than Tertiary Education 62 31.6 
First and Second Stage of Tertiary Education 134 68.4 
Total 196 100.0 
Italian Sample  Less than Tertiary Education 115 58.7 
First and Second Stage of Tertiary Education 81 41.3 
Total 196 100.0 
 
Figure C3 – Samples by Education: Pie Charts with Merged Categories 
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Table C6 – Samples by Occupation: Frequencies and Percentages with Merged Categories 
 Frequency Percent 
British Sample  Students and Unemployed 59 30.1 
Working Class 28 14.3 
Intermediate 49 25.0 
Managers and Professionals 60 30.6 
Total 196 100.0 
Italian Sample  Students and Unemployed 91 46.4 
Working Class 50 25.5 
Intermediate 35 17.9 
Managers and Professionals 20 10.2 
Total 196 100.0 
 
Figure C4 – Samples by Occupation: Pie Charts with Merged Categories  
 
 
 
As it is shown in the above tables and figures, the BS displayed higher educational and 
occupational levels than the IS. Similar results have also been produced in a cross-national 
study by eCircle, the leading digital marketing supplier across Europe (Wiewer and 
Anweiler 2010), focusing on six European countries: Britain, France, Germany, Holland, 
Italy, and Spain. Their samples included Internet users aged 14-69 and were representative 
of the Internet populations of the considered countries. As in the present research, also in the 
study by eCircle the BS had higher educational and occupational levels than the IS. In the 
last few years, the British and Italian Internet populations have seen an erosion of the digital 
divide in terms of education and income (Dutton and Blank 2013; ISTAT 2012). These 
trends have been confirmed in the samples of the present study. However, it has to be noted 
that the educational and occupational levels of the IS were considerably lower than the ones 
of the Italian Internet population. When compared to the British Internet population, the BS 
appeared to be more representative with respect to this variable. 
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Party affiliation: Concerning party affiliation, it is noticeable from the tables and figures 
below that many participants in both samples were not affiliated to a particular political party 
or movement. These results confirm, as highlighted in Section 5.2.1, British and Italian 
citizens’ disaffection towards the political class. Certain political parties such as the Popolo 
delle Libertà or the Tories were under-represented in the samples, while a relevant 
percentage of participants fall into the “Other” category.  In the BS, this could be explained 
through the high number of Scottish participants and to the popularity of the SNP in 
Scotland. The present research was carried out in a Scottish university and the researcher’s 
social network employed in the snowball sampling strategy included many Scottish people. 
However, as also mentioned in Section 4.4.3 (see Quantitative research process), in order to 
guarantee a certain degree of diversity in terms of nationality, English, Welsh and Northern 
Irish participants were particularly targeted in the recruitment process. In relation to the IS, 
considering the results of the 2014 general election in Italy, it is plausible to expect that the 
“Other” category comprised many participants affiliated to the M5S. However, due to the 
way party affiliation was operationalised in the survey (a more detailed discussion of this 
issue can be found in Section 6.7), participants’ affiliation to other popular parties such as 
the SNP, UKIP, the Greens, or the M5S could not be examined. Finally, it is worth noting 
that no relevant statistics on party affiliation for both British and Italian Facebook or Internet 
populations were found, and thus no considerations can be made on the representativeness of 
the samples with regards to this variable.  
 
Table C7 – British Sample by Party Affiliation: Frequencies and Percentages             
 Frequency Percent 
  Conservative 23 11.7 
Labour 46 23.5 
Liberal Democrat 14 7.1 
Other 49 25.0 
No affiliation 64 32.7 
Total 196 100.0 
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Figure C5 – British Sample by Party Affiliation: Pie Charts 
 
 
 
Table C8 – Italian Sample by Party Affiliation: Frequencies and Percentages 
 Frequency Percent 
 Popolo della Libertà 10 5.1 
Partito Democratico 40 20.4 
Terzo Polo 4 2.0 
Other 52 26.5 
No Affiliation 90 45.9 
Total 196 100.0 
 
 
 
Figure C6 – Italian Sample by Party Affiliation: Pie Charts
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Appendix D – Qualitative Samples 
British Sample 
Table D1 – Composition of the British Qualitative Sample 
 Age Gender Facebook 
Non-Political 
Usage 
Facebook 
Political 
Participation 
Internet 
Political 
Participation 
Offline 
Political 
Participation 
Most Used 
Venue of 
Participation 
 
Participant I – 
Alastair 
 
18-24 
 
Male 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Moderate 
 
High 
 
Facebook 
 
Participant II – 
Alex 
 
35-44 
 
Male 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Low 
 
Facebook 
 
Participant III – 
Andrew 
 
25-34 
 
Male 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
The Internet 
 
Participant IV – 
Callum 
 
35-44 
 
Male 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Low 
 
Moderate 
 
--- 
 
Participant V – 
Ellie 
 
18-24 
 
Female 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
         --- 
 
Participant VI – 
 Hazel 
 
45-65 
 
Female 
 
Moderate 
 
High 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Facebook 
 
Participant VII – 
Helen 
 
25-34 
 
Female 
 
High 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Low 
 
Facebook 
 
Participant VIII –
Hilary 
 
18-24 
 
Female 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Moderate 
 
High 
 
Offline 
 
Participant IX – 
Kaye 
 
25-34 
 
Female 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Moderate 
 
Offline 
 
Participant X – 
Lesley 
 
45-65 
 
Female 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Offline 
 
Participant XI – 
Rachel 
 
45-65 
 
Female 
 
Moderate 
 
High 
 
High 
 
High 
 
The Internet 
 
Participant XII – 
Tracey 
 
18-24 
 
Female 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
      Offline 
 
Participant XIII – 
Vincent 
 
35-44 
 
Male 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Moderate 
 
Low 
 
Facebook 
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British Participants’ Profiles 
Alastair: Alastair is in the 18-24 age-group and educated to degree level. He is a young 
political activist and a student representative. He does not participate in party politics, but is 
very active in single-issue campaigns. Being an activist, he displays high levels of 
participation both offline and online. Alastair depicts Facebook as a very powerful and 
useful political tool. He employs this SNS to obtain political information, to discuss politics, 
and to promote political initiatives. However, he stresses that he uses Facebook mainly for 
recreational purposes and to communicate with friends. 
Alex: Alex is in the 35-44 age-group and educated to degree level. He works as a consultant 
in the food industry and is also a music writer. He is left-leaning in terms of political 
alliance, but displays a limited political interest. Alex uses Facebook mainly for recreational 
purposes and is sceptical of the effectiveness of political activities carried out through this 
SNS. He appears particularly concerned about the trustworthiness of political information 
circulating on Facebook, demonstrating more trust in and appreciation of traditional media 
institutions. Despite this, sometimes he does engage in political activities through Facebook, 
disseminating information, signing and circulating petitions. In this sense, he even 
acknowledges that his participation has increased thanks to this SNS which has made 
participation much easier for him. He has two Facebook profiles: one for his music where he 
uses his real name, and another profile for which he does not use his real name, and where he 
engages, to a limited extent, in other activities including politics.  
Andrew: Andrew is in the 35-44 age-group and educated to degree level. He works in 
hospitality and studies on a vocational course in film. Andrew is very critical of the political 
and media establishment and shows an appreciation for alternative sources and platforms. He 
is particularly interested in documentaries (he is currently working on one), in conspiracy 
theories and historic revisionism. He is very interested in politics and very active politically 
online, but not on Facebook. He enjoys the anonymity offered by the Internet and for this 
reason he does not participate politically on Facebook. Andrew uses this SNS to a very 
limited extent and does not consider it an appropriate political platform. Rather he sees it as 
a tool for communication and entertainment.  
Callum: Callum is in the 35-44 age-group, and holds a college qualification. He works in 
technical support and therefore has very strong digital skills. He participates in several online 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, RIC, and other online forums. He is interested 
in politics but not affiliated to any particular party or movement. His political participation 
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consists mainly in the consumption of political information and political discussion. Callum 
does not display a particular antagonism towards government and political institutions, and 
does not feel the need for mobilisation. He enjoys political discussion and engages in it 
offline but also, quite extensively, through several online platforms. Because of the presence 
of certain people within his Facebook network, he limits his political participation on this 
SNS. He mainly follows technology-related pages and employs this SNS mostly for 
entertainment purposes, general light talk, and to keep in touch with people. 
Ellie: Ellie is in the 18-24 age-group, educated to degree level and working in 
administration. Ellie has no interest in politics, and could be described as politically 
apathetic. Her usage of Facebook is extremely high. She uses it every day for several hours 
from a variety of devices (e.g., mobile, laptop, etc.). She employs this SNS entirely for non-
political purposes, mainly for entertainment and to communicate with friends who are also 
not interested in politics. Sometimes on Facebook Ellie comes across political information, 
but she ignores it as she considers it irrelevant to her.  
Hazel: Hazel is in the 45-65 age-group and educated to degree level. She is a doctor and 
works for the NHS. She is a member of the Labour party, which she joined because of their 
campaigns against the privatisation of the NHS. She is very active politically, but her 
involvement in political activism is relatively recent. Hazel considers Facebook instrumental 
to the evolution of her political interest and involvement and depicts this SNS as a key tool 
for obtaining political information and promoting political initiatives. She also often employs 
this SNS for entertainment purposes (e.g., games), and, to a lesser degree, to keep in touch 
with family and friends.  
Helen: Helen is in the 25-34 age-group, studying towards a degree and working part-time in 
hospitality. She has an interest politics, which has recently developed, and is left-leaning in 
terms of political ideology. Helen is sceptical of British political institutions and mainstream 
media. She has a very high level of Facebook activity and employs the SNS as an all-round 
platform through which she engages in a variety of activities ranging from information to 
recreation and communication. Her political activity is limited to the consumption and 
diffusion of political information, and, because of health related issues, to online activity. 
Hilary: Hilary is in the 18-24 age-group and is studying towards a degree in PR. She 
exhibits high levels of political interest and comes from a politically active family (one of 
her parents is a politician). She supports the Conservative party and is politically active 
offline, while she limits her online participation to the consumption of political news. Hilary 
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has a positive perception of political institutions and mainstream media in general, which she 
considers much more trustworthy than online sources. She is very conscious of being a 
Conservative and prefers to keep her affiliation hidden from her friends. For this reason she 
uses Facebook mainly for non-political activities (i.e., light-hearted chat, to keep up with 
friends, and for entertainment) and posts political material, to a limited extent, only during 
electoral periods.   
Kaye: Kaye is in the 25-34 age-group, educated to degree level, and runs her own small 
business. She has limited digital skills which limit her political and non-political online 
activity. Kaye shows a certain level of interest in politics but is not affiliated to any specific 
party or movement and believes that a lack of a political network hinders, in part, her 
political participation. She does not use Facebook much and when she does, she tends to use 
it for light-hearted chatting and entertainment. However, Kaye acknowledges the presence of 
political information on this SNS, and the fact that she has been exposed to political content 
as a result. 
Lesley: Lesley is in the 45-65 age-group and educated to degree level. She works as a 
translator and is a medical herbalist. Lesley displays a high level of political interest and, in 
terms of political alliance, she is left-leaning. However, she is not affiliated to any particular 
political party and is critical of the British political class and mainstream media. Her political 
participation consists mainly in the consumption of political information and political 
discussion, but she also engages in single-issue campaigns concerning community education, 
sustainable living and health care. Her political participation occurs mainly offline as she is 
particularly sceptical of online political participation. Lesley seems to be especially 
concerned about the use online-based corporations make of users’ data, and she questions the 
credibility of information circulating on SNSs. She employs Facebook to a very limited 
extent, considers this SNS a time-waster, and prefers to use Twitter instead. 
Rachel: Rachel is in the 45-65 age-group and educated to Master’s level. She is a politician, 
member of the Green party, and a former member of the Liberal Democrats. Rachel defines 
herself as a political animal and is extremely active offline and online. She uses a range of 
online platforms, from forums and blogs to Facebook groups and pages. She also uses this 
SNS to maintain her social and professional networks, but for her Facebook is mainly a 
political tool. Rachel runs and participates in several Facebook groups, some affiliated to the 
Greens, which she uses to communicate internally with members of the party and to engage 
with the general public, and some for local single-issue campaigns. 
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Tracey: Tracey is in the 18-24 age-group and is studying towards a PhD in Arts. She has a 
varied information diet and gets political information through a variety of sources such as 
newspapers, TV, online newspapers, radio and Facebook. Tracey is interested in politics, has 
many friends who are politically active, and participates politically both online and offline. 
She is particularly active on Facebook. She employs this SNS for communication and 
information purposes, but also she uses it quite often for political discussion, and once used 
it for a campaign she was involved in which aimed to increase the public’s awareness of 
asthma.  
Vincent: Vincent is in the 35-44 age-group and educated to degree level. He is a scientist, 
living and working abroad. He shows a keen interest in politics and identifies with the 
Labour party. Being abroad, he tends not to participate politically offline, and his political 
participation is therefore limited to online activities. In this sense he considers Facebook a 
crucial political tool, and employs it for discussing politics with friends, obtaining and 
spreading political information. Vincent also uses this SNS to keep in touch with friends, but 
Facebook is for him a political tool more than anything else. 
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Italian Sample 
Table D2 – Composition of the Italian Qualitative Sample 
 Age Gender Facebook 
Non-Political 
Usage 
Facebook 
Political 
Participation 
Internet 
Political 
Participation 
Offline 
Political 
Participation 
Most Used 
Venue of 
Participation 
 
Participant I – 
Alessandro 
 
35-44 
 
Male 
 
High 
 
Moderate 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Facebook 
 
Participant II – 
Antonio 
 
45-65 
 
Female 
 
Moderate 
 
High 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Facebook 
 
Participant III – 
Ciro 
 
25-34 
 
Male 
 
High 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Offline 
  
Participant IV – 
Francesca 
 
18-24 
 
Female 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Moderate 
 
High 
 
Offline 
 
Participant V – 
Gaia 
 
 18-24 
 
Female 
 
Moderate 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
--- 
 
Participant VI – 
Giuliano 
 
35-44 
 
Male 
 
Moderate 
 
High 
 
Moderate 
 
High 
 
Facebook 
 
Participant VII – 
Luca 
 
35-44 
 
Male 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Offline 
 
Participant VIII – 
Luigi 
 
45-65 
 
Male 
 
High 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Facebook 
 
Participant IX – 
Mario 
 
18-24 
 
Male 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
High 
 
Moderate 
 
The Internet 
 
Participant X – 
Martina 
 
45-65 
 
Female 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Moderate 
 
High 
 
    Facebook 
 
Participant XI – 
Raffaella 
 
25-34 
 
Female 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Facebook 
 
Participant XII – 
Rosaria 
 
18-24 
 
Female 
 
High 
 
Moderate 
 
High 
 
Moderate 
 
The Internet 
 
Participant XIII – 
Virginia 
 
25-34 
 
Female 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
 
Low 
 
Facebook 
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Italian Participants’ Profiles 
Alessandro: Alessandro is in the 25-34 age-group, educated to High School level, and 
unemployed. He is very critical of Italian political institutions and mainstream media. He 
shows a certain degree of political interest but displays a strong aversion towards traditional 
politics. His political participation is limited to the consumption of political information. In 
this sense he is very active on Facebook, and he considers other political activities to be very 
limited in terms of effectiveness. He prefers online sources to traditional ones such as TV 
and newspapers, which he believes to be an expression of the corrupt Italian political system. 
His levels of Facebook activity are high and he uses this SNS as an all-round platform, 
mainly to communicate and keep up with his social network and for entertainment purposes 
(e.g., playing games, watching sport and music videos), but also for political and non-
political informational purposes. His political participation offline and on other online 
platforms is almost non-existent. 
Antonio: Antonio is in the 45-65 age-group and educated to degree level. He works for the 
Italian Communist party (Rifondazione Comunista) and deals with immigration related 
issues. Politics is therefore both his passion and his job. Antonio is very active politically, 
both offline and online, making use of several online platforms and forums. His primary 
sources of political information are mainstream media, online newspapers, blogs, and 
Facebook pages. He seems to prefer online sources because he considers them to be more 
varied and less influenced by the political establishment. Antonio considers Facebook a very 
valuable political tool, to be combined with offline activity, and a tool which can increase 
the reach of political initiatives and generate more political participation. Antonio also uses 
Facebook for a wide number of non-political activities ranging from communication to 
information and entertainment.  
Ciro: Ciro is in the 25-34 age-group, studying towards a Master’s in Sociology and New 
Media. He shows a keen interest in politics but does not support any particular party or 
movement, and tends to engage mainly in political communication activities, both online and 
offline. His information diet is extremely varied and includes mainstream media such as TV, 
newspapers, and radio, but also online newspapers and blogs. Facebook is his main political 
participation platform, and through this SNS he often obtains political information and 
engages in political discussions. Facebook plays an important role in Ciro’s life, as he uses 
this SNS not only for political and non-political (e.g., sport) information, but also to maintain 
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and communicate with both his social and professional network, to express moods and 
thoughts, and to promote a series of activities in which he is involved. 
Francesca: Francesca is in the 18-24 age-group, studying towards a degree in Languages. 
She is a left-leaning student political activist, critical of Italian political institutions and 
mainstream media. Francesca prefers online information sources, which she considers freer 
and more varied, to offline ones, which she perceive as strongly influenced by the political 
class. Facebook is a key source in her information diet and she depicts this SNS as a crucial 
tool for activists, to be combined with offline activity. Francesca acknowledges that 
Facebook has become her main tool to communicate with family, friends and contacts, and 
to obtain information, both political and non-political. 
Gaia: Gaia is in the 18-24 age-group, studying towards a degree in Biotechnology. She has 
no interest in politics and her political participation is almost non-existent and limited to the 
consumption, from time to time, of political information through mobile apps, newspaper 
websites, and the Facebook New Feed. Gaia uses Facebook on a daily basis and her usage is 
particularly varied. She employs this SNS mainly to keep in touch with friends, for 
entertainment (e.g. music and games), but also for university related activities and for 
information. 
Giuliano: Giuliano is in the 35-44 age-group, educated to degree level and owner of a 
company which deals with online sales. He is an activist of the M5S and consequently is 
very politically active online and on Facebook. Particularly critical of mainstream media, the 
Internet is for him the main source of political information. Facebook is a key political tool 
for Giuliano and is by far the most used online platform for communicating with his fellow 
activists, discussing politics, obtaining political information, organising and promoting 
political initiatives. Giuliano has advanced digital skills and also uses Facebook for his 
business, for which he has a separate profile, and to keep in touch with friends.   
Luca: Luca is in the 35-44 age-group, educated to Master’s level, working as a regional 
sales manager. He is very interested in politics but displays a strong disaffection towards 
Italian political institutions. He limits his political participation to political discussion and 
the consumption of political information, mainly online (i.e., online newspapers and 
Facebook) and through the radio. He enjoys discussing politics but is very selective with his 
interlocutors. For this reason, his political discussion occurs almost exclusively offline where 
he is more in control of the discussion and its participants. He tends to use Facebook daily, 
mainly for communicating with his network and for information purposes.  
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Luigi: Luigi is in the 45-65 age-group, educated to High School level, working as a 
photographer. He is politically interested, left-leaning, and uses Facebook a lot both 
politically and non-politically. Luigi is digitally savvy. Facebook is the only SNS that he 
uses, and he employs it mainly for communication and information purposes. Because of his 
job, hobbies and high levels of online activity, he has been able to build a large network of 
Facebook friends. Such a network constantly provides him with political and non-political 
information, and enables him to learn about events, both political and non-political, in which 
he has often taken part. Luigi enjoys discussing politics both online and offline, and 
consumes also a lot of information from radio, TV, and online newspapers. 
Mario: Mario is in the 18-24 age-group, studying towards a degree in Language and 
Economy. He is a young political activist, particularly active in the university circle. Mario 
is very critical of Italian political institutions and is not affiliated to any political movement. 
He uses a range of different online platforms for both political communication and 
mobilisation purposes, and acknowledges the dominance of Facebook in the toolkit of young 
activists. He exhibits moderate levels of Facebook political and non-political activity, 
preferring offline-based activism which he considers the foundation of Facebook political 
activity. He uses this SNS mainly for obtaining and spreading information, but also to a 
limited extent for communicating with some of his friends and contacts.  
Martina: Martina is in the 45-65 age-group, educated to High School level, working as a 
council officer for the Major of Naples. Because of her position she has a day-to-day 
involvement with politics, and is affiliated to the left-leaning party of the Major. She is very 
active politically both offline and online, employing a variety of platforms ranging from 
online forums and newspaper websites to Facebook. She uses this SNS to a great extent for 
political purposes. She manages a Facebook group affiliated to the Major through which she 
spreads information and promotes initiatives. She also uses Facebook to obtain information 
and engage in political discussion. In terms of non-political participation, Martina employs 
Facebook quite extensively for her hobby, photography, and for entertainment (i.e., games), 
while rarely for communicating with her network. 
Raffaella: Raffaella is in the 25-34 age-group, educated to High School level, and owns and 
works in a beauty shop. She has a moderate interest in politics, was previously affiliated to 
the Centre-right coalition, but is now very critical towards Italian political institutions and 
disengaged from party politics. Because of this disengagement she limits her participation 
mainly to the consumption of political information. Raffaella uses Facebook often, for both 
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political and non-political purposes, and she acknowledges that this SNS is her main source 
of political and non-political information. She also engages in a variety of other activities 
through this SNS. She uses it for entertainment, to keep in touch with friends, and even to 
engage with her local community through a Facebook group. 
Rosaria: Rosaria is in the 25-34 age-group, educated to degree level, working as an 
administrative officer and tutor in a cultural organisation. She does not have any particular 
political alliance but sympathises with the aims of the M5S. She engages in political 
communication activities both offline and online and also takes part in several offline 
political initiatives. Her online activity is, to a certain extent, almost entirely Facebook-
based. This SNS is her main source of politically relevant information (e.g., news and 
information about political initiatives). She also uses Facebook for a number of other 
purposes: for work, to communicate with her professional network, to keep in touch with 
certain people, and to express her feelings, thoughts and moods. 
Virginia: Virginia is in the 25-34 age-group, studying towards a Doctorate in Economy and 
Tourism. She shows a detachment from Italian political institutions and a moderate level of 
political interest. In terms of politics she tends to engage mainly in the consumption of 
political information which she obtains almost exclusively online, through newspaper 
websites, mobile apps and, in particular, Facebook. Facebook emerges as extremely relevant 
to Virginia who uses this SNS to maintain her social but also professional network and 
especially for information purposes. Because of her limited interest in and knowledge of 
politics, she keeps her political participation on Facebook to a minimum (i.e., consumption 
of political information), intentionally avoiding other forms of political participation such as 
political discussion or mobilisation related activities, in which she engages offline to a 
limited extent. 
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Appendix E – Questionnaires  
British Questionnaire 
 
Welcome 
Welcome to the "Facebook and Political Participation" survey. Firstly, I would like to thank 
you for clicking on the announcement.  
 
This survey is the first phase of my PhD research investigating the impact of Facebook on 
political participation.  
 
If you would like to learn more about the study and data protection policy please visit the 
following website: https://sites.google.com/site/phdprojectqmu/ 
 
This survey will take around 10 minutes to complete. 
 
To participate you will have to be a British citizen between the age of 18 and 65 and a 
Facebook user. 
 
To show you my appreciation for taking part in the study a random draw will be held. 
Your name will be entered in the draw and the winner will be rewarded with a £30 
voucher/mobile top-up. Further info on the rewards can be found on the website. 
 
If you have any questions please e-mail icasteltrione@qmu.ac.uk or post a comment on 
the "Homepage" of the website. 
 
Thank you very much for your help and enjoy the survey.  
 
 
Consent Form 
I have read and understood the information provided about this study. 
 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation. 
 
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in this study. 
 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage without giving 
any reason. 
 
I agree to participate in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
303 
Demographics 
Questions are mandatory. 
 
Please select only one answer for each question.  
 
Note that once you have clicked on the CONTINUE button your answers are submitted 
and you cannot return to review or amend that page.  
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Media Usage 
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Political Engagement 
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307 
 
Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements: 
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Facebook Usage 
 
Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements: 
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Facebook Non-political Activities
 
Facebook and Political Participation
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Political Participation 
The Internet and Political Participation
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Offline Political Participation
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Italian Questionnaire 
 
Benvenuto 
Benvenuto al questionario "Facebook e la Partecipazione Politica". Prima di tutto, vorrei 
ringraziarla per aver clickato sull'annuncio. 
 
Questo questionario è la prima fase del mio dottorato di ricerca che mira ad esaminare 
l'impatto di Facebook sulla partecipazione politica. 
 
Se vuole saperne di più sul progetto di ricerca e sul sistema atto a garantire la protezione 
dei dati la prego di visitare il seguente sito web:  
https://sites.google.com/site/progettodiricercaphd/ 
 
Questo questionario richiederà circa 10 minuti. 
 
Per partecipare è necessario essere un cittadino italiano di età compresa tra i 18 ed i 
65 anni ed un utente di Facebook. 
 
Per dimostare il mio apprezzamento verso i partecipanti che hanno preso parte allo studio 
verrà effettuato un sorteggio. Il Suo nome sarà inserito nel sorteggio e, nel caso dovesse 
risultare vincitore/ice, Lei verrà premiato/a con un buono/ricarica di cellulare del 
valore di 30 €. Può trovare ulteriori informazioni sui premi omaggio nel sopracitato sito 
web.  
 
Se ha domande la prego di inviare una e-mail a icasteltrione@qmu.ac.uk o di lasciare un 
commento sulla "Homepage" del sito web. 
 
La ringrazio molto per il Suo aiuto e spero che apprezzerà il questionario. 
 
Modulo di consenso 
Ho letto e compreso le informazioni fornite su questo studio. 
 
Ho avuto l'opportunità di porre domande circa la mia partecipazione. 
 
Capisco che non sono obbligato a prendere parte a questo studio. 
 
Mi rendo conto che ho il diritto di abbandonare il presente studio in qualsiasi momento, 
senza dare alcuna motivazione. 
 
Accetto di partecipare a questo studio. 
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Domande demografiche 
Le domande sono obbligatorie. 
Si prega di selezionare una sola risposta per ogni domanda. 
 
Si noti che una volta clickato sul pulsante CONTINUA le Sue risposte saranno inviate e 
non sarà possibile tornare indietro per rivederle o modificarle.  
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Utilizzo dei mezzi di comunicazione 
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Impegno politico 
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317 
 
La prego di indicare quanto concorda con ciascuna delle seguenti affermazioni:
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Utilizzo di Facebook 
 
  
La prego di indicare quanto concorda con ciascuna delle seguenti affermazioni:
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Facebook ed attività non-politica
 
Facebook ed attività politica
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Partecipazione politica 
Internet ed attività politica
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Attività politica offline
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Appendix F – Questionnaire Coding Sheet 
Q1 Are you? 
1 Female 
2 Male 
  Q2 What is your age? 
1 18-24  years old 
2 25-34 years old 
3 35-44 years old 
4 45-65 years old 
  Q3 What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
1 Less than Upper Secondary Education  
2 Upper Secondary Education  
3 Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary Education  
4 First Stage of Tertiary Education  
5 Second Stage of Tertiary Education  
  Q4 What is your main job or occupation? 
7 Large employer, manager and professional  
6 Intermediate and lower supervisor 
5 Small employer and own account worker 
4 White collar worker (e.g. clerk) 
3 Blue collar worker (e.g. labourer) 
2 Unemployed 
1 Student 
  Q5 How much time do you usually spend daily watching TV? 
1 None at all 
2 Less than 1 hour 
3 1 to 3 hours 
4 3 to 5 hours 
5 More than 5 hours 
  
Q6 
How much time do you usually spend daily reading  
newspapers and/or magazines? 
1 None at all 
2 Less than 1 hour 
3 1 to 3 hours 
4 3 to 5 hours 
5 More than 5 hours 
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Q7 How much time do you usually spend daily listening to the radio? 
1 None at all 
2 Less than 1 hour 
3 1 to 3 hours 
4 3 to 5 hours 
5 More than 5 hours 
  
Q8 
How much time do you usually spend daily on the Internet 
(excluding Facebook)? 
1 None at all 
2 Less than 1 hour 
3 1 to 3 hours 
4 3 to 5 hours 
5 More than 5 hours 
  
Q9 
In the last six months how often did you consume (read/listen/watch)  
political news through the following media? 
Q9_a TV 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very Often 
  Q9_b Press 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very Often 
  Q9_c Radio 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very Often 
  Q9_d Internet (excluding Facebook) 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very Often 
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Q9_e Facebook 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very Often 
  
Q10 
How often do you follow what is going on in government  
and public affairs? 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q11 Generally speaking, you usually think of yourself as 
1 Conservative/ Popolo della Libertà 
2 Labour/Partito Democratico 
3 Liberal Democrat/Terzo Polo 
4 Other 
5 No affiliation 
 
Q12 
 
What is your level of support for your preferred  
political party/movement?  
1 Not strong at all 
2 Not strong 
3 Neither strong nor weak 
4 Strong 
5 Very strong 
6 Not applicable 
  Q13 What political office is now held by Nick Clegg/Gianfranco Fini? 
0 Prime Minister/Presidente della Repubblica 
0 Chancellor of the Exchequer/Primo Ministro 
1 Deputy Prime Minister/Presidente della Camera 
0 Lord High Steward/ Presidente del Senato 
0 I don't know 
  
Q14 
At the moment, who is the leader of the Labour Party/ 
Partito Democratico? 
0 Nick Clegg/Antonio di Pietro 
0 Gordon Brown/Dario Franceschini 
1 Ed Miliband/Pier Luigi Bersani 
0 David Cameron/Silvio Berlusconi 
0 I don't know 
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Q15 How many times can the House of Lords/ 
Presidente della Repubblica reject a bill within a year? 
0 Never 
0 One time 
1(IS)0 Two times 
1(BS)0 Three times 
0 I don't know 
  
Q16 Which political party would you say is more right-wing? 
1 Conservative Party/Popolo della Libertà 
0 Labour Party/Partitio Democratico 
0 Liberal Democrats/UDC 
0 Green Party/Italia dei Valori 
0 I don't know 
  
Q17 
At the moment, which party has the most members  
in the House of Commons? 
1 Conservative Party/Popolo della Libertà 
0 Labour Party/Partitio Democratico 
0 Liberal Democrats/UDC 
0 Green Party/Italia dei Valori 
0 I don't know 
  Q18 Public officials don't care about people like me. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
  
Q19 
Sometimes politics seems so complicated that a person like  
me can't really understand it. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
  Q20 How much time do you usually spend daily on Facebook? 
1 Less than 1 hour 
2 1 to 3 hours 
3 3 to 5 hours 
4 More than 5 hours 
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Q21 
 
Facebook is part of my everyday activity. 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Disagree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Agree 
5 Strongly agree 
  Q22 I feel out of touch when I haven't logged onto Facebook for a while. 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Disagree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Agree 
5 Strongly agree 
  Q23 I feel I am part of the Facebook community. 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Disagree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Agree 
5 Strongly agree 
  Q24 I would be sorry if Facebook closed down. 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Disagree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Agree 
5 Strongly agree 
  
Q25 
In the last six months how often did you engage in the following  
activities through Facebook? 
Q25_a Watching/listening/reading non-political news (e.g. sport) 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q25_b Posting/uploading non-political material (e.g. music videos) 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
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Q25_c Visiting profiles of non-political actors or organisations  
(e.g. celebrities) 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q25_d Searching for non-political initiatives (e.g. concerts) 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q25_e Sharing information on non-political initiatives 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q25_f Contacting family and friends 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q25_g Non-political talk (e.g. gossip) 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q25_h Joining a non-political group (e.g. fan club) 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
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Q25_i Organising non-political initiatives (e.g. nights out) 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  
Q26 
In the last six months how often did you engage in the  
following activities through Facebook? 
Q26_a 
Organising/participating in a political initiative, meeting,  
rally and/or protest 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q26_b Forming/joining a group or an organisation developed around politics 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  
Q26_c 
Soliciting others to support or oppose a particular political party,  
candidate, and/or initiative 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  
Q26_d 
Contacting a political party, candidate, government department  
and/or local council 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q26_e Learning about a political initiative, meeting, rally and/or protest 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
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Q26_f 
Learning about a political initiative, meeting, rally  
and/or protest in which you took part 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q26_g Learning about a group or an organisation developed around politics 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q26_h Engaging in formal and informal political discussions 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  
Q26_i 
Expressing a political opinion  
(e.g. publishing/commenting on a post concerning politics) 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  
Q27 
In the last six months how often did you engage in the following  
activities through the Internet (excluding Facebook)? 
Q27_a 
Organising/participating in a political initiative,  
meeting, rally and/or protest 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q27_b Forming/joining a group or an organisation developed around politics 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
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Q27_c 
Soliciting others to support or oppose a particular political party,  
candidate, and/or initiative 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  
Q27_d 
Contacting a political party, candidate, government department  
and/or local council 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q27_e Learning about a political initiative, meeting, rally and/or protest 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  
Q27_f 
Learning about a political initiative, meeting, rally  
and/or protest in which you took part 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q27_g Learning about a group or an organisation developed around politics 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q27_h Engaging in formal and informal political discussions 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
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Q27_i 
Expressing a political opinion  
(e.g. publishing/commenting on a post concerning politics) 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  
Q28 
In the last six months how often did you engage in the following activities  
through neither Facebook nor the Internet? 
Q28_a 
Organising/participating in a political initiative, meeting,  
rally and/or protest 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q28_b Forming/joining a group or an organisation developed around politics 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  
Q28_c 
Soliciting others to support or oppose a particular political party,  
candidate, and/or initiative 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  
Q28_d 
Contacting a political party, candidate, government department  
and/or local council 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q28_e Learning about a political initiative, meeting, rally and/or protest 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
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Q28_f 
Learning about a political initiative, meeting, rally  
and/or protest in which you took part 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q28_g Learning about a group or an organisation developed around politics 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q28_h Engaging in formal and informal political discussions 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
  Q28_i Expressing a political opinion (e.g. commenting on a piece of news) 
1 Never 
2 Rarely 
3 Sometimes 
4 Often 
5 Very often 
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Appendix G – Interview Guide 
As anticipated in Section 4.6, an interview guide listing the main issues to be explored 
during the interviews was developed (see the attached CD for the interviews transcripts). 
Political Participation: 
 Description of participation in political activities on Facebook, on the Internet and 
offline  
 Reasons behind participants’ various levels of political participation on Facebook, 
on the Internet and offline 
 Links between Facebook, Internet and offline political participation 
 Increase/decline of political engagement and political  participation due to Facebook 
activity 
 Differences between Facebook, Internet and offline political participation 
 Reasons behind the preference for/opposition to a specific participation channel(s)  
 Contributions of Facebook to political participation 
 
Mobilisation Activities  
 Description of participation in political mobilisation activities on Facebook, on the 
Internet and offline  
 Reasons behind participants’ various levels of mobilisation activities on Facebook, 
on the Internet and offline 
 Links between Facebook, Internet and offline mobilisation activities 
 Differences/similarities  between Facebook, the Internet and the offline world as 
political mobilisation channels 
 Reasons behind the preference for/opposition to a specific mobilisation channel(s)  
 Nature of Facebook  mobilisation (i.e., single-issue or political organisations) 
 Contributions of Facebook to political mobilisation 
 
Communication Activities  
 Description of consumption of political information on Facebook, on the Internet 
and offline  
 Reasons behind participants’ various levels of consumption of political information 
on Facebook, on the Internet and offline 
 Description of participation in political discussion on Facebook, on the Internet and 
offline  
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 Reasons behind participants’ various levels of political discussion on Facebook, on 
the Internet and offline 
 Links between Facebook, Internet and offline political communication activities and 
political mobilisations ones 
 Reasons behind the preference for/opposition to a specific political information and 
media source(s)  
 Differences/similarities  between Facebook, other online and offline information 
sources 
 Nature of sources of Facebook political information (e.g., friends, political 
organisations, traditional media, alternative media, etc.) 
 Trustworthiness of political information from the various media channels 
 Reasons behind the preference for/opposition to a specific political discussion 
platform(s)  
 Differences/similarities  between Facebook, other online and offline political 
discussion 
 Quality and tones of Facebook, Internet and offline political discussion (e.g., 
productive discussion, fact-based discussion, quarrels, uncivil tones, etc.) 
 Nature of Facebook, Internet and offline discussants (e.g., friends, friends of friends, 
or strangers) 
 Exposure to political difference on Facebook, the Internet and offline 
 Dynamics of exposure to political information on Facebook, the Internet and offline 
(i.e., actively searching for information or accidentally exposed to information) 
 Contributions of Facebook to the consumption of political information 
 Contributions of Facebook to political discussion 
 
Facebook Usage 
 Description of Facebook usage 
 Reasons behind participants’ various levels of Facebook usage 
 Most common Facebook non-political activities 
 Nature of social network (e.g., number of friends, types of friends – real life friends, 
online friends, friends of friends, strangers; homogeneous or heterogeneous political 
backgrounds, etc.) 
 Links between Facebook usage(s) and political participation 
 Perception and relevance of Facebook 
 Contributions of Facebook to one’s life 
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Appendix H – Thematic Analysis 
As explained in Section 4.6.3, the interviews were analysed through a thematic analysis. 
Table H1 shows the process behind the development of the various codes through which the 
qualitative data were organised (i.e., theory-driven coding, quantitative data-driven, and 
qualitative data-driven), while Table H2 indicates how the various codes have informed the 
identified themes. 
Table H1 – Thematic Analysis: Code Development  
 
Cluster 
 
Thematic 
Categories 
 
Codes 
 
Coding 
FACEBOOK 
USAGE 
 
Relevance of 
Facebook  
1. A key tool in people’s 
lives 
Quantitative data-driven: 
Samples’ high/moderate scores on the 
Facebook perceived relevance scale 
2. Replacing other online 
platforms 
Qualitative data-driven 
3. Limited importance in 
people’s lives  
Qualitative data-driven 
4. Most used online 
platform 
Qualitative data-driven 
5. Using other online 
platforms instead of 
Facebook 
Qualitative data-driven 
6. Used in combination 
with other online 
platforms 
Qualitative data-driven 
Factors 
limiting 
Facebook 
activity 
7. Privacy concerns 
limiting Facebook 
activity 
Theory-driven: 
Section 2.3 and 2.4 – privacy paradox 
8. Digital skills reducing 
Facebook activity 
Qualitative data-driven  
9. Older people less active 
on Facebook  
Theory-driven: 
Section 2.2 – digital divide 
10. Dislike of Facebook as 
a company 
Theory-driven: 
Section 2.4 – exploiting users’ 
information 
11. Facebook as a time-
waster 
Qualitative data-driven 
12. Dislike of some 
Facebook contacts 
Qualitative data-driven 
13. Preference for other 
online platforms 
Qualitative data-driven 
14. Preference for offline 
based relationship and 
interaction 
Qualitative data-driven 
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Table H1 – Thematic Analysis: Code Development (continued from the previous page) 
 
Cluster 
 
Thematic 
Categories 
 
Codes 
 
Coding 
FACEBOOK 
USAGE 
 
Factors 
promoting 
Facebook 
activity  
15. Everybody is on 
Facebook 
Qualitative data-driven 
16. Everything is in one 
place 
Qualitative data-driven 
17. Easier to keep in touch 
with people 
Theory-driven: 
Section 2.3 – facilitating the 
management of social relationships 
18. Being constantly 
updated on what 
happens around you 
Qualitative data-driven 
19. Enjoyment of the 
variety of information 
and people found on 
Facebook 
Qualitative data-driven 
20. Improvement of social 
life 
Qualitative data-driven 
Various 
usages  of 
Facebook  
21. Facebook as a light-
hearted platform 
Quantitative data-driven: 
Samples’ higher levels of Facebook 
non-political activity when compared 
to their Facebook political 
participation 
22. Used only for politics Qualitative data-driven 
23. Different usages 
according to different 
levels of political 
engagement 
Qualitative data-driven 
24. Not one favourite usage  Quantitative data-driven: 
Samples’ similar scores on the 
various Facebook non-political usage 
dimensions 
25. Information usage 
 
Theory-driven: 
See Section 2.4 – various usages of 
Facebook 
26. Entertainment usage Theory-driven: 
See Section 2.4 – various usages of 
Facebook 
27. Communication usage Theory-driven: 
See Section 2.4 – various usages of 
Facebook 
28. Relationship 
maintenance 
Theory-driven: 
See Section 2.4 – various usages of 
Facebook 
29. Work and study-related 
usage  
Qualitative data-driven 
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Table H1 – Thematic Analysis: Code Development (continued from the previous page) 
 
Cluster 
 
Thematic 
Categories 
 
Codes 
 
Coding 
POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
 
Relevance of 
Facebook as a 
political 
platform  
30. Most used political 
platform 
Quantitative data-driven: 
IPs’ higher scores on Facebook 
political participation compared to 
Internet and offline political 
participation 
31. Used in combination 
with other online 
platforms for political 
purposes  
Quantitative data-driven: 
BPs’ higher scores on Internet 
political participation compared to 
Facebook political participation 
32. Using other online 
platforms instead of 
Facebook for political 
purposes 
Qualitative data-driven 
33. Growing importance of 
Facebook as a political 
platform 
Qualitative data-driven 
34. Limited importance of 
Facebook as a political 
platform  
Quantitative data-driven: 
Samples’ limited scores on Facebook 
political participation 
35. A further venue for 
politically active 
individuals 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.1 – reinforcement thesis 
36. Not relevant to users 
with limited levels of 
political participation  
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.1 – reinforcement thesis 
Advantages of 
Facebook as a 
political 
participation 
platform 
37. Possibility of 
participating at any time 
and from anywhere  
Qualitative data-driven 
38. Reducing the thresholds 
of participation 
Theory-driven:  
Section 3.1 – mobilisation thesis 
39. Possibility of learning 
more about politics 
Qualitative data-driven 
40. Facebook as a more 
informal venue for 
political participation 
Qualitative data-driven 
41. Emergence of new 
forms of participation 
(e.g., contacting 
politicians on 
Facebook) 
Theory-driven:  
Section 3.1 – mobilisation thesis 
42. Increase in requests for 
participation  
Qualitative data-driven 
43. Promoting the 
participation of 
previously politically 
inactive users 
Theory-driven:  
Section 3.1 – mobilisation thesis 
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Table H1 – Thematic Analysis: Code Development (continued from the previous page) 
 
Cluster 
 
Thematic 
Categories 
 
Codes 
 
Coding 
POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
 
Advantages of 
Facebook as a 
political 
participation 
platform 
44. Facebook leading to 
offline political 
participation  
Quantitative data-driven: 
Large correlations between Facebook 
and offline political participation 
45. Facebook leading to 
political participation on 
other online platforms 
Quantitative data-driven: 
Large correlations between Facebook 
and Internet political participation 
Limitations of 
Facebook as a 
political 
participation 
platform 
46. Participating on 
Facebook does not 
change anything 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.1 – drawing citizens away 
from more meaningful forms of 
participation 
47. Politics is not important 
on Facebook 
Qualitative data-driven 
48. Expressing political 
views on Facebook can 
endanger social 
relationships 
Qualitative data-driven 
49. Expressing political 
views on Facebook can 
impact negatively on  
offline life (e.g., losing 
job opportunities) 
Qualitative data-driven 
50. Only politically active 
people take advantage 
of Facebook 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.1 –  reinforcement thesis 
51. People who are not on 
Facebook are excluded  
Theory-driven: 
Section 2.2 – digital divide 
52. People with limited 
digital skills are 
excluded 
Theory-driven: 
Section 2.2 – digital divide 
53. Old people have less 
chances to participates 
Theory-driven: 
Section 2.2 – digital divide 
 
POLITICAL 
MOBILISATION 
 
Relevance of 
Facebook as a 
political 
mobilisation 
platform 
54. The most used political 
platform by activists 
Qualitative data-driven 
55. A key tool for the 
organisation of political 
initiatives   
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.4 – SNSs as key 
organisational tools 
56. Replacing other 
organisation and 
communication tools 
Qualitative data-driven 
57. Combined with other 
online platforms for 
political mobilisation 
Qualitative data-driven 
58. Very limited impact on 
citizens’ political 
mobilisation 
Quantitative data-driven: 
Samples’ very limited scores on 
Facebook political mobilisation 
59. Used mainly for 
political communication 
Quantitative data-driven: 
Samples’ higher scores on Facebook 
political communication  
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Table H1 – Thematic Analysis: Code Development (continued from the previous page) 
 
Cluster 
 
Thematic 
Categories 
 
Codes 
 
Coding 
POLITICAL 
MOBILISATION 
 
Relevance of 
Facebook as a 
political 
mobilisation 
platform 
60. No point in participating 
in political initiatives  
Qualitative data-driven 
 
61. Preference for offline 
mobilisation  
Qualitative data-driven 
 
Advantages of 
Facebook as a 
political 
mobilisation 
platform 
62. Learning about more 
political initiatives 
Qualitative data-driven 
63. Mobilisation does not 
depend anymore on 
political institutions 
Qualitative data-driven 
64. Possibility of supporting 
a wide range of causes 
Qualitative data-driven 
65. Possibility of supporting 
causes relevant to the 
individual 
Theory-driven: 
Section 1.2 – lifestyle politics 
66. Possibility of 
connecting with the 
offline-local dimension 
Qualitative data-driven 
67. Facilitating the 
organisation of political 
initiatives 
Qualitative data-driven 
68. Facilitating 
communication among 
activists 
Qualitative data-driven 
69. Increasing the reach of 
political initiatives 
Qualitative data-driven 
70. Possibility of increasing 
awareness around a 
political initiative 
Qualitative data-driven 
Limitations of 
Facebook as a 
political 
mobilisation 
platform 
71. Meaningful only if used 
in support of offline 
activities 
Qualitative data-driven 
72. Cannot be used in 
isolation – needs to be 
combined with other 
tools 
Qualitative data-driven 
73. Whoever is not on 
Facebook is often 
excluded from political 
initiatives 
Theory-driven: 
Section 2.2 – digital divide 
74. Limited impact on 
political process 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.4 – clicktivism 
75. Too many causes to 
support 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.2 – information overload 
76. Issues with the 
credibility of the various 
causes  
Qualitative data-driven 
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Table H1 – Thematic Analysis: Code Development (continued from the previous page) 
 
Cluster 
 
Thematic 
Categories 
 
Codes 
 
Coding 
POLITICAL 
INFORMATION 
 
Relevance of 
Facebook as a 
political 
information 
source 
77. Most used political 
information source 
Quantitative data-driven: 
IPs’ higher scores on Facebook 
political information compared to 
offline and Internet political 
information 
78. Used in combination 
with other online 
political information 
sources  
Quantitative data-driven: 
BPs’ higher scores on Internet 
political information compared to 
Facebook political information 
79. Using other online 
political information 
sources instead of 
Facebook  
Qualitative data-driven 
80. Growing importance of 
Facebook as a political 
information source 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.2 – values of SNSs as 
political information sources 
81. Preference for 
mainstream media  
Qualitative data-driven 
82. Preferred to mainstream 
media 
Quantitative data-driven: 
IPs’ low scores on offline political 
information  
83. Preference of other 
online sources 
Quantitative data-driven: 
BPs’ higher scores on Internet 
political information compared to 
Facebook political information 
Advantages of 
Facebook as a 
political 
information 
source 
84. Free from the influence 
of media and political 
institutions 
Qualitative data-driven 
85. Possibility of obtaining 
information from a wide 
variety of sources 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.2 – proliferation of 
information sources 
86. Possibility of fostering 
political interest 
Qualitative data-driven 
87. Leading users to search 
for further information 
Qualitative data-driven 
88. Information coming 
from other citizens 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.2 – information exuberance 
89. Being constantly 
updated 
Qualitative data-driven 
90. Presence of both 
mainstream and 
alternative political 
information sources 
Qualitative data-driven 
91. No need to search for 
information 
Qualitative data-driven 
92. Obtaining information 
impossible to find 
through more traditional 
channels 
Qualitative data-driven 
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Table H1 – Thematic Analysis: Code Development (continued from the previous page) 
 
Cluster 
 
Thematic 
Categories 
 
Codes 
 
Coding 
POLITICAL 
INFORMATION 
 
Advantages of 
Facebook as a 
political 
information 
source 
93. Obtaining more 
trustworthy political 
information 
Qualitative data-driven 
94. Obtaining more political 
information 
Qualitative data-driven 
Limitations of 
Facebook as a 
political 
information 
source  
95. Abundance of bogus 
information 
Qualitative data driven 
96. Too much information  Theory-driven: 
Section 2.2 – information  overload 
97. Information coming 
from mainstream media 
is more trustworthy 
Qualitative data driven 
Selective 
exposure 
98. Consuming pro-
attitudinal political 
information 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.2 – selective exposure 
99. Obtaining politically 
diverse information 
Qualitative data-driven 
100. Direct selection of 
political information 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.2 – pro-active selection 
typical of new media 
101. Accidental exposure to 
political information 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.2 – inadvertency thesis 
102.  More political 
difference on Facebook 
Qualitative data-driven 
103. More political 
difference on other 
online platforms 
Qualitative data-driven 
104. More political 
difference offline 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.2 – the Internet offering the 
conditions most conducive to 
selective exposure 
105. More selective 
exposure on other 
online platforms 
Qualitative data-driven 
106. More selective 
exposure offline 
Qualitative data-driven 
107. No difference among 
the various information 
sources in terms of 
exposure to political 
difference 
Qualitative data-driven 
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Table H1 – Thematic Analysis: Code Development (continued from the previous page) 
 
Cluster 
 
Thematic 
Categories 
 
Codes 
 
Coding 
POLITICAL 
DISCUSSION 
 
Relevance of 
Facebook as a 
political 
discussion 
platform 
108. Most used political 
discussion platform 
Qualitative data-driven 
109. Combined with other 
online political 
discussion platforms 
Qualitative data-driven 
110. Using other online 
discussion platforms 
instead of Facebook  
Qualitative data-driven 
111. Growing relevance of 
Facebook as a 
discussion platform 
Quantitative data-driven: 
Samples’ same scores on Facebook 
and offline political discussion 
112. Replacing other online 
discussion platforms 
Quantitative data-driven: 
Samples’ higher scores on Facebook 
political discussion compared to 
Internet political discussion 
113. Preference for offline 
political discussion  
Qualitative data-driven 
114. Preference for 
Facebook political 
discussion  
Qualitative data-driven 
115. Preference for other 
online political 
discussion platforms 
Qualitative data-driven 
Advantages of 
Facebook as a 
political 
discussion 
platform 
116. Involving more 
participants 
Qualitative data-driven 
117. Discussing with a 
wider range of people 
than offline 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.3 – discussing with 
geographically distant interlocutors   
118. Discussing with a 
wider range of people 
than on other online 
platforms 
Qualitative data-driven 
119. Discussing with a more 
politically diverse range 
of people than offline  
Qualitative data-driven 
120. Discussing with a more 
politically diverse range 
of people than on other 
online platforms 
Qualitative data-driven 
121. Possibility of engaging 
in political discussion at 
any time 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.3 – flexibility of online 
political discussion 
122. More political 
discussion 
Qualitative data-driven 
123. Learning new 
information 
Qualitative data-driven 
124. More honesty online Qualitative data-driven 
125. Absence of  physical 
cues contributing to 
honesty 
Qualitative data-driven 
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Table H1 – Thematic Analysis: Code Development (continued from the previous page) 
 
Cluster 
 
Thematic 
Categories 
 
Codes 
 
Coding 
POLITICAL 
DISCUSSION 
 
Limitations of 
Facebook as a 
political 
discussion 
platform 
126. Enjoyment of the 
physical element of 
face-to-face discussion 
Qualitative data-driven 
127. Online discussion more 
aggressive than offline 
discussion 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.3 – flaming 
128. Absence of physical 
contact leading to more 
aggressive tones 
Qualitative data-driven 
129. Discussing only with 
like-minded individuals  
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.3 – echo-chambers 
130. Possibility of being 
harassed by people 
holding a different 
political view 
Qualitative data-driven 
131. Possibility of people 
interfering in a 
discussion 
Qualitative data-driven 
132. Possibility of people 
ruining a discussion 
Theory-driven: 
Section 3.3 – trolls 
133. Presence of identity 
attributes limiting the 
honesty of a discussion 
Qualitative data-driven 
134. If a mistake is made 
greater possibility of 
receiving criticism 
Qualitative data-driven 
135. Semi-public nature of 
Facebook posts limiting 
the topics of discussions 
Theory-driven: 
Section 2.3 – blurring of the private 
and the public 
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The codes listed in Table H1 were examined, relationships among them sought, their links 
with the RQs considered, and relevant themes identified. 
Table H2 – Thematic Analysis: From Codes to Themes  
 
Cluster 
 
Themes 
 
Codes 
FACEBOOK 
USAGE 
Importance of Facebook in people’s 
lives 
1, 2, 4, 6, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 25, 26, 27, 
28, 29, 30, 54, 77, 82, 108,  
Negative perception of Facebook  3, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 34, 61, 76, 79, 
81, 95, 97, 110, 113, 115 
Facebook replacing other Internet tools 2, 6, 30, 31, 33, 54, 55, 56, 57, 77, 78, 
80, 108, 111, 112 
Facebook as an all-encompassing 
platform 
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 54,  55, 77, 
80, 108, 111 
Mainly non-political usage  7, 8, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 34, 
47, 58, 79, 81, 110, 113, 115 
Mainly political usage by highly 
politically active users 
22, 23, 30, 35, 36, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 77, 
80, 82, 108, 111, 114,  
 
POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
Facebook as main online political 
platform 
1, 2, 4, 22, 30, 33, 54, 55, 56, 77, 80, 82, 
108, 111, 112 
Political relevance of other online 
platforms and websites 
5, 6, 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 57, 
58, 78, 83, 109, 110, 115 
Involving new participants 15, 16, 17, 18, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 
44, 45, 59, 64, 67, 69, 70, 86, 87, 88,  
89, 91, 92, 94, 101, 116, 117, 121, 122, 
123,  
Facilitating participation 15, 16, 17, 18, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 
64, 67, 68, 69, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 121, 
122 
Bringing politics into everyday life 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 88, 89, 91, 94, 101, 
121, 122 
Virtuous circle 25, 27, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 59, 70, 77, 80, 
82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 101, 
121, 122, 123 
Facebook usage gap 5, 8, 9, 32, 34, 51, 52, 53, 72, 73, 81, 
113 
Need of digital skills 8, 9, 34, 52, 53, 72, 81, 113 
Relevance of privacy concerns 7, 32, 34, 48, 49, 133, 134, 135 
Relevance of political interest 22, 23, 30, 34, 35, 36, 39, 42, 50, 54, 58, 
77,  86, 94, 100, 101, 108  
Relevance of political knowledge and 
internal political efficacy 
25, 34, 39, 42, 62, 64, 68, 69, 70, 85, 86, 
88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 100, 101, 123, 134 
Relevance of external political efficacy 34, 46, 58, 59, 60, 63, 74, 76 
Relevance of affiliation to a party or 
movement 
22, 23, 30, 35, 50, 54, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 
77, 80, 108, 11 
Relevance of the amount of Facebook 
usage 
1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 24, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 39, 
42, 43, 44, 45, 54, 55, 56, 57, 62, 63, 65, 
69, 70, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 86, 87, 88, 89, 
91, 92, 94, 100, 101, 108, 109, 1010, 
1111, 112, 121, 122, 123 
Lack of time inhibiting participation 21, 23, 34, 36, 38, 37, 41, 43, 62, 67, 74, 
89, 91, 121, 122 
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Table H2 – Thematic Analysis: From Codes to Themes (continued form previous page) 
 
Cluster 
 
Themes 
 
Codes 
POLITICAL 
INFORMATION 
 
The flexibility and speed of online 
information 
25, 37, 39, 42, 59, 67, 68, 69, 77, 82, 84, 
88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 100, 101, 116, 117, 
121, 122, 123 
The variety of online sources 19, 25, 39, 42, 77, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 
89, 90, 92, 94, 99, 102, 103, 116, 117, 
119, 122, 123 
The interactive nature of online 
information 
25, 45, 62, 64, 66, 69, 70, 77, 78, 82, 83, 
85, 87, 88, 89, 91, 100, 101, 116, 117 
Facebook and proliferation of sources 1, 15, 16, 19, 25, 39, 42, 55, 62. 64, 65, 
66, 67, 69, 70, 75, 77, 80, 82, 85, 88, 89, 
90, 91, 92, 94, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102 , 
116, 117, 118, 119, 122, 123  
The networked nature of Facebook 
information 
15, 16, 18, 25, 38, 39, 42, 62, 65, 66, 69, 
70, 77, 80, 85, 87, 88, 89, 91, 94, 100, 
101, 102, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 
123 
Viral information on Facebook 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 25, 37, 38, 39, 42, 44, 
45, 54, 55, 62, 66, 69, 70, 77, 80, 85, 86, 
87, 88, 91, 92, 94, 99, 101, 102, 116, 
117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 131 
Facebook as activator of the information 
search process 
15, 16, 18, 19, 25, 39, 42, 45, 62, 64, 65, 
66, 70, 77, 80, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 100, 
116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122 
Issues of credibility of Facebook political 
information 
3, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 21, 25, 26,  34, 42, 
47, 58, 61, 62, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 83, 
85, 88, 95, 96, 97, 117, 118 
Exposure to pro-attitudinal political 
information 
22, 25, 35, 39, 42, 59, 62, 64, 65, 70, 77, 
80, 85, 92, 94, 98, 100, 101, 103, 104, 
105, 106, 107, 122 
Exposure to political difference on 
Facebook 
15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 25, 39, 42, 43, 59, 64, 
69, 70, 77, 80, 82, 85, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 
94, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, 
116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123 
Exposure to political difference through 
active selection 
15, 17, 19, 22, 23, 25, 35, 39, 42, 59, 64, 
77, 80, 85, 87, 94, 99, 100, 102, 105, 
106, 107  
Accidental exposure to political 
difference 
15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 27, 28, 29, 38, 39, 
42, 43, 44, 45, 62, 80, 85, 86, 88, 89, 91, 
92, 94, 99, 102, 105, 106, 107, 131 
Interaction and exposure to political 
difference 
15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 35, 39, 
50, 59, 80, 88, 91, 94, 99, 102, 103, 104, 
105, 106, 107, 116,  119, 120, 122  
Presence of established media 
institutions on Facebook 
25, 31, 39, 45, 75, 76, 77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 
90, 94, 95, 97, 100 
Facebook as source of alternative 
information 
22, 25, 30, 39, 42, 44, 45, 55, 57, 62, 64, 
65, 69, 70, 77, 80, 82, 84, 85, 89, 90, 92, 
93, 94, 100, 122, 123 
Negative perception of established media 
institutions 
22, 25, 30, 44, 45, 62, 64, 65, 69, 70, 77, 
80, 82, 84, 85, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 100 
Support for established media 
institutions 
21, 31, 32, 34, 46, 47, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 
90, 95, 96, 97 
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Table H2 – Thematic Analysis: From Codes to Themes (continued form previous page) 
 
Cluster 
 
Themes 
 
Codes 
POLITICAL 
MOBILISATION 
 
Low efficacy of political initiatives 34, 46, 58, 59, 60, 63, 74, 75, 76 
More communication than mobilisation 23, 33, 34, 39, 46, 58, 59, 60, 61, 71, 74, 
76, 77, 80, 82, 86, 89, 91, 92, 94, 100, 
101, 108, 111, 114, 121, 122 
Growing relevance of Facebook in 
activists’ repertoires 
23, 35, 54, 55, 56, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 
69, 70 
Promoting grassroots single-issue 
mobilisation 
40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 54, 55, 62, 63, 64, 65, 
66, 67, 69, 70, 88, 92 
More information on political initiatives 39, 42, 54, 55, 59, 62, 64, 67, 69, 70, 75, 
77, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 
100, 101, 116, 117, 118, 121, 122, 123 
Bypassing traditional mobilisation 
channels 
40, 41, 42, 54, 55, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 
70, 84, 85, 88, 90, 92, 94, 122 
Detachment from traditional politics 34, 40, 46, 58, 59, 60, 63, 65, 74, 82, 84, 
85, 88, 92, ,93 
Interdependence between Facebook and 
offline political participation 
23, 42, 44, 50, 54, 55, 61, 62, 68, 69, 70, 
71, 72   
 
POLITICAL 
DISCUSSION 
 
Flexibility and exposure to political 
information 
15, 16, 18, 30, 33, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 
62, 67, 68, 69, 70, 77, 80, 85, 86, 88, 89, 
91, 92, 94, 108, 111, 114, 116, 121, 122, 
123,  
Expanding and diversifying the 
discussion network 
15, 17, 19, 27, 28, 99, 108, 111, 114, 
116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122 
A more politically diverse discussion 
network 
19, 27, 28, 99, 102, 108, 111, 114, 116, 
117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123  
Limited control over discussion and its 
participants 
101, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 121, 122, 
131, 132 
Harsher and more aggressive tones 
online 
113, 115, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 
134 
More honesty and participation in online 
discussion 
114, 115, 119, 120, 122, 124, 125,  128, 
131, 133, 135 
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Appendix I – Ethical Approval Form 
 
 
 
APPLICATION FOR ETHICAL APPROVAL 
FOR A RESEARCH PROJECT 2010/11 
 
This is an application form for ethical approval to undertake a piece of research.  Ethical 
approval must be gained for any piece of research to be undertaken by any student or 
member of staff of QMU.  Approval must also be gained by any external researcher who 
wishes to use Queen Margaret students or staff as participants in their research. 
 
Please note, before any requests for volunteers can be distributed, through the moderator 
service, or externally, this form MUST be submitted (completed, with signatures) to the 
Secretary to the Research Ethics Panel. 
 
You should read QMU’s chapter on “Research Ethics: Regulations, Procedures, and 
Guidelines” before completing the form.  This is available at:  
http://www.qmu.ac.uk/quality/rs/default.htm  
Hard copies are available from the Secretary to the Research Ethics Panel. 
 
The person who completes this form (the applicant) will normally be the Principal 
Investigator (in the case of staff research) or the student (in the case of student research).  In 
other cases of collaborative research, e.g. an undergraduate group project, one member 
should be given responsibility for applying for ethical approval.  For class exercises 
involving research, the module coordinator should complete the application and secure 
approval. 
 
The completed form should be typed rather than handwritten. Electronic signatures should 
be used and the form should be submitted electronically wherever possible. 
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Applicant details 
 
1. Researcher’s name: Isidoropaolo Casteltrione 
 
2. Researcher’s contact email address:ICasteltrione@qmu.ac.uk 
 
3. Category of researcher (please tick and enter title of programme of study as appropriate): 
 
4. School: School of Arts, Social Sciences and Management 
 
5. Subject Area: Political Communication and Media 
 
6. Name of Supervisor or Director of Studies (if applicable): Dr Magda Pieczka 
 
7. Names and affiliations of all other researcher who will be working on the project: None 
 
Research details 
 
8. Title of study: Facebook and  Political Participation:  Self-presentation, Communication 
and Mobilisation 
 
9. Expected start date: February 2012 
 
10. Expected end date: August 2012 
 
11. Details of any financial support for the project from outside QMU: None 
 
12. Please detail the aims and objectives of this study (max. 400 words) 
 
This research investigates the contributions of Facebook to political participation. More 
specifically, it aims to establish how different types of political activities have been 
influenced by the rise of this particular social networking website. In addition, this research 
seeks to assess whether Facebook tends to promote to a greater degree the participation of 
already politically active and engaged citizens rather than the participation of politically 
inactive/less active audiences. This is a cross-national comparative study between Italy and 
the United Kingdom and it addresses the contributions of Facebook to citizens’ political 
participation. 
 
 
 
 
QMU undergraduate student  
Title of programme:  
QMU postgraduate student – taught degree  
Title of programme:  
QMU postgraduate student – research degree PhD 
QMU staff member – research degree  
QMU staff member – other research  
Other (please specify)  
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Methodology 
 
13. Research procedures to be used: please tick all that apply. 
 
 Tick if 
applicable 
Questionnaires (please attach copies of all questionnaires to be used) X 
Interviews (please attach summary of topics to be explored) X 
Focus groups (please attach summary of topics to be explored / copies 
of materials to be used) 
 
Experimental / Laboratory techniques (please include full details under 
question 14) 
 
Use of email / Internet as a means of data collection (please include full 
details under question 14) 
X 
Use of questionnaires / other materials that are subject to copyright 
(please include full details under question 14 and confirm that the 
materials have been / will be purchased for your use) 
 
Use of biomedical procedures to obtain blood or tissue samples (please 
include full details under question 14 and include subject area risk 
assessment forms, where appropriate) 
 
Other technique / procedure (please include full details under question 
14) 
 
 
 
14. Briefly outline the nature of the research and the methods and procedures to be used 
(max. 400 words).  
 
Research method: 
This research will adopt a Mixed Methods approach which combines or associates both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods. Among the various Mixed Methods strategies 
this study will employ a sequential-explanatory one, characterised by the collection and 
analysis of quantitative data in the first phase and the collection and analysis of qualitative 
data in the second one for a more detailed exploration. 
 
Web-survey: 
In the first phase, a web-based survey will investigate citizens’ political participation and the 
links between this phenomenon and  a number of different variables (i.e., media usage, 
Facebook usage, and political engagement). 
 
The website hosting the survey will be: www.survey.bris.ac.uk  
 
It will take approximately 14 minutes to complete the web survey. 
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Interview: 
Information from the first phase will be further explored in the second qualitative phase, 
where a series of semi-structured interviews will be held in order to better understand 
quantitative results. 
 
The interviews will be carried out through either telephone or Skype at a time indicated by 
the participants. Each interview will last approximately 1 hour. 
 
15. Does your research include the use of people as participants? Please delete as 
appropriate.  Yes  
 
16. Does your research include the experimental use of live animals? Please delete as 
appropriate.  No 
 
17. Does your research involve experimenting on plant or animal matter, or inorganic 
matter? Please delete as appropriate.  No 
 
18. Does your research include the analysis of documents, or of material in non-print media, 
other than those which are freely available for public access? Please delete as 
appropriate.  No  
 
19. If you answered ‘Yes’ to question 18, give a description of the material you intend to 
use.  Describe its ownership, your rights of access to it, the permissions required to 
access it and any ways in which personal identities might be revealed or personal 
information might be disclosed.  Describe any measures you will take to safeguard the 
anonymity of sources, where this is relevant: 
 
20. Will any restriction be placed on the publication of results? Please delete as appropriate.  
No    
 
21. If you answered ‘Yes’ to question 20, give details and provide a reasoned justification 
for the restrictions. (See Research Ethics Guidelines Section 2, paragraph 7) 
 
22. Will anyone except the named researchers have access to the data collected? Please 
delete as appropriate.  No    
 
23. Please give details of how and where data will be stored, and how long it will be retained 
for before being destroyed. (See Research Ethics Guidelines Section 1, paragraph 2.4.1) 
 
The only personal data collected from the participants will be their e-mail addresses or their 
Facebook user-names. Such details are required to trace the identity of the winner once the 
draw has been carried out and to limit the risk of people mischievously completing the 
survey more than once in order to have a better chance to be selected in the draw. In order to 
ensure confidentiality, the collected data and the report findings will be anonymised by 
removing all labels and titles that can lead to identification and through the allocation of 
pseudonyms. This procedure will be carried out once the research project has been 
completed. Special care will be taken to store data safely. A safe storage system only 
accessible to the researcher has already been set up. Following Queen Margaret University’s 
Data Protection guidelines, participants’ information will be computerised and password 
protected. 
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24. Please highlight what you see as the most important ethical issues this study raises (eg. 
adverse physical or psychological reactions; addressing a sensitive topic area; risk of 
loss of confidentiality; other ethical issue. If you do not think this study raises any 
ethical issues, please explain why). 
 
An issue could be related to the transparency of the random draw assigning the £30 
vouchers/top-ups. In order to deal with this possible issue a QMU member of staff who is 
not involved in the project will assist the researcher in the draw.  
 
Considering participants’ control over their participation in the study I could not identify any 
other potential ethical issues. 
 
25. If you have identified any ethical issues associated with this study, please explain how 
the potential benefits of the research outweigh any potential harms (e.g., by benefiting 
participants; by improving research skills; other potential benefit). 
 
This research will benefit citizens in that: 
- It will make citizens aware of the existence and effectiveness of a tool through 
which to fulfill their duties as citizens (i.e., indicating to governments which policies 
to pursue and engaging in the political process). 
- It will provide a possible solution to reverse the negative participatory trends 
characterising Western democracies. 
 
In addition, once completed the study a summary of the results will be published on the 
microsite developed for this project. In this way participants will be able to see the outcome 
of their contribution. 
 
This research will also benefit academia: 
- It will contribute to the academic literature on the impact of Internet on political 
participation and in particular to the ongoing and academic debate on the capacity of 
this medium to promote the participation of individuals such as young people or 
isolated citizens who are traditionally less politically active. 
- By focusing exclusively on Facebook and on a wide range of political activities in 
Italy and the UK mainly during a non-electoral period, this study will venture into 
uncharted territory and generate new knowledge. 
 
Protection for the Researcher 
 
26. Will the researcher be at risk of sustaining either physical or psychological harm as a 
result of the research? Please delete as appropriate. No    
 
27. If you answered ‘Yes’ to question 26, please give details of potential risks and the 
precautions which will be taken to protect the researcher. 
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Research Involving Human Participants  
You should only complete this section if you have indicated above that your research will 
involve human participants. 
 
28. Please indicate the total number of participants you intend to recruit for this study from 
each participant group: 
 
Participant Group Please state total 
number 
QMU students  
QMU staff  
Members of the public from outside QMU Approximately 400 
NHS patients  
NHS employees  
Children (under 18 years of age)  
People in custody  
People with communication or learning difficulties  
People with mental health issues  
People engaged in illegal activities (eg. illegal drug use)  
Other (please specify):  
* Please declare in section 32 where the participant group may necessitate the need for 
standard or enhanced disclosure check 
 
29. Please state any inclusion or exclusion criteria to be used. (See Research Ethics 
Guidelines Section 1, paragraph 2.4) 
 
Participants will have to be British/Italian citizens between the age of 18 and 65 and 
Facebook users. Underage users have been excluded in order to avoid ethical issues, while 
the 65+ year-olds have not been considered as they represent a very small fraction of the 
total Facebook population, and finding participants fitting within this category could prove 
particularly problematic. 
 
30. Please give details of how participants will be recruited: 
 
Announcements will be posted on several Facebook groups. 
 
31. Please describe how informed consent will be obtained from participants. (See Research 
Ethics Guidelines Section 1, paragraphs 2.1.2 – 2.1.5) 
 
A website has been created in order to provide participants with information on Queen 
Margaret University, the research project, the research team, the study’s participants, data 
protection and the rewards. The link to the website has been included in the recruitment ad 
and in the welcome page of the questionnaire.  Informed consent will be obtained through a 
page inserted just after the welcome page. Below you can see the content of the page: 
 
I have read and understood the provided information. 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation. 
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in this study. 
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I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage without giving any 
reason. 
I agree to participate in this study. 
Continue 
 
32. Ethical Principles incorporated into the study (please tick as applicable): 
 
 Tick as 
applicable 
Will participants be offered a written explanation of the research?   X 
Will participants be offered an oral explanation of the research?  
Will participants sign a consent form?  
Will oral consent be obtained from participants?  
Will participants be offered the opportunity to decline to take part? X 
Will participants be informed that participation is voluntary? X 
Will participants be offered the opportunity to withdraw at any stage without giving a 
reason? 
X 
Will independent expert advice be available if required?  
Will participants be informed that there may be no benefit to them in taking part?  
Will participants be guaranteed confidentiality? X 
Will participants be guaranteed anonymity? X 
Will the participant group necessitate a standard or enhanced disclosure check?  
Will the provisions of the Data Protection Act be met? X 
Has safe data storage been secured? X 
Will the researcher(s) be free to publish the findings of the research? X 
If the research involves deception, will an explanation be offered following 
participation? 
 
If the research involves questionnaires, will the participants be informed that they may 
omit items they do not wish to answer? 
 
If the research involves interviews, will the participants be informed that they do not 
have to answer questions, and do not have to give an explanation for this? 
X 
Will participants be offered any payment or reward, beyond reimbursement of out-of-
pocket expenses? 
X 
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Declarations 
 
34. Having completed all the relevant items of this form and, if appropriate, having attached 
the Information Sheet and Consent Form plus any other relevant documentation as indicated 
below, complete the statement below. 
 
 I have read Queen Margaret University’s document on “Research Ethics: 
Regulations, Procedures, and Guidelines”.  
 
 In my view this research is: 
 
See Research Ethics Guidelines Section 6 Please 
tick 
Non-invasive X 
Minor invasive using an established procedure at QMU  
Minor invasive using a NEW procedure at QMU  
Major invasive  
 
 I request Ethical Approval for the research described in this application. 
 
Documents enclosed with application: 
 
Document Enclosed 
(please tick) 
Not 
applicable 
(please tick) 
Copy of consent form(s) X (within the 
questionnaire) 
 
Copy of information sheet(s) X  
Sample questionnaire X  
Example interview questions X  
Copy of proposed recruitment advert(s) X  
Letters of support from any external organisations 
involved in the research 
 X 
Evidence of disclosure check  X 
Subject area risk assessment documentation  X 
Any other documentation (please detail below)  X 
Risk Assessment  X 
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35. If you are a student, show the completed form to your supervisor/Director of Studies 
and ask them to sign the statement below. If you are a member of staff, sign the statement 
below yourself. 
 
 I am the supervisor/Director of Studies for this research.  
 
 In my view this research is: 
 
See Research Ethics Guidelines Section 6 Please 
tick 
Non-invasive X 
Minor invasive using an established procedure at QMU  
Minor invasive using a NEW procedure at QMU  
Major invasive  
 
  I have read this application and I approve it. 
 
 
 
------- 
36. For all applicants, send the completed form to your Head of Subject or Head of 
Research Centre or, if you are an external researcher, submit the completed form to the 
Secretary to the QMU Research Ethics Panel.  You should not proceed with any aspect of 
your research which involves the use of participants, or the use of data which is not in 
the public domain, until you have been granted Ethical Approval.   
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Appendix J – Visual Representation of Quantitative Results 
 
Figure J1 – Facebook Political Participation: Box Plots 
  
 
Figure J2 – Facebook Political Participation: Histograms 
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Figure J3 – Facebook Non-Political Activity: Histograms 
 
 
 
 
Figure J4 – Facebook Political Communication and Mobilisation: Box Plots 
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Figure J5 – Facebook Political Mobilisation: Histograms 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure J6 – Facebook Political Communication: Histograms 
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Figure J7 – Consumption of Political News: Bar Charts 
 
 
 
 
Figure J8 – Political Discussion: Bar Charts 
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Figure J9 – Media Usage Time: Bar Charts 
 
 
 
 
Figure J10 – Political Engagement: Box Plots 
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Figure J11 – Political Engagement: Histograms 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure J12 – Facebook Political Participation and Political Engagement: Scatter Plots 
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Figure J13 – Facebook and Internet Political Participation: Scatter Plots 
 
 
 
 
Figure J14 – Facebook and Offline Political Participation: Scatter Plots 
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Figure J15 – Facebook Political Participation and Facebook Non-Political Activity: Scatter 
Plots 
 
 
 
 
Figure J16 – Facebook Political Communication and Mobilisation: Scatter Plots 
 
